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'ABSTRACT 
Weber's contribution to the study of social. action has been 
a major influence upon the development of modern sociology but aspects 
of his approach have been obscured by the process of translation, 
commentary and evaluation - and in this respect the work of Parsons 
and to a lesser extent Schutz has been significant. Hence this 
study aims (a) to clarify the nature of Webens Theory of Action and 
(b) to determine its contemporary value in comparison with the 
extension. of- his ideas by Parsons and Schutz. 
We examine the interpretation, advanced particularly by 
Parsons, that Weber's approach to., the study of action changed as he 
became increasingly concerned with the nature of sociological inquiry, 
and, thereby, moved beyond the problems of historical method. On 
the basis of a detailed examination of. Weber's theoretical and 
methodological arguments we reject the idea of a break in his 
thinking about historical and sociological research and this has 
important implications for some accepted views-on Weber's conception 
of objectivity,, ideal type concepts and understanding, 
Iarsons set out to extend Weber from the perspective of a 
natural science of society, but his claim to identify a convergence 
between Durkheim, Iareto and Weber into the Voluntaristic Theory of 
Action is rejected and the criticisms, which his development of some 
aspects of Weberts approach have experienced, are sufficient to cast 
11 
doubts upon the-validity of his. Generäl Theory. Schutz formulated 
a phenomenological critique of Weber''s categories of interpretive 
sociology and sought to establish a philosophically more secure basis 
for the study of action but, we'suggest, his assumptions about the 
everyday world, allied to his evaluation of Weber's approach, led him 
to propose an impracticable methodology. 
Finally, we'argue that the contemporary relevance of Weber's 
Theory of Action can be seen from the way many of the problems 
involved'in the study of action, some of which were identified by 
the development of the phenomenological perspective, ' can be solved 
by recourse to his approach. 
1 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
Weber is, arguably, sociology's greatest exponent: yet 
in the period since his death in 1920 up to the present day, there 
have been serious and persistent misunderstandings of elements of his 
conception of sociology. His ideas on the character of the 
discipline have, at best, been only partially incorporated into 
conventional sociological wisdom, with the result that the discipline 
was not as well prepared as it might have been to face the "crisis", 
the doubts and uncertainties of direction and purpose which become 
so prominent in the 1960's and 1970's. 
In the last decade there has been an unprecedented revival 
of interest in Weber's work and especially in his conception of 
sociology which has led to the clarification of previously obscure, 
or misunderstood features of his approach, This study'attempts to 
build upon these inquiries and, in the attempt to clarify the 
distinctiveness of'Weberts work, takes its direction from the fact 
that two logically distinct though historically inter-connected 
issues are involved: first the nature of Webers Theory of. Action 
a concept used here to denote the theoretical and methodological 
elements of his sociologyl - and second, the changing character of 
sociology which has provided the themes, problems and standards 
used in the interpretation of Weber's work, frequently with the 
effect of militating against its more accurate understanding. 
But before the aim of the study and its methods of 
procedure can be stated more fully, a brief review is necessary of 
Weberts Theory of Action and its reception within sociology, With 
the benefit. of hindsight it i. s clear that at Weber's death the 
single most important omission in his work was a comprehensive, ' 
-. - systematic and detailed statement of his views on the nature of 
f 
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sociology. Inevitably, therefore, commentators have had to 
reconstruct Weber's position on this issue by synthesizing a variety 
of materials, in particular, the brief methodological outline 
which introduces' Economy and Society2, the very specific and 
frequently polemic methodological essays3 written in the years 
immediately following the recovery of his intellectual powers, the 
comparative studies of the influence of religious ethics upon 
economic life4 and the formulation of some of the main types of 
economic, political and social institutions. 
5 
However the breadth 
and diversity of the issues addressed, in the context of a progression 
in Wdeber's terminology' and problems of analysis, from the 
epistemological and methodological assumptions'-Of the'historico- 
cultural sciences, to those of economics and finally to sociology 
left an impression, which quickly gained support, that there was 
6 
a lack of unity in these analyses: to be precise, an early stage 
concerned with the problems of historical inquiry, and a later 
stage dealing with the character of sociology as a generalizing 
science of social action. 
However, this perspective ceases to be convincing when 
all the available evidence is'taken into account.? The view 
advanced here is that a remarkable degree of unity and coherence 
can=be identified in Webers work on the basis of an examination of 
his theoretical. and methodological statements which can be clarified, 
where necessary, by reference to his research practice. But'this 
is to anticipate our argument, . The fact remains that historically 
the view of stages in Webens thinking has gained a great deal of 
support with the result that three areas. of Weberts Theory of Action 
have remained unclear: ' namely, (1) the'nature and role of theoretical 
3. 
concepts together with the relationship between sociological and 
historical research, (2) the implications of his theory of value, 
in particular, the principle of value-relevance for the objectivity 
of sociological work, and (3) the character of "understanding" 
as the method of analysis most appropriate to the study of social 
action. 
The process of-interpreting and evaluating tdeberts ideas 
within sociology has been both long and complex. Apart from the 
above mentioned disparate nature of Weber's own analyses, another' 
important problem was the very distinctiveness of the ideas in 
relation to the main strands of social thought in Germany in the 
1920's8, which meant that they lacked a hospitable medium in which 
to grow. For example, his emphasis upon the interpretation of 
subjective meaning and the role of values in the establishment of 
the information relevant to a scientific problem, was not 
consistent with the positivist movement in social science. The 
stress upon general theoretical categories, the role of economic 
circumstances, and the methods to be used in understanding social 
life, found little favour with the idealists, and the importance 
he attributed to both the separation of facts and values, and the 
effectiveness of ethical beliefs upon human conduct, were not 
acceptable to the Marxist traditions. 
in addition the-rapid changes in the economic, political 
and social life of Germany in the 192Qts were not favourable to 
the-social sciences. and with the rise of the Nazi movement the 
existence öf-any kind of sociology, let-alone one which procl4irned 
a separation of fact and value0 was-increasingly curtailed. In 
its wake followed the emigration of. many scholars to other-parts- 
1 4. 
of the western world, the war, and the assumption, by those living 
and working in North America, of the leadership of the social 
sciences. In this way the translation of Webers work into 
English became the key to its incorporation into a post-war subject 
which derived most of its character from traditions fundamentally 
different to the ones constituting Weber's own intellectual milieu. 
Whilst the translation*of even Weber's most important 
works proceeded in a sporadic and piecemeal fashion, 
9 
Parsons' 
The Structure of Social Action10 became the keystone to the 
assimilation and critique of Weber's Theory of Action. ' The book 
constituted the basis of Yarsonst reputation, not only as an 
influential commentator on Weber's sociology in general but in 
particular as the most authoritative assessor öf its methodological 
and theoretical foundations. His. analysis of Weber's work formed 
part of the Argument that convergence could be detected between the 
various. strands of European social thought at the beginning of 
this century. But this kind of examination is quite different from 
a study of a person's ideas, which has, as its primary objective, 
the discovery of their coherence, the relevance of particular 
background influences, and the importance of their innovatory 
content in relation to alternative ideas available at the time. 
Whilst it is inevitable that there would be some overlap between 
such an inquiry and Parsons own treatment of Weber, the significant 
difference between the two projects has not been sufficiently 
recognized, . -''et 
when it is remembered that the methodological 
framework för Parsons'+ convergence thesis the broadly positivistic 
-standards of scientific knowledge and procedure --were decided upon 
largely before the'. analysis of-the earlier' writers l' ideas p 
it becomes 
r 
5. 
apparent that "convergence" is implicitly a history of sociological 
thought involving an a priori standard against which the useful 
and not so useful features of the work of earlier writers are 
measure . 
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Consequently, Parsonst definition of sociology, ' formulated 
in terms of his attempted clarification of the discipline's 
epistemological and methodological assumptions, strategies, and 
techniques of inquiry, together with the concepts of his theoretical 
system, appeared to be a direct development of Weberian sociology, 
amongst others. But in reality, as a result of an intricate process 
of coummentary,, emphasis and critique, Parsons has hindered the full 
realization of Weber's. contribution to sociology by popularizing 
a selective and in some instances inaccurate appreciation of his 
Theory of Action. 
Of equal importance to Parsons! role as a commentator 
on Weber, was his contribution to shaping the character of the 
discipline, and thereby, to setting the standards against which 
Weber's Theory of Action, and in particular its contemporary 
relevance, was to be judged. 
In the last 30 to 40 years, Parsons exerted great 
influence amongst those for whom the sociological enterprise was 
rather more than socLography or the manipulation of statistical 
data in accordance with an operatLonalist philosophy of science, 
Even a9tex the recent development of several alternative conceptions 
of the subjectý;! the', general appreciation og the nature of sociology 
still owes 4 great deal to Iarsons' work, Of course" the impact of 
his ideas hassnot been uniform and it. is important to distinguish 
between, on the one hand, the more general theoretical and 
/ 
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methodological level where his influence has been pervasive and, 
on the other, his more specific analytical schemes which have been 
the subject of much controversy and critical attention. Nevertheless, 
whatever the long term judgement proves to be on the value of 
Parsons' sociology as a whole, there can be little doubt that it 
contains within it the most sophisticated and comprehensive attempt 
to define the nature and scope of the discipline which has been 
undertaken for several decades. 
The foundation of Parsons reputation lay in his 
programme for developing a General Theory of Action which stressed 
the fundamental continuity of the methods and procedures of science, 
whether natural or social. In its application'-to the study of 
social life this programme led to the development of an abstract and 
systematic form of theory which took as its main focus of interest 
the problem of order in the explanation of structures and 
developments. However, Parsons'-very success in establishing 
this framework within which other sociologists could pursue their more 
specific and discrete inquiries, is at least partly responsible for 
the contradictory and ambiguous state of the assessments made of 
his work. Although Parsons did not advocate a separation of theory 
from research, his emphasis not just upon the importance of theory 
but upon the decisive role of a particularly abstract kind of theory 
undoubtedly furthered the growing separation of these two aspects 
of sociology. This led to the creation and legitimation of 
"theoretical" socologyl2 in effect an autonomous realm of inquiry 
which was able to develop without the restrictions and'limitations- 
of empirical reference. Consequently the controversies which 
surrounded Parsonian Sociology in. the'1950's and 1960's over consensus' 
i 
r/ 
and conflict, system and action, were never'resolved in any decisive 
manner: after all, there was no pragmatic necessity for a solution 
because empirical research could continue relatively unaffected by 
the status of these disputes. Inevitably, with the passage of time 
interest in these questions waned, to be replaced by new theoretical 
issues particularly of a phenomenological nature and also, though to 
a lesser extent, of a neo-Marxist kind. 
Nevertheless, these criticisms served to indicate three 
problematic areas of Parsonian sociology: first, the abstractness 
of the theory presented problems not only for the idea of testing, 
but also for finding empirical referents for the theoretical ideas; 
second, Parsons claimed that his sociology was value free and that 
it represented objective knowledge of social reality, free from 
any ideological distortion - but many found this to be inconsistent 
with the emphasis on order, consensus, and the symbols of legitimation; 
third, the status of the subjective point of view - although 
originally a central element in Parsons' work, with the passage of 
time the suspicion grew that there had been subtle changes in the 
concept because Parsons' methods of analysis were increasingly 
addressed to the structural properties of social systems and 
systems of action and, therefore, appeared to allow little scope 
for reference to the actions of individuals and groups, 
As. A result, given Parsonst" central position in the 
sociological tradition and the broad acceptance of his claim to have 
incorporAted and extended Webers approach, certain principles- 
which had frequently, gained wide support in sociology 
13 
were 
seriously undermined: to be*precise, the unity of theory and 
research, the close relationship between'historical and sociölogical 
I 
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explanation, the potential objectivity of sociological findings, 
and the importance of subjective reference'in sociological 
explanation, 
As dissatisfaction with Parsons' sociology grew, Alfred 
Schutz's interpretation of Weber became increasingly important and, 
in fact, played a significant role in the realignment of sociological 
thought. 
14 
Schutz's view of Weber has not been as effective as 
Parsons' in shaping general opinion because its popularity is much 
more recent, and its scope - again in comparison with that of 
Parsons' is very narrow. -, Starting with the general framework of 
Weber's approach, Schutz develops a phenomenological analysis of 
the nature of meaning in social life which provides the basis for 
a critique of the inadequacies of Weber's basic categories of 
interpretive sociology. Schutz extended these themes in the essays 
emigrating to the U. S. A. into a critique of the he wrote after- 
assumptions and strategies utilized by the naturalistically 
oriented sociology of the late 1940's and early 1950's. The impact 
of Schutz's analysis was to put the interpretation of the meaning 
of action into the centre of sociological inquiry. At the same 
time his examination of the problems involved in an observer 
attaining a valid grasp of the subjective meaning of someone 
elseis actionsl whilst not denying the possibility of objective 
knowledge of subjective meaning structures, was interpreted by 
many, as the basis of a nore. radi, ca1 rejection of the claim that 
sociology could Achieve scientific knowledge of a kind and 
reliability achieved in the natural sciences, 
15 
At the end of 
the day Weheis approach-was seen to-represent merely a starting 
point for sociological inquiry. 
I 
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The confrontation between a more traditional sociology, 
based largely on Parsons' methodological position and following a 
structural-functional method of analysis, despite differences over 
the relative emphasis given to the elements of consensus and 
conflict, and a phenomenological inspired set of alternatives, 
helped to produce a "crisis" in sociology; a time of unprecedented 
debate about the nature and purpose of the discipline. 
16 
On the 
one hand, interest in the grounding of sociological statements more 
closely in the everyday lives of those whose actions constitute 
society led to a critique of the more established strategies which 
were seen to impose the sociologists' own relatively arbitrary 
interpretations upon this reality. And, on the other, the 
continuing desire to formulate objectively valid propositions 
of sociological theory went hand in hand with opposition to the 
relativism, and in some cases solipsism, of more recent" 
developments within the discipline. The "crisis", of course, 'was 
the result of many factors, academic, social and political, and to 
complicate matters'even more was perceived to represent quite distinct 
challenges to traditional opinion within sociology. For example, 
Gouldner17 identified the challenge essentially in terms of values 
and ideologies, as a critique informed by reflexive and Marxist 
themes, and whilst they were undoubtedly important, they will not 
be explored here any further, Afterall our interest in the ! `crisis" 
does not concern its origin and developmentt'per 'se, -rather the 
rTT' T 
"cris, is" serves to emphasise and clarify the limitations of the 
forms- og sociology developed by Parsons and Schutz as extensions, in 
varying degrees', of Weber''s Theory of Action, - Iri particular, . to 
introduce a Marxist critique, 
1$ 
lased"as it is upon rather' different 
/ 
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conceptions of objectivity and sociological knowledge, would take 
the study far beyond its original objectives. 
Starting with some common elements of Weber's work, Parsons 
and Schutz developed their sociologies in almost opposite directions, 
and this is what makes their comparison particularly interesting: 
Parsons attempted to develop a form of`sociology, based upon a 
natural scientific approach to knowledge of social phenomena, in 
which the structure of action occupied the central role; whereas 
Schutz, who strongly emphasised subjective meaning, rejected the 
natural scientific method of procedure, but continued to claim 
scientific status for the results of the study of everyday life. 
The criticisms to which these sociologies have been subjected have 
demonstrated the inherent limitations of their theoretical and 
methodological views and their contradictory positions were clearly 
unresolvable in the context of the available alternatives. In 
contrast we argue that if Weber's Theory of Action had been more 
accurately understood, a wider variety of options would have been 
available within sociology for solving the "crisis", which might 
therefore have been rather less painful -, and it is on these grounds 
that our claim to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Weberts 
theoretical and methodological ideas, is to be judged. 
Thus the aim of the study-is to clarify Weber's Theory 
of Action, by distinguishing it from the misleading interpretation 
of both parsons and Schutz. Our procedure is not to examine the 
material in chronological form, namely, to begin with Weber and 
then to consider the commentaries of Parsons and Schutze'because 
this, is., afterall, the sequence which led to the problematic 
interpretations., Instead the structure of the argument is dictated 
r 
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by the need to look at the respective extensions of elements of 
Weber's ideas and the limitations of these formulations which 
emerged with the passage of time, so that an assessment can be made 
of the usefulness of Weber's solution to the problems of 
sociological knowledge vis a vis the historically much more 
influential views of Parsons and Schutz. 
Utilizing this approach, our argument proceeds in the 
following manner. Chapter 1 is concerned with Parsons' 
interpretation and evaluation of Webens sociological work and 
attempts to demonstrate the importance, for this commentary, of the 
convergence thesis. This led Parsons to emphasize certain features 
of Weber's work which were favourable to the development of a 
general theory but, at the same time, to obscure the concept of 
value-relevance, the role of ideal types and the nature of 
understanding. In Chapter 2 the extension of certain elements of 
the Weberian approach and their incorporation into Parsons' own 
theoretical synthesis are examined, and the point is emphasized 
that the original convergence which Parsons identifies is far from 
explicit in the work of Pareto, Durkheim and Weber and is not related 
to any significant agreement in their theoretical and methodological" 
views. Chapter 3 follows the subsequent stages in the development 
of Parsonian Sociology and taking into account the main criticisms 
raised against this body of work it-identifies three major limitations 
in Parsons' attempt to create a General Theory of Action namely: 
the problem of the testability of. Parsonst work, its objectivity, 
and the role. of the subjective point of view within the structurally 
oriented concepts and analytic schemes. In contrast to Parsons' 
attempt to incorporate Weber Rs ideas within a natural science of 
/ 
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society perspective, Chapter 4 examines. Schutz's critique of Weber 
from a phenomenological point of view. Schutz drew*on some of 
Weber's ideas in the context of emphasizing the unique difficulties 
of a science of subjectively meaningful actions, in particular, 
the problems of reconciling common sense and scientific interpretations 
of action. However, Schutz's extension of Weber led to certain 
persistent criticisms and these are identified. In Chapter 5 the 
attempt is made to accurately formulate Weber's Theory of Action on 
the basis of a wide ranging analysis of his formal statements. This 
involves the demonstration of the unity of his "early" and "late" 
work, the emphasis upon the close relationship in Weber's thinking 
of historical and sociological research and, more generally, the 
identification of the limitations of the interpretations of Weber 
by Parsons and Schutz. The conclusion of the study deals with the 
contemporary relevance of Weber's theoretical and methodological 
ideas in relation to some of the problems encountered by sociology 
during the "crisis". 
. 
Finally, a comment on the title - Weber's Theory of Action. 
The wording is quite deliberate because it emphasizes two important 
features of the study. First, polemically it shows that although 
the term "Theory of Action" is synonymous with Parsons' Convergence 
Thesis and the varying analytic schemes which he developed, it need 
not necessarily be used in this all inclusive and synthetic form, 
In particular, this study examines a Weberian version of the "Theory 
of Actionq which is quite different to the one developed by Parsons 
and has not been incorporated within it, Second; informatively"it 
makes clear that we are not concerned pri%arily with Weber's 
sociology as awhble, rather we have a very specific interest in 
13. 
the formal side of his work, in other words, his conception of the 
sociological enterprise. Weber's substantive inquiries are 
relevant only to the extent that they illustrate or clarify., 
methodological or theoretical issues; and it is only in this sense 
that we are concerned with the contemporary significance of Weberts 
sociological ideas. 
r 
r 
1l-. 
NOTES. 
1. Whilst this. study is concerned largely with-theoretical 
and. methodological ideas this does not involve an assumption 
that such formal issues can be developed independently 
of empirical research, ** Rather, the study emphasizes these 
ideas purely from the point of view of improving the clarity 
and coherence of the argument. 
2. Max Weber, 'Economy'and Society, (Berkeley and London: 
University of California Press, 1978), 1-26. 
3. Max Weber, Rascher and Knies: 'The'Logical Problems*of 
Historical. Economics,. (New York: Free Press, 1975); 
'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" and 
"Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences" 
in Methodology of the Social Sciences, (New York: Free 
Press, 1968); 'R. Stammers' Surmounting' of the 
Materialist Conception of History", I, 'British Journal 
of Law and Society, 2, '(1975), 129-152 and II, British 
Journal of Law'and'Society, 3, (1976), 17-43.. 
4. Max Weber, "The Social-Psychology of the World Religions" 
and "Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions", 
in H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (Eds. ). From Max Weber: Essays 
in S6ciology;, "(London: Routledge, 1964); The Religion of 
China: Confucianism and Taoism (New York: Free Press, 1957); 
The Religion of India: The'Sociology of"Hinduism and 
Buddhism, (New York: Free Press, 1958); Ancient Judaism, 
(New York: Free Press, 1952). 
5. Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit. 
6. This is the view adopted by both Parsons and Schutz, see 
Chapters 1 and 4 respectively. 
7. The evidence is presented in Chapter 5. 
8. See J. Freund, "German Sociology in the Time of Max Weber" 
in T. B. Bottomore and R. Nisbet (Eds. ) A History of 
Sociological Analysis. (London: Heinemann, 1978). ' CJ-3, 
E. W. Muhlmann, Sociology in Germany" in H. Becker and 
A. Boskoff (Eds. )iModern Sociological' Theory, (New York: 
Holt, Rinehardt & Winston, 1957). 
9. The first complete English translation was not until 1968.. 
10, Talcott Parsons, The Structure of'Social Action, (New 
York: Free Press, 1937). 
11. This argument is developed in Chapter 2. 
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12. See, for example, Talcott, parsons, The Social System, 
(hew xork: ' Free* Press,, 1951). 
13. The'obvious exception is that traditionally. Marxist 
Sociology held rather different views on objectivity. 
14. Alfred Schutz, 'The Phenbmenology'of'the*Social World, 
(Evanston: North western University Press, 1967). 
15. D. Silverman, Reading Castanieda (London; Routledge, 1975). 
16. See, for example,. P. Filmer, 'et, al.; New' Directions' in 
Sociological ' Theory, (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1972) 
and J. D.. Douglas (ed. ), 'Understanding'Everyday Life: 
Toward the Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge, ' 
(London: Routledge, 1971). 
_ 
17. A. W. Couldner, 'The Coming*Crisis of'Western Sociology; 
(London: Heinemann, 1971). 
18. E. g., J. Habermas, I'Knowledge'and Human: Interests, (London: 
Heinemann, 1971); Theory.. and Practice, . 
(London: Heinemann, 
1974); and Legitimation Crisis, (London: Heinemann, 1976). 
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CHAPTPP - (1NR 
PARSONS' VERSION '0F 'WEBER 
Parsons' first published discussion of Weber appeared 
in 1929 in an introduction, for English speaking readers, to the 
way in which the phenomenon of modern capitalism had been analyzed 
by Sombart and Weber. 
1 
His most detailed and comprehensive 
analysis of Weber's work - and for this reason his most authoritative 
commentary - was published in 1937 and constituted the substance 
of four chapters in'The Strücture-of'S6cial*Action. 
2 
Since that 
time there have been two significant additions to his interpretation 
of Weber, which were published as introductions to translations 
of certain aspects of Weber's work: the first appeared in 1947 
as the editor's "Introduction" to his selection from Weber's 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft dealing with social relationships and 
institutions of an economically and politically relevant nature; 
3 
the second introduction was published in 1962 in Fischoff's 
translation of another part of the same study, only this time 
dealing with the sociolögy of religion. More recently, Parsons 
4 
wrote two quite similar general reviews, to coincide with the 
centenary of Weber's birth, about his contribution to the development 
of sociology: "Max Weber 1864 - 1964", 
5 
and "Evaluation and 
Objectivity in Social Science: An Interpretation of Max Weber's 
Contribution". In addition to these sources there are some other 
6 
articles and book reviews in which Parsons comments upon various 
? 
aspects of Weberian sociology. 
Given the considerable amount of attention Parsons has 
devoted to Weber's work during this time, it is necessary to begin 
17. 
our examination of Parsonst version of Weber by asking: Did 
Parsons interpretation of Weber undergo any major changes or 
developments? However, the analysis of the Parsonian commentaries, 
reveals no major changes in the interpretation of the nature or' 
significance of Weberian Sociology once he had reached what might 
be called his nature and comprehensive assessment. This viewpoint 
emerged in the process of developing the convergence thesis and 
subsequently formed the content of his treatment of Weber in The 
Structure' of'Social*Action. Since then, there has been remarkable 
consistency both in terms of detailed analysis of particular 
concepts, and the persistance of certain themes. Of course, there 
are some changes of emphasis which are inevitable given the 
considerable development of Parsons' General Theory of Action 
throughout this time, for it must be remembered that Parsons' 
discussion of Weber was always in terms of his own theoretical 
and' methodological problems. 
8 
Hence the-changing nature of 
Parsons' problem context led to variations in his comments on 
Weber; for example, in 1937 Parsons placed little significance 
upon Weber's opposition to the use by sociology of a functionalist 
method, and a great deal upon the consistency between Weber's 
treatment of rational action and his own concept of unit act, 
whereas, 10 years later when Parsons had abandoned the attempt to 
create analytic theory after the fashion of classical mechanics 
and decided that structural-functionalism offered the only way 
forward, he devoted considerable attention to an examination of 
the reasons for Weber's opposition to functionalism. Moreover, 
as Parsons interest had moved from the unit'act to system of 
i 
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action during this period, it was equally inevitable that Weber's 
discussion of rational action, which had been so important to the 
concept of unit act, had receeded in significance. 
9 
Throughout this period, there are certain aspects of Weber's 
work which have remained of enduring significance to Parsons, in 
particular those principles and concepts which are relevant to his 
thesis that a convergence could be detected in the approaches to 
social scientific study advanced by Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and 
Weber. For this reason Parsons' support for the following features 
of Weber's approach has not varied: the strict separation of 
value-judgements from the realm of science, the need for general 
theoretical categories in sociology, the abstractness of such 
concepts which is represented by Webers principle of value- 
relevance, the concentration upon the subjective aspect of action, 
and the use of the comparative method which allows for the causal 
explanation of social phenomena. In view of this basic continuity, 
therefore, it is possible with no loss of accuracy and a considerable 
gain in conciseness, to present a synthesis of Parsons' different 
discussions of Weber as a means to the formulation of the main 
features of his version of Weber's work. 
10 
Given the particular interests of this study in Weber's 
Theory of Action-and an inevitable concentration upon theoretical 
and methodological issues, Parsons' treatment of Weber's more 
substantive studies, such as the Protestant Ethic Thesis, the 
typologies of religious phenomena or political and economic 
organizations, will not be examined for their own sake, but only in 
so far as they illustrate or substantiate more formal issues. 
Also, in constructing this composite picture it is useful to 
t 
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distinguish between, on the one hand, those features of Weberian 
Sociology which played'an important role in the convergence thesis 
and, on the other hand, a residual collection of issues on which 
Parsons took a critical stance because they either led in a 
different direction'to his own theoretical approach, or were 
explicitly contradictory. And, finally, before beginning to examine 
those features'of Weber's work which Parsons regarded in a very 
positive manner, it is necessary to comment upon the-unusual 
context in which Weberts Sociology was examined in'The*Structure 
of Social Action. 
One of the most important features of Parsons treatment 
of the work of the earlier writers he examines in'The Structure of 
Social Action is the way in which he analyzes their ideas in the context 
of the intellectual tradition which had formed the starting point 
for their perspectives. There were two reasons for this strategy. 
The first concerned the general issue of accuracy of'interpretation. 
Parsons argued that misunderstanding of another writer's work was 
most easily avoided if it was examined in terms of the traditions, 
and problems of its particular intellectual milieu. 
11 
The second 
involves the convergence thesis. One of the grounds of proof for 
this thesis is that Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber all 
pursued their studies to the point there they. recognized the 
limitations of their particular traditions, and ultimately went 
beyond these limits, thereby helping to establish - though not 
necessarily in an explicit fashion -a new and superior form of 
social theory based upon a common body of concepts. Parsons 
does not claim that Weber was ever an idealist in the sense which 
would fully satisfy this epistemological stance, 
12 
rather he finds 
20. 
it convenient to examine the development of Weber's sociological 
ideas, particularly their methodological basis, in the context 
of opposition to idealist principles. This helps to clarify 
Weber's approach given that his ideas on the theoretical and 
methodological framework of sociology were often stated in 
critiques of the views'of idealist writers, 
13 
and with the brief 
exception of the first section of Chapter 1 in Economy and Society, 
Weber did not systematically set out his own'approach. 
14 
However, 
for Parsons, Webers studies clarifying the weaknesses of'idealism 
constituted a new level of social theory, and represented an 
indispensible component of the convergence thesis. 
_. _ .i_ 
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I' 'WEBER 'AND 'THE CONVERGENCE ' OF : SOCIAL ACTION 
(a) Critique ' of ' Ideälism ' änd ' the ' Emergence ' öf 'Weberian 
Sociology 
For Parsons the basic character of the idealist tradition 
was derived from Kant's distinction between two kinds of object: 
on the one hand, physical and material entities; and on the other, 
man as a spiritual being. With time this led to the separation 
of the natural and the socio-'cultural sciences, having distinct 
subject matters and methods of study. In particular human action 
was conceptualized as "free" and not as. subject to regularities 
in the manner of the phenomena. of nature, Hence actions could 
not be studied by the "analytic and generalizing methods" of the 
natural sciences. 
15 
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Within this perspective two, main variations 
in the study of social life were developed; on the one hand, a 
philosophy of history, particularly associated with Hegel, in 
which actions and events were examined in terms of their 
"significance for the totality of human development", 
16 
and on the 
other hand, very detailed descriptive histories. 
17 
Nevertheless, 
they remained united in common opposition to positivistic methods 
associated with the general theoretical schemes of natural science, 
for the study of human actions and events. The social theorizing 
which did develop in this unfavourable intellectual milieu 
centred on the arrangement of concrete details in terms of a concept 
of the historically unique cultural totality, or Geist. 
18 The 
study of law and of economic life proceded on the basis of building 
up an appreciation of how these self-contained cultural systems, 
such as capitalism or feudalism, worked. As each system was seen 
to be the result of specific circumstances, little attention was 
r 
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devoted to more general principles in terms of which the particular 
cultural entities could. be ordered, or to the way in which change 
occurred from one epoch to the. next, Methodologically, the aim 
was to understand the meaning of a cultural entity, and not, as in 
the positivistic approach, to discover causal relationships within, 
the phenomenon, 
19 
Given Parsonst commitment to a particular view of the 
nature of social science the. most serious theoretical and 
methodological limitation of this tradition was that knowledge was 
seen to be radically divided'between the natural sciences and 
the sciences dealing with human action and culture 
"Though both were conceived as consisting of 
systematic empirical knowledge subject to canons 
of accuracy of observation and logical precision 
and consistency, the tendency in Germany has been 
to_ emphasise the depth, of, the contrast, to hold that 
the' methodological canons most characteristic of 
the natural sciences were in the nature of the case 
not applicable to the sociocultural and vice versa. 
This is particularly true. of the role of general 
conceptual schemes, of. theory, and this is the 
point at which Weber chose to make his principal 
attack. " 20 
Parsons examines the basic features of Weberts sociological approach 
in the context of their development in opposition to two distinct 
tendencies of idealism, namely, objectivism and Intuitionism. The 
former viewpoint is based upon the assumption that the character 
of the subject matter of the social sciences makes the generalizing 
methods of natural science inappropriate and as a result of this, 
the study of action must adopt different procedures, in particular, 
detailed factual studies. The latter, the Intuitionist perspective, 
whilst fully accepting the special nature of the subject matter of 
social science, is much more concerned with the unique way in which 
knowledge of actions and events can be gained, 
21 
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The basis of Objectivism was the view that natural science 
is able to use general concepts because natural phenomena are 
determined; they conform to certain regularities which can be 
stated precisely by means of generalizing concepts, However, human 
actions are spontaneous and unpredictable because people can choose 
what to do and they can act rationally or irrationally. Social 
and cultural phenomena do not conform to regularities and so there 
is little point in attempting to subsume concrete facts within 
general concepts: hence, the differences in the nature of the 
subject matters dealt with in natural and social science constitutes 
the basis for their distinct methodological procedures. 
22 
According to Parsons, Weber simply rejected the Objectivist 
strategy of developing exclusively detailed and particular studies,, 
on the grounds of its inconsistency, Instead Weber argued that 
". 
_.. every 
demonstrable judgement of historical 
explanation rested implicitly if not explicitly 
on ... general theoretical concepts. " 23 
His analysis of the Objectivists' opposition to the use 
of general concepts in the study of human action is complex and 
involves four distinct issues. First of all, -Against-the-. view" 
that. abstract general concepts cannot include all the factual 
detail of concrete reality, Weber argues that it has never been 
the aim of science to gain all potential knowledge which is 
available about a phenomenon. Rather, the object has been to 
achieve knowledge adequate for a given purpose. It is inevitable 
that a scientific concept is abstract in relation to "raw" 
24 
experience and this is the same in both natural and social science. 
In fact Weber argues that 
i 
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ýý... the basis of difference between the two groups 
of sciences .., must be in the principles according 
to which; 'among Texperiencable'"' elements of reality, 
vfacts* are to be selected ' which' are significant 
for a given' scientific purpose. ' This lies ... in its logically relevant aspects; not in the objective 
nature of the 'reality' a science deals with, but in 
the 'subjective'' direction of interest of the scientist. " 25 
Secondly, in response to the view that whilst natural 
phenomena are determined social phenomena are "free", Weber considers 
that the ability of natural science to predict the distribution 
of fragments froni a broken boulder is low and concludes that there 
is really little difference between the two groups of sciences, 
although 
"Predi, ctability. in the natural'sciences seems to be 
high because bur interest-is predominantly in the 
aspect of natural events formulable in terms of known 
abstract laws: Our interest in human affairs is 
generally on a different level, " 26 
The third issue also concerns the Objectivists' antithesis 
between "free" action and "determined" nature: natural phenomena 
conform to regularities and their character and behaviour is 
accessible to the scientist, but in the social realm the possibility 
that people may act irrationally means that their actions always 
remain inaccessible to scientific comprehension. However, Weber' 
transforms this viewpoint by arguing that whilst the natural 
scientist can only observe the external uniformities of the 
phenomena under investigation, the social-scientist-can not only 
do this, but in addition, can understand the motives for. peoples 
actions. According to this point of view then, the social sciences 
offer the possibility of gaining a new and more direct knowledge 
of reality, and for Weber 
"This fact constitutes'an objective difference between 
the subject matters of the two' groups of sciences, and 
one of central importance. " * 27 
r 
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Nevertheless., 
't.. Weber insists that for the questions at issue 
this difference'does' not. constitute "the basis of a 
logical distinction of the two'sets of sciences. 
In the field of 'Verstehen as well as of 'Begreifen, , 
general concepts have a real place, and valid 
empirical proof is dependent on their use, implicitly 
or explicitly. "' 28 
The fourth and final element concerns the Objectivists' 
association of the freedom of action with irrationality. Weber 
rejects this viewpoint as a total misconception. In fact, he 
argues, we are most free from the various kinds-of determinism when 
we act deliberately and rationally; Parsons adds 
"'. . the curious thing 
is that, given the end, 
rational action is to an eminent degree both 
predictable and subject to analysis in terms of 
general concepts. " 29 
Moreover, Weber's discussion of rational action is particularly 
significant for Parsons, since. in his view, * 
"... the general concepts involved in the analysis 
of rational action ... formulate general relations 
of means and ends. And these concepts. are of a 
logical nature strictly comparable to the general 
laws of the physical sciences. " 30 
In contrast, the Intuitionist viewpoint developed around 
the principle that scientific-knowledge could be established. without 
the use of general concepts. Instead such knowledge could be 
attained through 
".,. immediate tintuitiont "- a direct grasp of 
meaning without the intervention of concepts in 
any form. " 31 
Weber's critical assessment of this perspective focussed on two 
main issues: first of all, he rejected the possibility of an 
intuitive kind of knowledge because the conception was based upon 
a major ambiguity. According to Parsons, the Intuitionists failed 
i 
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to distinguish the psychological processes involved in the 
formulation of valid knowledge from the "'lögi cal grounds of its 
validity", and there remained no way in which the validity of a 
social scientific proposition could be demonstrated without the 
use of general concepts. 
32 
In addition, although the understanding 
of the meaningful content of social action implies a special kind 
of certainty which is absent from the way in which the natural 
scientist gains knowledge of nature, Weber emphasizes that 
"The Ln ediate certainty of perception of meaning 
is at most only*one element in the proof of the 
validity of knowledge and cannot by itself be 
trusted. It must-be checked by reference to a 
rationally consistent system of concepts. " 33 
For Parsons, although the understanding of the subjective point of 
view of the actor remained central to Weber's approach, he was 
sharply critical of the methods advocated by the Intuitionists for 
34 
gaining knowledge of such phenomena. 
Another component of the Intuitionist position concerned 
the attempt to grasp a cultural totality in terms of its unique 
individuality. Weber rejected this position because, Parsons 
aruges, it confused knowledge with the data of experience. The 
cultural totality which is formulated by the investigator cannot 
reflect the actual complexity of reality, for it is inevitably a 
simplification based upon selection, 
"And this selection and systematization involves 
relating experience to concepts, including general 
concepts which serve as the basis of judging what 
elements of the raw experience are significant to the 
whole. This is as true of the social as of the natural 
sciences. " 35 
The criterion which makes it possible to select coherently and 
systematically and, thereby, facilitates the construction of precise 
concepts is called'by Weber "relevance to value". 
36' 
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This is such an important feature. oe Webens 
methodological framework for sociology that it provides Parsons 
with the key'to a more systematic and positive presentation of 
this new kind of social inquiry which had emerged from an idealist 
background through ä process of criticism and refinement. The 
introduction of values into the process of scientific conceptualization 
does not, in Parsons view, 'undermine-the objectivity of social 
scientific results because Weber was explicit about the separation 
of the - 
ý`... determination-of scientific interest, through 
value relevance (and thus of the immediate objects 
of scientific study, the historical individuals) and 
the exercise of value judgements... " 37 
Even. though a value element enters. into the selection 
of the material of science, once this material is 
given it. is possible to come to objectively valid 
conclusions about the causes and consequences'of 
given phenomena free of value-judgements and hence 
binding on anyone who. wishes to attain truth, 
regardless of what other subjective values he may 
hold. " 38 
The separation of value-relevance and value judgement is. possible, 
Parsons adds, because whilst the selection of facts about a 
phenomenon which are to be included in its scientific conceptualization 
involves an element of relativity, this is quite different from the 
44 
problem of the validity of these facts as statments about-the 
phenomenon in question. 
39 
In addition, Parsons argues, - 
ý'... once a phenomenon. is descriptively given,, the 
establishment of causal relations between it and 
either its antecedents or its consequences is 
possible only through the application, explicitly or 
implicitly, of a formal schema of proof that is 
independent of any value system, of scientific truth... 
this schema involves the use of. general concepts 
transcending the historical individual. " 40 
i 
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Of course, It is necessary to take into account the diversity of 
ultimate value systems and the'way in which such systems change 
over'tirne, together with the directions of interest they give rise 
tot, 
41 
But, Parsons argues", the inclusion of a role for values in 
science does not automatically entail relativism because, a change 
in the values of society cannot undermine the. status of knowledge 
which has been found to be valid in accordance with other values 
and directions of interest. 
42 
"And however different from each-other the-conceptual - 
schemes are,. In terms of which such knowledge has been 
formulated they must if valid be 'translatable' into 
terms of each other or of a wider-scheme. I' 43 
Moreover, Parsons argues', for Weber there was a finite number of 
such value systems, which meant a limited number of historical 
individuals which could be constructed in accordance with them, 
and of systems of theoretical concepts based upon them. Thus 
for Parsons 
".... Webers principle of value relevance, whilst it 
does introduce an element of relativity into scientific 
methodology (and a much-needed one by comparison with 
all empiricist views), does not involve the scepticism 
that is the inevitable consequence of any really radical 
relativity. " 44 
it is perhaps worth noting at this point that in his 
discussion of value relevance and the problems this raises for 
objectivity, Parsons, in The Structure of Social Action makes no 
reference to the concept of value-freedom (Wertfreiheit)., although, 
of course, he does state that value judgements have no legitimate 
role in science, 
45 
However, nearly thirty years later, Parsons 
says of Weberts methodology that 
"The concept of value freedom may be said to be the 
foundation of his Position. " 46 
i 
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And Parsons argues', it plays a particularly significant role in 
distinguishing Webers approach from that of the historicists, 
Marxists and utilitarians. Not surprisingly, then, the concept 
occupies an-important part-in Parsons more recent accounts of 
Weber. It is closely related to the concept of the value system 
of science, which Parsons describes in this way: 
t'... in his role as a scientist a particular subvalue 
system must be paramount for the investigator, one in 
which conceptual clarity, consistency and generality on 
the one hand, and empirical accuracy and verifiability 
on the other, are the valued outputs of the investigation. " 47 
This' establishes the basis for Weber's idea of value freedom, which 
for Parsons means the 
tt... freedom to pursue the. values of science within the 
relevant limits, without their being overridden by 
values*eLther contradictory to or irrelevant to those 
of scientific investigation. ' 48 
This is not to say that science is confined to the values of one 
specific culture nor that the scientist can have no value-commitments 
whatsoever; rather, that the individual should keep his role as 
a scientist separate from his role as a'citizen. 
49 
'Parsons'. -analysis of the theoretical and methodoligical 
elements which constitute the framework for Weber's Sociology can 
be summarized as follows: the central importance of general concepts 
in the scientific study of social life; the inevitably abstract 
nature of such concepts in relation to the reality which they 
represent, and the way in which the particular character of-the 
abstraction is related to the scientists interests; the'focus of 
sociological attention upon the subjective aspect of action, in 
other words, the understandable motives for peoples' activities; 
and finally, the special place of the concept of rational action 
30. 
in social scientific piethodology, This last point is particularly 
important to Parsons because 
"Rationality of action and systematic scientific 
theory are inseperably linked. The development of 
science is a process of action, and action is in part 
an application of'science. " 50 
(b) Analysis ' of' the Implicit Structure*of'Sdcial'Action 
Having clarified the basic elements of Weber's theoretical 
and methodological approach Parsons then turns his attention to the 
way in which they were combined by Weber, as a result of his 
experience in both historical and comparative research, into a 
new framework for'-the study of action. However, for Parsons, this 
framework contains some serious weaknesses; in particular, Weber's 
distinction between natural and social science and his use of 
4 
ideal type concepts. -Weber had rejected the idealist claim that 
there were differences in the logic of the procedures used by the 
two groups of sciences, insisting rather, that the differences were 
of a substantive order, and he had maintained that in the study of 
social reality the generality of the findings could only be 
increased at the cost of reducing the level of detailed knowledge 
of reality in its particular forms. 
51 
Following on from this 
principle Weber had developed the ideal type concepts, at least 
one of which was certainly general in nature, but from Parsons 
point of view, its fictional and unreal epistemological status 
raised certain problems. Suffice it to say, then, in both cases 
there was a substantial difference between Webers position and 
52 
the kind of scientific method utilized by Parsons. 
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The point of interest here is that the features of 
Webers sociological approach defined by Parsons in this negative 
fashion presented the convergence thesis with a major obstacle. 
To solve this problem Parsons introduces a persuasive argument 
about how Weber's sociological ideas*shöuld be interpreted. 
Basically the argument is developmental: Weber began his career 
in economic history and law And gradually concentrated more and 
more on sociological issues'so that it is only in the work written 
towards the end of his life that we'can see a "modern" conception 
of sociology beginning to emerge. ' More specifically, his 
methodological essays and his study of the relationship between 
Protestantism and capitalism established his independence from 
idealism. The comparative studies of the world religions marked 
an additional--step along this path and, finally, his systematic 
typologies in Economy and Society represented Weber's increasing 
commitment to a thoroughly generalizing method for the study of 
" action. Although in his methodological-essays Weber rejects the 
attempt to formulate a system of theory in sociology, Parsons 
suggests that there are systematic elements in Weber's thought 
and that it is those parts of Economy and Society which were 
included in The Theory'of Social and'Economic organization which come 
the nearest to being "... a comprehensive statement of these elements. 
, 53 
Unfortunately, this evidence which is crucial to the 
convergence thesis is in an inconvenient form because Weber's 
methodological views, containing traces of the idealist tradition, 
led him to develop an ideal type classification of social 
relationships rather than the kind of general theory which Parsons 
went on to formulate. ' However; Parsons claims that it is possible, 
32. 
through analysis, to-identify the components of this set of 
classifications which are consistent with ä structural outline of 
an action system*- although this system remains largely implicit 
even in Weberl's most mature work. In 1964, Parsons reflecting 
on Weberos argument, -reiterates'this" point: 
"The sense in which Weber did and did not develop 
a theoretical system persuant to his methodological 
commitments is complex. What can fairly be said, 
f think, is that he presented a most comprehensive 
outline, ' illustrated' and at many points even verified, 
by immense masses of historical material treated in an 
explicit, comprehensive framework.. The major 
orientation from which he set up. the outline is very 
clear indeed; it is a kind of charter for macro- 
sociological research, still very largely valid today. " 54 
But in his most detailed analysis of Weber's methodology. 
written nearly 30 years earlier; Parsons is more emphatic and 
although he indicates that Weber did not consider a "generalized 
theoretical system" for sociology, either in the form of the 
structure or of the elements of action he emphasized that 
"Weber did, however, attempt to build up a systematic 
classification of ideal types starting from a 
conception of action closely similar to that dealt 
with throughout this study. It is a reasonable 
hypothesis that in so far as these types are 
empirically verified and their classification is 
logically coherent, the general framework of concepts 
underlying the classification should be closely 
related to a generalized theoretical system, even 
though its methodological status as-such is not 
explicitly worked out. " 55 
Moreover, there is no doubt in Parsons mind that this represented 
a form of sociological theory; describing the section on the 
sociology of religion in*Economy and Society, he comments: 
"This is elementary theory ... Such propositions 
as that stating the intimate relations between a 
religious ethic and. the phenomenon of prophecy? or 
with reference, to the dispositions of different kinds 
of social strata to different religious orientations. 
are exämples'of the propositional content of this scheme... 
This, essentially, was what Weber meant by sociology as 
a theoretical discipline. " 56 
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According to Parsons, Weberl's attempt to construct this 
"elementary theöry'R was based upon the classification of types of 
social relationship and the distinction between four kinds of 
action; end rational, value-rational, traditional and affectual. 
Webers stress upon these four types, as. the foundation upon which 
more complex types are constructed, demonstrates his commitment to 
the understanding of the subjective aspect of peoples' actions. 
For Parsons the categories of end-rational and value-rational 
action describe complete types of action, since they include the 
means-end relationship, and the category of. ultimate ends. Also, 
they state a normative type of action. In the case of endrational 
action, a choicebetween equally valid ultimate ends is involved, 
whereas, in the case of value rational action, the action is 
orientated exclusively--to the achievment of one value or end. 
57 
According to Parsons these two cases represent the possible 
extremes of'. "ultimate end systems" and. reveal a theoretical strategy 
which leads in a different direction to his own main interest in 
the examination of the structure of systems of action. 
58 
Traditional action, Parsons argues, was not for Weber just a case 
of "habit". He maintains that if it is examined in terms of the 
concept of traditional authority it becomes clear that there are 
normative elements involved as well. However-, he continues, this 
is not true in the case of affectual action which remained in 
Weberfs usage very much a residual category. 
59 
The next level of Weber's thinking concerns the category 
of social relationship, this is the unit from which the more 
complicated types are constructed. However, Parsons argues that 
it is not logically, possible to classify these relationships, let 
/ 
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alone the types of action, without at least the beginning of a 
general system'of action, and whilst Weber did not explicitly 
formulate an outline of the structure of action it is implied by 
the criteria he üsed*to develop the classification of social 
relationships. 
60 
Not surprisingly, Parsons concentrates upon 
the outline which he claims can be found in Weber's classifications. 
"... in his treatment of social relationships there is 
implied the existence o£. elements of regularity in 
action itself in order that there may be a significant 
probability of such kinds of action occurring as to 
constitute a definable relationship. " 61 
Parsons examines the nature of these regularities in terms 
of "modes of orientation" which Weber had subdivided into three 
distinct forms, namely usage, interest, and legitimate order. 
Both interest and legitimate order involve a clear normative 
element: -- Interest refers to an actors orientation of the end- 
rational kind, in other words, the individual chooses to pursue a 
course of action leading to a particular end or value, selected 
from a group of values which are subjectively all of equal worth. 
Legitimate order, by comparison, is 
".,.. the orientation of action to the idea on the 
part of the actors of the. existence of such an order 
as a norm. " 62. 
The concept of usage raises some difficulties because 
its definition suggests close links with the psychological 
mechanism of habit which is the very antithesis of a normative 
orientation, but Parsons argues, in practice Weber used it in a 
manner involving conformity to norms. Parsons-. continues; 
; 5. 
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k'"The exact logical status of these three concepts 
is not very clear in Webers own'treatment .. t The 
most plausible interpretation seems to be that what 
Weber was really doing. was putting forward, as a 
general framework for his classification of ideal 
types, an outline of the generalized' structure of 
systems of action. " 63 
In particular these three modes of orientation of action are 
not just ideal types, describing "hypothetically concrete types of 
action" because any concrete acts involve, in varying degrees, 
elements of interests, legitimacy and usage, hence the 'modes 
of orientation" are parts of the structure of action. Although 
Weber did not pursue this line of inquiry, being content with the 
formulation of a system of "objectively possible" types of social 
structures, Parsons has no doubt about their significance: 
64 
D,, there is .., a complete account of the structure 
of action systems identifiable in Webers own conceptual 
scheme, And, this is true in spite of the fact that his 
methödology had not clarified the logical nature of a 
generalized theoretical system. " 65 
In his demonstration of this Parsons focusses attention upon 
the three Weberian concepts of legitimacy, charisma, and usage. 
For Weber, the concept-of legitimacy is 
"... a quality of an order, that is, of a system of 
norms governing conduct, or at least to which action 
may (or must) be oriented. This quality is imputed 
to the order by those acting in relation to it. Doing 
so involves taking a given type of attitude toward the 
norms involved which may be characterized as one of 
disinterested acceptance ... for one who holds an order 
to be legitimate, living up to its rules becomes .... 
a matter of moral obligation. ' 66 
For Parsons the similarity between "legitimacy" and Durkheim's 
interpretation of constraint as moral authority is overwhelming. 
Both writers, he argues, see action as taking place in terms of a 
set of rules which'forx the conditions of action. Charisma involves 
an attitude of respect and parallels the ritual attitude examined 
I 
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by Durkehim, but it is used by Weber as a major element in a theory 
of social change rather than in relation. to the structure of 
action. Moreover, for Weber there can be'no legitimate order 
without a charismatic element because, 
"Legitimacy,.. is a quality imputed only to the 
norms of an order, not to persons, things or . "imaginary"entities, and its reference is-to-the 
regulation of action .... Legitimacy is thus the institutional application or embodiment of charisma. " 67 
Usage is examined by Parsons. in terms of the concept of taste: 
beyond the framework-established by the norms of legitimate order 
and of the efficient pursuit of interest there is a further 
component of action which, is governed by its own distinct set of 
norms, namely, those relating to artistic creations, Of the 
writers examined by Parsons in'The'Structure'öf Social'Action only 
Weber identified this additional structural element of an action 
system, and all the other elements which Parsons'. analysis of 
Weber's work has made explicit, corroborate the structural accounts 
of Marshall, Pareto and Durkheim. 
68 
Significantly, Parsons' assessment of the implicit structural 
elements of Weber's classification of types of action and relätionship 
has remained unchanged throughout his career. In 1964 Parsons 
suggests that the sociology of law is the central part of Weber's 
substantive studies because, after the initial methodological 
statement at the beginning of*Econo 'and Society, he 
et... begins immediately to, outline his classification 
of the types and components of'normative order in 
society. He comes furthermore very quickly to the 
concept. of*legitimate order, which is the nodal point 
where the concepts of law, of political authority, and 
of the social role of religious, ethics come together. " 69 
37" 
Developing this point further parsons argues that law provided 
Weber'with ä solution to-the'ideal/material dualism in European 
social thought' becaüse it enabled him to demonstrate that political 
and economic structures could only be'understood in terms of 
normative order'and, in addition, that religious meaning systems 
only influence action through their consequences for the same set 
of legitimate norms. The significance of this for Parsons' 
7° 
own work is quite clear: 
"Quite correctly, I think, he viewed the. phenomena 
of normative control of interests and other aspects 
of overt behaviour ^ thus the conditions of successful 
control - as the appropriate focus of sociology ... 
Problems of order"as distinguished from those of the 
categories of linterest' that define'the primary 
subject matter of economics and political science 
thus constitute the core of sociological concern. " 71 
Parsons! summarizes his-view on the significance of Weber's work 
for the establishment of a new and much more sophisticated level of 
theory in the sciences dealing with human action, in relation to 
two areas; firsto the logic of science and second, the character 
of a theory of action. " Weber's methodological position was 
clearly directed at the understanding of empirical actions, not of 
natural phenomena, nor of "atemporal complexes of meaning", which 
had been the object of Intuitionist concern. 
'Weber has demonstrated that the conception of objective 
scientific knowledge in any sense, of any empirical 
subject matter, is indisolubly bound up with the reality 
both of the normative aspect of action and of the obstacles 
to the realization of norms. . Science 
itself cannot be 
methodologically grounded without reference to the value 
element in the relation of Wertbeziehung.. Without it 
there can be no determinate selection of'relevant data, 
hence of objective knowledge in distinction from the 
'system of consciousnessf. The very. conception of 
science itself implies action. Furthermore it is this 
basic solidarity of science and action which is the 
ultimate justification of the'starting point of this whole 
study, the"role in action of the norm of rationality in the 
sense of a scientifically verifiable intrinsic means-end 
relationship. " 72 
I 
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For Parsons, if there is. to be a genuinely scientific study of 
social action it rkust focus upon the "norm of intrinsic -, rationality" 
for only, by using this criterion can the dangers of subjectivity 
be avoided*, 
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Parsons has no doubt that Weber developed a Voluntaristic 
theory of action rather'than an idealist or positivist version, and 
he argues that it is only in terms of this conception of Voluntarism 
that his studies'of the effects of religion upon economic life can 
be fully appreciated. 
"The role both of. ideas and of the ultimate values 
associated with them is fundamental to Weber 's 
thought. But equally so is the fact that these 
elements do not stand alone but in complex 
interrelations with other independent factors. " 74 
Weber's conception of action, then, presupposes a complex of 
values, _norms., and 
ideas, together with an independent role assigned 
to hereditary and environmental factors. Moreover, Webers use 
of normative ideal type concepts of an avowedly fictional nature is 
crucial to his acceptance of the Voluntaristic approach because it 
emphasizes that although normative elements are crucial to action, 
explanations cannot be based exclusively upon them if an idealist 
position is to be avoided. 
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it "WEBER, AND RESIDUAL' IDEALIST ELEMENTS 
In the'secbnd part of this exposition of Parsons' 
interpretation of Weber's sociology attention is concentrated upon 
those aspects of Webers theoretical and methodological approach 
which stood in a critical or ambivalent relationship to Parsons' 
own views and strategies. Three closely related issues are 
examined in detail: Webens views on the relevance of the methods 
of natural science for sociology; his development of a theoretical 
strategy based upon the use of ideal type concepts; and his rejection 
of a functionalist method for sociology, which Parsons considers 
in terms of the need'to explain the behaviour of'total social 
systems, rather than individual actions. 
(a) ' Natural and - Social' Science 
The concept of value relevance is the starting point for 
Parsons' examination of what he regards as Weber's somewhat 
confused methodological distinction between natural and social 
science. 
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Weber argued that the scientists' direction of interest 
provided the basis both for selection and, therefore, conceptualization 
from the "total flux of raw experience", 
77 
but that differences in 
the nature of this interest in natural and social phenomena were 
responsible for a radical division between the procedures used by 
the two groups of sciences. Interest in natural objects focusses 
upon their abstract and general features, rather'than their 
individual uniquenesses; hence the objective of the natural sciences 
is to construct a system of general law. ' In contrast, however, 
our interest in social phenomena lies in their particularities. 
i l. 0. 
'Since in the social field interest is in the aspect 
of concrete individuality, generäl concepts cannot 
stand in the same relation to this interest; their 
formulation and verification cannot be an end in itself 
for the'scientistEs'labour; they are only means to the 
elucidation-and understanding of the particular, unique 
and individual phenbmenon. "78 
These differences in the aims of conceptualization are explained 
by Weber in terms of the source of the two-kinds of interest in 
phenomena. The desire to control natural objects for social 
benefit is the basis of our-interest in such phenomena. 
"Apart from this interest in control, natural phenomena 
are, ' as an object of science, * indifferent to human values. " 79 
The situation is quite different in the social case: here 
a value attitude is taken toward the phenomena because the objects 
of study are actions and cultural achievements which embody human 
ideals and values. Our-interest in the phenomena concerns their 
individuality`Tbecause-they are relevant to values which are 
actually shared by, or are in some way significant to the 
scientist. Moreover, in social science, ""unlike natural science, 
there is no common direction of interest in the phenomena of study. 
This follows from the fact that there is a diversity of'values 
within the society, each of which can be used to construct a 
concept about the phenomenon in question, with the result that as 
many concepts may be formulated of the object as there are directions 
of interest to take towards it. 
Summarizing Webers position, Parsons continues, 
"It follows, then, that the process will not issue in one 
ultimately uniform'system of general concepts but in as 
many systems as there are value points of view or others 
significant to knowledge, There can. be no one 
universally valid system of general theory in the social 
sciences, This is one of the main routes by which 
Weber arrives at his. view' of the '-fictional' nature of 
social science concepts so important to his doctrine 
of the' ideal type. "' 80 
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Parsons concedes that there is. some ierit. in this formulation 
for it makes. *expli, cit the unavoidable degree'öf relativism in 
science which follows'from the'fact'that knowledge is always 
selective, 'and the'basis for this selection is not to be found 
in the facts, but in the subjective interest of the scientist: 
in Parsons' terms, observation is always in terms of a conceptual 
scheme. 
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Moreover, as we have seen above, Weber does not 
capitulate to relativism because of the distinction he draws 
between*motives'of scientific interest and the entirely separate 
issue of the validity of scientific statements. 
But Parsons rejects Weber's position on the methodological 
relationship between the two groups of sciences, insisting that 
there are only substantive differences between natural and social 
science. 
_ 
He-argues that Weber is mistaken in drawing a distinction 
in principle between the subjective directions of the scientists, 
interests in 'natural and social phenomena. Accepting that the 
motive of control is important for natural science he nevertheless 
argues that it is more significant in social science than Weber 
believed. Indeed, there is no reason why a value interest rather 
than a control interest should give rise to a concern with 
individual rather than general concepts. Consequently, Parsons 
concludes, 
ý'... there seems to be no basis for a. radical 
distinction in principle between the-natural and 
the social sciences with regard to the roles of 
individuality and generality, Quantitative 
differences of degree there may be, but these are 
not sufficient to justify such a distinction. The 
principle of value relevance helps to explain the 
element of relativism, in scientific methodology, 
but it is applicable to both groups of sciences, not 
to one alone, ` 82 
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In order to establish firmly the weaknesses of the 
Webei an pos'itjon parsons advances an entirely, different conception 
og the "reldtionship. between individual and general concepts. This 
classification of the'sciences is based'upon the distinction 
between the analytic and the historical. Analytic sciences, such 
as theoretical physics, economics and sociology, attempt to 
construct systems of theory valid for a wide range of objects, 
whereas the historical sciences''- history, geology, meterology and 
anthropology - are concerned-with the understanding of unique 
historical individuals. In the analytic sciences the formation 
of general concepts is an end in itself, whereas in the historical 
group they are only a means to understanding. However, the 
distinction between the two kinds of sciences does not coincide 
with the classification of real phenomena because the scope of the 
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analytic sciences necessarily cuts across such a division. 
Types 'and 'the 'Mösaic 'Theory ' Of 'Society (b) ''Ideal' 
Weber's analysis of the methodological circumstances of social 
science led him to formulate the ideal type conceptwhich is 
defined as 
! '... a construction of elements abstracted from the 
concrete, and put together to form a unified conceptual 
pattern. This involves a one-sided. exaggeration of 
certain aspects of the concrete reality, but is not to 
be found in it, that is, concretely existing, except 
in a few very special cases, such as purely rational 
action, It is a utopia, " 84 
The fictional nature of this concept can best be accounted for, 
Parsons suggests, in terms of Weber's relationship with idealism. 
There were several reasons why Weber emphasized' their unreality. 
Firstly, all scientific concepts were based upon a selection of the 
243. 
material given in reality. Secondly, given'Weberl-s views on the 
special character'. of social science in which the aim is to understand 
particular concrete phenomena, the'role. öf scientific concepts is 
inevitably, restricted to that of being a means to'achieving 
knowledge rather than constituting knowledge in themselves. In 
addition, given the idealist tendency to explain social action and 
events exclusively in terms of ideas, and Webers concentration 
upon values, ideas, and norms as the subject matter of sociology, 
he did not wish to give the impression that these were the only 
components of social reality which could be studied. 
85 
Uncertainty about the exact methodological status of a 
concept which is not a hypothesis, description, average, or statement 
of the features common to a class of empirical phenomena leads , 
Parsons to seek-clarification from the analysis of the ideal type 
concept presented by von Schelting, who drew a distinction between 
two types of individual concept, 
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On the one hand, there is the 
conceptualization of a concrete historical individual which becomes 
the object of causal' analysis -and in this case the 'idealness' of 
the concept is merely a function'of the selectivity of scientific 
interest. The other form of the individual ideal type, 
ý'... is very similar in its logical function but 
different in its content. The first contained at 
least elements of real phenomena - things and events 
in time - elements of social fact. ' The other contains 
another order of object r- ideas. Such are, for example, 
the Calvinistic theology, the Brahmanic philosophy of 
Karina and transmigration. These are, of course, 
relevant to real processes ... but-short of Hegelianism 
they cannot be identified with it.., But neither are 
they the actual concrete contents of the minds of all 
Calvinists or Brahmins., On the contrary, these two 
are exaggerations, they, are developments into the most 
clear *cut "and consistent form of the general tendencies 
of' religious thought to be found in the circles' in 
question. ' 87 
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Significantly Parsons does'not attempt to see how this 
kind of concept could be üsed in empirical research, or to clarify 
its methodological status, but quickly moves'on to the generalizing 
ideal type which is of more immediate relevance to his thesis of 
a convergence in thebretical structures. This concept formulates 
a hypothetical course of events in order'to facilitate causal 
imputation and for this purpose it has an abstract and general 
character, 0 
"... it is an ideal construction of a typical course 
of action, or form of relationship which is applicable 
to the änalysis. of an indefinite plurality of concrete 
cases, and which formulates in pure, logically consistent 
form certain elements that are-relevant to the 
understanding of the several concrete situations. ' 88 
Parsons notes that Weber gives as an example of the generalizing 
ideal type, 'the'concepts of economic theory, and for Parsons this is 
crucial to his demonstration of a major methodological weakness in 
Webers thought, namely, the fictional view of scientific concepts. 
The concepts used in economic theory have a normative character 
which follows from the importance given to the idea of economic 
rationality, consequently, they state a course of hypothetically 
concrete action and formulate an unattainable norm ^ even though 
it makes sense as a limiting concept. When the construction of 
normative concepts is seen as the object of the scientific 
enterprise it is hard to avoid the belief that such concepts are 
unreal. However, if a different perspective is adopted, and 
these concepts are seen'to state a relationship between certain 
analytic elements of a generalized system of action, then the 
limitations of the fictional view become apparent. In the absence 
of ideal experimental conditions if social analysis is confined to 
25. 
the use of ideal, types stating hypothetically concrete action 
the result is the break up of the organic unity-of historical objects 
and processes, and this may lead to a mosaic theory of society in 
which social life is conceived of as consisting of "disparate 
atoms' defined as ideal type iinits. 
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Parsons demonstrates' the üsefulness'of analytic theory 
based upon a generalized system'of action by comparing Marshall's 
concept of free enterprise including the notion of activities, with 
Weber's category of traditionalism. They both involve the same 
basic component of the rational maximization of utility and could 
not be formulated without it. ' Hence: 
ý'... this element of utility is an indepdndent variable 
relative to traditionalism and to activities. The 
two' elements. simply are not reducible to terms of one 
another in the sense that maximization of utility 
logically implies either maximization of traditionalism 
(in Weberts sense) or of activities (in Marshall's 
sense). " 90 
For Parsons the limitations of Weber's methodological view 
resulted from the belief that every analytical element of a system 
of theory must correspond to a different ideal type unit of a 
concrete system'of action, whereas the comparison of the categories 
of traditionalism and free enterprise shows that the economic element 
of the structure of a system of action varies independently of the 
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value elements of the same system. The concept of traditionalism 
involves the maximization of economic rationality and astandard of 
living fixed by traditional values and the ideal type gains its 
special character from the relationship between these two' properties. 
Within such a type concept, 
r 
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! The'relations between'the values., of analytical 
elements which are important to the formulation 
of the type- are always- the same whatever may be 
their particular values and those of the other 
elements. Idealtype analysis provides no means 
of breaking down' the rigidity of these fixed 
relations. 92 
Indeed'Iarsons argues, the'diverse and changeable nature 
of social reality does'not support the idea of fixed relationships 
so much as that of independent variation between elements, ''Therefore, 
although 
The formulation of class concepts, including ideal 
types in Webers sense, is an indispensible procedure. 
... it is not usually possible for scientific analysis 
to'stop there. * To do so-would result in a type atomism 
each . type would be a unit of analysis byl itself. But 
in reality. these. units are systematically related to 
one another'. This is true because they are formulated 
in-terms of combinations of relations between the values 
of a more limited number of properties, each property 
being predicable of a number of different type concepts. 
Above all, the values of the. general elements concerned 
are not always combined in the particular way that any 
one type concept involves; they are independently 
variable over a wider range ... To employ only the 
type concept in analysis is to obscure these 
possibilities of independent variation. " 93 
Moreover, it is cumbersome to have a general concept for every 
possible combination of relations between the values of the 
relevant, elements. In contrast, the analytic programme allows 
for the derivation of all of these types from a more limited number 
of element concepts and involves the development of a general 
theoretical system. 
However, Iarsons suggests that Weber did not restrict 
himself to the formulation of unrelated ideal type concepts; indeed, 
"The attempt, whicl, constitutes the principal 
theoretical aspect of his work, to construct a 
systematic classification of ideal types, really 
involved him by implication in generalized 
analytic theory,, His sociological theory is 
neitherthe'one nor the'other*but a mixture of 
both. " * 94 
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Parsons finds support for this. Viewpoint in. Weher's insistence on 
the ýmportance'of causal explanation to. the*discovery of knowledge 
about social phenomena, In order to determine the significance of 
particular factors or components in the'historical process it is 
necessary to imagine the process without the effects of the components 
Ln question; this involves the logic of experiment, and where 
processes cannot be reproduced it is necessary to perform mental 
experiments and construct courses"of action which are "objectively 
possible", 
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"The construction of what would have happened under 
different circumstances*.,, requires knowledge of how 
certain elements of the situation. would have 
developed. This involves ... both analysis of the 
phenomenon into elements, and with respect to each 
element, ability to predict with more or less 
accuracy its trends of development. It is as 
logically necessary prerequisites of this latter 
prediction of tendencies that general laws become 
involved". 96 
The elements which are used in the analysis of phenomena 
may be of two kinds, although Weber only recognized the general 
ideal type. The other alternative, and the one preferred by 
Parsons, is the analytical element, An analytical element is a 
universal category which refers to a general property of an 
empirical phenomenon and the specific details of this property, 
in the particular case, constitute the facts describing the 
phenomenon, Parsons summarizes the differing character of the 
two kinds of element in this way; 
'A11 concrete phenoman, including the particulars 
corresponding to ideal types are capable of 
description only in terms of a specific combination 
of the values*of analytical elements, The ideal 
type, being a universal does, not involve a combination 
of specific values, but it does*involve. a fixed set 
of relations between the values of the'analytical 
elements. " 97 
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But for Parsons. the'danger of an exclusive reliance for general 
conceptualization upon 'ideal typen is a degree' of rigidity and 
methodological atomism which, as noted above, is inconsistent 
with social reality. 
The final issue Parsons examines'in relation to Weber 's 
theoretical strategy of formulating ideal types'concerns his stated 
opposition to developing a generäl system'of sociological theory. 
The formulation of increasingly abstract concepts is, for Weber, 
inconsistent with knowledge of social phenomena in their 
individuality. Given Webers use of type concepts, this conclusion 
was correct because, Parsons argues, whenever these concepts are 
broadened toInclude more specific cases they increasingly lack" 
empirical content. However', the üse of analytic concepts 
avoids this problem, and, _if a general 
theoretical system is developed, 
".... there need be no fear of analytical abstraction 
on the score of its incompatibility with the concept 
of individuality. For the inherent nature of the 
frame of reference 'of a theoretical system sets a 
limit to the extent of abstraction which is possible 
or in any other way admissable within the range of 
any given type of focus of interest. The structure 
of such systems is most intimately related to 
Wertbeziehung. " 98 
(c) Functionalism and the Limits of Ideal Type Theory 
Perhaps the most important change in'Parsons' own 
theoretical and methodological views which had consequences for 
his interpretation and assessment of Weber's work occurred between 
the publication of The'Structüte'bf*SöciAZ'Action and his "Introduction" 
to'The Theory'of'Social and'Economic'Organization, published 10 years 
later, In the former'study Parsons was committed to the development 
of general analytic theory but he found the difficulties in 
M-Q" 
constructing such a theory to be'insuperabie, and so by the time 
of the läter'work, '1arsons had adopted a structural-functionalist 
approach with the result that certain areas of Weber's methodology 
took on a newýsignificance: 
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Parsons remains co=ttted'to the view that Weber1s 
classification of types of action and social relationship presupposes 
an outline of the structure of a system of action. However, 
Parsons identifies a new weakness in the use of ideal type 
conceptualization because its emphasis upon extreme or limiting 
cases diverts attention from the conceptualization of empirical 
reality in terms of a system of action, 
". *. as a balance of forces' in equilibrium of relative 
degrees'of integration and disorganization. " 100 
This can be seen particularly clearly from Weber's use of the 
category of rational action, which was used'by him to compare with 
actual cases in-order-to see the extent of the deviation of the real 
course of action from the rational norm. But this very rigid 
division between the rational and the non-rational hinders the 
possibility of viewing both kinds of element in terms of a system 
of action. Moreover, Parsons states that Weber's definitions of 
end and value rational action are defined inadequately because they 
do not describe all the components of a concrete-act-and, therefore, 
do not state the criteria according to which the actor chooses 
the appropriate means, In addition Parsons regards-it as vital to 
refer to the external nonsocial situation, the personality of the 
actor concerned as well as the values'which have been institutionalized 
in the society; 
r 
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1'The r are essential to' coutplete an 'objectively 
pogsiblet" descrýpt , on, of a system to which the 
criteria-of rational typ apply, " 101 
For Parsons the cause of these problems is clear and can 
be' explained bfr; 
ý'.., Weberas failure to carry through a systematic 
functional analysis of a generalized social system 
of action. F' 102 
It is, of course, of some importance to Parsons' convergence thesis 
that Webens stated restriction of the use of functional method in 
sociology to-the role of preliminary analysis, can be placed in a 
different interpretive context and its impact relativized in the 
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process, He suggests that the functionalism used in the 
social sci, ences'in Weber's time had close links with biological 
thought and produced serious diff iculties'when, for example, features 
of a particular society were explained in terms of their need. to 
survive in a particular environment. In contrast, the more modern 
functionalist view of an organism or society was to examine them 
as a "going concern", an approach derived much more from physiological, 
rather than evolutionary thought. Although Weber had sharply 
contrasted his methöd of understanding the subjective aspect of 
action with a functionalist approach, Parsons counters by arguing 
"He did not perceive that starting from the frame of 
reference of subjectively interpreted individual 
action ... 
it was possible by functionalist analysis 
to develop a generalized outline of social systems of 
action .. t such an outline was .. to a large extent implicit in the structure of his own system of ideal 
types. " 104 
Parsons takes' the'poLnt that Weber, in his analysis of 
individual motivation, makes use of the-general categöries"of the 
orientation of action and they-, by implication, presuppose that 
I 
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social relationships are integrated' within systems of action. 
Moreover, such, ä social system has to cope with an external situation 
and its various structural elements, such'äs individuals, roles' 
and actions, must Be' sufficiently integrated for the various parts 
to function with some degree of harmony, 
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Therefore, 
"Systematic investigation of the relations of human 
activity to the external situation and. to other . 
persons would reveal ... a coherent system of such 
generalized categories. These along with the basic 
modes of orientation of actions, are fundamental to 
the conception of a generalized system of action and 
relätionships. on the social level. And the systematic 
ordering of these categories is not possible. without 
the functional point of view; * it provides the 
integrating principles in terms of which such categories 
constitute a generalized system rather than an'ad hoc 
collection of disconnected concepts. " 106 
Significantly, Parsons argues,. 4Tebe0s motivational ideal types 
involve these situational and relational categories so that 
descriptions of social structures necessarily involve reference to 
the subjective point of view in exactly the same way as 
descriptions of. individual actions. For Parsons, it is because 
Webens concepts of motivation also involve social structural 
definitions of the situation, that his analysis 'of institutions 
has been so successful, particularly when judged in comparison 
with psychologically based explanations in terms of drives. 
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In the absence of the kind of dynamic analysis pioneered 
by classical mechanics, Parsons advocates a structural-functional 
method because it facilitates an understanding of the behaviour 
of a social system as a whole, in terms of the contribution of its 
various structures and processes to the 
'"maintenance'bf -a level of functional performance 
by the system*,,, as. a going concern. ' 108 
And this, Parsons suggests, is precisely what Weber did by relating 
i 
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the dynamic changes'of social systems to-the motives of individuals, 
although regrettably, he'did not pursue this course in a sufficiently 
systematic manner. Consequently, 
''''... there-is implicit in the organization 
of his type system the outline of a systematized 
general theory. " 109 
According to Parsons although this was largely confined to the level 
of the structure of systems of action, had it been widened to include 
social groups and relationships, Weber would have undoubtedly 
recognized that functional analysis constitutes the most useful 
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form of generalized theory, 
The examination of, ParsonsF version of Weber can now be 
brought to a close with a brief summary öf, dts"main points. . 
The 
authoritativeness of his treatment of Weber derives from The Structure 
of Social Action, and depends both . upon, the extremely 
detailed and 
systematic nature of the analysis'of Webers theoretical, 
methodological and substantive inquiries, 
111 
and the fact that the 
inquiry takes place in the context, of the convergence thesis. Now 
this theoretical argument had, a specific structure, with the result 
that Parsons' account of Weber was "... not a general secondary 
interpretation. "112 Indeed, in response to some recent criticism 
Parsons has again emphasized that his "... initial study of Weber 
was not meant to be and was not a general assessment of evaluation 
of Weberts sociological theory«. 
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It was rather, an account 
which examined Webens work purely from the point of view of its 
contribution to this convergent movement in European social thought 
into a new scientific form of sociolog3. cal theory,, 
rarsons' General Theory. of Action became widely accepted 
in sociology, "especially, in America'andy inevitably, so too was his 
53. 
view of the hiatory. of the discipline and in particular his . 
estimation of Weber s. contribution to. the', founding of systematic 
theory in sociology. Hence Parsonst interpretation and assessment 
of Weber came tobe seen as. definitive, 'with the result that-he could 
claim, with considerable justification, in 1963 that the four 
chapters in The'Structüre"df'Socia1 Action stillcontained "... the 
most comprehensive änälytic treatment of Webers accomplishments 
in theory, " 
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In the detailed"exämination of Parsonst version of Weber 
the distinction was drawn between the elements of Weber's approach 
which were favourable, to convergence, and those which were not. 
The former category included Weber`s-use of general and theoretical 
concepts, the'separation of science from value-judgement, the 
understanding-of subjective meaning through the conceptual scheme 
of means-ends analysis rather than reliance upon intuition, the 
classification of types of social action and relationship, the use 
of'the categories of interest, legitimacy. and usage as an 
elementary outline of the structure of social action, and finally, 
the general significance of the concept of legitimacy which 
represents a type of social-action based upon normative order. 
The latter group - the elements inconsistent with convergence 
involved Weberas logical distinction-between natural and social-, 
science in terms of the scientistls interest in the objects of 
study, together with the fictional view of ideal type concepts and 
the resulting opposition to a general conceptual scheme for the 
analysis of society, 
/ 
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The di, vison of material helped'to clarify the developmental 
nature of Parsons £nterpretation of Weber; According to this 
viewpoint, Weber had, in his later=work, 'moved away from the 
formulation of discrete-. sets-of ideal type concepts to a more 
systematic classification of ideal types which impicitly depended 
upon a generalized theoretical system. In these terms Parsons 
was able to account for Weberls rejection of general theory in the 
field of the historico-cultural sciences, by identifying it as part 
of his earlier thinking on the problems of historical research. 
Whereas, towards the end of his life, he became more explicitly 
concerned with the nature of sociology and the specific problems 
associated with generalization and gradually moved away from his 
earlier views, although without full awareness of the steps he 
had taken. 
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Essentially, therefore, Parsons' interpretation of Weber's 
theoretical, methodological and substantive analyses identifies 
his work as a transitional stage in the development of the modern 
discipline, having been successful in overcoming some, but not all, 
of the problems of idealism. For Parsons the result was an 
inevitable difficulty in incorporating the work into contemporary 
sociology because Weber's discrete sets of ideal types raised 
problems for the analysis of the transition between types which for 
Parsons could only be solved by a general theoretical system. 
Weber! s`ad'hoc solutions to these problems which were based upon 
T ý"ýT1 
his encyclopaedic knowledge had tended to obscure the difficulties 
involved, and in a statement with which we-shall conclude this 
55. 
chapter, Parsons argues, 
that Ln. the hands of 4 scholar of lesser genius 
than Weber, it. would be'diffi, cult to get comparable 
results through the'üse bf'his*scheme. This may well 
be one principal reason for the relatively small 
cumulative outcome of Webergis work. " 116 
56. 
NOTES 
1. Talcott Parsons, "? 'Capitalism! in Recent German 
Literature: Sombart and Weber", II Journal of Political 
'Economy, 37 (1929), 31-51. 
2. T. Parsons, 'The*Structure'of Social'Actiön, (New York: Free 
Press, 1937). All references are to the 1968 paperback 
edition. 
3. T. Parsons, "Introduction"-to Max Weber, The Theory of-'Social 
and'Economic'Organization, translated and edited by, 
T. Parsons. and A. M. Henderson, (New York: Free Press, 1947). 
4. T. Parsons, "Introduction" to Max Weber, The Sociology of 
Religion, translated by E. Fischoff, (Boston: Beacon, 1962), 
reprinted in Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Societyy 
(New York: Free Press, 1967). 
5. T. Parsons, "Max Weber: 1864-1964", American Sociological 
Review, 30 (1964), 171-175. 
6. T. Parsons, "Evaluation and Objectivity. in Social Science: 
An Evaluation of Max Weber's Contribution", in his 
Sociological Theory and Modern Society, 'op. cit. 
7. T. Parsons, "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological 
Theory"-, 'International Journal of'Ethics, 45 (1935), 282-316; 
Review of A. von Schelting"Max Webers. Wissenschaftslehre, 
American Sociological Review, 1 (1936), _675-681; "Unity 
and Diversity in the'Modern Intellectual Disciplines: The 
Role of the Social Sciences", and "An Approach to the 
Sociology of Knowledge" both reprinted in Sociological 
Theory and Modern Society, op. cit.; "On 'De-Parsonizing 
Weber"', American Sociological-Review, 40 (1975), 666-669; 
and "Reply to Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope", American Sociological 
Review, 41 (1976), 361-365. 
8. Parsons emphasized that The Structure of Social Action was 
an independent theoretical investigation, not a secondary 
study. See Parsons op. cit., 15 and "On De-Parsonizing 
Weber", op. cit., 666-and 669. 
9. By the mid-1960's Parsons' comments on Weber had become less 
critical because by then he had begun to focus exclusively 
upon what he saw to be the positive features of Weber's work. 
10. For a different interpretation see D. Martindale, "Talcott 
Parsons' Theoretical Metamorphosis from Social Behaviourism 
to Macro-Functionalism", in H. Turk and R. L. Simpson (eds. ), 
Institutions and Social Exchange, (New York: 'Bobbs-Merril, 1971)) 
and J. F. Scott "The Changing Foundations of the Parsonian 
Action-Scheme", American Sociological Review, 28 (1963), 
716-735. 
57. 
11. Parsons, -''Introduction" to Max Weber, The Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization, op. cit,, 8. 
12. Parsons, The Structure' of" Social'Action, *op. cit., 580. 
13. 'Ibid., 579. 
14. Max Weber,, 'Economy'and Society, (Berkely and Los Angeles: 
University*of California Press, 1978), 1-28. 
15. Parsons, The Structure of Social: Action, op. cit., 475. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid., 581. 
18. Ibid.., 478. 
19. Ibid., 485. See also. Parsons "Evaluation and Objectivity 
in Social Science: An Interpretation of Max Webens 
Contribution"; op. cit. '; 82. Parsons examines in more 
detail the philosophical-issues involved in German Idealism 
in his "Unity and Diversity in the Modern Intellectual 
Disciplines", *op. cit., 173-180. 
20. Parsons, "Introduction" to Max Weber, The Theory of Social 
and"Economic Organization, op. cit., 9.. See also Parsons 
"Social-Interaction" in his'Social Systems and'the Evolution 
of Action'Theory, (New York: Free Press, 1977), 163. 
21. Parsons, The Structure of'Social Action, op. cit., 579. - In 
his analysis of Weber's critique of Objectivism and Idealism, 
Parsons closely follows Alexander von Schelting's treatment 
of these issues in his Max Webers'Wissenschafts1ehre 
(Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934).. For -Parsonsoverall, 
estimation of von Schelting's study see his review of Max 
Webers Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit. 
22. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., 581. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid., 582. See also Parsons "Introduction" to Max Weber, 
The Theory of Social and-Economic Organization, op. cit., 9. 
25. Parsons, The Structure'of Social Action, op. cit., 582. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid., 583. 
28. Ibid., 584. . 
29. Ibid. 
58. 
30. ' Ib id . 
31. 'Ibid. 
32. Ibid., 587. Here again: Parsons follows von Schelting's 
analysis in his Max'Webers Wissenschaftslehre; op. cit.. 
33. Parsons, The'Structure'of'Söcial Action, ' op. cit., 589. 
34. Ibid., See also, Parsons, "Max Weber 1864-1964", op. cit.; 
173-4. 
35. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., 587, and 
"Max Weber. 1864-1964", op. cit. ', 174. 
36. Parsons, The Stucture'of'Social Action, op. cit., 588, 
37. Ibid., 594,638. 
38. Ibid. ''See also "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Science... " 
op. cit., 87 and "Introduction" to Max Weber The Theory of 
'Social and Economic Organization, op cit., 10. - 
39. Parsons,, "Max'Weber 1864-1964", op. cit.,. 173 
40. Parsons, ' The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., 594. 
"Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Scienc e.,., ' op. cit., 
87,91. On the schema of proof see "The University 
Bundle: A Study of the Balance Between Differentiation and 
Integration" in T. Parsons Action Theory and the Human. 
Condition, (New York: 'Free Press,. 1978), 142. 
41. For a detailed examination of the relationship between the 
values of society and the selection of scientific problems 
see "An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge'", in Parsons, 
Sociological Theory and Modern*Society, -dp. cit., 152. 
42. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, *op. cit., 600. 
43. Ibid., 601. See also Parsons' review of von Schelting's 
Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre,, '6p. cit., -679, 
44. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., 601. - 
45. Ibid., 594. The differences in emphasis between 1937 and 
1964 may be explained in terms of Parsons' growing sensitivity 
to the criticism that his work is ideological. 
46. Parsons, "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social. Science... ", 
op. cit., 85. 
471. Ibid., 86. 
48. Ibid. -- 
/ 
r 
5i. 
49. Parsons, "Max Weber 1864-196411, op. cit., 173. 
50. Parsons, The Structure of"Social Action, op. cit., 586. 
51. Ibid., '590-1. 
52. Parsons' detailed critique of Weber is examined in the 
second part of the chapter and assessed in Chapter 5, 
part 4(a). 
53. Parsons, "Introduction" to Max Weber' The'Theory'of'Social 
and Economic Organization, 'op. cit., 3. 
c. f. Parsons' Action'Theory'and the'Human'Condition, op. cit., 
355,404. 
54. Parsons, "Max Weber 1864-1964", 'op. cit., 174. 
55. Parsons, The-Structure df'Social Action; op. cit., 640. 
56. Parsons, "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Science.., ", 
op. cit., 88-9. 
57. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., 643--4.. 
58. Ibid., 645. Parsons argues that the four types of. action are 
a source of ambiguity because they are used in different 
ways, and, therefore, do not have the same theoretical- 
status, see 643,647. C. f. Parsons "Introduction" to 
Max Weber. The Theory of Social'and Economic*Organization, 
op. cit., 14. 
59. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit.; 647-8. 
60. Parsons, "Introduction" to Max Weber The 'Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization, op cit., 14-15. 
61. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., 649. 
62. Ibid., 650. 
63. Ibid., 651. 
64. Ibid., 652-3. 
65. Ibid., 684-5. 
66. Ibid., 661. 
67. Ibid., 669. 
68. Ibid., 582. 
69. Parsons, "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Science... " 
op. cit., 92 and "Max Weber 1864-1964" 174. op. cit. , ,. 
/ 
60. 
70. Parsons, "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Science... " 
op. cit., 93. 
71. Parsons, "Max Weber 1864-1964", 'op. cit., 174. 
72. Parsons, 'The Structure ' of' Social Action, ' op. cit., 683. 
73. Ibid., *684. 
74. Ibid., 683. 
75. Ibid., 684. 
76. Ibid., 591-"2. 
77. Ibid., 591. 
78. Ibid., 592. 
79. Ibid. 
80. Ibid., 593. 
81. Ibid., 597. 
82. Ibid. - 
83. Ibid., 598-9.. C. f. Arun Sahay, 'Sociological Analysis, 
(London: Routledge, 1972), 147. 
84. Parsons, The Structure. of Social Action, op. cit., 603. 
85. Ibid. 
86. Ibid., 604. C. f. his review of von Schelting's 
Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit. 
87. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., 605. 
88. Ibid., 606. 
89. Ibid., 607. 
90. Ibid., 608-9. * 
91. Ibid., 609. 
92. Ibid., 617. ' C. f. his "Introduction" to Max Weber 
The Theory of Social and Economic, Organization, op. cit., 13. 
93. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., 618. 
94. Ibid., 626. 
61. 
95. Ibid., -610-V, See also Parsons "Introductionll to Max Weber 
The Sociology of Religion, op. cit., 38, "Max Weber 18641964", 
op. cit., 175 and. "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social 
Science.,. ", op. cit., 88. 
96. Parsons, The'Structure'of Social Action, op. cit., 612-3. 
97. 'Ibid., 621. 
98. 'Ibid., 635. 
99. These changes led to the allegation that his work had moved 
away from a. reliance upon Weber-to an-increasing dependence 
upon a Durkheimian approach which-left the status of 
voluntarism somewhat obscure. See 
- 
D. Martindale, -"Talcott 
Parsons' - Theoretical Metamorphosis from Social Behaviourism 
to Macro-Functionalism", op. cit., and J. F. Scott, "The 
Changing Foundations of the Parsonian Action Scheme", 
-American'Sociological'R view, 'op. cit. 
100. Parsons "Introduction" to Max Weber The Sociology'of 
Religion, op. cit., 15. 
101.. Ibid., 17. 
102. Ibid., 18. 
103. Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit., 15-16. 
104. Parsons "Introduction" to Max Weber The ' Theory" of'S6cial 
and Economic Organization, op. cit., 20. 
105. Ibid., 21. 
106. Ibid., 22. 
107. Ibid., 23 and "Introduction" to Max Weber The Sociology 
of Religion, op. cit., 75. 
108. Parsons "Introduction" to Max Weber The Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization, op. cit_., 26. 
109. Ibid., 28. 
110. Ihid. 
111. An important element in the authoritativeness of this 
study can be explained by Parsons' reliance upon von 
Schelting's analysis of the epistemological and methodological 
nature-of Weber's work. See A. Sahay, Sociological Analysis, 
op. cit., 18. 
112. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., 15, 
l 
62. 
113. Parsons, "On 'De-Parsonizing Webers", op. cit., 669. 
114. -Parsons, "Introduction" to Max Weber'The Sociology-of 
Religion, 'op. cit., 41. 
115. Parsons, Action'Theory'and-the-Human Condition, op. cit., 
355. - 
116. Parsons "Introduction" to Max Weber'The Sociology of 
'Religion, *op. cit., 77; 
63. 
CHAPTER TWO 
`'THE PARSONIAN. THEORY 'OF 'ACTION 
The term "Theory of Action" is generälly understood in 
contemporary sociology to be synonymous with the work of Talcott 
Parsons' and derives its meaning from the synthesis he constructed 
from amongst the particular approaches developed by the four social 
scientists whom he regarded as the most eminent of the generation 
living and working at the beginning of the 20th Century. It 
represents a movement towards agreement over certain fundamental 
principles, concepts and procedures and could be seen most explicitly 
in the work of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber, but was by 
2 
no means exclusively confined to them. In his original statement 
of the convergence toward a common set of categories which describe 
the structure of social action, Parsons examined the sociological 
contributions of Durkheim and Weber, the perspective developed by -- 
Pareto, who was both economist and sociologist, and the work of 
Marshall which fell more strictly within the discipline of economics. 
Subsequently Parsons has suggested that the convergence can be seen 
in a wider context, and that the work of Freud in psychology, 
3 
and 
the views of the social psychologists Mead and Thomas, 
4 
all 
represent movements towards the same-set of assumptions and strategies. 
5 
However the essential point about convergence is that 
this body, of-concepts represents the foundations from which Parsons 
has derived the nethodological and theoretical framework of the 
General Theory of Action together with the more specific-schemes for 
the analysis of social systems. "The"Structute'of Social Action-- 
represents- only the starting point for the'general theory of action 
64. 
because although the main features. og'hig. theoretical strategy 
are established in. the' course ö£*his. analysis of the structural 
features- of social action, it is not until 1951 with the publication 
of*Toward' a'General*Theory'of'Action that Parsons specifically 
attempts to formulate the system-äf analytic elements which have 
been his long-term objective. Undoubtedly there have been changes 
in ParsonsR' work, but it is a mistake to regard these as anything 
more than the extension, refinement and application to new levels, 
of the earlier ideas. In particular, there is little evidence 
to support the claims made, for instance, by Scott and Martindale, 
that there have been radical breaks between'one form of his 
General Theory of Action and another. 
6 
Parsons has consistently 
emphasized 'the continuing importance of his original synthesis and 
the progressively incremental nature of'his career as a theorist: ' 
his theoretical work 
"... has been characterized by a complicated balance 
between continuity and developmental change. With 
respect to certain conceptual fundamentals ... there has been essential continuity over the forty year 
period since 'The 'Strüctüre'df Söcial`Action. This" 
continuity has centred above all on the mining" of 
the theoretical richness of the works of'Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber, attempting not only to 
understand them but to use them constructively for 
further theoretical development. " 7 
Let us begin, therefore, by situating The Structure of 
Social Action in the context of Parsons'overall career. In 1968 
Rarson$ referred to three distinct phases in the development of his 
work since its pubUUcatýQn jn 1937. The first stage emphasized a 
structuxal'functtonA1 mode of analysis which was strongly influenced 
by W,. B% Cannon*s work in biology and to a lesser extent Radcliffe- 
Brown's: approach to anthropology. It represented'a change in the 
65. 
understanding of the concept of system which had originally been 
based upon the ideas of Bendersont-Pareto and Schiimpeter, and the 
practice of economics and physics. In this period Parsons' work- 
was broadened to take account of psychological theories of the 
personality, and he saw in this some important parallels with 
Durkheim&s examination of the way the individual internalizes 
$ 
social and cultural norms. This structural-functional form of 
theory is to be found in'Toward' a'Geiieral'Theory'of'Action and, 
more specifically concerned with the subject matter of sociology, 
9 in The Social System, 
The publication with Smelser in 1956 of'Ec6nomy,: arid-Society10 
marked the next stage and was based upon developing the implications 
of a revised version of the pattern-variable scheme formulated 
in Workiiig'Papers 'in the Theory'of 'Action; 
ll 
and applied in Family, 
Sodialization'and Interaction*Process. 
12 
This involved moving 
away from the Paretean conception of economic theory as an analytic 
scheme within the theory of social systems and the adoption of the 
view that the economy could be examined as a sub-system of society, 
a sub-system related in specific ways to other sub-systems, all of 
which could be analyzed in terms of the four-function paradigm. 
This led to the identification of the four primary functional 
sub-systems of society, namely? the economy, the polity, the 
societal community and the pattern maintenance sub-system, and, 
in turn, to an interest'in the generalized media of exchange. 
13 
The third phase was i. niti4ily documented by the article 
"Evolutionary Universals in Society"114 and subsequently amplified 
in 'Sci i tio-s: 'Evolutionary' and 'Comparative'Perspectives15 and 'The 
16 
'Systet$"'öf 'Moderzi'Söcietiesf it is based upon an increased 
66. 
awareness of the importance of social change, which is analyzed in 
terms of the'paradigm of differentiation, inclusion, upgrading 
17 
and value generalization. At this time Parsons began to 
reconsider the relationship betweein'the'brganic world and the human 
action system through an interest in the processes of'biological 
evolution; in particular he was impressed'by the similarities 
between the'concept of society and that of population, as used 
in biological evolution, and between the processes of natural 
selection and institutionalization which he regarded''as a marked 
theme of Weber's work. 
18 
This led to Parsonsl'f inal concern, an 
attempt to go beyond the general system of action and to systematically 
develop a wider' framework, which he called the Human Condition. 
This, constitutes the environment for the' action frame of reference 
and, consequently, the-boundary between-the action and the organic' 
systems figures prominently. 
19 
It is represented by his'Social 
Systems ' ärid ' the 'Evoltition ' öf 'Action 'Theory20 and 'Action 'Theory and 
the Human' Condition. 
21 
The richness, complexity and sheer scale of the Parsonian 
Theory of Action makes it appropriate at this point to specify the 
nature of our interest in this body of work. The primary reference 
point is its relationship to the work of Max Weber, represented 
in particular by the convergence thesis, According to this 
complex argument parsons' claimed to have incorporated the'Weberian 
perspective into a synthesis with other' approaches, and thereby 
to have substantially impxoved'the reliability and generality of 
the*scdences'dealing with human action through the establishment of 
a much more secure methodo1igtcal and theoretical foundation, 
Consequently it-is important, first of all, tö*clarify the nature 
67. 
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of Parsons'theoreti, cal strategy and the epistemological and 
methodological basis of his categories, and second, the details 
of the convergence' into the Theory of Action,. befbre there can be 
any discussion of the "'incorporation'l- of Weberfs sociological 
perspective into this wider theoretical approach. Inevitably, "then, 
22 
Parsonsl earlier work will figure prominently whereas his later 
work, although relevant to the issue of the theoretical continuity 
of the various stages of analytic scheme, will be examined more in 
terms of formal characteristics than substantive details, given 
the fact that Parsons extended much of his analysis into areas not 
explicitly covered by Weber. 
The analysis of Parsons Theory of Action is divided into 
two parts: the first looks at the origin of Parsonian sociology 
in the convergence of the four theoretical systems, as a preliminary 
to the second, which deals with the subsequent stages of development 
of his ideas, together with the main weaknesses which have been 
identified by his critics. The issues examined in each part 
are sufficiently extensive and coherent to justify their division 
into separate chapters and, finally, it is worth noting that 
largely as a result of the contrasting issues involved, the two 
chapters have distinctive styles. This chapter is.. largely 
expositionary in nature and seeks to establish. both the basic 
features of Parsonst theoretical and methodological approach and 
the extent to which Iarsons has demonstrated their validity, The 
following chapter is more critical, -, and. deals with contemporary 
assessments of Parsons work? its influencep, 'and the various responses 
to its and is organized around the-three-. key issues of testability, 
objectivity and the'. centrality to Parsonian theory of the subjective 
68. 
point of view, The aim is to show how the'particular characteristics 
of Paraonsl' work led directly to the "crisis" in sociology and to 
demands for radical revisions in the discipline. Indeed, the 
failure to find an adequate basis for criticism of Parsons' work, 
allied to dissatisfaction with5its ostensible nature -- which appeared 
to many commentators to be' inconsistent with their experience of 
reality - led to the undermining of some of the most basic principles 
of sociology as it had hitherto been understood. 
69. 
Z EPISTOMEOLOGICAL; METHODOLOGICAL.: AND-THEORETICAL 
'PRESUPPOSITIONS 
In The Structure of Social-Action Parsons presented 
systematically for the first time his views'on the nature of 
reality, the role of concepts and the possibilities of human knowledge 
within a framework which he called Analytic Realism. Prior to, 
this his discussions of social scientific theory had-been much more 
fragmentary and had centred on the status-of economic theory in 
23 
relation to a set of sociological factors. - Undoubtedly the single 
most important influence upon the development of Analytic Realism 
was the work of the philospher A. N. Whitehead. 
24 
He emphasized 
the importance of constructing a system of. theory in its own right 
rather than merely basing theory upon validated statements of fact; 
he drew attention to the abstract nature of theory'vis a'vis the 
empirical reality to which it referred, through his idea of the 
"fallacy of misplaced concreteness"25; and, in addition, he stressed 
the continuities between the social and the physical worlds. 
There have, of course, been other influences upon Parsons' views 
on scientific cognition, for example, W. B. Cannon, J. B. Conant, 
L. J. Henderson as well as Max Weber, who Parsons suggests, showed 
how scientific method could be applied to historical and cultural 
material. But the main features of Parsonst thinking in this area 
26 
are derived frojq Whitehead, and this is perhaps nowhere more 
true than in the case of his reputation as an "incurable theorist", 
27 
In more detail, theno Analytic Realism is based upon 
the epistemological assumption that there is an external world, and 
that this world of empirical phenomena has a particular nature which 
70. 
makes }; t accessible to hugan ýnaui: yS 
t% 1 to order Must he. og a character .' gbich. 
is in 
some sense,. congruent' with the ' öxder , of 
Duman logics 
Events ißt it cannot occur simply, at random, in the 
sense which is the negation of. logical order. -For 
a common feature of all scientific theory is the 
logicality of the relations between its propositions, " 28 
However, all knowledge of this world of'empirical phenomena is 
abstract when it is considered in relation to the raw data of sense 
experience although there are certain general ' concepts. in science - 
Parsons calls them the "analytic elements" which can adequately 
represent aspects of this empirical reality for specific purposes. 
These elements correspond to components of empirical phenomena which 
29 
can be analytically separated from other'components. 
Scientific inquiry is dependent upon observation, and for 
Parsons, observation of empirical fact is only possible through a 
conceptual scheme with the result that the very notion of a fact 
30 
is relative to such a scheme* Conceptual schemes which Parsons 
also calls descriptive frames of reference make possible the 
description of particular phenomena: 
of the great mass of possible empirical 
observations we select those which are at the same 
time meaningful within such a schema and 'belong 
together* They thus serve together to characterize 
the essential aspects of concrete phenomenon, which 
then becomes the object, of scientific interest. " 31 
Once a phenomenon has been conceptualized in terms-of a descriptive 
frame of reference, the next step in the scientific process is its 
analysis into its constituent parts or units, There are various 
forms of ana1ys. is. depending upon the nature of-the phenomenon under 
nvestigat, on; a machine can be' taken'apart. to, reveäl`its separate 
components and, in an anlogous fashion; the various structural 
elements, of a biological organism can be'identiUied, although this 
71. 
can lead to rather fictional concepts- because organic phenomena cannot 
be broken up without substantially altering the phenomena themselves. 
Also a sequence of actions may be analyzed into its different 
component acts, and the key to this procedure is the ability to 
imagine a particular act as a pure type, 'quite distinct from all other 
kinds of act. However, irrespective of the'level of abstraction 
the methodological purpose of the unit or part concept remains the 
same; 
"It refers to an, actually or hypothetically, existent 
concrete entity. ' However'much"the concept of the 
t'pure type', especially in the 'organic' case, may 
differ from anything concretely observable, the test 
is that thinking of it as concretely existent makes 
sense, that is does not involve a contradiction in 
terms. " 32 
Hence an empirical generalization is formulated on the basis of 
".,. --. the possible or probable behaviour of such 
concrete-or hypothetically concrete 'parts' of concrete` 
piienomena, "or various combinations-of them, under given 
typical circumstances. " 33 
The role of the analytic element=is, however, quite different. 
These concepts represent the general properties which can be 
identified once phenomena have been analyzed into their actually 
or hypothetically concrete parts or units because each unit or 
part constitutes a specific combination of such general properties. 
"Thus a physical body is described as having a certain 
particular mass, velocity, location, etc,, in the 
respects relevant to the theory of mechanics, Similarly 
an act iay be described as having a certain degree of 
rationality, of disinterestedness? etc, " 34 
The analytic element is inevitably abstract because 
'iý.. it refers to a general property while what we 
actually observe is. only its particular 'Value'- in 
the' pgrticular case. '"i' . 35 
1 
72. 
Parsons sees the relationship between, on the one hand, analytic 
elements and on the other} the unit and part concepts, to be based 
upon different kinds of abstraction, 
"Prom the point of view of element analysis every 
unit or part, concretely or conceptually isolated, 
constitutes a specific' combination of the particular 
values of one. or more analytical elements ... The 
element, on the other hand, may be the universal (1), 
of which the particular unit as a whole is a particular, 
(2) of which one or more facts describing it are 
particulars, (3) which corresponds to one or more 
emergent properties of complex combinations of such 
units. " 36 
However, the analytic elements are crucial to the development of 
science because, Parsons argues, once they have been clearly defined 
it has been a feature of the various sciences that a pattern of 
uniform relationships has been discovered between them: he calls 
such relationships analytical laws. 
37 
Consequently, -for Parsons, all theoretical systems are made 
up of these three. different kinds of concept: conceptual schemes, 
units and parts, and analytical elements. 
"They are so closely interdependent that there is 
never a system of-analytical elements without a 
corresponding frame of reference and a conception 
of the structure of the concrete systems to which it 
applies as made up of certain kinds of units or parts. " 38 
/ 
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II CONVERGENCE AND THE ' VOLUNTARISTIC. THEORY OF ACTION 
In view of the enormity of the material Parsons examines 
in the course of developing his argument, it will be useful to 
separate out certain themes from the substantive detail of 
convergence, This will provide some guidelines for examining the 
significance of particular factors within the Parsonian thesis. 
() Preliminary Considerations 
''The'Structure of'Social'-Adtion is a particularly complex 
book because Parsons attempts to demonstrate not one but two 
hypotheses, which are in effect mutually supporting. The rather 
better known'argument concerns a convergence between the different 
traditions of European social and economic thought toward the 
Voluntaristic Theory of Action, but the framework`'of this analysis 
is provided by the second hypothesis which is a methodological 
proposition concerning the way scientific knowledge advances. Hence 
the convergence in social thought becomes corroborating evidence for 
Parsons'- view on the nature of the development of scientific theory 
and, thereby, a justification for his strategy for the development 
of Grand Theory39 - namely the exclusive concentration upon theoretical 
issues. Significantly, little attention has been paid to Parsons' 
ideas on the process of scientific development. by his critics and 
commentators v indeed this reflecta a lack of interest, until quite 
recently., in: -the convergence thesis as a whole40 and it is for 
this reason that we shall begin by. considering scientific progress in 
terms of the relationship between fact and theory. 
72+. 
According. to Parsons it is widely. believed that 
scientific knowledge develops on the basis of the accumulation of 
new discoveries' and in this process the role for theory is to 
formulate propositions based upon this ever increasing body of 
information. 
"Development of theory would consist-entirely in the 
process of modification of these-general statements 
to take account of new-discoveries of fact. Above 
all, the process of discovery of fact is -held to be', 
essentially independent of the existing body of 
! theory to be the result of some such impulse as 
idle curiosity. " 41 
However, for Parsons the role of scientific theory is much more 
independent; whilst'a theory must>. be'consistent with empirical 
information, by itself this information does not exclusively, 
determine the shape of the theory. A system of theory has a clear 
logical structure with the result that a change in one proposition 
will have implications for some of the others; Parsons continues, 
! c.,. any important change in our knowledge of fact -0 in the field in question must of itself change the 
statement of-at least one. of the propositions of the 
theoretical system and, through the logical consequences 
öf. this. change, that of other propositions to a greater 
or lesser degree. That is. to say, the structure of 
the theoretical system is changed. " 42 
It is in the implications which new factual informdtion have for 
the structure of a theoretical system that its scientific importance 
lies, and this distinguishes it from other facts which may be 
equally true but are quite unremarkable because they remain 
consistent with existing theories. In addition, Parsons argues, 
the structure of a theory concentrates interest upon certain kinds 
of fact 
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'Theory not only formulates. 'whät. we know but also 
tells us what we want to know, *that is, the question 
to which an answer'is needed. Moreover, the structure 
of a theoretical system tells us what alternatives are 
open in the possible answers to a given question. If 
observed facts of undoubted accuracy will not fit any of 
the alternatives it leaves open, the system itself is" 
in need of reconstruction. " 43 
Thus the aim of the development of a theoretical systems is to achieve 
logical closure; this is realized' Parsons argues, 
'ý... when each of the logical implications which can be 
derived from any one proposition within the system 
finds its statement within another proposition in the 
same system. " 44" 
However, as long as the theoretical propositions do'not form a 
closed system in this sense, it is apparent that some implicit 
assumptions are involved, and for Parsons their ' discovery` is one 
of the main objectives- of theoretical work. 
Parsons* views-about the advance of scientific knowledge 
can be summarized as follows: the development of the structure of 
a theoretical. system is the result of combining new factual discoveries 
with the changing generalizations which are possible about the 
particular' body of information. ' 
Parsons' detailed proof of this argument - his examination 
of the work of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber - is concerned, 
therefore, with possible connections between changes in their 
empirical interpretations and changes in their repsective'theoretical 
sys. tema, He begins by exaýgining' the origin of the Voluntaristic 
Theory of Actkon. in the general positivistic tradition represented 
by Durkheim and, the utý'litarian approach exemplified by Marshall and 
Pareto and, then argues, that a very similar perspective was 
developed by Weber-. n the context of-idealjsM* The rationale for 
__,. this argument js. that the writers who' 
collectively were the most 
i 
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eminent of their generation each began within a certain tradition 
or theoretical system, but as a result of their inquiries which they 
pursued further than their contemporaries they were able to recognize 
more clearly than anyone else, the limitations of their tradition. 
Consequently, Parsons argues, they modified their theoretical systems 
to fit the new facts and generalizations which they had discovered. 
Although not explicitly aware of it the four writers had moved away 
from their heterogeneous starting points and arrived at what was to 
all intents and purposes a single theoretical system, which Parsons 
was able to codify and elaborate under the rubric of*the Voluntaristic 
Theory of Action, 
The final question we'must consider before turning to 'the 
substantive details of convergence is this: Why did Parsons 
choose to develop a general theory of action -a theoretical' 
framework broad enough to include within it all of the social sciences - 
rather than concerning himself specifically with the development, of 
a theoretical system for sociology? There are'perhaps two-sets of 
factors here. First, as was observed above, his conception of 
scientific theory was strongly influenced by Whitehead's work, with 
the result that his desire to emulate the notable theoretical 
advances in "the study of natural phenomena crystallized around the 
attempt to formulate a general theory applicable to human action. 
In addition, and perhaps more revealingly for our purposes, the 
ambitiousness of his obýecttve. can be usefully related to his 
biographical circumstances? In particular his adoption of a career 
in sociology, after an earlier start in economics. 
45 
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His doctoral dissertation at Heidelberg had been concerned 
with the problem of the origin and nature og capitalism, as seen 
by Sombart and Weber, and this initial-study led'Parsons to the 
realization that the interpretation of the economic institutions of 
the modern world, 
""'.,. could not be adequately handled without attempting 
to make far more explicit than was ordinarily done 
the extra'-economic theoretical framework within which 
economic theory would have to be'made to fit. " 46 
Given Parsons distinction between analytic and historical sciences, 
the interpretation or explanation of any empirical phenomenon 
required the utilization of concepts derived from several analytic 
schemes with the result that there was a vital need for a general 
theory or framework which could facilitate the coordination of 
particular schemes and ensure the'. compatibility of both terminology 
and the logical structure of different theoretical schemes. This 
is precisely what Parsons attempted to do through his examination 
of the Structure of social action and-his formulation of the Action 
Frame of Reference. 
Economic theory played a crucial role in Parsons' 
deliberations because it was the only form of theory in the area of 
the social sciences which resembled physical theory in terms of 
generality, analytic power and systematization. 
k'Economic theory, broadly at the level. achieved by 
Marshall, waa undoubtedly, the most highly sophisticated 
theoretical scheme yet developed for the analysis of 
any phase of human behaviour.. 47 
However, this theory was not without its problems which concerned, 
in particular, its relationship to reality; the elegant analytic 
models were based'upon limLted sets of variables and artificial 
assumptions about people's actions and it is, Parsons argues, for 
I 
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this reason that 
%,. the most: important theoretical contribution of 
'The Structure of'Social Action was the. demonstration 
of a systematic range of problems on the borderline 
of this theory, and a convergent body of 'concepts 
oriented toward dealing with these problems. - The most 
fundamental of these was ..: the problem of order. It 
included also the problem of "rationality" and the 
clarification of the'two basic meanings of the concept, 
the -'psychological" meaning of motivational components 
accounting. for deviations from rational norms, And, on 
the other hand, the "cultural" concepts cf values; 
"ultimate ends", and so forth, which were non rational 
rather than irrational. These were all related 
to and underlay the conception of a normative order of 
institutions such as cöntract, property, authority, and 
so forth, and some reconstruction of the relation between 
these institutions and the "self-interest" which was the 
focus of the motivational conceptions in economic tradition. 
They included the anchorage of the "moral authority" of 
normative patterns in religious*committments as analyzed 
in Durkheim's and Weber's concepts, respectively, of the 
sacred and of charisma. " 48 
(b) `'Substantive Convergence 
The central feature of Parsons argument is the recognition 
of several distinct traditions following their own logical courses 
of development toward a more scientific or accurate account of 
social reality. Parsons regarded these developments as preliminary 
attempts to formulate a general theory of action, although the 
participants were not necessarily aware of this, nor for that matter 
would all of them have approved: of it. He drew a broad, distinction 
between two marin groups= namely positivism and,. idealism. The 
positivists attempted to develop a theory of human conduct in the 
manner of the natural &ciences, a-consequently they looked for 
explanations in terms- of scientific laws'which assumed a determinism 
of social phenömenä in terins"of cause and effect. In contrast to 
this the idealists sought to explain social phenomena as manifestations 
of cultural values*, For Parsons each tradition had considerable 
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insight, but it was insufficient by Ltself to establish a general 
theory, in relation to positivism, for example, Parsons argues 
that, 
ýý. ý. each of the main categories' developed has found, 
subject, of course, to. qualifications and refinement, 
a permanent place in the attack on. the problems of 
human behaviour. " 49 
The difficulty which remained, however', was to find the right way 
to combine these various categories' into a system of theory which 
could adequately explain social life: this is the. task he set 
himself in The Structure of'Social'ACtion, Writing some 30 years 
after the publication of the book, Parsons assessmentiof his 
interest in the work of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber 
remained unchanged; it was, 
ýý... to demonstrate in them the emergence of a single, 
basically integrated, if fragmentary theoretical,. 
movement. This made it necessary to. work out 
independently the main structure of the theoretical 
scheme in terms of which the unity of the intellectual 
movement could be demonstrated. The general-theory 
of the 'structure of social actions which constitutes 
the framework of the book r and the justification for 
its title ^ was not simply a 'summary' of the works of 
the four theorists. It was an independent theoretical 
contribution... " 50 
Parsons took as his point of departure the utilitarian tradition, 
which had gained a dominant position in European social thought in 
the 19th Century, . 
Its significance for Parsons lay in the emphasis 
given to the conception of -intrinsically rational action and 
consequently its incorporation of the subjective point of view into 
the study, of action 
"Action is rational in so far as it pursues ends 
possible. within the conditions of the situation, 
and by'the means which, 'among those available to 
the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to 
the'end for reasons understandable and verifiable 
by positive empirical science. " 51 
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The utilitarians conceived of the'*actor in everyday life 
as faced with sjtuations requiring a choice between alternative 
means to achieve ends in an analogous fashion to the scientist's 
efforts to solve problems through the application of knowledge. 
This had the advantage that analysis in terms of the means-ends 
schema fully conformed to the methodological procedures of positive 
science, but it did mean that categories"of empirical actions such 
as, for example, ritual, were almost entirely ignored, In addition, 
Parsons suggests that the other main features of the tradition were 
as follows; atomism -a tendency to establish the nature of systems 
of action solely on the basis of generalization from the properties 
of conceptually isolated unit acts, together with the assumption 
that the rationality of the unit, act applied to complete empirical 
systems of action; the randomness of wants - the assumption that 
individuals and their ends were unique meant that little attention 
was paid to the possibility of the integration into a coherent 
system of the ends of action for the participants in specific 
settings; and empiricism the belief that the various conceptual 
elements of a theory were sufficient in themselves to account for 
a particular range or class of empirical phenomena. 
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The result. was a system of theory which concentrated its 
attention upon the relationship between means and ends, very much to 
the detriment of the category of ultimate ends which were assumed, 
both for the individual and the meubers of society, to be randomly 
related; although it was often implicitly assumed that in a free 
and rational society orderly and peaceful social relationships would 
be inevitable, However, this was an unsatisfactory theoretical 
position'gor Parsons who argued that unless some attempt was made to 
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systematically relate the ultimate ends of action to each other, 
a general theory was impossible. - 
Various attempts were made to question the utilitarian 
assumption concerning'the randomness of ends, but the result was 
the incorporation of the ends of action into the conditions of the 
situation. This meant that the analytic independence of the, 
category of ends disappeared together. with the independence of the 
actor who was-: now conceptualized as merely adapting to the social 
context, in other words, action was seen to be determined by the 
53 
conditions of the situation. Parsons refers to the problem of 
the status of the ends of action as the utilitarian dilemma. 
"That is, either the active agency of the actor in 
the choice of ends is an independent factor'in action, 
and the end element must be random, or the objectional 
implication of randomness of ends is denied, but then 
their independence disappears and they are assimilated 
to-the conditions of the situation, that is to elements 
analyzable in terms of non-subjective categories, 
principally heredity and environment. " 54 
But in this case, Parsons argued, the position could no longer be 
described in voluntaristic. terms. 
Another problem was faced by the positivist movement which 
gained its coherence from the assumption that, 
... positive science constitutes man's sole 
possible significant cognitive relation to 
external (nonego) reality. ", 55 
Although. individualistic and xattonalistic theories, could be 
successfully applied to rational conduct this meAnt that the non- 
rational element in social life was- either, totally forgotten, or 
all deviations from rational standards were explained in terms of 
ignorance and error; in particular, thenp there could be'no 
satisfactory exäptnation of ritual actions, 
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Within the broad positivistic framework the work of Hobbes 
came to occupy an important position and his problem of order has 
remained an enduring theme in Parsons work. Hobbes believed that 
mankind was guided by a variety of passions not all of which could 
be realized, The desires were regarded as randomly related to-each 
other and the role allocated to"the individual's intellect was merely 
one of serving to achieve what-is desired. The members of society 
pursue different desires which inevitably bring them into-conflict 
with each other-in the course of the struggle to achieve their 
particular objectives. The ability to realize what is desired depends 
upon the individuals power, and in these. circumstances people resort 
to the use of force and fraud. » In order, to-avoid this kind of 
chaos., Robbes'argued, the members of society give power to a--sovereign 
who in return gives them security through- the. establishment. of 
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rules governing interaction. This form of theory was based, 
squarely in the utilitarian tradition; according to Parsons it 
deduced a concrete situation justifying the-role of a monarch 
directly from the theoretical system, and in particular, from the 
problem of order. Subsequently,, -this problem became the main 
empirical difficulty for the utilitarian tradition because it could 
only be solved by abandoning the positivistic framework or by 
accepting a form of. radical positivism., - 
Having clarigied this preparatory material it is now 
possible to. see why, the. nature and role of economic theory V 'and 
as a representative of this, the work of Alfred Marshall - is such 
a key' eature of Parsons1theoretical concerns, Given that economic 
actions are empirically, important. in social life, Parsons asks, 
J 
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Now is it possible, still making use of the general 
action schema, to solve the*Hobbesian problem of order 
and yet not make use of an objectionable metaphysical 
prop as the doctrine of the natural identity of 
intrests? " 57 
The basic instability of the utilitarian theoretical system, 
vis a'vis the problem of order - either increasing reliance upon 
nonscientific elements or. decreasing importance attached to normative 
elements '- provides the organizing thread for Parsons' analysis of 
the economic theories of Marshall and Paretö in relation to a 
broader set of sociological factors. 
Alfred Marshall made important contributions to economics 
with his utility theory, an innovation closely associated with the 
traditional elements of utilitarianism but for Parsons there is 
another aspect to his work, the attempt to relate economic conditions 
to the human character. Marshall went beyond the utilitarians 
in refusing to accept the assumption of independent, wants, nor did 
he see peoples' actions merely as a means to want satisfaction, , 
and developed an additional category, that of, activities. Parsons, 
argues that this was a value factor: 
"Concrete economic actions are held to be not merely 
means to the acquisition of purchasing power. They 
are also carried on for their own sake,. they are modes 
of the immediate expression of ultimate value attitudes 
in action. " 58 
This is corroborated by the fact that where 4ar. shall saw the utklity 
elements to be inadequate he did not invoke hedonisitc explanations 
as had frequently been the case to positivist thought, nor did he 
emphaaýse heredity-And environments Marshall supported free 
enterprise because he considered that it*provided the opportunity to 
develop the moral qualities of an individualls character, particularly 
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those which he valued. And in direct contrast to the utilitarian 
tradition, individualistic society was not to be understood purely 
in terms of rational want satisfaction, rather it was seen to be 
based upon certain values. For Parsons this formulation is in broad 
agreement with the views of Durkheim and Weber. 
According to Parsons, the'significance of this point was 
somewhat obscured by Marshall's empiricist approach, whereby he 
attempted a complete explanation of the empirical phenomena of 
business life.. The disadvantage of this position is that it 
rests implicitly upon the need för an'encyclopaedic sociology which 
inevLtably submerged the logically distinct body of economic 
principles. 
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Parsons summarizes Marshall's contribution to a general 
theory of action, ` in this way; first, he showed the importance of 
common values for the explanation of an individualistic order like 
free enterprize; second, he made the relationship between the value 
element and economics a methodological issue; and third, he brought 
attention to bear upon. the fäct. that the subjective analysis of action 
in terms of the means-end schema could be the basis for the 
classification of the social sciences. For Parsons these three issues 
are the most important methodoligical problems to be examined in 
\The Structure of 'Social Action, 
60 
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Vilfredo pareto 
In contrast to ý14rshaiVs views Raretots-methodology was extremely 
sophisticated, and of the four writers exäminedr*the most consistent 
with iars'ons'' own' position; 
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"Tiere is in it nothing essential*on either the 
inethodölogical or theoretical level which from the 
point of view of this study, must be discarded. " 61 
Of particular importance to Parsons is the fact that whilst Pareto 
was guided by his experience of the physical sciences in the 
formulation of his systematic theory of social life he did not 
incorporate any of their substantive concepts. Moreover, 
"His approach to sociology and the general methodology 
of social science is throughout determined by the question 
of the status of the concepts-of traditional economic 
theory in relation both to concrete reality and to other 
theoretical schemata. " 62 
Iareto, then, was not an empiricist and for this reason was able 
to develop a system of economic theory as an abstract discipline; 
he recognized that theories are selective in relation to empirical 
reality, that analytic laws are not generalizations about the 
behaviour of concrete phenomena and that the formulation of such 
generalizations necessitates the amalgamation of several systems 
of theory. 
63 
In his consideration of the social element Pareto 
distinguished between two groups of actions, the logical and the 
non-logcical, Logical action referred closely to the class of 
empirical actions traditionally dealt with by economic theory, 
whereas the nonlogical covers an area of life which can be added 
to the abstract analytic scheme of economics. This enabled him 
to distinguish more clearly than Marshall had been able, between 
the categories og utility and activities, ParetoEs strategy was 
to develop a system of analytic elements dealing with non-,. logical 
actions --broadly the social factor m and then to synthesize them 
with the economic elements as a basis for explaining concrete social 
systems, Parsons, aim, is, as we have seen', more modest; it is to 
8i 
develop an outline of the structure of systems of action, 
Nevertheless, Parsons says this of Pareto: 
"... his own system is not incompatable with this 
structural analysis, but its absence may be justly 
regarded as a limitation on the completeness of his, 
work regarded as a treatise on general sociology. 64 
In addition 
... its very 
incompleteness is one thing which makes 
it particularly useful for the purposes of this study, 
since it provides an excellent medium for verification 
of the analysis attempted here, 3, n spite of not stating 
the analysis explicitly. " 65 
It is for this reason that Parsons utilizes the distinction 
between logical and non-logical action as a starting point for his 
own analysis of the structure of systems of action, whereas Pareto 
had made it the basis for his classification of residues and 
derivations. 
Foi4Pareto an- action is logical when the objective end and 
the subjective end coincide: this characterization makes it clear 
that the subjective point of view is crucial to hi3 approach as 
also is the rational norm of action which was such a feature of the 
positivistic theory. 
66 But in contrast to Pareto who examined 
action in systems synthetically, Parsons considers them analytically, 
and in this way it becomes possible to see particular acts as part 
of a sequence or chain of related acts. On this basis Parsons 
identifies three sectors of the means-end relationship - the ultimate 
means and conditions of action, an intermediate sector, and the 
category of ultimate endsJ67 Identi tying the economic element of 
the intermedjate. sector of logical action with the allocation of 
scarce means to particular ends, Parsons comments; 
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ýý... if the concept of logical action be. accepted 
at all the meaning of rationality must-be extended 
from the relations of means to a single given end, 
to include an element of the choice between 
alternative ends. " 68 
In his view to speak of choice logically implies that the ends 
of action form part of a meaningfully integrated system. Hence, 
Parsons argues, each individual's actions must be related to his 
or her system of ultimate ends. When action is examined at a 
more complex level, involving a variety of actors, the use of 
coercion in social relationships becomes a real possibility. 
For Parsons the political aspect of the intermediate sector of the 
means-end relationship refers to the potential: iuse of coercion 
over others to facilitate the realization of one individual's ends, 
69 
and this, of course, brings our attention back to the problem of 
order. 
The basis for Pareto's solution to this problem lay in 
the role of the value element in social life; Parsons finds. 
corroboration of his analysis of the intrinsic means-end schema 
and this applies particularly to his view that the ultimate ends 
of action form a coherent. system in contrast to the utilitarian 
assumption of a random relationship between the ends of action 
in Pareto's examinations of social utility. Pareto developed 
this concept to correspond to the. economistst doctrine that the. 
maximum satisfaction for the individual leads to a society in 
which there ja the greatest possible satisfaction of the wants of 
all the'nembers-. of society, and he applied it specifically to non- 
economic wants or ends, In the formulation of this idea Pareto 
distinguishes between two abstract types of society, 'and in one 
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of the cases refers to the end which the society pursues, For 
Parsons this point is of enormous significance: 
"This is surely considering the collectivity as 
a unity, a unity in the sense that the society 
can be thought of as pursuing a 'single common 
end (or system or ends) and not merely discrete 
individuals ends. 70 
Whilst human society is clearly not the same as the 
abstract type, it is clear to Parsons that Pareto regarded the 
end which the society pursues as an important element in the 
empirical world. Moreover, if end is to be used as a subjective 
category, then the "end of the society" must constitute an 
integrated system of aims and objectives common to all its members 
in this abstract and extreme case. For Parsons the category of a 
system of ends held in common is an emergent property of systems 
of action and'does not-apply to the consideration of isolated 
individual acts and this is one of the main reasons why it was 
ignored within the utilitarian approach. Parsons finds additional 
corroboration for his interpretation of the role of the value 
elements in social life in Pareto's cyclical theory of social change 
which emphasizes the importance of ideology. 
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The contrast between 
this theory and Marshall's evolutionary approach 
. 
to social change 
based upon increasing rationality within society is of special 
interest to Parsons because it demonstrates his views on the 
intimate connection between changes in theoretical systems and 
empirical nterpretationa. 
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The importance of Paretö", s analysis of logical and 
non^lo&ical. action. to Parsons' argument lies in his transcendence 
of the individualistic bias of the positivistic tradition of 
thought, through his stress upon a shared system of ultimate values 
as an element in action. In addition action is analyzed in terms 
of the scientific standards inherent in the means-ends schema, and 
the individual is- seen to be integrated with. bthers, to varying 
degrees, through common ultimate values. For all of these reasons, 
therefore, Parsons is emphatic that Pareto's work represents a, 
Voluntaristic Theory of Action. 
Emile Durkheim 
Durkheim, unlike Marshall and Pareto, had no training in economics. 
His background was instead, in law and philosophy, but despite this 
he made, in Parsons' view, a major contribution to empirical science: 
".,. at every critical point, there. is the -closest 
possible relationship between his theoretical views 
even on the most abstrusely methodological plane, and 
the problems of interpretation of empirical material 
with which he was struggling at the same time. " 73 
Although Durkheim was more interested in the structure of social 
action than Pareto, his work lacked the latter's theoretical and 
methodological consistency and underwent quite distinct transformations 
in its development with the result that his contribution to the 
convergent body of concepts is 
inherently more complicated to establish 
because it involves Parsons in considerable analysis to separate 
out certain metaphysical elements. 
Durkheim'""s importance to Parsons can be' traced to his 
critical examination-of the utilitarian interpretation of an 
individualistic &gcial order, and his view' that a free enterprise 
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society can only be understood in terms of a. set of normative rules 
governing social relationships; a viewpoint which is in broad 
agreement with that of Marshall. 
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In opposition to individualistic 
thought, Durkheim proposed the idea of a society as a reality 
sui generis, and for Parsons this represents a major step towards 
the solution of the problem of order: 
"'.,. in his criticism of the' utilitarian conception 
of contractual relations he sets over against their 
view that the stability of a contractual system involves 
only an'ad hoc conciliation of interests his own 
insistence that a vital part is played by a system of 
binding rules embodied in the institution of contract; 
without them, indeed, a stable system'öf. such relations 
would not be conceivable. Thus the emphasis on the 
normative rule as an agency controlling individual 
conduct. '! 75 
According to Parsons, in the examination of anomie in his 
study of suicide, Durkheim goes further: 
- "There, not merely contractual relationships but stable 
social relationships in general and even the personal 
equilibrium of the members of a social group are seen 
to be dependent on the existence of a normative structure 
in relation to conduct, generally accepted as having 
moral authority by the members of the community, and upon 
their effective subordination to these norms. " 76 
This formulation' was of particular significance to Parsons because 
it is couched in terms of the subjective point of view of the actor 
and the utilitarian dilemma is-rejected without resorting to the 
positivistic view that rules externally regulate peoples' behaviour; 
instead the rules are seen to be part o£ the actorls ends and in' 
this way constraint becomes part of the normative orientation of 
action, Hence What was for Parsons the characteristically Durkheimian 
view of constraints 
'"'ý.. moral obligation to obey a rule c" the voluntary 
adherence. to it as, a dutyt! ' 77 
1 
91 
Durkheim'-s solution to the Hobbesian problem of order 
at the same time provides an answer to the phenömenon of anomie, 
the state of disorganizations which exists when social norms 
have ceased'to influence individual conduct. According to Parsons 
the basis of this view is to be found in the idea of respect for 
the rules in themselves, rather than the individual adopting a 
calculating attitude towards them. 
Durkheim'"s transcendence of the utilitarian dilemma has 
major consequences for his system of theory: Parsons comments, 
"The 'subjective' can no longer be exhausted by the 
element of random wants in the utilitarian sense, 
since the latter cannot become ä basis of normative 
order. The utilitarian conception in. turn therefore 
cannot exhaust the concrete wants of the concrete 
individual. " 78 
But, Parsons argues, Durkheim was not able to-capitalize-on these 
theoretical developments-and draw out their implications in the 
direction of the Voluntaristic Theory because of his empiricist 
view of the relationship between concept and reality. In particular, 
he did not sufficiently free himself from, 
"... the interpretation that the social reality of 
which he speaks is a concrete entity separate from 
individuals. " 79 
Whereas if a methodology consistent with analytic realism is adopted 
these problems can be avoided, in this case Parsons suggests, 
"The social-is an element or group o4 elements in the 
causation og the behaviour of individuals and masses 
of them; Equally, the individual elements`" do not 
constitute the concrete human being, but a theoretical 
abstraction. '' 80 
As Durkheim"s conception of the social element came 
increasingly to focus upon norms, of moral obligation, so a change 
took place in the meaning of "collective representation",, originally 
a system of ideas about concrete social reality external to the minds 
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of the members of society, it became, 
t'... a body of ideas which themselves form the 
effective factor in action, that is, the effective 
factor is itself present in the minds of individualst, 
not merely a representation of it. To be sure the 
ideas are still conceived as representatives of 
something, But this something is not a contemporaneously 
existent observed empirical entity, but is in part a 
state of affairs which will come into being or be 
maintained in so far as the normative elements in fact 
determine the actual course of action. It is not a 
present, but a future state of affairs in the empirical 
world to which they refer. " 81 
Given that one of the elements of "collective representation" 
is a system of normative rules morally binding upon., the members of 
society Durkheim reaches the position that, 
"... a common value system is one of the required 
conditions for a society to be a stable system in 
equilibrium. ". 82 
Hence sanctions become merely a secondary level of support for the 
social control of individuals -a system which derives its 
principal effectiveness from the moral authority of the normative 
rules. Parsons continues, 
"Thus in every society there is such a body of 
normative rules of action, the embodiment of 
ultimate common values. In. one main aspect the 
integration of the society is to be measured in 
terms of the degrees to which these rules are 
lived up to from motives of moral obligation. 
But beside this there is always the motive of 'interest' 
which, looking upon the rules as essentially conditions 
of actionsp acts in terms of the comparative personal 
advantage of obedience or disobedience and acceptance 
og the sanctions which wall have to be suffered. 1' 83 
According to Parsons, Durkheimts. theory of control fits 
within the action schema and is practically identical to the - 
viewpoint which will be found to be implicit in Paret0s work, 
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Whilst both have agreed on the role of the common value system'in 
social life, Durkheim with his greater interest in the structure of 
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systems. of action went beyond l'areto and identified the nature and 
role of social institutions. Durkheim argued that although an 
individual's ultimate ends may conform to- the system of common 
ultimate values, 
",.. there is a need for a regulatory system of rules 
explicit or implicit, legal or customary, which keeps 
action ... in conformity with that system. The 
breakdown of this control is anomie or the war of all 
against all. 
This body of rules governing action in pursuit of 
immediate ends in so far as they excercise moral 
authority derivable from a. common value system may 
be called social institutions. " 85 
For Durkheim the study of the social, the rules. and 
institutions governing people's actions - became the proper focus 
for sociology, and this had major methodological implications: it 
meant a departure from the utilitarian tradition in respect of the 
ends of action which. were now conceptualized'as a social rather than 
an individual category whilst at-the same time, the roles of the_ 
other utilitarian. elements of action were maintained. Parsons 
argues that, like Pareto, Durkheim saw that: the complex interwoven 
chains of the intrinsic means-end relationship provided the basis 
for distinguishing between the different social sciences in terms 
of the analytic separation of the elements of concrete social 
phenomenon. Consequently Parsons is able to claim; 
"The view of the proper abstraction for the social 
sciences here put forward is. not that of a series 
of hypothetical concrete systems, but'rather of 
abstract analytical systems each of which assumes 
as data the main outline of fundamental structure of 
concrete systems of action including the elements 
other than those immediately, dealt with by the science 
in question, "' 86 
A major-part of Durkheiml-s. theoretical and empirical 
researches centred upon the nature of religion and its role in 
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social life. 'According to Parsons, Durkheim held the view that, 
"Religious ideas may be held to constitute the 
cognitive bridge between'men's active attitudes 
and the non empirical aspects of their universe. 
Action is not only 'meaningfully oriented'', as the 
positivist inevitably concludes', -to reality as 
rationally understood by science but to the 
nonempirical as well. " 87 
Hence, in examining religious actions Durkheim expanded the means- 
end schema to include a normative component of action systems 
which had always been rejected as "irrationalt by the positivists. 
Although ritual actions cannot be measured by the standards of 
intrinsic rationality they can be considered as an expression of 
peoples' attitudes towards the. nonempirical aspects of social life. 
For Parsons this marked a clear rejection of positivistic methodology, 
a process which had begun with the recognitiorL of the significance 
of ultimate values in relation to the intrinsic means-end chain and 
had become increasingly apparent as ultimate value attitudes were 
seen to be expressed directly in religious actions. 
Parsons continues his interpretation of Durkheimýs views 
on the role of religion in social life as follows: 
"Society is... the reality underlying the symbols 
of religious ritual because it is only empirical 
reality which, as of a moral nature, can serve as 
the source of the ritual attitude. Therefore 
religious ritual is an expression of this social 
reality. This proposition may be modified to the 
form that religious ritual is (in la*zge part) an 
expression of the common ultimate value attitudes 
which constitute the specifically 'social' normative 
element in concrete society; '"" 88 
Thus: A coupon religion is the basis Zor a moral community, 
consequently, every society is. characterized' to a certain extent 
by the*possession. of a common religion, Without this sytem of 
common values, partly represented by religion, society as an 
organized and stable set of social relationship"s could not exist 
I 
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and for Parsons, Durkheim's analysis of anomie clearly proved 
this. However, there is a constant possibility of disorganization 
in society because the ultimate ends of action may be submerged in 
the pressure of immediate interests, and for Durkheim it is in 
relation to this problem that the crucial role of religion is to be 
found : 
rº.., by the common ritual expression of their 
attitudes men not only manifest them but they, 
in turn, reinforce the attitudes. Ritual brings 
the attitudes into a heightened state of self 
consciousness which greatly strengthens them, and 
through them strengthens, in turn, the moral community. 
Thus religious ritual effects a reassertion and 
fortification of the sentiments on which social 
solidarity depends. As Durkheim sometimes puts it, 
it recreates the society itself. " 89 
For Parsons, liurkheim's theory of religion is clearly based 
upon a voluntaristic: conception of action. The actor is seen to 
play a creative rather-than adaptive role, whilst the realization 
of value attitudes in action is not automatic. Indeed, 
"Durkheium's view of the-functions of ritual implies 
the necessity of still a further element, what is 
generally called will-or effort. '! 90 
Moreover, according to Parsons, Durkheim came near to the 
recognition that the science of -sociology should address itself to 
the analytically separable common ultimate value elements and their 
relationships to the other elements of action. But Durkheim's 
epistemology prohibited an explicit realizat on of this and, in 
addition, towards the end og his career he moved away from his 
earlier objectivj., st standards. In The ElementarZ'Forms of Religious. 
Life, 'Durkheim argued that society existed only in peoples ideas 
and sentiments, in. other words, it-became part of the realm of 
eternal objects-. For 'arsons this is an idealist position which is 
contradictory to the standards of science. 
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"It is-of especial interest here. because it represents 
a close approach to [deberýs doctrine of 1Verstehen'. " 92 
Parsons explains this aspect of Durkheim's theoretical development 
in these terms; 
Il.. 
q one very important reason why Durkheim was 
attracted by idealism was that he never really 
outgrew his empiricism. He could never clearly 
and consistently think of social reality as'one 
factor in concrete social life, but always tended 
to slip over into thinking of it as a concrete 
entity. Then since 'ideas' cannot be dissociated 
from the latter, it must consist of ideas. " 93 
For Durkheim, therefore, sociology became the study of the value 
ideas in themselves whereas, Parsons argues, the proper 
conceptualization of the subject matter of sociology as an explanatory 
science concerns the relationships between the normative elements 
and action. 
In a_summary of the lessons to be learned from the problems 
faced by the positivist tradition, Parsons makes the following-points: 
"It. seems legitimate to conclude.. *that neither 
the radical positivist position nor the related 
utilitarian view is a stable methodological basis 
for the theoretical sciences of action. Marshall 
came from the very midst of the utilitarian tradition, 
and, without meaning to do so, modified it out of "7, 
recognition. The other two attacked it explicitly 
and successfully. Both of them tended at times to 
react from it in the direction of radical positivism, 
but for both that involved difficulties from the 
consideration of which they emerged with the conception 
of a common system of ultimate values as a vital element 
in concrete social life. Durkheim went beyond this to 
work out some of the most important modes of its 
relation to the other elemente of action 
This process may be interpreted to contribute a 
definite -internal breakdown of the, positivistic theory 
of action in the work of the two men strongly 
predisposed in its favours In this breakdown'the 
sheer ' empirical evidence played a decisive role along 
with theoretical and methodological considerations, " 94 
i 
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The other main tradition of European social thought 
examined by Parsons is that of idealism and his analysis of the 
way in which its specific limitations were overcome is predominantly 
in terms of Webers sociological work. According to Parsons, Weber 
started from an intellectual milieu largely determined by idealist 
considerations, yet produced a framework for the'study of social 
action identical in all important respects to the Voluntaristic 
Theory which had emerged from positivism. We have already observed 
in Chapter 1 where certain features of the idealistic tradition 
were explored, that Parsonst interpretation of Weber is inextricably 
linked to the exigencies of the convergence thesis. It is therefore 
unnecessary here, in examining the idealistic side of the transformation 
in social thought, to repeat what has already been said. It will 
suffice to summarize the theoretical background of idealism and 
focus attention in outline form on those aspects of Webens work 
which were crucial to the convergence thesis simply to ensure 
that the relevant issues for the assessment of Parsons' arguments 
are established. 
To recapitulate briefly: the influence of Kantian 
epistemology led to the separation of the sciences of natural 
phenomena and the sciences concerned with the human spirit. Actions 
could not be satisfactorily examined by the analytic and generalizing 
methods of natural. science because the person was seen" to be free 
to choose hour to act, with the result that philosophical methods 
were regarded as more appropriate for their study, 'and this applied 
in particular, to the intuitive grasp of cultural totalities, 
The most sophisticated opposition to the use of the methods developed 
for the study of physical and biological, phenomena in the realm of 
1 
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human society and culture was expressed by Windelband, Dilthey 
and Rickert. 
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History was seen to be a-succession of unique 
and unconnected periods, to be comprehended in: terms of the organic 
unity of, these ideal realities, and such meaningful relationships 
were sharply distinguished from the causal relationships developed 
by the positivistic tradition. For Parsons, idealism clarifies 
the possible relationships between the normative elements of 
action and the system of human conduct. He argues that the 
relationship can be conceptualized in two'ways, intrinsically and 
symbolically. 
"The first ..., lies closest to positivistic modes of 
thought, since for thought processes the elements of 
scientific. methodology. constitute such a norm, 
especially the logical, and in so far as action is 
rational, in the sense employed throughout this study, 
the same elements are normative not only to thought 
but also to, action ... In this context the meaningful 
elements of action become, in the terms of a 
voluntaristic theory of action, of causal significance, 
for it is only in terms of orientation to such norms 
that a measure of independence of the processes of 
action from their conditions is conceivable. 
The second mode of relation, the symbolic, has come 
into prominence especially in connection with 
Durkheim's treatment of religion between the 
particular symbol and its meaning; certainly the 
relation is not that. -between the non-normative 
elements of a situation and a norm. In this context 
spatiotemporal phenomena of all sorts are capable of 
interpretation, not in terms of their intrinsic 
properties and their causal relations, but as 
symbolic expressions of meanings or systems of 
meanings. In so far as phenomena are interpreted 
in this context, it means dispensing with, the 
causal explanation of the natural sciences altogether, " 96 
Methodologically, the explication of these meanings is known'as 
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. and for Parsons 
it is perhaps the'most characteristic Verstehen. 
feature of idealism with the result that the rigid distinction 
between it and. positivism was inevLtablet 
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"Agains. t. mechanism, individualism, atomism, it has 
placed organicism, the subordination of the unit, 
including the human individual, to: "the whole, Against 
essential continuity in its field of study, which has 
looked upon particular cases. as instances of a general 
law or principle, it has emphasized the irreducible 
qualitative individuality of the phenomena it was 
studying and has issued in a far-reaching historical 
relativism. " 98 
In idealism, like positivism, economic phenomena , 
attracted the main focus of interest in the study of social life, 
but in this case the Historical School of Economics tended to 
examine the modern economic order'as a unique system with the 
result that the conceptual schemes, 16f the classical economic 
theorists were seen to apply exclusively to such an: individualistic 
order. For Parsons, the Marxist theory of capitalism retained a 
major element of the historical approach in that although, following 
Hegel, a dialectical process of change was, conceptualized from one - 
form of society to the next, each separate stage of society was 
seen to be organized on quite distinct principles.. -Consequently,. 
although Marx used the theoretical approach of, classical economics, 
he 
... turned it from an analytic theory of the economic 
aspect of social phenomena in general into a historical 
theory of the functioning and development-of a 
particular economic system, the capitalistic. " 99 
In contrast to Marxts emphasis on economic causation, 
Sombart can be seen as a much more central representative of 
idealism because he gives primacy in the explanation of modern 
capitalisni to its. spirit, - According to Parsonse Sombartts 
economic concepts were relevant only to a specific economic system, 
they were not oX the'analyti, c type-with general applicability, but 
in his identification of the spirit of the' modern age he did refer 
to a common value element. However'Sombart used this, Parsons 
r 
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comments, in an empiricist manner' believing that the total concrete 
phenomenon of capitalism could be explained by its-spirit - an 
approach which left no room for utilitarian elements. 
Max Weber 
With the main features of the idealist tradition outlined Parsons 
introduces, what is, for his convergence thesis, its most crucial 
representative. 
"Weber... was a thinker steeped both in the idealistic 
tradition of thought and in the particular empirical 
problems of Marx and Sombart. He transcended ... the 
Marx-Sombart dilemma in a way consonant with the 
general scheme of analysis developed in this study. "-100 
In particular, for Parsons, the empirical tradition: of German : 
historical thought was the context for Weber's intellectual development 
and his early, attempts at theoretical statements undoubtedly bore this 
imprint, but his later and more significant work broke through this 
framework to arrive at a substantially different position. 
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Like 
Marx and Sombart he saw the modern economic order to' be unique and 
he shared with Marx the view of the compulsive nature of rational 
bourgeois capitalism in which people's actions were-largely 
determined by the nature of the situation in which they found ., 
themselves. However, he disagreed with Marx over the issue of the 
origin of the modern economic order. 
"At the opening of the new period of this thinking 
Weber came quite decisively to the view that an 
indispensible (though by no means the only) element 
in the explanation of the system lay in a system. of 
ultimate values and value attitudea, -in turn anchored 
in and. in part dependent upon a definite metaphysical 
system'. of ideas, This constituted, for the particular 
case in. haind, a direct polemical challenge to the 
Marxan type of explanation,! " 102 
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Parsonst account of the details. of the. Weberian explanation of 
the rise of modern western capitalism and the' comparative studies 
in the world religions need not be pursued here because these 
studies reflect a sufficiently consistent theoretical orientation 
unlike Durkheimts work in which substantive studies are intermingled 
with theoretical developments - that it was possible for Parsons 
to present these issues essentially in an expositionary manner. 
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The theoretical purpose of these studies was, according to Parsons, 
twofold: to demonstrate'the effective, role of values in social 
action, thereby relativizing the Marxist account; and, at'the same 
time, to evaluate the relative importance-of ideal and material 
circumstances in the particular historical settings, which leads 
equally to the relativization of a purely idealistic interpretation 
of social change. 
One of the main reasons why Parsons was able to separate 
empirical and theoretical issues in his treatment of Weberian" 
sociology lay in the explicit attention Weber devoted to 
methodological considerations, with the result that his discussion 
of these issues was far greater than that of Durkheim and more even 
than that of Pareto. This had the advantage to Parsons of obviating 
a good deal of analysis which as we have seen was needed 'in Durkheim's 
case to determine his theoretical and methodological position. 
However, the polemical context of much of Weber's writing on these 
topics and the absence of a very detailed general statement left 
a somewhat fragmented picture which enabled Parsons to discover 
certain underlying-and implicit features about [Webers methodological 
and theoretical. standpoint, as he had been able to do in his analysis 
of Pareto and Durkhei, m. 
102. 
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Again it will be sufficient to merely summarize the main. 
characteristics of. WeberFs methodology, as Parsons' interpretation 
of this has already been examined in detail. According to Parsons, 
in opposition to idealism Weber argued for the indispensibility of 
general concepts in the scientific study of action, for the 
inevitability of their abstractness'vis'ä'vis empirical, reality, and 
in this respect, then, for the same logical position in both, natural 
and social science. The differences between the two groups, of 
sciences lay in the subject matter which could be distinguished in 
terms of the observation of natural phenomena and the understanding 
of other people's, attions ^ an understanding which was most apparent 
when rational actions were involved. For Parsons, Weber's. use of 
the means-ends schema is significant, as too is his critical view 
of understanding based solely upon intuition without any other 
criteria being used to establish the validity of "knowledge"., 
Parsons, in a particularly important passage, identifies 
the implications of Webens critiques for the epistemological or 
philosophy of science level of the convergence thesis: 
"... it went a very long way toward, bridging the hiatus 
which the idealist methodology had created between the 
natural and the social sciences in a logical context. 
He concludes that both must involve. systems of general 
theoretical concepts, -for without them anything 
approaching logical proof is out of the question. 
But in neither case can this system of concepts 
possibly be conceived of as a literal representation 
of the total concrete reality of raw experience ... It is interesting to note here a definite convergence 
on a common logical meeting ground with the . movement of methodology fma positivistic basis, which has 
been seen most explicitly among the subjects o2 this 
study in Pareto, Pareto, it will be remembered, laid 
down. a general methodological outline common to all 
empirical explanatory-science, natural and social. 
But to_make'. natural science methodology applicable to 
social-subject matter it was necesary for him to 
d yest. ýt; of certain positivistic-, empiricist implications 
of eatlier". methodologies, Weber-has come to the same 
result from the other'side, and has seen the same implications for the natural sciences. " 104 
i 
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Within the context of these. general methodological ideas, 
and as a result of his critique of idealims, Parsons argues that 
Weber constructed his mature sociology on the basis of the category 
of understanding, the role of values in social life and the means- 
end schema, But this led to certain problems: in particular 
Parsons regards as unacceptable Weber's distinction between natural 
and social science on the basis of the contrast between an interest, 
of control in the natural world and an interest based upon the 
scientist's values in social phenomena. Parsons argues that what 
was for Weber a unique feature of social science - namely valued 
relevance - was in effect the. selective organizing principle for 
concept formulation which applied to all science. Nevertheless, 
despite certain reservations about Webers methodology Parsons, 
overall assessment is favourable: 
"Weber has succeeded in bringing a much needed element 
of relativity into his methodology thus relieving*it 
of the necessity of making claims to an empiricist 
i' absolutism which would place it in a vulnerable 
position. At the-same time he has vindicated its 
claims, properly qualified, to objectivity. Above 
all he has established the logical independence of 
the standards of objectivity, the scheme of proöf 
from the relativistic elements. " 105 
For Parsons the main limitation of Webens methodological 
position concerned the'ideal type. This general concept, states 
a course of action which fully conforms to a norm with the result 
that it represents a hypothetically rather than a concretely 
observable action but according to Parsons its use led to a mosaic 
theory of society, For Parsons this limitation can be largely 
explained by the fact that Weber's views. on general concepts were 
developed in opposition to an empiricist position which was opposed 
to all fora of eneralization, therefore Weber used the one 
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formulation which carne closest to being an empirical description. 
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Implicit within this mosaic theory of society, Parsons 
argues that it is possible to detect a system of theory underlying 
Webers classification of types of action and relationship. This is 
to be found most explicitly in the modes of orientation of action 
which are elements of regularity understandable in terms of 
subjective cagegories, and are concerned in particular with normative 
aspects of action systems`. Weber's concepts of usage, interest, 
and legitimate order constitute for Parsons the framework for this 
classification of ideal types and the implicit outline of a 
generalized structure of systems of action which corresponds to all 
the distinctions of structural elements which he was able to 
identify in the work of Pareto and Durkheim; namely, the economic, 
technological, -and political elements of. the 
intermediate sector of 
the means-end chain. 
107 
In his analysis of the concept of legitimate order, Parsons 
finds a remarkable similarity with Durkheim's treatment of constraint 
as moral authority. 
"Moreover, Weber has approached the question from the 
same point of view, that of an individual thought of 
as acting in relation to a system of rules that 
constitute conditions of his action. There has emerged' 
from the work of both men the same distinction of 
attitude elements towards the rules of such an 'order, 
the interested and the disinterested. In both cases 
a legitimate order is contrasted with a situation of 
the uncontrolled play of interests. Both have 
concentrated their attention upon the'latter element. 
Such a parallel is not likely to be purely fortuitous, " 108 
Another important similarity can be found in their analyses of 
religion which is one of the more important forms of legitimate 
order; Weber's concept of charisma refers to an extraordinary 
quality quite distinct from everyday life, *a phenomenon which 
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resenbles Durkheim's concept of sacred, In fact ,, Parsons agues, 
some of their conclusions are practically identical. 
"The identity applies at least two strategic 
points ^ the. distinction of the moral and non-" 
moral motives of action in relation to norms, 
and the distinction between'the quality of norms 
as such (Weber - legitimacy; Durkheim R moral 
authority) and the broader element of which this 
is a "manifestation" (Weber -" charisma; Durkheim 
sacredness). The correspondence is the more 
striking in that the two'started from opposite 
poles of thought - Weber from historical idealism 
Durkheim from highly self-conscious positivism. " 109 
A similar level of correspondence exists in their views on the 
relationship between the social factor and action: Parsons 
observes: 
"Weber ruthlessly discarded from his work all non- 
empirical entities. The only Geist with which he 
will have anything to do is a matter of empirically 
observable attitudes and ideas which can be directly 
related to the understandable motivation of action. 
But ' in spite of this fact he definitely takes a 
sociologistic position. For one of his most 
fundamental results is that of the dominant social 
role of religious ideas and value attitudes - 
specific embodiments or values of charisma , which 
are common to the members of a great social movement 
or a whole society ... A society can only be subject 
to a legitimate order, and therefore can be on a 
non biological level somthing other than a balance 
of power of interests, only in so far as there are 
common value attitudes in the society. " 110 
Some of the differences between Durkheim and Weber can be accounted 
for through the diversity of their interests; Weber concentrated 
upon social change ^ particularly through the agency of charisma 
and rationalization, with the result that he was not empirically 
concerned with the category of ritual which basically represents 
resistance to change. ' Hence Weber did not, according to Parsons, 
extend his analysis of traditionalism very far, but had he done so, 
then his" treatment of ritual as symbolically meaningful action 
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outside the intrinsic means-end chain would have led to a greater 
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correspondence with Durkheim's position. 
In his final remarks on the convergence between the work 
of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber, Parsons makes the 
following statement which conveniently summarizes his views'on 
Webers role in this movement in social thought: 
"The catalogue of'the structural elements of action 
discernable in or directly inferable from Webers 
systematic scheme of ideal types has now been completed. 
It has proved possible to identify and assign to a 
clear and definite role in the general scheme every 
single element of the previous analysis, especially 
as gained from the study of the work of Pareto and 
Durkheim. Moreover, every one of these elements, 
if it emerges in their work in clear-cut form at 
all, can be given a formulation that will fit both 
the theoretical schemes and the empirical interpretations 
of all three writers and'do justice to what, according 
to the best interpretation a careful analysis has 
been able to put upon them, these writers themselves 
meant by their theories. This definitely and finally 
established the convergence that it has been the 
principal object of this study to demonstrate. 
Finally, in Weber there has emerged still another 
structural element, the orientation of forms of 
expression to norms of taste, which fills a gap 
left in the other schemes. " 112 
(c) Assessment of Convergence 
Let us briefly summarize the convergence towards the 
Voluntaristic Theory of Action: for Parsons its origin lay in the 
idea of rational action with the elements of ends, means and 
conditions unified, in the case of intrinsically rational` action, 
by a normative relationship between ends and means, so as to 
conform with scientific knowledge of the connection between particular 
acts and certain objectives. Rational action was always important 
within utilitarianism although the nature of ends was not considered 
in detail. ]Frequently, the assumption was made that the ends of 
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action were random, and in this case, 'no explanation of order 
was possible. * This was the dilemma which'Marshall and Pareto 
attempted to overcome R though with varying degrees of explicitness 
and methodological sophistication r by focussing upon a system of 
shared values in society. Durkheim, who had begun by rejecting 
the utilitarian position in favour of a positivistic view of action, 
constrained by external social facts, gradually realized that 
constraint was a form of moral authority dependent upon a common 
system of values. In the idealist tradition the category of 
ultimate values had occupied a well established position, but it 
was in the methods used to study these values that the problems 
lay. In Weber's critique of Marx emphasis was placed upon the 
role of values in social life, not in the idealist sense of values 
becoming-"real'-' so much as through a complex interaction with other 
elements in society -' especially the economic. Weber was critical 
of idealist methodology and emphasised the necessity of both general 
theoretical categories and the norm of intrinsically rational 
action. In addition, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber identified ritual 
action as a phenomenon which could be examined in terms of the 
symbolic means-end relationship rather than being explained away, 
as frequently happened in the positivistic tradition, as the result 
of non-subjective determinism. 
As a result, Parsons was able to identify a convergence in 
the different varieities of inquiry into human action towards an 
agreement between Pareto, Durkheim and Weber on the structure of 
social action; namely ultimate ends, means, and an intermediate 
sector, For Parsons this set of structures was unified by*the 
concept of effort which related the normative end the conditional 
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elements of action because, he*argued, norms can only be realized 
through the application of effort. 
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Parsons drew five specific conclusions from his analysis 
of convergence: first of, all, 
"That in the works of the four principal writers ... 
there has appeared the outline of what 'in all 
" essentials, is the same system of generalized 
social theory, the structural aspect of what has 
been called the voluntaristic theory of. action. " 114 
In other words, there were no theoretically important differences 
between them which could not be reduced-to variations in terminology, 
the point to which they pursued their analyses, and their objectives 
which conveyed different kinds of significance upon particular 
issues. 
Secondly, 
"That this generalized system of theoretical categories 
common to the writers here treated is, taken as a total 
system, a new development of theory and is not simply 
taken over from the traditions on. which they built. " 115 
Whilst all of the elements of the new system of theory could be 
found individually in the earlier traditions, together they constitute a 
separate entity, a new advance which 
is. incompatible with. either 
positivism or idealism. 
Parsons' third conclusion"is, 
"That the development of this theoretical system 
has in each case stood in the closest relation to 
the principal empirical generalizations which the 
writer in question formulated. " 116 
Hence, the empirical insights which these writers gained were 
incompatible with a positivist or idealist theoretical position and 
were only possible in terms of the categories ' of- the voluntaristic 
theory. 
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The fourth. conclusion involves several ideas: 
"That one major factor in the emergence of the 
voluntaristic theory of action lies in correct 
observation of the empirical facts of social life, 
especially corrections of and additions to the 
observations made by proponents of the theories 
against which these writers stood in pölemicäl 
opposition. " 117 
Whilst Parsons has been unable, for reasons of space, to present 
all the relevant empirical material with a bearing upon this 
issue, he argues that enough has been brought forward to be 
conclusive, especially when the fact of convergence amongst 
writers who initially held quite different intellectual, moral and 
political orientations is taken into account. Consequently, 
"... the concepts of the voluntaristic theory of 
action must be sound theoretical concepts. " 118 
The fifth and. final conclusion aggregates the four 
previous points to constitute the proof of Parsons' thesis about 
the nature of scientific development. In particular the changes 
in European social thought cannot be properly understood, 
"... (a) as the resultant of a process of accumulation 
of new knowledge of empirical fact arrived at 
independently of the statement of problems and the 
direction of interest inherent in the structure of 
the initial theoretical systems; (b) as resulting 
from processes of the purely "immanent" development 
of the initial. theoretical systems without reference 
to the facts; (c) as only the result of elements 
external to science altogether such as the personal 
sentiments of the authors, their class position, 
nationality etc. That leaves the material 
interdependence of the structure of the theoretical 
systems with observation and verification of fact in 
a position of great, though by no means exclusive 
importance. " 119 
Before commenting upon the validity of Parsons' 
convergence thesis and the conclusions which he draws, it will-be 
helpful to relate= our interest in Parsons' work to the kind of 
I, 
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criticism which it is possible to make at this stage of the 
inquiry. Clearly the most crucial and ultimately, perhaps, the 
most debatable aspect of the Parsonian thesis is the accuracy of 
his interpretation of the work of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and 
Weber. However our interest is specifically concerned with the 
validity of Parsons'interpretation of Weber and the extent to. 
which the latter's approach was incorporated by Parsons'. 
voluntaristic theory. Needless to say, therefore, we are not. in 
a position to comment upon, -the validity of 
the convergence thesis 
per se, as the accuracy of Parsons' interpretation of the other 
writers is beyond the scope of this study, though it would be fair 
to say that since the publication of The Structure of Social Action 
considerable attention has been devoted to the nature of their 
respective contributions to sociology and certain problems in 
Parsons'work have been identified. 
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What can be said, on the 
basis of this analysis, is. that certain assumptions. implicit in .. 
Parsons' work, which have*. direct relevance for his assessment of 
Weber's theory of action and its,. relationship to the voluntaristic 
theory - to say nothing of the status of this theory as the 
starting point for Parsons' subsequent work - are in need of 
clarification and. analysis. 
When the convergence thesis is considered from the point 
of view of the different conceptions of. the sociological enterprise 
involved, in other words, in terms of the epistemological, 
methodological and theoretical views of the three major writers, a 
fundamental problem'emerges. In effect the views'of: Pareto, 
Durkheim and Weber on these issues were excluded from any central 
role in the convergence thesis.. It is quite clear that for 
I 
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Parsons the epistemological foundations, methodological practices 
and theoretical constructions of science as a whole had been 
clarified and demonstrated through the advances in physics and 
biology prior to his investigation into the relationship between 
economics and sociology which, as we have seen, was the original 
focus of his theory of action. Analytic realism as a conception 
of the scientific enterprise in the social sphere was not to be 
proven through convergence: the strategy of developing a general 
theory was quite independent of it although, of course, the 
assumptions and procedures which analytic realism sanctioned had 
been influential in the discipline-of economics. 
Parsons. wds, for example, very critical of Durkheim's, 
methodological position. He saw Paretots assumptions to be 
the closest. tp his own, and used Weberts methodological ideas only 
where they revealed problems in idealism and so justified the 
claim that Weber was moving away from his original tradition to a 
new one; where their assumptions about scientific method and 
social scientific knowledge diverged from what Parsons saw as the 
modern principles, they were rejected. - The crux of the matter, 
therefore, is that in the absence of a methodological convergence, 
their respective contributions to the common conceptual scheme 
were to be judged exclusively in terms of their identification r 
intentionally or unintentionally, explicitly or implicitly , of 
the structural categories of social action, 
Before proceeding with the argument it is necessary to 
explore some of the implications of this point in detail, First 
of all, it emphasizes' the centrality to, Parsons `'entire argument 
of the correctness. of his interpretation of the various features'of 
112. 
the earlier writerst work. It will be remembered that Pareto, 
Durkheim and Weber did not share Parson's aims of outlining the 
structural features of action systems, with the result that in-each 
case it was necessary for him to develop implicit features of 
their work, to draw out possible implications, in short, to 
determine what their views on these structural properties would 
have been if they had wished to pursue such an inquiry. In 
particular, Weber's stated opposition to a general theory in the 
realm of sociology meant that it was necessary for Parsons to 
stress-: in his interpretation a developmental perspective; according 
to this Webens later work was seen to be moving, away from its 
earlier methodological foundations with the result that some degree 
of ambiguity and inconsistency arose between his formal views and 
his substantive practices. Clearly then the convergence is 
dependent to a large extent upon Parson's creative analysis of the 
work of the three sociologists and his discovery of a number of 
previously unseen features. 
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The second point is perhaps even more important, because 
it means that according to Parsons, another writer's theoretical 
concepts and substantive formulations could be incorporated into 
the convergence thesis with no real loss of accuracy, intelligibility 
or implication even though the methodology which gave such 
concepts direction and purpose were seen to be problematic and 
outdated. However, a purely substantive convergence in conceptual 
schemes based upon different epistemological and methodological 
positions is quite vacuous; Pareto, Durkheim and Weber used some 
similar concepts, but the ways in which their conceptual schemes 
were designed to be iised were not the same, and this difference was 
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directly related to their respective conceptions of social scientific 
knowledge. There could be little doubt, 'given their variety 
of starting points, that a convergence in conceptual schemes allied 
to a convergence in the methods they used to arrive at these 
concepts would, by itself, be a strong indication of the validity 
of such concepts and methods, but a substantive convergence - even 
if we disregard all the problems resulting from its highly 
inferential nature - must remain inconclusive. 
In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, let us 
clarify the extent to which Parsons does and does not establish 
methodological agreement between the three major writers. In 
other words, how similar are their methodological views to the 
position on which the voluntaristic theory is built. Certainly 
Parsons claimed that some convergence toward the methodology of 
analytic realism could be found in the work of Pareto and Weber; 
they both rejected the empiricist view of the relationship between 
a conceptual scheme and empirical reality and recognized the 
abstractness of scientific concepts, and in addition, Pareto 
accepted the need for combining different systems of analytic 
theory in the explanation of concrete phenomena. 
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The position 
of Weber, however, is more complex because he strongly emphasized 
the distinction between natural and social science in terms of the 
principle of value relevance and argued for a limited role in 
social science for general theoretical statements, preferring 
instead to concentrate upon the explanation of particular causal 
sequences. - Not surprisingly, of course, Parsons rejected these 
features of. Weberls methodology but their very existence does 
place the utmost strain upon the credibility of a methodological 
I 
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convergence between'Weber and the voluntaristic theory a problem 
which Parsons attempts to resolve by imputing a major element of 
inconsistency between Weber's statements on these issues and his 
implicit theoretical classification of, social relationships. 
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Finally, there was little in Durkheim's methodology with which 
Parsons could agree because in its later stages it combined 
empiricist views on the nature of theoretical categories with an 
idealist position on the role of ideas in social'life. 
In reality, therefore, the result of convergence, the 
Voluntaristic Theory of Action, differs from its constituent parts 
of positivism, utilitarianism, and idealism, in that the category 
of subjective motivation in the form of action oriented toward 
common ultimate values is added to the methodological strategies 
of utilitarianism, thereby subsuming the analytic device of 
rational economic man within a wider and more comprehensive framework 
of normatively oriented action and supplementing the intrinsic 
form of relationship between the elements of the system with 
the symbolic means-end schema. But in the process of incorporating 
what Parsons called the subjective point of view, in other words, 
the notion of subjective meaning which had occupied such a central 
position in Weberian sociology, he isolated the category from the 
context in which it had been developed -a context involving 
assumptions about the nature of sociological meaning, the kind of 
procedures required in order to gain knowledge of such phenomena, 
and the sorts of. generalization that can be formulated. The 
isolation of this category v, and one suspects, several others as 
well -- from its background assumptions, necessarily transforms it, 
i 
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The approach utilized' by'Parsons. "has had some important 
consequences; by, assuming that the' epistemological and methodological 
nature of sociology was not problematic and by criticising earlier 
writers for diverging from his standards, he effectively removed 
the discussion of such issues from sociology for a considerable 
period of time. 
124 In the case of Weberian sociology, this led" 
to something of a paradox surrounding his "incorporation" into the 
contemporary discipline. On the one hand, the extent of Weber's 
historical and comparative knowledge is universally admired. His 
studies of the economic ethics of the world religions have become 
an exemplar-of comparative method and his definitions of some of the 
most pervasive forms of social action -- presented in'Economy and 
Society - demarcate several major specialisms within the subject. 
Yet, on the other hand, the methodological rules which both guided 
and were refined by these empirical researches are either seen as out 
of date and of little more than historical interest, or are regarded 
as a "pioneering effort", a euphemism which not only damns with 
feint praise but in contemporary sociology has come to justify taking 
a particular component of an earlier writer's work out of its 
methodological context in order to legitimate possibly similar, but 
sometimes quite dissimilar ideas and concepts derived from unrelated 
perspectives. 
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In short, it provided Parsons with the justification 
for developing and modifying Weber's more theoretical concepts, 
analyses and typologies in the rarefied air of pure theory, unrestricted 
by the methodological framework in which. they had been developed. 
116. 
Consequently, Webens sociology is left in a curious 
position by Parsons! interpretation; if the methods Weber used to 
reach his substantive findings are seen to be very limited, perhaps 
even harmful, then his empirical analyses which were reached through 
the use of these methods must be equally problematic. However, 
this inference is not made and as a result it comes as no surprise to 
find that there is a general lack of clarity about how Weber's 
contribution can be improved upon and about the criteria to be used 
in deciding when a particular Weberian concept, typology, causal 
relationship or empirical generalization is correct or in need of 
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revision. 
Returning to the main theme of our inquiry from this 
lengthy though important digression on the ramifications of the fact 
that all Parsons identifies is a convergence in the substantive 
concepts used by Pareto, Durkheim and Weber, which are then presented 
in terms of the 'structural features of a system of action --it is 
clear that Parsons does not establish any significant level of 
agreement between these writers over the nature of a scientific 
study of action, And in particular, the role of general theoretical 
statements. 
127 
Of course, Parsons is entitled to borrow concepts 
and ideas from different traditions and attempt to synthesise them 
into something of his own creation, but without demonstrating a 
methodological convergence his argument that the same conceptual 
scheme emerged from the different traditions and is valid because 
of this convergence, is quite unproven. 
One of the*main consequences of this appraisal is the 
reopening of the issue of ideological bias leading to a relativism 
of standards which*Parsons believed had been overcome by the development 
/ 
117. 
of a common basis for a truly general theory, Parsons saw 
particular significance to reside in the fact that agreement 
had taken place. between writers who had reached the same 
conclusions inspite of their personal and intellectual predilections. 
For Parsons this was an adequate defence against those who suggested 
that; 
M... there are as many systems of sociological 
theory as there are sociologists, and there is no 
common basis, that all is arbitrary and subjective. " 128 
More recently, in an examination of Webens contribution 
to the Theory of Action, Parsons emphasized some of the ideological 
components of social thought at the turn of the century: idealism 
represented conservatism; utilitarianism and economic theory stood 
for individualism and a belief in the legitimacy of capitalism; 
and Marxism was committed to a new social order.. Parsons continued: 
"Weber broke out of what I have called the 'trilemma' 
presented by the structure of the principal currents 
of social thinking of his time, His resolution of 
the trilemma pointed in the direction of a new 
pattern of-thinking in the area, of which an 
autonomous theoretical sociology was an essential 
ingredient. On this level Weber clearly converged 
with the other parts of a major intellectual movement 
of his generation. Taking his contribution which I 
regard as the most crucial single one - along with 
many others, I think it can be said that the whole 
intellectual social situation has been redefined in a 
way that makes the principle categorizations of the 
late 19th Century, many of which are still widely 
-current, basically obsolete. " 129 
Finally, what are the consequences of Parsons! failure to 
establish a genuine convergence, rather than to impose his ideas of 
social scientL is theory upon the categories of Pareto, Durkheim 
and Weber, for his thesis concerning the way in which scientific 
theory advances? Two points can be made. On the one hand the 
fact that Parsons was unable to prove the validity of the concepts- 
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of the voluntaristic theory, due to the restricted nature of the 
convengence he demonstrated, completely undermines the whole 
argument. What Parsons regards as valid concepts derived from 
correct empirical analysis and logical inference must now be seen as 
a set of concepts of unknown scientific validity with the result 
that their status as proof of the way scientific knowledge develops 
is equally transformed. " On the other hand, even if these problems 
were to be ignored, there are major difficulties with the relevance 
to Parsons' argument of the material which he draws from idealism. 
Whilst the developments within utilitarianism in relation to the 
problem of order are examined by Parsons in considerable detail and 
offer support for his thesis, the relationship of Weber's sociology 
to idealism is much more problematic. There are several reasons 
for this. To begin with, Parsonsfs treatment of idealism is in 
rather marked contrast to his very detailed knowledge of the 
development of economic theory within the positivist tradition, a 
fact demonstrated by his considerable reliance upon von Schelting's 
discussion of Weber's critique of idealism. Moreover, Parsons is 
not able to show that Weber ever subscribed to idealist principles; 
rather, the point he makes-is that Weber's treatment of religion 
and capitalism represents an overcoming of the limitations of' Marxism 
on the one hand, and an intuitionist approach on the other. But 
he is unable to show the development of Weberks ideas in relation to 
a central problem within idealism, comparable for instance with the 
utilitarian dilemma for the positivist approach. Hence the evidence 
Parsons presents about changes within an idealist perspective are 
inconclusive for his thesis that increasing factual knowledge leads 
to changes- in empirical generalizations and subsequently to 
I 
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modifications in the-structure of theoretical systems. 
Let'us, bring this analysis of Parsons', convergence thesis 
to a close by indicating the consequences of our criticisms for his 
General Theory of Action, Parsons failed to demonstrate the 
validity of the concepts of the voluntaristic theory through the 
convergence of positivism and idealism, but this failure leaves open 
the whole question of the usefulness of his work. It remains to 
be seen in the next chapter if Parsons could validate his concepts 
and methods in terms of other criteria. However, the points we 
have made are not without significance because if Parsons had 
merely claimed that his work was a development of various aspects of 
the theories and methodologies of. Pareto, Durkheim and Weber 
aspects-which he selected - then it is inconceivable that his work 
would have received so much attention, for its authoritative status 
lay in the idea of'convergence and the belief that it represented 
all that was valid in the earlier traditions of social thought, 
I 
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CHAPTER *THREE 
"THE GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION AND ITS'PROBLEMS 
The previous chapter dealt with the origins of Parsong' 
theoretical sociology in his analysis of the contribution made to 
social scientific knowledge by Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber as the 
leading representatives of the positivist and idealist traditions of 
European social thought. In addition, it sought to clarify the 
limitations of the Parsonian convergence of conceptual schemes. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts each of which 
has a distinctive style; the first is expositionary, and the second 
is critical. We begin by outlining the various theoretical and 
conceptual innovations which have appeared"in Parsons' work during 
his career. This task is relatively straightforward because 
Parsonian theory can be divided into clear stages within an overall 
N 
process of thinking about action and society which has exhibited 
remarkable continuity. This progressive character has been the result 
of Parsons' attempt to achieve higher levels of systematization in 
his theoretical scheme, and the pursuit of this objective had led 
Parsons into new substantive areas; for example, the development of 
the General Theory of Action necessitated reference to the psychological 
elements of motivation. The undoubted benefit of this eclectic 
and synthesizing strategy has been the incorporation of different 
empirical problems and conceptualizations which have fostered a 
dynamic quality in I'arsons' work that is quite remarkable given an 
active career of over 40 years since his first major publication. 
In more detail, then, the examination of the theoretical 
and methodological foundations of Iarsons'"" attempt to formulate a 
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system of theory capable of explaining complexes of action is 
divided into four stages: (1) the öriginal 1937 formulation, 
(2) the structural-functional phase of theoretical analysis, 
(3) the general systems theory orientation, and (4) the evolutionary 
perspective. 
Utilizing this overall view of Parsons' work as a resource 
the second part of the chapter moves on to consider the validity of 
his various theoretical formulations. It deals with the contemporary 
assessments of Parsons' General Theory of Action, its influence within 
sociology and the various responses to it, and is organized around 
the three key issues of testability, objectivity and the centrality 
to the theory of the subjective point of view. The aim here is to 
establish how the particular characteristics of Parsons' work led 
directly to the "crisis" in sociology and to demands for a radical 
revi6ion of the discipline) To be more specific, many commentators 
had great difficulty in finding an appropriate basis for evaluating 
Parsonian Theory whilst being convinced of the triviality2, 
partiality3 or sheer irrelevance4 to empirical investigations of its 
conceptual schemes. The result was that the objectivity of 
sociological work, which hnd hitherto been a basic principle of the 
discipline, came to be increasingly questioned. 
5 
Within the context of the overall objectives of this study 
the reception of Parsons! work by his critics and the role of his 
ideas in precipitating a "crisis" is particularly crucial to our 
interest in his. relationship to Webers Theory of Action. These 
circumstances serve to reveal the viability of Parsons' modification 
and development of key featured of Weberts conception of a scientific 
analysis of social action. The themes'of testability, objectivity and 
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the subjective point. of view have been emphasized because they help 
to clarify the divergence between the theoretical and methodological 
ideas of Parsons and Weber, The issues examined under the heading 
of "testability" relate directly to Parsons! ' attempt to develop a 
general theory and his rejection of Weber's use of ideal types which 
was based upon scepticism of the possibility of deducing precise 
statements about the empirical world from a-set of abstract concepts. 
Whilst the differences between Parsons and Weber over the nature of 
objectivity may not appear to be so profound, in reality, there is 
a sharp divergence of opinion. For Parsons objectivity is guaranteed 
by the role of the structure of the theoretical system in the 
selection of important information, whereas for Weber, the role of 
values in selection was crucial. Finally, in terms of the concept 
of the subjective point of view, we examine the extent to which 
Parsons' original emphasis upon the actor was subsequently changed by 
the development of the General Theory. In this process the attempt 
is made to clarify what precisely was involved in Parsons' reference 
to the subjective meaning of the actor and, thereby, to establish 
an accurate basis for a comparison with Weberts approach. 
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I STAGE$'IN THE DEVELOPAIENT-OF"PARSONIAN. THEORY 
(a) 'Structural Units as'a*Basis'for'A Voluntaristic Theory 
of-Action 
In the previous chapter, the analysis of the theoretical 
and methodological basis of the Voluntaristic Theory of Action largely 
took place in the context of the convergence thesis, but it is now 
possible, and indeed very desirable, to consider these issues in 
their own right because they represent the crucial base line upon 
which all Parsonsl own theoretical schemes were built. 
The ideas Parsons derived from the convergence thesis which 
he synthesized to form the first level of his own theory can best 
be seen in terms of his notion of the. action frame of reference. 
This constitutes the framework for all the concepts which are required 
for a satisfactory description and analysis of action. The most 
important concept within this scheme is the unit act which is the 
basic category from which all other concepts. are derived. The 
unit act is made up of certain properties: namely, an actor, an end 
which is the object of the action, a situation consisting of 
conditions and means - the former lying beyond the actor's control, 
the latter within it. In addition, 
11... there is inherent in the conception of this unit, 
in its analytic uses, a certain mode of relationship 
between these elements. That is in the choice of 
alternative means to the end, in so far as the situation 
allows alternatives, there is a normative orientation' 
of action. Within the area of control of the actor, 
the means employed cannot, in general' be conceived either 
as, chosen at random or as dependent exclusively on the 
conditions of action, but must in some sense be subject 
to the influence of an independent,, determinate, selective 
factor, a knowledge of which is necessary to the 
understanding of the concrete course of action. 
What is essential to the concept of action is that 
there should be a normative orientation, not that this 
should. be, any particular typet", 6 
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Significantly, this view of action avoids any deterministic problems 
through the element of choice, which allows for the possibility of 
the actor making a mistake in the decision about the means needed 
to achieve a specific end. Consequently, Parsons does not claim 
that the mere fact of having a particularly valued end leads 
automatically to a specific kind of action,? 
The purpose of the frame of reference is to make possible 
the description of 
phenomena in such a way as to distinguish those 
facts about them which are relevant to and capable of 
explanation in terms of a given theoretical system from 
those which are not. " 8 
This problem arises because different considerations are involved 
in the description of an empirical phenomenon and it"is the Action 
Frame of Reference which. nakes explicit the criteria to be used 
in the selection of relevant facts about the phenomenon which, taken 
together, represent an adequate description. Parsons uses the 
example of a person committing suicide by jumping from a bridge to 
illustrate the point that whilst information about the motivation of 
the individual is required for the theoretical system dealing with 
action it is only necessary to establish other data sufficiently for 
the immediate purpose. For example, it is quite unnecessary to 
pursue information about the speed of the individuales fall from the 
bridge to the point required by the theoretical system dealing with 
physical phenomena, 
The frame of reference also facilitates the distinction 
between constant and variable data. The constants are related to 
the description of empirical phenomena and the' formulation of 
concrete historical individuals, which can be' examined in terms of - 
their various sub-, -divisions into parts and units: as well as their 
10 
combination into increasingly complex structures. The frame, öf 
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reference sets the limit to sub-division and in the'study of action 
this is reached with the unit act, which is the smallest part that 
can be conceived of as existing by' itself. 
"Description of the same phenomena in terms that 
isolate these elements, or, inturn, further 
subdivided parts of them, from their relation to an 
act in this sense, destroys the relevance to the action 
schema so that if the facts are relevant to any 
scientific theory it must be a theoretical system 
other than that of action. " 11 
For Parsons the subjective point of view is used as the criterion 
for determining the level to which phenomena can be subdivided 
whilst remaining relevant to the frame of reference of the theory 
of action. 
However, the organic-like properties'of`social phenomena 
present certain difficulties for their subdivision into units and 
parts. According to Parsons, at certain levels of complexity 
action systems have emergent properties which evaporate when the 
level of analysis is taken'to the point of isolating the unit-act: 
consequently, analysis at the unit level, rather than of units 
within systems of action leads to abstract and fictional concepts. 
Parsons gives as an example of this problem the isolated rational 
act, which he argues, cannot be described as economically rational 
because the economic'aspect of action involves the relationship of 
scarce means to a variety of different ends. 
"Economic rationality is thus an emergent property 
of action which can be observed-only when 'a plurality 
of unit acts is treated together as constituting an 
integrated system of action. " 12 
However, at the descriptive level; it is unnecessary to 
reduce phenomena on all occasions to the5r parts or units, rather 
it is possible on the basis of scientific economy to utilize' several 
secondary descrLptýve. schemes, for example, those of social 
11 
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relationship, personality and social group. But for Parsons, it 
remains a fundamental characteristic of the Action Frame of Reference 
that: 
I'There are no group properties that are not reducible 
to properties of systems of. action and there is no 
analytic theory of. groups which is not translatable 
into terms of the theory of action. " 13 
In contrast to the use of the Action Frame of Reference 
as a way of describing phenomena, it can be used as a theoretical 
system of analytic elements. In this case, 
"Its elements have causal significance in the sense 
that variation in the value of any one has consequences 
for the values of the others. Above äll, the means-end 
schema. becomes the central framework for the causal -- 
explanation of action. Furthermore it is the specific 
peculiarity of this schema that it has a subjective reference. 
It involves a real process in the mind of the actor, as 
well as external to it. " 14 . 
The realism of a body of scientific knowledge is limited 
firstly, by the fact that it uses conceptually constructed concepts 
of specific phenomena (historical individuals) as the basis of 
analysis which are broken down-into units or- parts in isolation. - 
from their actual context and, secondly, by the abstractness of 
analytic elements. 
"The empirical reference of such a concept is not 
necessarily a concrete phenomenon even'in the above 
relative sense, but may be one aspect of it; the 
particulars corresponding to the general concept may 
constitute. only a small part of the many facts 
ascertainable about the phenomenon in question. " 15 
Thus a general system of theory can only explain some of the facts 
which are important to a particular frame of reference. This is a 
point of fundamental difference between Analytical Realism and 
earlier orientations to social science, which as in the case of some 
versions of utilitarianism involved what Parsons called an 
t 
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"empiricist reification" of systems of theory. Within these 
approaches it was argued that only one system of analytic categories 
was required to understand a particular class of empirical phenomena. 
In contrast, for Parsons the categories of several theoretical 
systems may be required to account for a concrete phenomenon. 
Orthodox economic theory is, 'therefore, 
a... the formulation of the relations of a limited 
group of analytic elements in the broader concrete 
system-of'action. " 16 
And it is to this wider system of action that Parsons gives the 
name, the Voluntaristic Theory of Action. 
17 
This leads on to the problem of the classification of. the 
different sciences of action within the wider framework for the. 
study of human conduct. As we have already seen, for Parsons 
there are two kinds of sciences, -the historical and the analytical: 
the former attempt to account for a class of concrete historical 
individuals and in so doing, at the very least, refer to theoretical 
categories of one or more analytical sciences, whereas the latter 
attempt, "... to develop logically coherent systems of general 
analytic theory. '. ' 
18 . 
In this case the primary reference is not to 
a. class of historical individuals but where possible to a self 
contained system of theory which is independent of, and irreducible 
to any other theoretical system. Once this has been achieved 
then an independent science has been established, 
Within the theoretical system of action there are various 
specialisxns which Parsons classifies in terms of the emergent 
properties- og increasingly complex relationships between unit acts. 
The first emergent property to develop from an action system, 
Parsons argues. -, is economic rationality and this has led to the 
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formulation of a sophisticated'theoretical_systeiR, namely economics. 
With increased complexity of'action systems the numbers of people 
involved increases'and so the possibility arises of some coercing 
others - this is the problem of order associated with Hobbes. 
But, 
"In order that there may be a stable system of action 
involving a plurality of individuals there must be 
normative regulation of the power aspect of the 
relationships of individuals within the system, in this 
sense there must be a redistributive order. " 19 
These political action elements are studied by political science. 
The next emergent property is explained by Parsons in 
these terms: 
! `.,. it has been seen the solution of the power question, 
as well as-of a plurality of other complex features of 
social action systems, involves a common value system, 
manifested in the legitimacy of institutional norms, in 
the common ultimate ends of action; in ritual and in 
, various modes of expression. All these phenomena may 
be referred back to a single general emergent property 
of social action systems which may be called 'common 
value integration'. " 20 
This property is distinct from the economic and the pbl tUca1- 
and constitutes the subject matter of sociology, which Parsons 
defines as, 
"... the science which attempts to develop an 
analytic theory of social action systems in so 
far as these systems can be understood in terms 
of the property of common-value integration. ' 21 
Having clarified the main features of Parsonst thinking 
on methodological and theoretical issues at the time of the 
original formulation of the theory of action, it will perhaps be 
useful to conclude our consideration of the foundation level of his 
work with an indication of how The'Structüre'of'Social Action stood 
in relAtion to the different kinds, of scientific conceptualization 
i 
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and levels of theoretical strategy which'have been outlined. 
Parsons tells us that the book is- exclusively concerned with unit 
and part concepts together with their structural relationships, 
all of which together constitute actual systems of action. His 
objective in the book, therefore, is quite limited. There is no 
attempt to formulate a system of'analytic variables; rather the 
aim is much more preparatory, it is to establish the structural 
outline of general systems of action to which analytic theory can 
be applied and, despite Weber's views to the contrary, 
ýý... by showing that the conception of a generalized 
system is useful in its structural aspect, it has 
demonstrated that the task of setting up a corresponding 
system of elements and their relations is not logically 
impossible. " 22 
(b) Structural-Functional Theoretical Analysis 
The transition from a Voluntaristic to a structural- 
functional form of theory represents a development in two main 
areas: on the one hand the unit act was replaced by the system of 
action as the basic reference point of analysis, and on the other, 
the programme for formulating dynamic analysis of a system of 
theory was simplified, in the face of insuperable difficulties, by 
a structural-functional orientation. These changes led to some of 
the most celebrated commentaries which Parsons I" work-has attracted; 
namely Scott's charge that Parsons' pre-war Voluntarism had 
been entirely superseded by a deterministic view of action 
consistent with-Tolman's purposive behaviourism23 and, Martindale's 
view that with the growing emphasis upon systems of action the study 
of interaction became increasingly Durkheimian whereas in the 
/ 
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Voluntaristic stage it had appeared to. be_very sjmilar to Weber'"'s 
position, 
24 
Whilst these ckiticisms will be examined in detail 
toward the end of the chapter it is sufficient for our purposes, at 
this stage, merely to note that Parsons saw the situation quite 
differently. In a reply to critics of his'The'Social System25 and 
Toward a General Theory of Action26, which were characterized by the 
stress upon systems and the use of structural'rfünctional analysis, 
Parsons argued that although considerable theoretical and conceptual 
advances had been introduced, the books 
"... were in no sense meant to suggest any fundamental 
break in the continuity of theoretical development ... 
they stand-in the most intimate relation to a great deal 
. of work done before. 
" 27 
Indeed Parsons draws exactly the same distinction between a descriptive 
and an analytic interest in phenomena as he. did at the Voluntaristic 
stage of his`thinking. ý' Accurate description necessitates selection 
from the facts of experience and the frame of reference performs 
the vital role of establishing the criteria which make this possible. 
In addition, the movement to systems of action as the basic unit 
of the theoretical approach, which represented the growing 
importance in Parsons' thinking of the concept of system itself, added 
a new tool to the descriptive armoury as the idea of the structure 
of a system could be used to organize the varying kinds of 
relationship between the units and subsystems which together constitute 
the system of action. 
28 
At the analytic level the goal of science remains for 
Parsons the realization of dynamic analysis of complex systems; 
/ 
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I'.. the essential feature of dynamic analysis in 
the fullest-sense is the treatment of a body of inter- 
dependent phenomena simultaneously in the mathematical 
sense. The simplest case is the analysis of the effect 
of variation in one antecedent factor, but this ignores 
the reciprocal effect of these changes on this factor. 
The ideal solution is the possession of a logically 
complete system of dynanic generilization which can 
state all the elements of reciprocal interdependence. 
between all the variables of the system. This ideal 
has, in the formal sense, been attained only in the 
systems of differential equations of analytical mechanics. 
All other sciences are limited to a more tprimitive' 
level of systematic theoretical analysis. " 29 
However, the lack of success which Parsons experienced after '1937 
in his attempts to achieve such dynamic analysis, based upon 
generalized analytic knowledge, meant that in order to achieve 
theoretical generalization about empirically significant variables 
it was necessary to artificially reduce the complexity of the 
concrete phenomena and processes under investigation, 
30 
The 
resulting compromise *produced a rather abstract form of analysis. 
However, the effect of this problem was to some extent 
minimized by the use of structural categories which according to 
Parsons, 
to... simplify the dynamic problems to the point where 
they are manageable without the possibility of refined 
mathematical analysis. At the same time the loss, which 
is very great., is partly compensated by relating all 
problems explicitly and systematically to the total 
system. For the structure of a system as described in 
the context of a generalized conceptual scheme is a 
genuinely technical analytical tool. It ensures that 
nothing of vital importance is inadvertently overlooked, 
and ties in loose ends, giving determinacy to problems 
and solutions. It minimizes the danger, so serious to 
commonsense thinking, of filling gaps by resort to 
uncritical residual categories. " 31 
The structures themselves are identified in terms of their 
functional or dysfunctional effect upon the ongoing processes of 
the system. As a result of the gradual movement away from the 
ýý 
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earlier analytic programme for dynamic analysis, of the kind 
possible in mechanics, Parsons argues that it is-now-more accurate 
to describe his theoretical work as structural-functional: - in 
other words, the analysis of the functional contribution of 
particular structures to the social system or system of-action. 
32 
parsons' greater emphasis upon the concept of system, which 
was particularly inspired by the work of W. B. Cannon33, was 
closely related to his extension of the theory of action to a much 
wider variety of social scientific approaches than he had covered 
in The Structure of. Social-Action. He acknowledges that his 
conception. of the theoretical system, in the studies leading-up to 
that book, was confined-to the social system and that it was only 
after 1949 that he began to develop the idea of a truly general 
theory incorporating social psychology and cultural systems. 
34 
Reflecting this much more general background, Parsons was able to 
describe, in 1951, the development of the basic categories involved 
in the formulation of a general theory of action in these terms; 
the theory ... 
"... for many years has been developing through the 
convergence of anthropological studies of culture, 
the theory of learning, the psychoanalytic theory of 
personality, economic theory, and the study of modern 
social structure. " 35 
This substantive widening of the scope of the theory meant that. 
it became fruitful to distinguish; within the action frame of 
reference, three distinct and irreducible though nevertheless, 
interrelated sub-divisions; namely, the personality system, the 
36 
social system and the cultural system. 
/ 
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For Parsons one of the'most important properties of 
empirical systems were the interdependence of parts or variables 
which were characterized by some uniformity of pattern rather than 
randomness. More specifically, the relationships between the 
components of the system have a tendency to equilibrium -. to the 
maintenance of a particular state- of affairs, which need' not be 
static but is likely to involve an orderly form of change. Looking 
at a group of elements as a system with a tendency to equilibrium 
makes it possible to focus attention upon the boundaries of the 
system with the envirönment, and the processes and structures' 
whereby the system is able to maintain its position vis a vis 
the environment. 
37 
The utilization of this conception of system led to 
attention being concentrated upon the ability of the system to 
meet certain conditions if it was to remain broadly the same or 
undergo an orderly process of change. This new theoretical 
advance was based, therefore, upon the assumption that the 
biological and psychological needs of an adequate proportion of 
the population must be met and if orderliness is, to be maintained 
within the system the actions of the members must be coordinated 
to maintain standards of fairness and efficiency. Hence for 
Parsons, 
." 
"The system can only function if a sufficient 
proportion of its members perform the essential 
social roles with an adequate degree of effectiveness, " 38 
Having considered some of the more general epistemological 
and methodological . features of the Action Frame of Reference it is 
now possible to-examine the specific conceptual schemes which 
Parsons developed for the analysis of social systems., 
/ 
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Faced with the problem of simplifying the number of 
variables required for dynamic analysis, Parsons' strategy was to 
develop structural categories and the most important of these, 
units within the social system was that of status-role. At a very 
early stage in his use of this concept, Parsons said this: 
"Role, as the behavioural aspect of status, 
furnishes the link between the ideal and the 
behavioural patterns of a society. Each definition 
of a status includes that of an expected role. These 
expectations are, however, conformed with to varying 
degrees, and the kinds and degrees of deviance from the 
ideal patterns which are found in the actual behavioural 
patterns are of the greatest importance, " 39 
For Parsons the major difficulty involved in the study 
of social roles was this: -How is it possible to take full account 
of the different cultural patterns which have become 
institutionalized in social roles? Parsons acknowledges a debt to. 
Weber in his recognitidh of the complexity -of this issue because, 
he argues, in contrast to Toennies' distinction between Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft Weber had demonstrated in his studies of the world 
religions how the belief systems of particular religious traditions 
corresponded to the main forms of the social structure in the 
societies in which the beliefs were institutionalized. Parsons 
comments on the importance of Weber's research; 
"This was the first major development in modern 
sociology in the systematic discrimination of 
major types of value system in terms directly 
articulated with the comparative analysis of social 
structures, which went well beyond the impressionistic 
level of Toennies. " 40 
ParsonsE solution to this problem of accurate classification took 
the form of a precise and systematic set of concepts which he 
called the pattern variables of role-definition. 
41 
According to 
Parsons, with the pattern variables as -developed'ini Toward a General 
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Theory of Action and The Social 'System the* "ý .. classification of 
social structure ... for the first time goes beyond Max Weber. " 
In the development of this schema Parsons was strongly 
influenced by his consideration of the nature of professional 
groups in modern society and the extent to which their actions 
could be characterized as rational. The professionals did not 
fit easily into either of the two'main ideological interpretations 
of industrial society: capitalism was seen to be based upon the 
rational pursuit of collective interest. In fact this concern with 
the professions, especially the analysis of the role of the medical 
practitioner, was for Parsons a major element of continuity between 
The Structure of Social Action and the' development of the General 
Theory because he came to realize that Toennies' dichotomy did not 
just involve-one variable, but was based upon the mixture of several 
quite independent ones. 
43 
The Pattern Variables, then, were a set of five dichotomies 
of orientation which an actor had to resolve, implicitly or 
explicitly, consciously or unconsciously in the course of each 
action. The five sets of alternatives are as follows: 
" Affectivity - Lffective Neutrality ... is that between accepting an opportunity for gratification 
without regard for its consequences, on the one hand, 
and evaluating it with regard to its consequences, 
on the other. Self'-. Orientation - Collectivity 
Orientation ... 
is that between considering an act 
solely with respect to its personal significance, on the 
one hand, anc considering it with respect to its 
significance for a collectivity or a moral code, on the 
other. Universalism - Particulari§m ... is that between evaluating the object of an action in terms 
of its relations to a generalized frame of reference, 
on the one hand, and evaluating it in terms of its 
relations to the actor and his own specific. relations 
to objects, on the other, Ascription -. Achievement 
.., is that between seeing the'social object with 
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respect to which an action is oriented. as a composite 
of performances*(actions), on the*öne hand, and seeing 
it asa composite of ascribed qualities, on the other. 
Specificity- Diffuseness ... is that between conceding 
to the social object with respect'to which action is 
oriented an undefined set of rights (to be delimited 
only by feasibility in the light of. other demands), 
on the one hand, and conceding to that social object 
only a clearly specified set of rights on the other. " 44 
According to Parsons the pattern variables are thoroughly 
consistent with his pre-war use of concepts embodying the subjective 
point of view, as can be seen in the following comment; - they:,. 
it... apply to the normative or ideal aspect 
of the structure of systems of action ... ` 
They are equally useful. in the empirical 
description of the degree of conformity with 
or divergence of concrete action from the patterns 
of expectation or aspiration. " 45 
Indeed if allowance is made for modifications in terminology to 
take account of developments in sociology and the extension of his 
work into other disciplines, Parsons' conception of the relationship 
between the individual and society in connection with-the problem 
of order is also remarkably similar to his pre-war view. 
"The structural roles of the social system t.. must 
be oriented to value alternatives. Selections are 
of course always actions of individuals, - but these 
selections cannot be inter-individually random in a 
social system. Indeed one of the most important 
functional imperatives of the maintenance of social 
systems is that the value orientations of the 
different actors in the same social system must be 
integrated in some measure in a common system. All 
ongoing social systems do actually show a tendency 
toward a general system of common cultural 
orientations. ` 46 
By reducing the analysis of the way the normal consensus 
in society affects conduct to more detailed levels, through a 
utilization of a. combination of learning-theory and a Durkheimian- 
approach, Parsons. arrived at a very characteristic feature of this 
phase of his work. 
1 
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«.., value patterns, -. institutionalized'in the social 
structure, through the operation of role mechanisms, 
and in combination with other elements, organize'the 
behaviour. of adult members of society, Through the 
socialization process, they are in turn constitutive 
in establishment. of the personality structure of the 
new adult from the plasticity of early childhood. " 47 
This process of institutionalization, which is a key theme in 
Parsons'_work, is defined in these terms; 
"... the organization of action around sufficiently 
stable patterns so that it may be teated as 
structured from the point of view of the system. " 48. 
Indeed for Parsons it is only possible to talk of a social 
system when interaction has become institutionalized in this sense. 
This is the key to Parsonst conceptualization of the role for 
sociological analysis in the study of social action - it is concerned 
with institutions because this class of phenomena represent a 
structural framework of social systems. Thus for Parsons sociology 
is to concentrate upon several related theoretical issues; 
the comparative study of the integration and differentiation of 
institutional patterns; the analysis of the relationships between 
institutions and culture; the motivation of institutional ' 
behaviour; the motivatioa_of deviance and the problem of control 
within society; and finally a theory of institutional change, 
49 
Of course, sociology was only intended by Parsons to be a theory of 
part of the social system: consequently sociological theory was 
inevitably abstract vis a vis empirical reality. For example, 
Parsons considered that economic theory was concerned with distinct 
processes within such a system taking place within a framework of 
institutions which facilitated the operation of the market, although 
the theory did not concern itself with the nature of these 
institutions in themselves, 
50 
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(c) "Systems Theöry and'the'Foür: Fünctiön'Paradigm 
However, certain problems emerged concerning the level of 
theoretical systematization which had been attained; in particular 
it was apparent that a degree of logical imbalance existed between 
the personality and social systems on the one hand, -and the cultural 
system on the other. In addition, whilst there was a notable emphasis 
upon the disciplines of psychology and sociology, economics was 
relatively neglected. Given Parsons' desire to create a genuinely 
systematic general theory of action, and the prestige of economic 
theory in its own right, it was inevitable that Parsons would seek 
to integrate the analysis of economic phenomena more successfully 
within his conceptual scheme. At the level of Parsonian thinking 
represented, for instance by The Social'System, economic theory 
was conceptualized as an abstract set of analytic elements within 
a wider theory of social systems, but with the development of 
51 
the functional problems this view was radically transformed 
this new theoretical advance constituting the basis for Econom 
& Society. 
52 
Parsons' Functional-Problems were a development of the 
Pattern-Variable scheme together with Bales' categories of 
interaction process analysis. Bales' categories were formulated 
on the basis of the conceptualization of a small-group of people., 
as a functioning social system, in which four different structures 
and processes contributing to the systems' needs were identified. 
The four functional problems were as follows; adaptation to 
environmental conditions; goal attainment " the instrumental 
control of parts of the system to achieve specific goals? lateticy- 
the management of the members' sentiments and tensions; and the 
r 
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integration of the'variousmembers of the unit, In collaboration 
with Bales and Shils53 Parsons concluded'that the Functional Problems 
and the Pattern Variables were, in essential respects, attempts to 
conceptualize the same thing, and that the new combined scheme could 
be used to analyze all types of action system from small group to 
total society. 
"The fundamental conception underlying both original 
schemes is that a process of on-going social 
interaction can be usefully described by comparison with a 
hypothetical system in a state of moving equilibrium. If 
no new elements at all were introduced into the system, 
the interaction process would, according to the 'law of 
inertia' stated in The Social'System, continue unchanged. " 54 
The more familiar A-G-I-L terminology quickly became established 
representing a schema for the analysis of the structure and process 
of systems of action in terms of their contribution to the four 
functional problems of adpätion, goal-attainment, integration and 
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latent pattern maintenance and tension management. In this way 
Parsons'. earlier emphasis uron structures which contributed to the 
integration of social systems was replaced by a new interest in 
the relationships between the A-G-I-L sub-systems and the other 
systems which together constitute their environment. 
Utilizing this new framework Parsons concluded that the 
economy as the term was used by economists represented a special. type 
of social system, a functional sub-system of the total social system 
which specialized in its adaptation to the environment. As a 
sub-system'it is clearly not self-sufficient and therefore is 
involved with the exchange of inputs and outputs at its boundaries, 
the most important of which demarcate the other functional sub- 
systems. 
56 
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! 'This conception of the ecönotny as a societal 
sub-system proved capable of generalization, In 
the first instance, such generalization opened a new' 
approach to-the theoretical analysis of the "polity" 
by suggesting that it be treated as an analytically' 
defined subsystem of a society strictly parallel to 
the economy. This eliminated". a very serious 
asymmetry within the general theory of social systems 
between the status of economic and political theory. " 57 
In this phase of Parsons' thinking,: the analytic sub-division of 
the Action Frame of Reference itself underwent a major change; 
to the personality social and cultural systems was added a fourth, 
the biological organism. This addition was, no doubt, a result 
of his pursuit of systematization given the central role of the 
functional requisites in his work. This development enabled 
Parsons to draw a parallel between the interchanges of the four 
sub-systems at the most general level of action theory, in other 
words, the biological organism, the personality, the social, 
and the cultural systems and the interchanges between the four 
functional sub-systems of a social system. Hence the biological 
organism is concerned with the resolution of adaptive problems, 
the personality system specifically deals with goal seeking and 
decision making issues, the social system represents a pattern 
of norms and roles which integrate the cultural and personality 
systems, and the cultural. system refers to the symbolic meanings 
which structure behaviour. This schema can be'represented in 
the following well knotm diagrammatic form; 
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A Biological Organism Personality' G' 
Adaptation . Coal Attainment 
Culture Social System 
L Latency Integration I' 
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Given that it was in the periodof the late. 1950Fs and early 1960's 
that Parsons. F influence 'in sociology and the social sciences was 
at its highest, it will be instructive to pause in our examination 
of the developmental stages of his work and look in rather more 
detail at certain issues of particular relevance to our concerns: 
namely the status of the actor and normative order. 
Whilst the. focus of Parsons' analytic interests turned 
to interchanges between the four distinct action systems, his 
conceptualization of action as a decision making process remained 
although some of the voluntaristic connotations of the earliest 
stages of his work were modified to take account of the structural- 
functional analysis of collectivities. 
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However, his views on 
normative control as the basis for social order were unchanged. 
For Parsons, then, a system of action is composed at the 
very least of two units, though frequently many more. The units 
can be both actors and social collectivities. 
"The unit act involves the relationship of an actor 
to a situation composed of objects, and it is 
conceived as a choice (imputed by the theorist to 
the actor) among alternative ways of defining the 
situation. " 60 
The duality of'actor and situation is particularly crucial to 
Parsons' Action Frame of Reference: 
It.... one cannot speak of action except as a relation 
between both, it is not a 'property' of one or the 
other or of the two as aggregated rather than related. " 61 
From the point of view-of the actor, and for Parsons the 
concept of actor is broad enough to include collectivities, the 
situation is composed of all those objects T social: physical 
and cultural - which have acquired a meaning for that actor. 
/ 
150. 
"Actors are oriented to objects in their situation 
in so far as the object in its relation to him may 
be said to have acquired a pattern of meaning to the 
actor in question which is relatively stabilized 
and can, therefore, serve as a reference point for- 
the analysis of his action. Meaning is ... 
resolvable with two'components (a) cathetic 
meaning as a goal object (or object to be avoided) 
or source of gratification (or deprivation) (b) 
cognitive meaning, as part of a relatively stable 
definition of the situation. "62 
In addition, interaction takes place through communication which 
involves common meanings: 
"That is in order for ego to communicate with 
alter and to impute intentions to him and vice 
versa, they must both to some degree of approximation 
'understand the same thing' by each other's acts. 
This means in turn, that if he is to be understood 
or if he is properly to understand the intentions of 
the,: other, he must conform with the 'conventions' of 
the 'language' involved in communication. " 63 
Hence communication and ultimately action has to conform with 
. gyp 
normative standards. Indeed for Parsons the frame of reference 
of action can best be seen as a framework for the analysis of the 
structures and processes which control action and behaviour and 
this, of course, is the reason for the theoretical salience of. the 
functional problems which represent the exigencies constraining all 
systems of action. 
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It is in these terms that Parsons is able to say: 
"The most fundamental theorum of the theory of action 
seems to me to be that the structure-of systems of 
action consists in institutionalized ... and/or ... r-- internalized 2atterns of cultural, meaning. " 65 
And with reference to a system of action: 
"In such a structured system both actor and object 
share institutionalized norms, conformity with 
which is a condition for stability of the system. " 66 
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For Parsons the'institutionalization'of norms as a solution to the 
problem of order is much'to be'pref erred' to the alternatives, either 
the actors or acting units are seen as orientated to each other in 
a purely random fashion or such severe conflict must be envisaged as 
to bring the continuation of the system into doubt. One of the 
benefits of using the idea of normative control is that it leads 
into the concept of a boundary maintaining system'in relation to 
its environment with some very clear' parallels between the structures 
and processes leading to order in a social system and the problem 
of control in any boundary maintaining system in relation to a 
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changing external environment; and this conveniently introduces 
the next phase of the General Theory of Action. 
(d) --The-Evolutionary Perspective 
The final stage of Parsons' thinking which began in the 
mid-1960's68 was marked by the use of an evolutionary context for 
the analysis of social change and this was only one, albeit very,, 
significant, example of the, increasing tendency towards the end 
of his career to emphasize the. similarities between the concepts 
used for the study of the phenomena of action and nature. The 
four function paradigm continues to be the basis for analysis, 
but increasingly, in the context of the class of all living systems. 
Consequently, the direct influence of biological approaches, 
information theory and cybernetics can be'increasingly detected in 
his work, Indeed the theoretical category of social system is, 
for 'arsons, merely one form of the basic methodological principle 
of the generalizing sciences, namely, -systems analysis. 
69 
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For parsons the concept of system provides'the. key to the 
analysis of interdependencies' between parts of a phenomenon and 
between the phenomenon and its environment. It is crucial to all 
generalizing disciplines because, by focussing upon the total 
context, it facilitates a more accurate understanding of structures, 
processes, 'and interrelationships. In the use; of this concept 
Parsons again acknowledges a debt to-the work of W. B. Cannon. 
"With homeostasis, he conceived of a spontaneous 
built-in control within the organism which maintained 
an equilibrium state within boundaries;. this concept 
referred more to a 'pattern of functioning' like that 
of behaviour than to an 'inert' anatomical structure. 
... later ... this trend ... established contact with 
that of cybernetics and information theory ... which 
grounded conceptions of an organized-system maintained 
by integrative control mechanism much more solidly in 
the general theory of science. '' 70 
The purpose of the inevitably abstract. theoretical concept 
of social system is to'describe and analyze empirical systems of 
social interaction, which for Parsons can be seen as the behaviour 
rather than the physical existence of living organisms. This 
theme of the unity of the objects of all the sciences is increasingly 
in, evidence as can be seen from his description of human social 
interaction organized on a cultural level as "... a late evolutionary 
product ... continuous with a very 
broad range of interaction 
phenomena among other organisms . "7l In more detail, the paradigm 
Parsons formulates for the analysis of social interaction focusses 
upon: 
"... a social system generated by and composed of the 
interaction of units which-are 'behaving organisms , 
personalities,, or various levels of collectivity. 
Acting units, however, are always involved in cultural 
systems, which express, symbolize,, order, and control 
human orientations through patterned-meaning systems 
consisting of both codes of meaning and specific 
combinations of symbols in particular contexts. "' 72 
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Such an interaction system'is analytically differentiated 
by Parsons as follows: firstly, a group of interacting units; 
secondly, a collection of rules'which provide ä framework guiding 
both the interaction and the orientation of the components; 
thirdly, an ordered process or sequence of the interaction; and 
fourthly, an environment within which the system functions and to 
which it is interrelated. 
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For Parsons each interacting unit 
is both an active agent and an object to be taken into consideration. 
by other acting units; but in each case the unit has meaning both 
to itself and to others. Hence the characteristic feature of 
interaction which Parsons refers to as! double contingency: 
"Not only, as for isolated behaving units, animals 
or human, is a goal outcome contingent on successful 
cognition and manipulation of environmental objects 
by the actors, but since the most important objects 
--involved 
in interaction act too, it is also contingent 
on their action or intervention in the course of events. " 74 
The analysis of social systems proceeds on the basis of the 
examination of their exchanges with their environments as well as 
the exchanges between the different parts of the system and it is 
this context which provides the notion of functional problem with 
its significance. The functional importance of an exchange to a 
system can be readily determined by considering the consequences 
to the'system of a sudden rise or fall in the level of the particular 
input or output. 
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In fact, for Parsons the concept of function is; 
"... simply the corrollary-of the concept living system, 
delineating certain features in the first instance of 
the system-environment relationship, and in the second, 
of the internal differentiation of the system itself. " 76 
Broadly speaking, then, living systems are conceptualized as having 
an internal state which is more stable than the environment and 
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different from it. They'are also to some extent self regulating 
and it, is in the mechanisms which'facilitate this that the meaning 
of the concept function can be found. According to Parsons the 
designation "structural-functional theory" is no longer appropriate 
to this kind of analysis because structure and function are not 
parallel terms; structure is much more equivalent-to process and 
refers to relatively stable relationships between parts of the 
system, whereas function refers to the operation of a living system 
seen as a going concern in its relationships with the environment 
and, thereby, meeting certain requirements through a combination of 
structure and process. 
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The, basis of the four-function paradigm has-become 
increasingly secure, according to Parsons, as the developments in 
biological theory and general science have been extrapolated into the 
field of action; in particular the conceptions of homeostasis 
and cybernetics provide valuable new opportunities for dealing with 
the problem of integration: 
"It thus seems significant that the four function paradigm 
proved useful in integrating economic theory within that of 
the social system and in particular by analyzing money as a 
mechanism of integration ^ indeed a cybernetic mechanism 
at the symbolic cultural level - through ramified systems` 
of market exchange. " 78 
Moreover, Parsons was able to use the analytic scheme of the primary 
sub-system of society, and the mechanisms of their' integration, as 
a framework for the-analysis of total societies. 
Parsons'. interest in the media of interchange, as 
symbolic modes of communication forming part of a cybernetic 
hierarchy of control, was closely associated with his development 
of the paradigm of the four suhnsystems of action. This was initially 
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based upon the example of money',. but was subsequently extended to 
political power and, in turn, this led* to the analytic treatment of 
two more functional sub-systems, the societal community which is 
concerned with integration, and the pattern-maintenance sub: tisystem. 
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The complete analytic scheme, seen primarily from the point of view 
of the scope of sociology, is as. follows : 
"',.. the core of a society is the societal community, 
which, functionally regarded, is the integrative 
subsystem. It interpenetrates and interchanges 
directly with each of the other primary subsystems: 
the pattern-maintenance or cultural-primary, subsystem; 
the goal--attainment subsystem, or polity; and the 
adaptive subsystem, or economy. The medium focal to 
the societal community is influence which is 
interchangeable for power,, money, and value commitments,. " 80 
According to Parsons in interchanges involving the polity, power. 
is used to mobilize and secure human services, money is used by 
the economy., in exchanges with the physical environment concerning 
the factors of production, and finally, the relationship between 
the social and cultural system is in terms of value commitments. 
Having considered the way in which general systems theory 
influenced Parsons general analytic scheme-in this period of his 
work, it is now possible to examine how his specific views on the 
treatment of social change were modified by his introduction of an 
evolutionary perspective. This represented an increasing stress 
upon the similarities between developmental changes which take place 
in the human and sub-human worlds. 
Parsons defines an evolutionary universal asp 
... any organizational 
development sufficiently important 
to further ' evolution that, rather than emerging only once, 
it is likely to be 'hit upon' by various systems operating 
under different conditions. " 81 
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For Parsons, the concept of adaptation provides', the' theoretical 
framework for the identification of such an-organizational 
development which is conceptualized in terms-sufficiently broad to 
include both a passive adaptation to the environment as well as 
a more active alteration of environmental circumstances in the 
favour of the living system. Systems which develop an 
evolutionary universal have, Parsons argues, so radically enhanced 
their long term ability to adapt to the environment that only 
those systems possessing this new characteristic can progress to 
... higher levels of adaptive capaity. 
"82 He cites several 
examples of such evolutionary universals; vision for evolution in 
the organic world, and in the case of the biological evolution of 
mankind, the development of the human hand as a general purpose 
tool, as well-as the human brain. However, failure to develop 
the particular evolutionary universal does not necessarily mean 
that the system will die out, 
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For Parsons the characteristic feature of the evolution 
of human society is the interchange between natural and social 
conditions: 
"... it is not only the genetic constitution of the 
species that determines the 'needs' confronting the 
environment, but this constitution plus the cultural 
tradition. A set of "normative expectations" 
pertaining to van's relation to his environment delineates 
the ways in which adaptation should be developed and 
extended. Within-the relevant range, cultural innovations, 
especially definitions of what man's. life ought to be, 
thus replace Darwinian variations in genetic constitution. " 84 
The development of a common cultural orientationp which in 
its most basic form is, according to Parsons, similar to religion, 
presupposes the evolutionary universal of language. The 
establishment of social organization presupposes kinship systems and, 
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the evolution of technology presupposes'culture. änd the. development 
of specialized knowledge of practical techniques. Together, 
religion, language, kinship and technology... 
Y,.. may be regarded as an integrated set of 
evolutionary universals at even the earliest 
human level, No known human society has existed 
without all four in relatively definite relations 
to each other. In fact, their presence constitutes 
the very minimum that may be said to mark a society 
as truly human. " 85 
Parsons argues that at the social structural level- 
evolution beyond the primitive stage is-dependent upon two other 
evolutionary universals; first, a clear system of social 
stratification and, second, a system of legitimations dealing in 
particular with political roles. Those societies which develop 
beyond this point, especially if they have a. literate population- 
exhibit-another pair of. universals, administrative bureaucracy 
and money and markets. -In reference to bureaucracy Parson"s says; 
"It is by no means the only structural factor in the 
adaptive capacity of social systems, but no one can deny 
that it is an important one. Above all, it is built 
on further specializations ensuing from the broad 
emancipation from ascription that stratification and 
specialized legitimation make possible. " 86 , 
Both bureaucracy and monef and markets incorporate and are dependent 
upon the further development and specialization of universalistic 
norms, such as law. These norms are probably necessary for the 
emergence of the last structural complex which Parsons considers, 
namely the democratic association based upon elected leadership 
and wide franchise. 
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Within this process Parsons attaches 
particular weight to changes in levels of knowledge in society and 
argues that the revolution' in education and its universalization 
has had effects of comparable significance in modern society to 
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the industria1 and politicäl revolutions; he'argues that it 
has certainly led'to problems of integration of which the most 
common symptom has been the student revolt. 
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In the last few years of his life Parsons attempted to 
place the General Theory of Action within a more comprehensive 
framework than had been used before89 a framework entitled the 
human condition. 
90 As this development is consistent with the 
theoretical and methodological assumptions of the evolutionary 
phase of his work - an emphasis upon open systems theorizing and. 
interchange with the environment -a brief examination will be 
sufficient for our purposes: tt .e essential point is that Parsonst 
interest in the human condition does not entail any major 
revisions of the four function paradigm or the media of interchange 
in the study, -of systems.. of action. 
"My attempt to develop a paradigm of the human 
condition is premised in the assumption that the 
scientific method, in this case of theorizing rather 
than of empirical investigation, can be extended 
to contributing to the problem of the systematizing 
of our knowledge of the "setting", as we have called 
it, -beyond the boundaries of the system of action, 
in the 'environment', if we use that concept, in which 
human action is placed". 91 
Anticipating some criticism Parsons defends the new venture in 
two ways: first, whilst he fully recognizes that the issues 
involved in the human condition are more speculative than have 
hitherto been acceptable to empirical science, he argues that 
although there are linits to knowledge, they do not necessarily lie 
at the boundary of the action system, afterall, the physical and 
organic worlds have been particularly well studied; 
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seconds that 
he is merely following his usual theoretical strategy when faced 
by'a problem R in such a situLtion he attempts 
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ý' .. to 
improve understanding, of one sector of the 
subject matter*of action by seeking better understanding 
of the framework in which it is located in a more 
comprehensive system. " "93 
Discussing the environment in which the general system of 
action is placed, Parsons states: 
"All students-of human action have long been aware of 
the importance to human beings of the physical world, 
the organic world, and, though its status has been'more 
controversal, the 'transempirical' (telic) world, 
besides that of action itself in our technical sense. 
What is new in the present venture is the attempt to 
put their relations to action and each other in a more 
systematic framework. " 94 
Within the paradigm of the human conditions Parsonst: main interests 
are centred upon the telic system as a source of meaning for the 
action system and the interchanges which are possible. Following 
his normal systematic practice he also examines the relationship 
between the telic and the physicochemical system and the telic acid 
the human organic system, as well as the relationships between all 
the different permutations of pairs of sub systems in the human 
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condition and the media which makes it all feasible. 
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II PARSONIAN'THEORY AND THE'CRISISIN. SOCIOLOGY 
As a result of our examination of the origin of Parsons' 
work in the `convergence` of theoretical schemes and its subsequent 
development throughvarious stages of refinement and extension, 
culminating in the paradigm of the human condition, there can be 
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no doubt that Parsons has produced a theoretical system of 
remarkable systematic coherence and enormous complexity. This is 
particularly true when the range of variables the theory seeks to- 
encompass and the different levels of analysis which it is designed 
to facilitate are taken into account. But above all, it is 
the ambitiousness of the enterprise allied to its authorls persistence 
in spite of criticism and indifference, which will, perhaps, prove 
to be its most distinctive features. 
In presenting an overview of the various forms and 
conditions of Parsons' general theory it has been necessary to adopt 
an expositionary approach, but having reached this vantage point, it 
is now possible to pursue a more critical path and consider Parsons' 
work in relation to the strengths and weaknesses identified by his 
contemporaries which point to certain themes of particular relevance 
to our study. In other words, then, we shall attempt to assess 
the permanent value of the General Theory of Action as an extension 
and development of certain aspects of Weber's approach to the 
theoretical and methodological features of sociology. 
However, it is at the very point of considering the value 
of Parsonsl work as a contribution to social scientific knowledge 
that a rather curious phenomenon becomes apparent, From the first 
reviews* of The"Structure of Social Action through to the comments 
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on, his latest collection of essays": published.. in 1978,97 Parsonian 
Theory has evoked'. feeli. ngs ranging from wonder to disbelief 
amongst other sociologists r and this choice of ' terminology. is 
quite deliberate ^ because by its very nature the basis. on which 
an assessment could have been made, was incomplete. Indeed both the 
acceptance and rejection of Parsonian Theory exhibited remarkable 
similarities with a spiritual or ideological transformation, a. 
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Kuhnian paradigm shift, in short it was analogous to an act of 
faith. The explanation of this lies in the fact. that Parsonian 
Theory was. not consistent with existing standards and assumptions 
within sociology concerning the nature of 'theory'. To be, precise, 
Parsons redefined the criteria for judgingthe role and value of 
theory in social science. Hence his comment 
"There is an ambiguity in, the common use of the 
term"theory" - the term is often usen to designate 
what I have called the solution of a problem,. e. g. 
a theory of juvenile delinquency. By theory ... I 
mean a logical system of abstract propositions which 
as such have no direct empirical content at all. 
A prototype is the system of differential equations 
constituting the theory of classicial mechanics. " 99 
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Moreover, whilst the presentation in an extricably linked 
form of both a theoretical system and a framework legitimating the 
theoretical strategy was a source of, initial strength and appeal, 
in-the longer term, it appears to be responsible for. what can now 
been seen to be a major eclipse of influence - certainly-to a 
level which would have been quite unimaginable in the heady,. 
Parsonian days of the early 1950's. 
To be more specific, the initial source of Parsons 
influence can be traced to the nature of Americah--.. Sociology in the 
1930's and. 401s. - At that. time the discipline was predöminantly 
r 
162. 
, ý. atheorefical and pragmatic 
in. form and often viewed its subject 
matter in behaviouristic terms. 
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Against this background Parsons explicitly attempted to 
situate his theory in the context of an analysis of theoretical 
and methodological issues directly relevant for sociology and the 
other sciences of action. Parsons' work stood out dramatically 
because such problems of method and object of study, on the borderline 
of-sociology and philosophy, were of marginal interest to most 
American sociologists at a time when an operationalist philosophy 
of science exerted a major influence. Having rewritten the rules 
for discourse, having apparently incorporated the main. ideas of the 
three most eminent sociologists of the turn of the century generation 
into his work, Parsons came to dominate sociology. His General 
Theory of, Action provided a legitimating framework for several 
generations of less ambitious sociological endeavour: it defined 
the questions to be asked, suggested the concepts to be. used in 
analysis, and its systematic interconnectedness provided a coherent 
thread linking up the various substantive areas of the discipline., 
Thus Parsons shaped a conception of theory which largely moulded 
theoretical debate until the mid 1960's. 
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However, throughout this time the paradox at the centre-of 
the theory remained: whilst the theoretical strategy 
, continued 
to, 
be broadly consistent with the conventionally accepted philosophy 
of science its application was constantly disappointing in the 
sense that testable results were meagre. At the same time it 
was not possible to identify any obviously erroneous components 
of the strategy and, inevitably, this led to a question which was 
posed with growing frustration; How can the value öf Parsons' 
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General Theory. of Action be'judged? Significantly this question 
was not satisfactorily resolved'at the time and Parsons work only 
began to recede from the centre of the theoretical stage because 
of the growth from the early sixties of phenomenologically inspired 
versions of the subject based upon rather different epistemological 
and methodoligical assumptions. 
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In other words then, Parsonst 
influence did not decline because it was suddenly- shown to be 
invalid, rather Parsonian sociology waned because it was 
increasingly ignored as other issues became-more fashionable. 
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The heart of the matter is that Parsons' conception of 
theory appeared to"'equate a programme for the construction of a 
general theory with a contribution to knowledge of empirical 
reality. With the benefit of hindsight it is now possible to 
see much more-clearly than was possible for his contemporaries 
of the 50's and 60's that the programme has not been realized, that 
the promise of innovatory conceptual schemes has been repeatedly 
unfulfilled, and that despite Parsons' formidable intellectual 
efforts throughout his career there has been insufficient empirical 
corroboration of relationships between his analytic elements to 
validate his theoretical system. 
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His theory of action remains a purely theoretical set of 
concepts and classificatory schemes which have'not been demonstrated 
in any rigorous fashion, to have a basis in the empirical world. 
Whilst this lack of corroboration of the general theory has no 
conclusive implications for the validity of the methodological 
approach and the related conception of sociology, it may well be 
a valuable clue to their potentiality for realization, And, in 
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particular, it does serve to highlight the crucial nature of 
Parsons's analysis of the convergence of theoretical schemes for 
the assessment of all his work, because without empirical corroboration 
of the theoretical system the only basis for. determining its value 
or usefulness consists of the arguments about convergence t-" the 
base line from which all his subsequent work has been inferred in 
accordance with the methodological framework of the general theory, 
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But this of course is to anticipate one of the main 
themes of the argument which can only proceed on the basis of a 
thorough examination of the value of Parsons work as a contribution 
to scientific knowledge of social action. Since its initial 
formulation Parsons' work has been subjected to considerable 
critical attention from a variety of perspectives, and by 
utilizing the.. problems. which have been identified as a framework, 
it is possible to provide a detailed answer, oriented to our 
specific interests, in terms of three themes; (a)*the extent to 
which Parsonian theory represents tested scientific knowledge. 
(b) the objectivity of his work and (c) the nature of the subjective 
point of view which Parsons has always insisted is crucial to'- his 
conception of action. 
(a) The Testability of Parsonian Theory - 
The extent to which Parsons work could or could not be 
seen as tested scientific propositions was raised most sharply 
within the mainstream of American Sociology by George Homans in 
his Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association 
106 in 1964 
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After recognizing the'value of functional analysis for 
sociological research, Homans argues' that the position of 
functional theory is quite different: the purpose of a scientific 
theory is to explain empirical phenomena, and in so doing it must 
conform to a logico-deductive structure. A theory has-to be a 
strictly deductive propositional system in which statements capable 
of testing with empirical reality can be logically deduced from the 
more abstract ones. If in the process of testing, a lower level 
proposition is corroborated then logically, the more abstract and 
general propositions are similarly corroborated. A theory which 
lacks these characteristics belongs to metaphysics, not empirical 
science. 
In rather trenchant tones, Homans continues: 
-"One inay define properties and categories, and one still, 
has no theory. One may state that there are relations 
between the properties, and one still has no theory. 
One may state that a change in one property will produce 
a definite change in another property, and one still has 
no'theory. Not until one has properties, and, 
propositions stating'the relations between them, and 
the propositions form a deductive system - not until one 
has all three does one have a theory. Most of'our 
arguments about theory would fall to the ground, if we 
first asked whether we had a theory to argue about. " 107 
Functional theory has not met these criteria and, Homans 
argues, the practice of resorting to conditional statments of the 
form, "If x is to be maintained then institutions of type y are 
necessary", do not resolve the problem. Rather, he argues, "... 
what sociology has to explain are the actual features of actual 
societies and not just the-generalized society, " 
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In a particularly clear reference to Parsons, Romans 
makes the point that although some functionalists have recognized 
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these problems and sought to avoid them by*develöping a different 
form of theory, a conceptual scheme based'upon a group of functional 
problems to be faced by any society, it is still not a deductive 
system. 
"From their lower order propositions, as from their 
higher order ones, no definite conclusions in logic 
could be drawn. Under these conditions, there was 
no way of telling whether their choice of functional 
problems and categories was not wholly arbitrary. 
What the functionalists actually produced was not a 
theory but anew language for describing social 
structure, one among many possible languages; and 
much of the work they called theoretical consisted 
in showing how the words in other languages, including 
that of every-day life, could be translated into 
theirs. " 109 
In view of the importance of. Homan's critique it is 
necessary to examine Parsons! work to see if the substance of 
this argument., -is correct: 
Can statements be deduced from the 
theory and compared with empirical reality in order to determine 
the validity of the theoretical system? Conveniently, Parsons 
has frequently commented upon this issue so that it is possible 
to resolve the question by reference to his own statements on his 
theory of action as it has unfolded through its various stages. 
As we have already seen, the initial formulation of the 
theoretical scheme in The Structure of Social Action was,. for 
Parsons, 
"... the first level of integrated general theory in ... 
(his) .. 
own work. This was clearly very far from being 
a logico-deductive system ... but ... it was very much 
more than an eclectic collection of unrelated theoretical 
ideas. " 110 
However, according to Parsons, the task of discovering, the 
relationships between the various elements within the structure of 
action had proved to be very formidable. 
ill 
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In an address presented in 1949, -Parsons summarized his views on 
his basic orientation to social theory, its concepts and problem 
areas, and concludes- by saying that his work so far "... is not a 
system of sociological theory. It is rather a programme for the 
development of such a system. "112 
Somewhat later, writing about the change from analytic 
to structural-functional theory, Parsons argued that the 
advantages of a structural-functional orientation lay in the 
fact that it was possible to use it to develop a theoretical 
system on the basis of a simplification of variables to more 
manageable proportions. And whilst progress could not be made 
immediately on deriving empirical propositions from the theory 
at least the theoretical system itself could be made more 
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systematic and=coherent-. 
For Parsons, The Social System represented such a purely 
theoretical statement: 
"the subject of this volume is the exposition and 
illustration of a conceptual scheme for the analysis 
of social systems in terms of the action frame of 
reference. It is intended as a theoretical work in 
the strict sense. Its direct concern will be neither 
with empirical generalization as such nor with 
methodology, though of course it will contain a 
considerable amount of both. Naturally the value of 
the conceptual scheme here put forward is ultimately 
to be*tested in terms of its usefulness in empirical 
research. But this is not an attempt to set forth 
a systematic account of our empirical knowledge. ... 
the focus is on a theoretical scheme. " 114 
His subsequent assessments indicate that his work has continued to 
be concerned with the systematization of concepts at the expense 
of stating their empirical reference. In 1956, for example, Parsons 
commented, 
i 
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! 'It is a theory in the process of development which 
has not yet ' evolved' to a desirable level of refinement 
and elegance or empirical validation, " 115- 
Some years later in the article '-Pattern Variables Revisited . ý' 
Parsons concedes that his analytic schemes do not constitute an 
empirical contribution and agrees with Dubin that the empirical 
verification of his-work is important and, as an instance of this, 
refers to the codification of the theory with bodies of empirical 
material. However, the theoretical propositions remain ... 
"... couched at a very high level of generality, 
deliberately designed to cover all classes of 
action system. Therefore it is unlikely that 
these propositions as such can be empirically 
verified at the usual operational levels. " 116 
Indeed Parsons recognizes that there are considerable problems 
involved in. deriving lower level propositions for the purpose of 
testing with suitable empirical material. 
Finally, in an analysis of his own work written in the 
late 1960's Parsons makes a realistic assessment of its progress, 
an assessment which lacks the note of optimism which was frequently 
to be found in his earlier statements. 
"This theory ... clearly stands in an early stage 
of its development, with only a broad consensus 
on the principal frame of reference, with uneven 
degrees of clarity andprecision of conceptualization 
in its various parts, with only spotty formulations 
of analytical uniformities in the relations among 
variables, and with uneven achievement of empirical 
verification of such propositions as we have. " 117 
The undoubted inference to be drawn from this is that 
within Parsonian Theory as long as ambiguity surrounds the specific 
empirical reference of the theoretical concepts -" whether unit acts, 
pattern variables, systems' problems, the four function paradigm or 
i 
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evolutionary universals R there can be'1i. ttle possibility of 
empirical support for the theoretically alleged relationships between 
the variables of the system. 
Thus we can see that Homans' criticism of Parsonian Theory 
is entirely justified: yet it is at this point that the paradoxical 
nature of Parsons influence within the sociological discipline again 
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emerges because Homans was not the first to make this criticism, 
although perhaps he made it most decisively. Indeed after Mertonts 
plea for theories of the middle range in 1948 the status of 
Parsonian Theory with regard to the extent of its empirical 
corroboration should have been clear. 
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Two questions therefore, 
need to be answered: first, How is it possible when these issues 
were widely understood, both by Parsons and the rest of the 
discipline, that he would continue to follow a theoretical strategy 
based upon programmatic theory; and second, How is it possible 
that Parsons' work could have gained such a position of influence 
in spite of this strategy? 
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Programmatic Theorizing 
Parsons' most detailed exposition of the rationale for his theory 
building strategy, as it affects the issue of testability, is to 
be found in the monograrh 'Values, Motives and-Systems of Action'. 
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which initiated the General Theory of Action. His subsequent work 
has remained consistent with these criteria. However, before 
examining the issues in detail, it is worth noting that they 
represent a change of emphasis in comparison with the views expressed 
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fourteen years earlier- i n-The' Structure öf Social 'Action. There 
the prospect of empirical corroboration of the theoretical system 
is considered to be relatively immediate; 
122 
hence his discussion 
of the nature of a body of theory: 
"... the propositions of, the systems have reference 
to. matters of empirical fact; if they did not, they 
could have no claim to be called-scientific. , Indeed,, 
if the term fact is properly interpreted it may be 
said that a theoretical proposition, if it has a 
place in science at all, is either itself a statement 
of fact or a statement of a mode of relations between 
facts. " 123 
Even allowing for the inevitable limitation upon the scope of 
reference inherent in Henderson's definition of fact ^a verifiable 
statement about a phenomenon "... in terms of a conceptual scheme"124 
- the empirical testing of his theory was crucial to Parsons. 
But in the years leading up to the publication of Towards 
A General Theory of Action precise empirical support for such 
theoretical propositions had been singularly difficult to establish 
with the result that his statement of the different levels of 
systematization of scientific theory was a clear attempt to 
defuse potential criticism of his system-building activities by 
emphasizing the abstractness of theory and the difficulties of 
deriving precise empirical reference in the absense of ideal 
experimental conditions. 
In "Values, Motives and Systems of Action", four levels 
of conceptual schemes are presented in ascending order of scientific 
sophistication. First are ad hoc classificatory schemes of common 
sense which are frequently based upon quite arbitrary distinctions. 
At the second level is the categorial type of system: 
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! I, 
4t. a systemof classes* which 
is formed to fit the 
subject matter, so that there are intrinsic relations 
among the classes, and these are in accord with the 
relations among the items of the subject matter. " 125 
The classifications are based upon criteria which identify the 
variables and at least some of their relationships with the result 
that the elements can be seen as an interdependent system, Moreover, 
such a system has sufficient complexity "... to duplicate, in some 
sense, the interdependence of the. empirical systems which are the 
subject matter". 
126 
The example Parsons gives is the categorial 
system in classicial mechanis, consisting for example, of such 
elements as space, time, particle-and mass. 
The third level of conceptual scheme is represented by 
the theoretical system. This is based upon a categorial system 
of interrelated elements with the addition of verified laws stating 
general propositions about the interdependence of the elements of 
the system. According to Parsons the transition from categorial 
theoretical system can be gradual, and categorial systems can 
exist consisting purely of precisely defined elements with little 
or no knowledge of laws stating relationships between them. And 
this aptly described the situation of the General Theory- of Action 
in the early 1950's; Parsons illustrates the point with the 
relationship between reward and learning - although the general 
nature of the relationship 
is known, it is not. possible to predict 
in a particular situation how reward would affect, and be affected 
by, other variables. Hence, 
! 'Knowing that a variable is significant, having a 
definite conception of it and its logical distinctions 
from other variables and other aspects of the empirical 
system is categorial_ knowledge; and that is where most 
of our theoretical knowledge of action stands today. " 127 
172. 
For Parsons-, classical mechanics constitutes the best 
example of a theoretical system, in other'words, then, a categorial 
system together with laws stating the relationships between the 
elements. In a theoretical system', because the laws of the 
system are known, it is possible through logical manipulation to 
predict the effects of particular changes in the values of certain 
variables. But even in the case of classical mechanics it is not 
possible to predict exactly changes in empirical systems; in fact 
the predictions presuppose the existence of ideal or experimental 
conditions. In the specific case of the astronomy of the solar 
system predictions derived from the theoretical system do correspond 
to the nature of the empirical system, but in general there is a 
discrepancy between the predictions at the theoretical level and 
the state of., the corresponding empirical system. 
This sets the scene for the fourth and final level of 
conceptual development, the empirical-theoretical system. According 
to Parsons this is achieved -. or may be achieved because he provides 
no example, 
"Whenever a sufficient number of relevant 
variables can be brought together in a single 
(theoretical) system of interdependence adequate 
for a high level of precision in predicting. changes 
in empirical systems outside the special experimental 
conditions. This is the long term goal. -6f scientific 
endeavour. " 128 
This strategy based upon a gradual increase in the ; 
systematization of his conceptual scheme is clearly dependent upon 
Parsons confidence in the ultimate success of his pattern of 
theorLzing. That Parsons does not recognize the inherent problems 
in this form of development is to be explained by the fact. that for 
1 
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him there are no alternative strategies*.. Afterill, according 
to Parsons, the General Theory of Action is based upon the most 
impressive work of earlier generations of sociologists and, 
therefore, represents the best prospect'for the formulation of 
scientific theory. It is a question of trial and error, of 
gradual refinement of concepts, and of a closer and closer 
resemblance of the relationships between the concepts and reality; 
in the early stages in terms of the experimental simplication of 
the number of relevant variables, but ultimately, in terms of the 
full complexity of empirical reality itself. 
The Credibility of the Strategy 
Parsons' conception of the movement from the categorial system 
of theory, involving the' identification of the major variables 
involved in the empirical situation, to the theoretical system 
where the-relationships between the variables are corroborated 
under artificial conditions, implies a progressively increasing 
validity of the knowledge represented by the different levels of 
theory. Even allowing for the immense problems involved in the 
idea of corroboration through artificial or ideal circumstances, 
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what happens before the theory attains the degree of sophistication 
in which corroboration is possible at all? To be precise; What 
grounds are there for seeing the categorial system as more than 
a possible identification of the elements of a General Theory of 
Action and the suggestion of the relationships between them? 
The guidelines Parsons identifies for distinguishing between 
productive and misleading insights, between useful and arbitrary 
classifications and conceptual schemes, have already been*ref erred 
1 
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to, though in different contexts: first, the"lögical structure 
of the theory identifies the essential from the unessential factual 
material; second, the social scientists' training enhances the 
ability to make such discriminations; third, the working out of 
the implications of schemes for adjacent sub-systems, and fourth, 
the reliance upon concepts and forms of reasoning given in other 
branches of scientific work. 
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Again the conclusion is 
inescapable, *without the assumption that convergence had been 
proven, and by implication that the initial system of theoretical 
elements was valid, -the Parsonian strategy looks extremely 
speculative and its product can be seen for what it is, a botch- 
potch of concepts, schemes, and ideas, which in the hands of 
anyone less talented than Parsons would never have attained such 
a level-of coherence and systematization. . _, _ But this of course, 
is 
only a side issue because in terms of Homans argument Parsons! 
work is not a scientific theory at all. 
Parsons, however, resisted such-. a conclusion; his view 
of different levels of scientific development. implied, as we have 
seen, a gradual and incremental process. Consequently he'was 
able to argue, 
"... my approach is not yet a logico-deductive system, 
but rather a temporal and historical series of contributions 
toward the development of such a system. Above all I would 
reject the rigid alternative: either. a fully integrated 
deductive system, or a congeries of unrelated 
conceptualizations and generalizations. I should contend 
strenuously that the level of The Structure of Social Action 
represented genuine systematization, at a certain rather 
elementary level, to be sure, but well in advance of 
previous attempts. The steps taken since then have by 
and large been real advances from that point, advances 
by extension, but also clarity of definition, analytical 
refinement, and better theoretical integration. " 131* 
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Indeed Parsons draws a parallel'between"his role and that of an 
appellate judge in the development of the law, whose task is not so 
much to rule on particular cases as to interpret the rules at a 
more general level and to ensure consistency with fundamental 
principles - and for Parsons The General Theory of Action, with its 
origins in convergence, represents such basic principles for the 
study of action. 
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As Parsonst career developed, the role of theory in the 
interpretation of empirical phenomena became a substitute for a 
more strictly empirical kind of testing. He argues that the 
successful use of the theory in the codification of empirical material 
does confer some validity upon it; and it is in this context that 
Parsons' essays on substantive topics acquire a new significance. 
" the empirical essays in this volume can claim 
to"be'contributions to empirical sociology and to 
the development of theory at the same time. (Not 
products of operational research techniques). They 
are ... called essays 
in the "application" of theory 
in that in every case they represent attempts to 
bring to bear theoretical considerations in 
interpreting the various broad phenomena with which 
they are concerned. It matters profoundly to theory 
whether the theoretically expected relationships 
in fact hold up. empirically. " 133 
In this case, Parsons argues, the explanations derived from the 
theory about the phenomenon of the youth culture are supported by 
the contrast between the American middle class-urban kinship system 
and those of classical China And Japan; he continues, 'Then however 
impressionistically these differences have been established, theory 
enables us to draw conclusions from them. " 134 
But the usefulness of- a theory for ordering a mass of 
empirical information and its value in the interpretation of that 
data in particular ways can in no way be taken'to confer' validity 
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upon the elements of the theoretical system and-their interrelatedness. 
Indeed the essentially theoretical character of his work is 
recognized by Parsons. 
"Both the pattern-variables and the four system problems 
are conceptual schemes, or sets of categories, for 
classifying the. components of action. They provide a 
frame of reference within which such classifications can 
be made. The figures presented here indicate. the methods 
sets of rules and procedures, that state how these 
categories may be used analytically; they imply theorems 
propositions that admit of logical, not empirical, proof 
which state a set of determinate relationships among 
the categories and, in. so doing, outline a theory of.,, 
action. The theory, then, is a set of logical 
relationships among categories used to classify 
empirical phenomena and, in empirical reference, 
attempts to account for whatever may be the-degree of 
uniformity and stability of such phenomena. " 135 
More recently, in-an attempt to justify the empirical 
relevance of the media of interchange paradigm in the social system, 
Parsons. ' refers to its consistency with-both the. basic principles 
of the theory of living systems and the theory of cybernetic control 
of symbolic systems. These similarities ensure "... -that is is 
neither purely speculative nor simply arbitrary. "136 He continues, 
and this can perhaps stand as a fitting last word on the issue of 
the testability of his theoretical system: 
"If it is correct, as has often been said, that it 
is highly general and abstract, though this is by 
no means necessarily a fault. The fault lies rather 
in that at the many levels and in the. many contexts 
where it is inherently relevant - if its general. 
claims mean anything - the terms cannot be precisely 
defined, nor can they yet be adequately operationalized. " 137 
(b) Objectivity, Abstraction'and'the Problem of Order 
Parsons has been criticised for. his partisanship whilst, 
he claimed to represent objective standards.. 
138 
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This issue, 
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largely revolves around his treatment of the problem of order, but 
it is a debate which involves a good deal of misunderstanding. In 
the majorLty of cases his critics have jailed to appreciate the 
abstractness of his theoretical work -ýan abstractness or artificiality 
which is inevitable in a theoretical system which has'only been 
developed to the categorial stage - in which. comparisons with the 
full complexity of the empirical world can only be misleading. 
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Indeed the entire debate over the problem of order in which 
Dahrendorf, Lockwood, -Mills, and Rex played such a prominent part 
by advocating the crucial role of conflict in society, in opposition 
to a society conceptualized in terms of consensus, was based upon 
misapprehension of the nature of Parsons work,. ' This was a result 
of their failure to fully appreciate its theoretical and methodological 
character, a problem which was aided and abetted by ParsonsF mode 
of expression. Indeed, on occasions he failed, to make sufficiently 
explicit the distinction between his conceptual scheme and the 
empirical reality to which it referred. 
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Let us begin, therefore, with the problem of objectivity 
in Parsons work because it is his apparent denial of the political 
realities of the modern world which led to most critical attention. 
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Parsons' thinking on the objectivity of the sciences dealing 
with the phenomena of action was strongly influenced by Weber who, 
he suggests, even anticipated Whitehead's demonstration of, the 
analytical abstraction of sciencet142 With the recognition of the 
inability, of any theory to grasp the £u11 complexity of empirical 
reality, copes the realization that theory is not possible . without 
selection and evaluation of problems and facts, It is in this 
context that flarsons"considers Webers"distjnction between the 
motives which guide interest into certain problems R motives which 
are dependent upon certain value orientations - and the grounds for 
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determining the validity- of scientific propositions, which are 
specifically independent of such orientations, 
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"This is the focus of Weber's famous doctrine of the 
"value freedom". of social science (Wertfreiheit). It 
does not mean that the scientist should'be'free of any 
values, but rather that in his professional role, he 
must be free to give the discipline's values' priority 
over others, notably in Weber's mind over political 
commitments. " 144 
However, for Parsons, as for Weber, the selection of problems 
is relevant to values (Wertbeziehung), it is inextricably tied to 
the values of society which take. their form from the history of 
the society, its level of knowledge and culture, and the events 
of the day. But for Parsons, 
" selection in this sense must be carefully 
distinguished both from a secondary type of 
selection and from distortion, which is realistically 
always present but which analytically must be attributed 
- to a--quite different order of factors. Weber's concept 
of Wertbeziehung, in my opinion, adequately takes care 
of the concept of what may be called the 'primary 
selectivity' involved in the value-science integrate. " 145 
Within the context of the selectivity of problems, Parsons considers 
that the findings of social science can aspire to the reliability'" 
which characterizes natural scientific work so long as the rules of 
the intellectual inquiry are followed: that is, objectivity in 
empirical observation, clear and precise concepts, and logical 
inference. 1 Parsons has always argued that in this procedure 
the structure of the theory plays an important role: it, facilitates 
the determination of the scientifically important facts, provides 
a framework within which factual material can be arranged, and 
. indicates those areas where factual information is missing, 
147 
And this is perfectly illustrated by-the role of the problem'of' 
order'in parsons'- thinking. 
t 
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More recently Parsons summarized'his views'on the 
relations between the actLve role of the theoretical structure 
and research as follows: 
"The best strategy for maintaining. objectivity thus 
lies in the emphasis upon the match between the 
theoretical scheme employed in T the study which is 
explicitly comparative and evolutionary, and the 
statements of empirical fact that have been selected 
to validate theoretical interpretation. ", 148 
Now whilst this strategy may be entirely satisfactory in natural 
science, or those social sciences with a tried and tested theory, 
Parsons' use of a theoretical structure of untestable empirical 
validity clearly offers no guarantee of objectivity. Indeed, 
despite Parsons' commitment to the scientific-ideal of objectivity 
a great many commentators came to regard his work as unreasonably 
conservative and committddto the status quo because of its concern 
with norms to the detriment of interests. 
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However the real point 
of contention has been not so much its political commitment or 
partiality, but the problem of determining the empirical significance 
of the exclusively theoretical propositions. 
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And this problem 
has undoubtedly been made gorse by Parsons' enthusiasm for 
abstraction. 
Indeed it is hardly an exaggeration to say that Parsons 
was not merely content to accept the inevitable degree of 
abstraction in relation to empirical reality, to be found in 
prestigious natural scientific theories, 
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but positively fostered 
the level of abstraction in his own work. And although abstraction 
may go hand in hand with increasing generality there is a constant 
danger of artificiality if the concepts lose touch with reality. 
Given Parsons} strategy of theory building, the very limited-role for 
/ 
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experiment, and the problems- inherent in ideal conditions for the 
testing of propositions, the monitoring of the progress of the 
theory in terms of empirical corroboration became extremely 
difficult. To make matters worse, the abstraction of the theory 
was enhanced because of the formalization of four sub-divisions 
within the theory of action. Subsequently the abstraction was 
extended by the sub-division of responsibility for different 
academic disciplines, namely economics, politics, sociology and 
psychology to different aspects of the social system, which was one 
of these sub-systems. Consequently it became a major problem 
to determine the kind of empirical evidence which was relevant 
to a specific theoretical statrent because the sub-division of 
the General Theory of Action, on the basis of specialization, 
presupposed that the explanation of an empirical phenomenon would 
require the recombination of the various theoretical schemes. 
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And it was the labyrinthine nature of this task which was largely 
responsible for the misunderstanding of Parsons work. 
Parsons was aware of the dangers of abstraction and 
recognized that it was vital to specify the particular system level 
for functional analysis: 
"... human'action cannot be dealt with in terms'of 
one system reference, such as 'society', but most 
involve mutliple system references: perhaps the 
problem of keeping these system references straight.. 
has been the most prolific single source of difficulty 
and confusion in theoretical analysis in this field. " 153 
But failure on the part of the critics to keep this point in 
mind led to quite unnecessary debates over Parsonst definition 
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of sociology. In the'preface to The'Social System Parsons 
argued, 
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"ý.. the book should be'regarded*as a statement of 
general sociological theory, since this is here 
interpreted to be that part of the' theory of the' 
social system which is centred on the'phenömena 
of institutionalization of patterns of value orientation 
in roles. " 155 
Parsons definition of sociology ras closely related to his views 
on analytic specialization and the division of labour within the 
sciences of action. Consequently, the apparent unreality of 
this selection of elements should not necessarily be seen as a 
result of Parsons' idealogical or other predilections. 
Another factor which has enhanced the abstract nature of 
Parsonian theory has been the use of functional analysis. For 
Parsons the concept provided a basic set of reference points for 
structural analysis. The identification of the functional 
contribution of a structural component to a system is based upon 
the expected alteration to the operation of the system which would 
result from changes in such structures. This kind of assessment is 
dependent upon the study of a wide range of. cases which demonstrate"± 
the relationship between such structural changes and specific effects 
on the social system. 
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In addition, functional analysis exhibits certain special 
features: 
"A functional explanation begins with a postulated 
state of affairs, and refers back to the necessary 
antecedent or underlying condi öns. Such teleology 
must of course be conditional, couched in the form 
that if certain patterns are to be maintained, or 
certain goals achieved, certain conditions must be 
fulfilled. " 157 
The same kind of conditional reasoning is implicit in Parsonst 
use of--equilibrium as a theoretical device. At an earlier point 
in his career Parsons made this, quite explicit, 
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"We have concentrated' our attention on the'processes 
of equilibrätion. in carefully defined, 'i; ndeed'in a 
strict sense in hypothetical, systems'. of action .,. we. have been very careful not to imply that there is any 
inherent presumption that empirical systems must 
remain in equilibrium... We merely use the concept of 
the equilibrating system as a theoretical mode. " 158 
For Parsons a theoretical model is a hypothetical structure or 
process derived from certain theoretical premises and compared 
with a body of empirical information in order to facilitate. 
its analysis. Models include a theoretical ordering of 
elements and relationships, they represent a particular kind of 
abstraction as they are formed on the basis of a certain range of 
theoretical relationships for particular purposes, but there is- a 
constant danger of reifying a model. if it' is forgotten thatthey 
were constructed for very specific analytic purposes. 
159 
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This. kind of hypothetical reasoning is an inevitable 
corollary of Parsons' analytic strategy with its distinction 
between an empirical system -a group of empirical phenomena - and 
the relevant conceptual scheme at the categorial level of 
theoretical development. This distinction between hypothetical 
or simplified reasoning at the theoreticäl level and the full 
complexity of the empirical system can also be seen in the 
concept of isocial system'160 which as a theoretical device is 
quite different to a concrete society. 
The conditional nature of Parsons'ýreasoning in relation 
to the concepts of functionalism, equilibrium, norms and 
institutionalization has not been widely appreciated. 
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Indeed 
Parsons could argue with some justification that functional analysis 
has no ideological implications, that it is not committed'to the 
status quo, and that it does not represent an assessment of the 
r 
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balance between integrating and disintegrating elements and on this 
basis, with Merton, he rejected as misconceived the suggestion of 
rival consensus and conflict theories. 
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To be fair to his critics, however, there are occasions 
when Parsons omitted to distinguish between the theoretical and the 
empirical level, as for instance, can be seen in his comments on 
the four function paradigm and the extent of its empirical 
corroboratiön: 
"... the four function scheme is grounded in the 
essential nature of living systems at all levels 
of 'organization and evolutionary development, from 
the unicellular organism to the highest human civil- 
ization. The contributions of homeostatic physiology, 
the new genetics, and cybernetics and information 
theory lend strength to the view that in these basic 
respects there is strong continuity over the class of 
living systems, especially with regard to the central 
role of the processes we have characterized as pattern-s 
maintenance. " 163 
This leads directly to the problem of order, one of the 
most important themes in Parsons work, 
164 
which has suffered acutely 
from the level of ambiguity between theoretical schemes based 
upon conditional reasoning and theoretical schemes presented as 
if they had full empirical support. According to Parsons, 
"Order is a sociological problem because the unlimited 
and random desires of man might lead to the state which 
is described by Hobbes: 'a'life poor, solitary, nasty, 
brutish and short'. If our lives are not poor, solitary, 
nasty, brutish and short, why are they not? So Hobbes 
presented a problem: explain how man's life in society 
is more satisfactory than in a state of nature. " 165 
His. solution to this problem is that order results from 
a combination of two factors, from the actors and object's 
orientations which at a particular stage in the development of 
his theory r.. could be analyzed in terms of the pattern variables; 
I8. 
together with a system* of structüres'which'is quite- independent of 
particular actors. 
"In such a structural system both actor and object . 
share institutionalized norms, conformity with which 
is a condition for stability of the system. The 
relationship between the actor's orientation and the 
modalities of. objects in the situation cannot be 
random. " 166 
In this passage the conditional nature of Parsons' view is 
explicit; if stability is to exist there has to be conformity 
by actors. with-a system_of institutionalized'norms. 
The same viewpoint can be found in the 'General Statement' 
in Toward a General Theory of Action where the solution'to the 
problem of order exhibits the same features. 
"The structural roles of"the social system 1.. must 
be oriented to value alternatives. - Selections are 
of course always actions of individuals, but these 
selections cannot be inter-individually random in a 
social system. Inleed, one of the most important 
functional imperatives of the maintenance of social 
systems is that the value orientations of the 
different actors in the same social system must be 
integrated in some measure in a common system. All 
on-going social systems do actually show a tendency 
toward a general system of common cultural 
orientations. " 167 
Again the hypothetical nature of this statment is revealed by 
the phrases - "cannot be inter-individually random" and "must be 
integrated in some measure". 
These views have remained ä permanent part of the General 
Theory of Action, in 1968 Parsons emphasized; 
"The most important single condition of the integration 
of an interaction system is a'shared basis'of'normative 
order. " 168 
It is in this context of the conditional nature of this formulation 
that Parsons can argue with some justification that he'has been 
185. 
unfairly accused' of being a defender' of order' at any price when 
in fact he has always regarded order as a problem and not an 
imperative, hence; 
".. ý the remarkable thing about social order is 
not how perfect it is, but that it does exist at 
some sort of reasonably tolerable level". 169 
However, on other occasions the hypothetical nature of 
Parsons reasoning, based upon consciously simplified selection 
of variables, is not made explicit and the theoretical solution 
to the problem is presented as if it had precise empirical support. 
And, 
"... so fundamental is the Problem of Order that 
the structure of systems of human social action, 
whether they be personality systems of individuals 
or social systems, consists of internalized and 
institutionalized normative patterns of culture 
rules, values and other normative components. ", 170 
".. the most fundamental ground of order in 
societies is the internalization of the'normative 
culture in the personalities of its members and the 
institutionalization of that in the normative 
structure of the society. " 171 
Given this kind of statement it is hardly. surprising 
that Parsons attracted a considerable amount of criticism, but- 
it was criticism which in general failed-to appreciate the purely 
theoretical reasoning involved in the General Theory: of Action. 
From our point of view this was the real weakness of the 
discussion and evaluation of Parsons`: work in the 1940ts, 1950's, 
and early 1960's. There was an absence of detailed. examinations 
of the nethodolßgical and theoretical nature of Parsons' strategy 
for building a general theory and, as a result, a failure to -. 
identify its weaknesses and suggest alternative solutions where 
172 
possible, Indeed the framework within which'Parsons had 
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developed his conceptual scheme was accepted by supporters and 
critics alike. 
173 
Sociological theory was seen'to consist of 
highly abstract and general propositions which could be used in 
the analysis of structures and processes on the basis of 
presupposing certain conditions about either equilibrium and 
normative order, or change and conflicting interest groups. On 
this artificial basis Parsons, and to a, lesser extent the conflict 
writers,, formulated complex theoretical schemes that were self- 
contained and essentially autonorous. from the world of experience. 
But this meant ignoring a fundamental issue, namely: what, -procedures 
were necessary for accurate and precise. translation of the generality 
of the theoretical level to the specific and. detailed realm of 
empirical reality so that the analytic schemes and models could 
even be tested, let alone their corroboration be established. 
The point of our argument is that in this Parsonian era 
sociological theory was little more than speculation, admittedly, of 
varying degrees of abstraction. Associated with this was alack 
of interest in the problems of the relationship, between general 
theoretical concepts, encompassing aclass or group of empirical 
phenomena, and the particular explanation of, a concrete phenomenon 
by itself. This lack of interest can be accounted for in terms 
of two factors. " First, by the-authoritativeness of Parsons' 
The Structure of Social Action with its 'examination of the theoretical 
and methodological ideas of Pareto, Durkheim. and Weber, and in 
particular, his claim to have identified a-convergent set of 
concepts which became the basis of the General Theory of. Action. 
And second, the wider context of the appreciation of sociology which 
was strongly- influenced by the d5scussions of the philosophers of 
r 
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social science. concerning - thenatural scientific model of a logico, 
deductive theoretical system, served to legitimate the role and value 
174 
of general and abstract conceptual schemes. Perhaps the most 
notable attempt to provide an alternative to the Parsonian conception 
of the theoretical and methodological character of sociology was 
made by Dahiendorf, 
175 
but his arguments did not lead to a 
substantial challenge to the Parsonian orthodoxy because he failed 
to develop a systematic framework linking the "problem oriented" 
view of sociology with a continued use of an abstract conflict 
model. With the exception of Marxist analyses which, anyway, 
were concerned with rather different problems, discussion of the 
theoretical and methodological foundations of sociology gradually 
-atrophied176 until they were suddenly projected 
into the forefront 
of attention-by the emergence of the "crisis" in the late 1960's, as 
a result of critiques of conventional sociology froma broadly 
phenomenological point of view. 
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A fitting conclusion to these two sections, which have 
dealt with the problems of testability of Parsons! work, its 
objectivity, level of abstraction and the nature of order in 
society, can be found in a characteristically trenchant comment 
by C. Wright Mills. He argued, in a reference to Parsons' 
solution to the problem of order, that because. of the diversity 
of actual societies in terms of the extent to which values, norms, 
178 
and interests were shared, there could not be just one solution. 
In what can stand as a final word on the scientific usefulness of 
this form of theoretical sociology, Mills identifies the weakness 
of Parsons' approach by arguing: - 
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'"'... he is possessed by the'idea'that the one model 
of social order he has . constructed. is some kind of 
universal model; because .... he*has fetishized 
his concepts. " 179 
(c) The Subjective Point of View 
Reference to the subjective point of view of the actor 
was one of the basic principles of Parsonst:. Voluntaristic Theory 
of Action; tbroughout, his career he has continued to emphasize 
that it has remained an indispensible assumption of his work. '-- 
However, the developing nature of Parsonian Theory presented 
supporters and opponents alike-with a substantial task of analysis 
and clarification. The extension of its scope-into a general 
theory of action, and the considerable innovation in analytic- 
schemes, led to ambiguity about its central principles with-the 
result that it defied straightforward categorization. 
Martindale180 was the first to focus attention upon the 
extent of-the changes between Parsons' pre-war theoretical 
system consisting of analytic elements and the post-war structural- 
functional version. He argued that Parsonst earlier position was 
strongly influenced by Weber and took as its basic category the unit 
act, whereas the later theory was based upon the analysis of systems 
of action within which the concept of role became the basic 
category. For Martindale, The Social System represented an approach 
which was increasingly critical of a Weberfan perspective and 
correspondingly receptive to-the work-of Durkheiml81; The 
implication was clear: the value of a body of work which was 
claimed by its actor to be consistent with its initial formulations 
and yet had moved radically away from them, must be severely reduced% 
189. 
This critique was quickly-followed by JF,, ScottIs.. much 
more detailed and, for that reason, much more effective examination; 
'The Changing Foundations of the. Parsonian Action Scheme"182. 
Drawing upon Martindale's account of a general movement in the 
character of Parsons work, Scott identified a fundamental change 
of assumptions between a pre-war voluntarism and a post-war 
naturalism. According to Scott, Parsons! pre-war voluntaristic 
theory of action stressed the "... causal efficacy of valuation _J83 
in other words, the early Parsons was opposed to the explanation 
of human conduct in terms of a natural scientific frame of 
reference. In an article written in 1935184, Parsons had 
stated the philosophical presupposition of voluntarism; -man is 
a thinking. evaluating, and ultimately creative being whose values 
cannot be satisfactorily explained by the circumstances of the 
material world. For Scott, Parsons' early work is. very similar 
to a form of philosophical idealism. Indeed he argues that 
Parsons! had rejected a naturalistic interpretation of the, "... 
phenomena of minded behaviour" ... because it did not allow a 
role for ... "the mental phenomena of cognition, rationality and 
evaluation" ...., and 
in this context voluntarism can be seen to 
185 
be based upon ... 
"non-natural factors of volition or 'will'. " 
However, according to Scott, in the voluntaristic theory 
Parsons did not accept an idealistic reductionism because he assumed 
that 
!!. t. human action participates 
in-two metaphysical 
realms, that of ideas and values for its formation, 
and that of material fact for its realization. " 186 
190. 
But in methodological terms, Scott suggests that Parsons recognized 
a degree of independence between the sciences'of action and 
nature because special methods were required'to deal with subjective 
material from the point of view of the actor. 
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Although in The Structure*of*Social'Action the emphasis 
upon voluntarism is reduced, the fact-that-it is ý, "contrasted with 
both positivism and idealism in the book's main theme is a 
demonstration of its continuing importance with , the, result that 
for Scott, Toward a-General Theory of Action represents 'a stark 
contrast, because voluntarism is replaced by a cautious naturalism. 
188 
In fact Scott considers, that Tolman's participation in this 
collaborative effort is a measure of the-changed nature of Parsons 
post-war work, because Tolman had consistently argued that a 
behaviouristic account of purposive behaviour is both feasible 
189 
and desirable. In this context, therefore, Parsonsl claim 
that there had been a convergence between his conceptual,, scheme 
and Tolman's form of behaviourism is of particular significance to 
Scott who refers to Parsons'-. statement: 
"The organization of observational data in terms of the 
theory of action is quite possible and fruitful in. 
modified behaviouristic terms, and such formulation avoids 
many of the difficult questions of introspection or 
empathy. " 190 
Indeed, according to Parsons, all that is needed is the addition 
of the concept of "complementarity of expections! ' to Tolman1s 
categories of orientation and cognition because "'t.. What the 
actor thinks or feels can be treated as a systeinyof intervening 
variables; '191 
For-Scott, within the General Theory of Action the'role 
__,, of 
Voluntarism has been reduced to the point where it has practically 
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ceased to exist yet, paradoxically, Parsons' post-war discussions 
of normative orientation and subjective reference exhibited a 
terminological continuity with his earlier but very different 
approach. For Scott these "crucial equivocations" seriously 
undermined the value of Parsons' work. 
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One example of ambiguity which Scott examines in the postr 
war theory is the category of action: this can be interpreted 
in two ways, first and most straightforwardly as a naturalistic 
concept consistent with Tolman's purposive behaviourism and 
second in potentially voluntaristic terms because although the 
scope of naturalistic elements Las been increased the assumption 
of a metaphysical dualism has not, in principle been denied. 
Scott continues: 
. _".., _the 
postwar ambiguity obtains because Parsons 
no longer believes that valuation involves a 
metaphysical autonomy. As a result of a new respect 
for psychoanalytic theory and other naturalistic 
persuasions, plainly at odds with his prewar doctrine, 
he has had to make the appropriate adjustments in the 
action scheme. At the same time he has stressed 
the continuity of his postwar work with what he did 
before. Since tF. e subjective and normative aspects 
of action were the means by which voluntarism was 
given its salience and necessity in the action scheme 
of 1935 and 1937, they are the parts most changed in' 
the scheme of 1951, where voluntarism has been obscured 
and reduced to a wholly hypothetical role. " 193 
What is for Scott perhaps the. most. significant change in the post- 
war theory is to be found in Parsons' discussion of the relationship 
between the theory of action and Tolman's work: for Scott, Parsons; 
argument that his approach does not presuppose a mind which is 
separate from, a material organism is particularly important. 
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Yet 
according to Scott in the voluntaristic theory the independence of 
mind from material nature was the whole reason for basing the theory 
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upon the subjective point of view. ' Extending this point of 
contrast, Scott argues: 
"What actors think or feel was not only independent, 
it was private; a subjective reference was essential 
and the method of'verstehen was invoked. But Tolman's 
behaviouristic position, in terms of which the action 
scheme can now be defined, was always opposed. to the 
_. _ -, -, ': confirmatory use of such non-public data as those which. 
verstehen would provide. ' The retreat from mind-body 
dualism has removed the need for a subjective 
reference. " 195 
With the main points of Scott's analysis in mind it is now 
possible to consider the significance which Parsons gives to the 
changes between his prewar and postwar theory. He explicitly 
recognises that there have been modifications to the treatment of 
the subjective point of view over this time. 
"Contrary to the view ... in The Structure of Social Action 
it now appears that this postulate is not essential to 
the. frame of reference of action in its most elementary 
form. It is, -however, necessarily involved at the levels 
of elaboration of systems of action at which culture, 
that is, shared symbolic patterns, become involved". 196 
For Parsons the modification is an extension . of. the frame of 
reference rather than a major change; of principles. Indeed,, in 
a related discussion in The Social-System of the relationship 
between the theory of action and, the theoretical. frameworks for the 
study of nature, Parsons argues that -the subjective point of view - 
the analysis of action from the viewpoint of the actor '- is one of 
its three distinctive features. 
197 
. 
The importance of this theme 
is established in Parsons' subsequent, examination of the role of 
communication in interaction. 
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"It is not possible .... to interpret'alter`s 
behaviour in terms of the-action frame of 
reference without communicating with him, 
without tunderstanding his motivesF in the 
full sense of the theory of action as we'have 
developed such a-conception. This'is essentially 
what is meant by the subjective reference or the 
subjective point of view of the theory of action, " 198 
Consequently, Parsons was not prepared to accept Scott's argument 
about a discontinuity between The Structure of Social Action and 
the structural-functional theoretical system represented by Toward 
A General Theory of Action and The Social'System. Differences 
of emphasis and terminology were the result of extending the . 
theoretical scheme to include a more comprehensive set of factors. 
relevant, to the explanation of action in society. 
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In 
particular, the'changes in the frame of reference were necessary in 
order to clarify the problems of motivation, but-... "no fundamental 
change has been made. The analysis has simply been carried to a 
more generalized level. " 
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Undoubtedly between 1937 and 1951 there was considerable 
development in Parsons' Theory of Action, and in the same period 
the notion of voluntarism disappeared. But the concept had been 
used by Parsons in 1935 with considerable metaphysical overtones, 
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although this was reduced two years later in The Structure of-Social 
Action. Hence by 1951 although the metaphysical form of voluntarism 
had disappeared Parsons clearly'believed that its substance had 
remained broadly the same, and this is borne out by the fact that 
he has subsequently both emphasized the importance of the subjective 
202 
point of view and acknowledged that Weberts ideas on subjective 
understanding were a stimulus to reject the monopolistic claims to 
scientific status of the extreme behaviourists whö'held"that only 
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bodily movements could be'studied'objectively, 
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Whilst Scott took Parsons' continuing support for the 
subjective point of view in Toward a General Theory*of Action and 
The Social System as evidence of major confusion and ambiguity, he 
does in fact advance a plausible explanation for these changes 
although he does not give it sufficient weight. Scott refers 
to the incentive for Parsons of having as many subscribers to the 
"General Statement" as possible in the context of the creation of. 
Harvard's Department of Social Relations. The implication is 
that Parsons' use of terminology was specifically influenced by this. 
collaborative enterprise. and, as Scott, shows, the fact that "Values, 
Motives and Systems of Action" by Parsons and Shils, is noticeably 
less naturalistic in orientation than the "General, Statment" can be 
explained by the political exigencies of setting up the new 
department., The essential point, however, is this; there is no 
necessary implication of a major change in Parsons', conception of 
action or the way it is to be studied. Indeed after the pace of 
institutional integration at Harvard slowed, Parsons' behaviouristically 
oriented terminology was gradually phased out as the focus of his 
theoretical work moved from roles conceptualized in terms of the 
pattern variables to that of systems of interaction regarded as 
functioning entities. 
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It is important to note that at . the. voluntaristic stage, 
and even at the time of the merger with Tolman's-behaviourism, 
Parsons distinguished between=his approach to. the explanation. of- 
action and its explanation in terms-of the frames of reference of 
biology and physiology. In methodological-terms it is clear that 
-,. Parsons was only opposed to radical behaviourists who'denied'the 
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relevance of any subjective materials in the, explanation of 
behaviour, not to the use of natural scientific concepts and 
procedures which stopped short of this position. Afterall, Parsons 
was explicit that a pure behaviourist position must either reject 
the action frame of reference altogether and follow a biologically 
oriented perspective, or limit its scope to the study of biological 
organisms which lack culture. 
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It is possible to see, therefore, that Scott overestimated 
the meaning of the changes which he identified in Parsons. 
terminological style. He. did not give, sufficient weight to Parsons! 
desire to formulate a general theory of action and the inevitable 
accommodation which this meant toward psychological language and, 
aided by a judicious choice of quotations, Scott never felt the 
need to consider that Tolman may have moved in the direction of. 
Parsons for equally pragmatic reasons. Yet the "General Statement", 
which had Tolman's support as much as Parsons',. in an examination 
of the orientation of action and the motivation of individual 
actors, states: 
"Action has an orientation when it is guided by the 
meaning which the actor attaches to-it in its 
relationship to his goals and interests. " 206 
Now it may well be that the authors of this statement intended the 
analysis of this action to proceed in terms of-the concept of 
intervening variables, but this euphemism cannot disguise the 
fact that some kind of subjective reference is involved. 
Consequently Scott does not really clarify what Parsons 
meant by this particular conceptualization. Hence-it is necessary 
to examine Parsons work in rather more -detail (especially between 
1935' and 1951) to see what changes occurred'in the elements of 
i lqu 
his analysis of action from the point of view'of the actor. 
In "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory" 
207 
the article to which Scott attributes so much significance, we find 
a schematic outline of Parsons' views that were to be expressed 
in more detail in'The'Structure*of Social Action: Parsons viewed 
action in the structural context of ultimate ends, an intermediate 
sector, and ultimate means or conditions and argued that action 
could only be explained as a result of a specific combination of 
the three sets of factors as people attempted to achieve their 
goals. And in the course of the analysis of this effort to 
achieve goals the use of a means-ends schema became important 
because it formulated a scientifically verifiable relationship 
between means and ends. The significance of the means-end 
relationship'. -for Parsons cannot therefore, be, overestimated: it 
is, 
1'... a scientific statement couched in the conditional ... form. That is, if I do certain things, bring about 
certain conditions, I will achieve my end. But this 
rational schema of the relationship of means and ends is 
not to be arrived at by empirical generalization from the 
crude facts of experience. It is not only an analytical 
scheme, but one of aparticular-sort. What it formulates. 
is a norm of rational action. Its empirical relevance rests 
on the view, which -I believe to be factually borne out, 
that human beings do in fact, strive to realize ends and 
to do so by the rational application of means to them. " 208 
Let us be clear on this point. Parsons did not say that human' 
beings automatically act in accordance with such a rational norm, 
rather, the essence of early voluntarism was that the norm provided 
a limited case to wL, ich the individual's actions could approximate 
depending,. -; upon the amount of effort - among other things expended 
in the attempt to achieve a particular end. The conditional. nature 
of this kind of rational analysis is quite-explicit: 
i 
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"The concepts built up on the basis of the'means-end 
schema are thus not empirical generalizations but, to 
use Max Weberfs term 'Ideal Types'. But, precisely 
in so far as this voluntaristic conception of action 
holds true, they are indispensible to the understanding 
of concrete human 'affairs". 209 
In The Structure ' of' Social Action the emphasis changed 
from the factor of ultimate ends, to that of the means employed 
by the actor, which were conceived by Parsons to be normatively 
orientated to the extent at least that the problem of order was 
solved. 
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In addition, Parsons argued, the action frame of 
reference. 
... deals 
with phenomena, with things and events 
as they appear from the 'point of view-of the actör. . 
whose action is being analyzed and considered. Of 
., course, the phenomena of the 
'external world? play 
a major part in the influencing of action. But in 
so far as they can be utilized by this particular 
theoretical scheme, they must be reducible to terms 
which are subjective in this particular sense. " 211 
For Parsons the, fact that within the social sciences the inquirer 
studies the content of others peoples' minds, _rather 
than his 
own, is the basis for the distinction between the objective and 
the subjective points of view; the former refers to the viewpoint 
of the observer, -the 1attar to the view of the actor. 
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In perhaps Parsonslmost-explicit statement of what the 
subjective point of view entails for scientific analysis he 
clearly reveals how in his approach, subjective references, 
normative orientation and conditional reasoning are inextricably 
linked. Referring to the abstractness of some of the concepts 
of the theory of action, Parsons suggest that this results from 
the fact that, 
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"... they'are descriptive not of, the''actual observable 
state of. affairs of overt'action, but of the'norms 
toward which it may be'regarded'as being oriented hence 
these concepts contain an element of '-unreality" which is 
not involved'in the physical sciences. Of course the 
only reason for admitting such concepts to a scientific 
theory is that they are in fact descriptive of an . 
empirical phenomenon, namely the state of mind of the 
actor. They exist in this state of mind, but not in 
the actor's 'external world'. It is, indeed, this 
circumstance which necessitates resort, on the part of 
the theory of action, to the subjective point of view. " 213 
The post-war form of the theory, as we'have seen, involved a 
change of emphasis in particular a much greater use of a psychologically 
oriented terminology but, with this exception, there were no 
fundamental changes in Parsons' approach to what he called the actorts 
point of view. Consistent with the more general nature of the 
theory the concept of actor was broadened to include collectivities 
as well as individual people. This meant that analysis could be 
Rt 
phrased more successfully in terms of large-scale social phenomena 
and the theory now referred to the orientation of action rather 
than its motivation because the concept of motivation'has 
individualistic connotations which Parsons'argued would not always 
be appropriate. 
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This was consistent with a change in emphasis 
from the unit act in The Structure of Social Action to units 
within systems, in other words, to systems of interaction, and with 
the growing importance of structural-functional' analysis, the 
concept of role came to the fore as a structure which could be ' 
used to simplify the analysis of a complex interaction system. 
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Despite these detailed alterations, in effect, Parsonst basic 
assumptions about subjective reference were little changed from 
his pre-war theory216; this can be seen from three'different- 
examples taken from. FValues, Motives and Systems of Action F, written 
jointly with Shils and published in 1951. 
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First, Parsons is emphatic that the. theory of action is 
distinguished from the biological analysis of the person by the 
fact that its main concern lies in the ".... actor's- relations to 
his situation", 
217 
consequently, 
... the'structure of action is'not the structure of 
the organism. It is the structure of the organism's 
relationship to the objects,. -in-the organism's 
situation. " 218 
Second, the analysis of action concentrates upon the organism's 
219 
selection between different alternatives. Selection is 
conceptualized in terms of internalized cultural values, and whilst 
there is no presupposition of the empirical importance of value 
standards as determinants of action, the theory 
"... analyzes action in such a way as to leave the 
door open for attributing a major significance to 
these standards (and their patterning)". 220 
Third, in a comment upon the distinction between action and 
behaviour Parsons suggests that action is that segment of an 
organismIs behaviour which can be analyzed in terms of the future 
state of affairs to which it is directed, the situation in which it 
takes place, its normative orientation and the amount of effort 
involved. 221 
In other words, then, the changes which Scott identified 
are no more than alterations of style and language, which occured 
at a time when Parsons' theoretical analysis was changing its focus 
from the unit act to systems of action in an attempt to overcome 
the problems of dynamic analysis and make possible the formulation 
of general statements about systems of action. Inevitably, given 
Parsons desire to examine complex collections of actions within 
interactive systems the earlier emphasis upon the' individual unit 
i 
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act diminished but this did not mean that the'earlier ideas became 
irrelevant, rather'theywere subsümed'within a theoretical scheme 
which, for pragmatic reasons222, focussed increasingly upon the more 
complex levels of interaction and the results of the interaction of 
large groups of people conceptualized in terms of the exchanges 
between analytically distinguished parts of a social system. 
one particularly crucial feature of Parsons' treatment 
of the subjective point of view which has emerged in the course 
of this analysis is the reservation he expressed about the 
reliability of data incorporating the point of view of the actor. 
However, it would be'a mistake to consider that this degree of 
scepticism suddenly appeared in 1951 when, for example, in distinguishing 
action from behaviour he referred to observable behaviour together 
with "... theoretically postulated intervening variables and 
'convert' processes". 
223 
In fact Parsons' approach to the theory 
of action has always exhibited a liking for the sort of analysis 
represented by the rational man of economic theory, and this is, 
no doubt, the reason why in his earlier work he found Weber's 
use of the rational norm of the means-end relationship to be such 
a significant step beyond the problems of the idealist tradition. 
In recent years Parsons' thinking on subjective reference 
and voluntarism has been clarified by a series. of critical articles 
224 
by Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope who examined the divergence between 
the sociologies of Durkheim and Weber and the way in which Parsons, 
in order to substantiate his convergence thesis, systematically 
misinterpreted Weber - especially the balance in his work between 
norms and interests. These articles together'with Parsons'' rejoinders 
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produced a much more incisive debate about the nature of Parsons' 
work, the role of voluntarism, and the place of the subjective 
225 
point of view than was achieved by Scott's critique. 
In the course of replying to Pope's claim that Durkheim's 
work was totally inconsistent with a theory of action, given his 
explicit reservations about the scientific usefulness of information 
concerning subjective consciousnesses, Parsons makes a revealing 
comment, 
"My own view has developed greatly since I wrote 
The Structure of Social Action. I regard human 
voluntarism'as an extension of what many biologists 
call the self-regulating properties of living. systems. 
This point of view has become increasingly prominent 
in modern biological theory ... has been immensely 
furthered by the development of cybernetics and 
information theory ... Durkheim's views are on the, 
whole consistent with this view and certain themes 
that-become increasingly important in his later work, 
link-. up with' it. " 226' 
The year before, Parsons had again emphasized the voluntaristic 
nature of Durkheim's work and had argued that it was possible 
to follow a Durkheimian approach to the study of action, whilst 
being able to 
it... remain completely true to Weber's famous 
'methodological individualism' with respect to 
which he maintained that action in a proper 
sense occurs only through the agency of individual 
human beings and that the 'intentions' of these 
human beings, the meaning of their actions, and 
of their consequences to them 'subjectively' are 
of the essence of the Weberian method. " 227 
Parsons argued that he fully supported this Weberian view point'' 
228 
and saw nothing inconsistent between it and DurkheLm's approach. 
Whilst Parsons may have found this statement believable 
an increasing number of commentators do not. 
229. 
The basis of 
the problem is to be found in the ambiguity og the* concept of 
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subjective reference which means one thing to Parsons and something 
rather different to the Weberian perspective. 
In principle Parsonst General Theory of Action has always 
been concerned with the subjective point of view, and conceived 
of action in terms of "... meaningful motivations and goal 
directedness", in practice the views of specific actors, 
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or groups of actors, have received little attention and it becomes 
pertinent to ask: Does the theory deal with the meaning of action 
for the actor and other participants in empirical situations or 
with the meaning as perceived by an observer of general and 
typical forms of interaction peopled by 'oversocialized'231 and 
normativd oriented actors? The answer is not difficult to 
discover. In a discussion of the role of communication in 
interaction Parsons suggests that language can be seen to function 
as a form of normative control in that it is dependent for its 
effective operation upon the use of the proper meaning of signs. 
He continues: 
"Interaction operates through communicttion. This 
involves the transmission of meanings common both to 
the agent and to the recipient object. On the part 
of the agent the meaning is FintendeV (not necessarily 
consciously) and on the part of the recipients is 
'understood' (again not necessarily consciously): 
All communication operates through signs, symbols, 
acts, etc., which can have intended meaning to the 
agent and can be 'understood' by the recipient of the 
communication. ' 232 - ,. 
Parsons made a very similar point in connection with the 
pattern variables of role orientation which in their original 
formulation referred to five basic and exhaustive dilemmas of 
choice which had to be resolved before the actor could be said to 
be oriented to a situation. The actor it will beremembered*has 
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to choose between affectivity and-affective neutrality, collectivity 
orientation and self -orientation, "particularism and universalism, 
ascription and achievment, and finally, diffuseness and specificity, 
233 
before the action could have a precise meaning. Significantly 
Parsons argued that the choices represented by these five dilemmas 
may be made consciously or unconsciously, implicitly or explicitly. 
234 
The meaning of an action as a c_ioice between these alternatives 
is therefore determined by the observers point of view which 
attains the status of objectivity merely because of the 
scientific observer's non-involvement in the interaction. With 
the transition to the systems' problems and the media of interchange 
the focus of analytic interest moved to more complex levels at which 
the results of the ongoing processes of interactive systems, and 
collections of"such systems, are examined in terms of their 
contributions to functional problems. But despite these changes 
of emphasis, Parsons' views on action and the subjective point of 
view were merely subsumed within this higher level of analysis. 
For Parsons, therefore, the subjective point of view of 
the actor whilst remaining a fundamental presupposition of the 
entire approach became an unattainable methodological ideal throughout 
the course of his development of the General Theory of Action. 
There were two main reasons why the subjective meaning of action 
to empirical actors, or groups of actors, remained beyond the 
reach of Parsons' work. The first was an inescapable consequence 
of his epistemological and methodological assumptions about the 
kind of knowledge admissible in the field of action, the second was 
a direct result of his strategy of programmatic theorizing, namely 
i 
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a gradual approximation of the'system*of theory-to the complexitites 
of empirical reality allied to the decision to concentrate upon 
the theoretical systematization of the conceptual scheme even though 
this meant that little progress could be made in the direction of 
empirical corroboration. 
In more detail then there were, ' first of all, the inevitable 
difficulties associated with what he called the problem of empathy, 
which resulted from the 'non-observable` status of subjective data. 
Second, given the categorial nature of the development of Parson's' 
theoretical system, there was the practical need to simplify the 
number of variables so that solle kind of statement about the 
general nature of processes within systems of action could be 
made: this simplification took the form of holding certain variables' 
constant and in most cases this meant using conditional statements 
of subjective reference represented especially in his early work by 
the rational norm of the means-end relationships. When Parsons 
dealt with system of action rather than individual acts the 
central importance of the problem of order meant further simplification 
of actors orientations (or motivations) and the reduction in the 
number of values and goals from the potential range available in 
society to those consistent with the theoretically derived system 
of common values conceptualized as a necessary condition for 
stability and order, and it became simpler to focus upon roles. 
In practice, the subjective point of view which Parsons 
always argued was both essential to his approach and was derived 
from Weberts sociology, came to be used in such a way that the 
theory of action dealt exclusively with generalized'bpt 
hypothetical meanings of typical actions undertaken'by. typical 
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actors, Such actors were conceptualizedl. as either occupying roles 
.1 
for which the potential range of choices were derived in a purely 
theoretical. fashion, or who took part in transactions between 
similarly derived sub-units of social systems. The. subjective 
reference of Parsons` study of action was not, therefore, primarily 
oriented toward the meaning of action to real people in-real 
situations - although of course, Parsons' views as an observer. 
were based upon his participation in particular social situations. 
Although Parsons' own experience, together with knowledge derived 
from enquiry, clearly bore some resemblance to such empirical 
meanings it is quite impossible to say how accurate or representative 
his views were in this respect. Instead, the. subjective references 
of Parsons' theory of action primarily represented a highly simplified 
picture-of actors linked together in interactive systems by: commonly 
held values and norms aided and abetted by. the socialization process 
and where necessary the conforming effect of appropriate institutions. 
It was a picture derived by purely theoretical reasoning from a 
number of assumptions which for Parsons had been-justified in the 
course of his analysis of the structural features of social action 
and they have, of course, =occupied such a salient position in the 
development of his work ever since. 
Parsons would, no doubt, have justified the relevance of 
his Theory in terms of the fact that this highly integrated 
theoretical scheme of an action system constituted one indispensible 
element of empirical systems of action, and consequently, concrete 
reality could not be explained without it. It represented a 
starting point; a logically integrated'and systematic theoretical 
scheme which although not at all perfect'in the sense of containing 
r 
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a sufficient number'of variables' to mirror the' complexities of 
reality, undoubtedly, for Parsons, could be'said to represent a summation 
of all the earlier contributions to social inquiry. Moreover it 
was abstract, not only because of the inherent simplicity, of all 
new undertakings - in this case the explicit attempt to formulate 
a general theory in contrast to the single-discipline boiindedness 
of most of the previous contributions ' but also because it took 
the idea of a theoretical division of labour between the sciences 
of action extremely seriously. Hence, sociological theory which 
focussed upon integrative mechanisms needed to be supplemented by 
the theoretical schemes of other action disciplines in order to; 
provide the sort of analysis which could be compared with an 
empirical phenomena, but afterall, this was entirely compatable with 
his views at the earlier self-consciously voluntaristic'stage of his 
thinking in which the explanation of action was conceived of as 
the result of a. state of tension between normatively oriented 
goals, a knowledge of appropriate means and the application of 
effort in the face of obstacles. V 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SCHUTZ AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MEANING 
Viewed historically, the sociological enterprise has been 
seen primarily in terms of a natural science of society. Attention 
has been concentrated upon the search for universal propositions 
about human conduct, and in this search the role. of society has 
been emphasized at the expense of the interpretation of the 
activities of individual people,. whether in small domestic groups 
or the larger settings of economic and political life. Through 
the 1950's and into the 1960's sociology was dominated by various 
approaches which drew support from the prevailing mood of the 
positivistic philosophy of science and were characterized by the use 
of methods, concepts and procedures proven useful in the study of 
natural phenomenal But the weakness of these approaches lay 
in 
the lack of consideration afforded to the question of their appropriateness' 
for the study of social reality. The result was a committment to 
the form of a scientific analysis of social conduct which went hand 
in hand with an inability to produce the sort of substantive-results 
which had been thought possible. 
2 
The main reason for the failure of these approaches then 
lay in the absence of a direct and systematic examination of, the 
nature of social phenomena - namely, the subjectively meaningful 
activities of people going about their everyday lives. This is 
the central issue for any form of sociology which aspires to 
penetrate further into social life than a mere behaviourism, 
3 
and 
from it, of course, radiate a variety of associated difficulties'. 
We saw in the previous chapter* how- Parsons '" inability to come to 
i 
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terms with the full implications of the problem of objectivity, 
which is inevitably linked'to the study of action in the context 
of different values, beliefs and ideologies', was undoubtedly a 
major factor in the decline of the authoritativeness of his work. 
In this chapter we shall consider the more basic problem of the 
meaningful nature of social phenomena, and examine the extent to. 
which the actions of other people can be understood and explained 
by their fellow participants in social life and, interpreted, 
though more tenuously, by the sociologist. Undoubtedly the work, 
of Alfred Schutz has played the major role in the emergence of these 
issues in contemporary sociology and since the late 1960rs his 
ideas have been increasingly influential as a resource for alternative 
perspectives which presuppose fundamental differences between 
social and natural reality, in other words, phenomenological and 
45 
existential sociology, as well as ethnomethodology. 
Alfred Schutz's studies of the social world draw on a 
tradition of German scholarship which, until the contemporary periods 
constituted the one major exception to the naturalistic perspective. 
This tradition, associated with Dilthey's6 concept of understanding, 
7 
the hermeneutic tradition, and drawing upon Windelband8 and Rickert`s9 
methodological distinction between two kinds of science - the 
natural and the cultural - was characterized by an analysis of 
social life which granted full recognition to the peculiarities of 
each culture, event and personality: in other words it emphasized 
their particular details and qualities. Inevitably, the result 
of this stress upon the specific was at the expense of the generalp 
and the result was to reduce the scope and importance, O 
generalization in the analysis of social reality - and this of course, 
220. 
served to emphasize: its distinctiveness in. relätion to the natural 
science perspective where generalization has always been seen as 
the primary objective. " 
Undoubtedly the most impressive representation of this 
approach within the sociological tradition can be found in Max 
Weber's historical and comparative analyses of social institutions 
and the way in which they effect, and are affected by the actions 
of people, both individually and collectively. 
10 
It is a 
perspective based upon the attempt to find a methodological balance 
between, on the one hand, the requirements of scientific knowledge 
and procedure, namely, generality, objectivity and testability, 
and on the other hand, the particular methods required to 
understand the subtle and sometimes contradictory meanings of 
peoples' actions, which are such a characteristic feature of 
social life. 
Schutz's work stands in an intentionally close relationship 
to this tradition. He satt himself working essentially within the 
parameters of interpretive sociology as established theoretically, 
and practically through research, by Weber. He shared Weberts 
views on the distinctive nature of sociology as the study of 
subjectively meaningful action and, also, that it was possible to 
pursue such a study in a scientific manner. But he was critical 
in respect of what he identified as detailed omissions and 
ambiguities in the methdological foundations of Weberian sociology 
which he argued could be clarified'with the help of some of the 
philosophical insights of Bergson 
ll 
and in particular Husserl. 
12 
In The Pheriomenölogy öf'the'Social'[Jorld, 
13 
perhaps Schutz's most 
important publication? he described his project, -, which remained 
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essentially unchanged throughout his subsequent career14 in 
the following terms. 
"... taking its point of departure from the questions 
raised by Max Weber ... it seeks to determine the 
precise nature of the phenomenon of meaning, and to do 
this by an analysis of the constituting function. Only 
after we have a firm grasp of the concept of meaning 
as such will. we be able to analyse step by step the 
meaning structure of the social world,. By following 
this procedure we shall be able to anchor the 
methodological apparatus of interpretive sociology at 
a far deeper point than Max Weber was able to do. " 15 
It is the relationship between the work of Schutz and that of 
Weber which is the focus of our attention here. 
Curiously this relationship between the work of Schutz 
and that of Weber has received remarkably little critical attention, 
in fact until quite recently, this häs'also been true of Schutzes 
work in general. 
16 
In spite of the enormous impact his ideas 
have had upon contemporary sociology discussions of Schutz's 
contribution to the subject have been essentially expositionary in 
nature. 
17 
In effect it has been assumed that Schutz's criticism 
of Weber is valid, 
18 
and that Schutz's work is necessarily the more 
important reference point for all those whose work falls under, 
what is today, the rather broad rubric of "interpretive sociology". 
Indeed there are differences in the emphases of their 
respective inquiries which lend credence to this point of view: 
Schutz analyzed in great detail some of the philosophical 
assumptions of sociology which relate to the problem of meaning, 
whereas Weber only makes brief mention of these topics. But 
what has been even more important in creating the uncritical 
assumption of Schutz's "improvement" upon Weber has- been parsons' 
interpretation of Weber's role in the history of the discipline. ' 
J 
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We have already seen how Parsons'- argument that Weberian 
sociology constituted an indispensible element of the General Theory 
of Action, indeed of the whole eclectic synthesis, was widely 
accepted. The convergence thesis even came to be regarded as one 
of the major theoretical contributions of post-war sociology. 
19 
However, it was a success which, as we have seen, owed a great deal 
to the. ambiguity of some of Parsons' leading concepts as well as to 
the theoretical naievety of its audience, and with the passage of 
time the manifest' inability of Parsons'- Analytic and Systems Theory 
to study social action, namely, the meaningful activities of people 
in their everyday worlds has become clear. One result of this 
has been a degree of disenchantment with Weber's conception of sociology; 
a negative attitude fostered in particular by Parsons', argument 
that Weber's.,. 5. deas on objectivity and value-freedom were 
incorporated into his own work. 
20 
In addition Parsons! selective 
emphasis upon Weber's most abstract and general typologies of actions 
and institutions, as the key to modern system oriented sociological 
thinking - despite Weber's rejection of certain features of this 
approach - left the impression of Weber as a gifted but ultimately 
muddled thinker whose work was fit more to serve as a source of 
concepts and discrete ideas on particular. problems21 than to be 
looked at as a potentially coherent and systematic solution to the 
problems of a particular conception of sociological inquiry. 
Herein, then, lies the secret of much of Schutz! s appeal, 
for the radically different emphasis of his approach was seen to 
provide the basis for an alternative form of sociology, a return to 
the older interpretive- tradition and a new, start beyönd the confines 
of the structural functionalist orthodoxy with its interminable yet' 
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fruitless debates about order'and control7. consenses arid conflict. 
Given the extensive examination of Parsons critique 
and"improvement of Weber it may be useful to locate Schutzes 
analysis of Weber and his contribution to the development of 
phenomenological sociology in the context of this wider set of 
themes. 
The relationships to Weber of the work of Parsons and 
Schutz exhibits two broad similarities: first, both'of them 
considered that Weber had made a major contribution to the 
development of sociology, although for Schutz the contribution lay 
in the establishment of interpretive sociology, whereas for 
Parsons Weber's role had been to reintegrate the central feature of 
idealism, namely the emphasis upon values and meanings, within a 
more positivistic conception of science based upon general 
theoretical categories. Second, both set out to improve 
upon Weber: Schutz through the process of a phenomenological 
analysis of the philosophical assumptions implicit in Weber s 
interpretive sociology, and Parsons through the synthesis of the 
theoretical elements of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber, 
within a more rigorous framework consistent with a general theory 
of action. 
However, it is the differences in their relationships to 
Weber which are of particular interest here. Whilst Schutz! 
analysis began with the attempt to clarify and make secure certain 
underlying features of Weber's sociology which in general terms he 
considered to be entirely adequate, for Parsons, Weber was only ever 
22 
one - admittedly very important T--reference point for his subsequent 
theory, Hence Schutz"s phenomenological approach to sociology must 
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be seen in terms of a good deal of compatibility with Weber's 
interpretive sociology, In more detail, then, it presupposes 
that WeberFs emphasis upon interpretive understanding had clarified 
the nature of the subject matter, demonstrated the methods to be 
used in studying individual peoples' actions, and indicated, through 
his empirical investigations and typologies, the scope and 
possibilities of the discipline. In addition, Schutz and Parsons 
differ, in their relationship to k'eberian sociology because of the 
character of their respective interests; for Schutz the object 
of analysis lay in a purely theoretical and therefore philosophical 
consideration of the nature of the meaning of social action and 
behaviour, together with their implications for sociological 
research, whereas, despite the theoretical and occasionally 
extremely speculative elements of Parsons' work23, his goal fell 
more strictly within the traditional boundaries of sociological 
inquiry in which the constituents of social phenomena were largely 
regarded as unproblematic and attention was concentrated R as 
befitting a general theory of action upon the resultants of the- 
actions of individuals and groups in the context of private and 
institutional life, in short, upon society. 
Having established the general nature of Schutz's interest 
in Weber and the features of his sociological project it is now 
possible to consider some more specific issues. Schutzes most 
detailed critique and assessment of Weberts interpretive sociology 
is to be found in his The Phenomenology of the 'Social 'World 
24 
In this study Schutz developed an analysis of the meaning structure 
of the social world which remained of fundamental importance 
throughout a career which exhibited a remarkable degree'öf thematic 
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unity. 
25 
Indeed this coherence is particularly noteworthy when 
it is considered that after leaving Europe and moving to the 
U. S. A., Schutz found himself in a rather different intellectual 
context with quite different traditions, assumptions and problems. 
26 
These circumstances, no doubt, strongly influenced the form of some 
of his most important essays, written in the 1940's, which were 
concerned with introducing the main features of a phenomenological 
analysis of-the social world and using this as a framework for 
criticizing various aspects of American sociology. As a result, 
they were explicitly addressed to the methodological problems of 
sociology and social science. Towards the end of his life Schutz 
had been working on a major new study but it remained unfinished 
at his death although it has subsequently been edited and 
finalized by-Luckmann. _. 
This too manifests the unity of Schutzýs 
career, 27 as it is based upon the same assumptions as his first 
major study and seeks to extend the analysis of the structures 
of. the life world into new areas. Significantly, although Schutz 
had planned a final chapter on the methodology of the social sciences, 
Buckman 
n8, 
decided not to include it because it did not represent 
a significant advance in relation. to his essay on""Common Sense 
and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", published 
29 
in 1953. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Schutz1s discussion 
of Weberian sociology 
is its very selective nature. This is, 
of course, quite consistent with Schutz'"s particular concern to 
clarify, by philosophical analysis, some of the basic assumptions 
of interpretive sociology. His detailed examination of WeberEs 
work involves almost exclusively methodological issues and is 
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based upon the opening section, of*Economy. 'dnd"Söciety30 including, 
in particular, WeberFs definition of key'concepts, Now WeberFs 
methodological introduction to this immense study contains little 
reference to his early discussions of the methodological problems 
31 
common to history and economics, or to the lessons to be drawn 
from his historical and comparative analysis, so that Schutz's 
decision to concentrate upon his statement is quite explicitly 
based upon a developmental interpretation of Weber's conception of 
sociology32 -a developmental view which bears a good deal of 
similarity to the one used by Parsons. 
It is undoubtedly true that Weber refers explicitly to 
'sociology' in Economy and Society and therein he outlines its 
scope and objectives, with the result that, like Parsons, Schutz 
infers that Weber's later formulations represent a major change 
from the earlier methodological analyses associated in particular 
with the character of the historical-cultural sciences. The 
nature of this change whether it be real or apparent is, of course, 
crucial to our study and will be examined in Chapter 5. Suffice 
it here to say that in our examination of Schutz's critique of 
Weber the validity of this developmental interpretation will be 
accepted-as unproblematic 
in order to facilitate as clear an 
interpretation of Schutz's contribution as possible. 
s 
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I ACTION AND "THE CONSTITUTION : OF 'MEANING 
In view of the length and complexity of Schutz*s analysis 
of Weber''s concepts and procedures let us be clear at the outset 
on the three areas of broad agreement between them. First, 
according to*Schutz, Weber had developed a sociological approach 
in which the aim of describing social life took the form of 
reducing complex institutions and relationships to "the most 
elementary form of individual behaviour" in order thereby to 
understand the meaning intended by the actor for a particular act. 
This is the basis for Weber's conception of the aim of sociology: 
"... to interpret the actions of individuals in the 
social world and the ways in which individuals give 
meaning to social phenomena. " 33 
Moreover, it is particularly significant for Schutz's purposes that 
this method*idvocated by Webar is similar to the way in which, 
according to common sense thinking, people going about their 
everyday lives comprehend the social world. 
34 
Second, Weber developed the ideal type, a theoretical 
concept which avoided the problems of descriptive empiricism and 
could be verified by using the empirical materials established by 
social science. Thus Schutz argues, 
"By this method of constructing and verifying ideal 
types, the meaaing of particular social phenomena 
can be interpreted layer by layer as the subjectively 
intended meaning of human acts. In this way, the 
structure of the social world can be disclosed as a 
structure of intelligible intentional meanings. " 35 
And thirdly, Schutz fully agreed with Webens insistence 
upon the social sciences! avoidence of value judgements, 
36' 
Against this background of agreement the areas of 
difference assume added significance and clearly indicate the 
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direction of Schutz's 'detailed" analysis of Weber'-s work. His 
critique is based upon the view that Weber had not devoted 
sufficient attention to the nature of subjective meaning. For 
Schutz this was the most fundamental problem facing the social 
sciences, and he comments, 
"As Weber left this concept, it was little more than 
a heading for a number of important problems which 
he did not examine in detail, even though they were 
hardly foreign to him. Almost all these problems are 
closely related to the lived experience of time (or, 
internal time-sense) which can be studied only by the 
most rigorous philosophical reflection. Only when we 
have grasped the nature of the internal time. consciousness 
can we attack the complicated structure of the concepts 
of the human sciences. " 37 
According to Schutz, Weber's entire programme for 
interpretive sociology is based upon a range of unexamined assumptions, 
and one. of the reasons for this concerns Weber's preference for the 
problems of empirical research rather than the development of a 
secure philosophical foundation for his work. Indeed, according to 
Schutz, Weber only examines epistemological issues in so far as 
they are relevant to particular empirical issues. The limitations 
of Weber's strategy, therefore, are clear: 
"He breaks off his analysis of the social. world when 
he arrives at what he assumes to be the basic and 
irreducuble elements of social phenomena. But he is 
wrong in this assumption. His concept of the meaningful 
act of the individual - the key idea of interpretive 
sociology - by no means defines a primitive, as he thinks 
it does. It is on the contrary, a mere label for a 
highly complex and ramified area that calls for much 
further study. " 38 
In more detail, then, Weber does not distinguish between 
an action in progress and a completed act, between' the-meaning, of 
the action to the actor and to an observer; he' says little about 
i 
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the relationship between the äctör and the other participants in 
a social relationship, the role of the' interpreter in modifying 
meaning or the various kinds of directness of one''s knowledge of 
others and for Schutz the weakness of interpretive sociology is 
to be explained simply by the fact that although Weber recognized 
the existence of many of these problems he only analyzed them as 
far as was necessary for his particular empirically orientated 
interests; ultimately 
"He naively took for granted the meaningful phenomena 
of the social world as a matter of 'intersubjective 
agreement'-in precisely the same way as we all in daily 
life assume the existence of a lawful external world 
conforming to the concepts of our understanding. " 39 
Schutz implies that Weber was misled by the fact that in 
the natural outlook of everyday life our actions are directly 
meaningful to ourselves, and we assume that other people's actions 
are as meaningful to them as they would be to ourselves if we were 
in their situation and, "in addition, that our interpretations of 
the meaning of their experiences are broadly correct. Moreover, 
for Schutz this assumption obscures a fundamental issue because 
the interests of the social. scientist are not consistent with 
the attitude of everyday life: for the sociologist, 
. the context of meaning 
in which he interprets this 
world is that of systematizing scrutiny rather than that 
of living experience., His data ... are the already 
constituted meanings of active participants in the social 
world. It is to these already meaningful data that his 
scientific concepts must ultimately refer. " 40 
Consequently, as a result of the fact that the purpose 
of sociology is to study social phenomena and these phenomena are 
at least partly made up'of common sense concepts; Schutz ärgues' 
that i, t is not possible for "sociology to abstain from a scientific 
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' examination of these self-evident ideas. ' 
Al 
(a) The Presuppositions'öf Schutz's Phenomenological Analysis 
Schutz's phenomenological examination of the philosophical 
assumptions of sociology is centred upon the discovery of the 
nature of meaning for the actor living within the life-world; and 
in the initial stages of his analysis he restricts the complexity 
of the problem by only considering how an experience becomes 
meaningful to a hypothetically isolated actor. 
The key to this problem is the idea of "internal time 
consciousness", a concept developed both by Bergson and Husserl. 
Bergson distinguished between living within the stream of ones own 
experience and living within the world of space and time. In 
the former, the inner stream of duration, xthere 
is "... a continuous 
coming-to-be and passing-away of heterogeneous qualities", 
42 
whereas in the latter, the world. of space and time, we experience 
objects because the heterogenous qualities of raw experience have 
been "... spatialized, quantified and so made discontinuous". 
43 
Within the stream of consciousness, therefore, I do not 
reflect upon or consider life, rather I experience at this moment 
in time. Following Husserl, Schutz argues, 
".. I live in my Acts, whose living intentionally. carries 
me over from one Now to the next. But this Now should not 
be construed as a punctiform instant, as a break in the 
stream of duration, as a cutting-in-two of the latter. For 
in order to effect such an artificial division within 
duration, I should have to get outside the flow itself. 
From the point of view of being immersed in duration, * the 
"Now" is a phase rather than a point, and therefore the 
different phases melt into one another along a continuum. 
The simple experience of living in the flow of duration 
goes forward in a uni-directional, irreversible movement, 
proceeding from manifold to manifold in a constant 
J 
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running-off process. " Each'phase öf experience melts 
into the next without any sharp boundaries as it is 
being lived through;. but each phase is distinct in its 
thusness,. or quality, from the next insofar as it is 
held in the gaze of attention. " 44 
In contrast to living within the stream of consciousness, Schutz 
suggests that whenever I attempt to reflect upon 
it... my living experience, I am no longer taking. up 
my position within the stream of pure duration, I am 
no longer simply living within that flow. The experiences 
are apprehended, distinguished, brought into relief, 
marked out. from one another; the experiences which 
were constituted as phases within the flow of duration 
now become objects of attention as constituted=. experiences. " 45 
Consequently our intellectual faculties relate to the world of 
space, time and finite objects. On this basis Schutz argues 
that the act of reflection presupposes an already completed act, 
and this, of course, has major implications for the relationship 
between experience and meaningfulness. According to Schutz, 
experience in itself does not contain, or exhibit meaning rather 
the source of meaningfulness is to be found in the way in which the 
person regards their experiences, in other words, how they reflect 
upon them. 
Meaning, therefore, is constituted by the attitude of the 
person to that part of'the stream of consciousness which has already 
passed by. 
46 
This does not result in every experience becoming 
meaningful to the person because there is no pragmatic reason for 
relfecting upon each and every one of them. The mere fact of 
living through, or experiencing, does not by itself confer meaning; 
what is crucial, however, is the act of reflection based upon a 
decision to single out an experience or set of experiences from 
the total of lived experiences -- and it is this decision which 
47 
confers meaning. 
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Schutz develops the sociölogical implications of his 
analysis of the constitition of meaning in relation to the concepts 
of action and behaviour. For him the relationship between 
meaningful experience, action and behaviour takes this form; an 
actor lives within a stream of consciousness; a reflective glance 
identifies a particular lived experience and for this reason it 
becomes meaningful; if in addition there is an intentional 
reflection upon the prior spontaneous activity which produced 
the experience, then, it becomes meaningful behaviour; 
48 
and 
finally if the reflective gland goes further back to consider 
the project of the activity, in other words, the orientation to 
the future, "... the execution of a*projected'act ... "49, then, 
s° 
it constitutes meaningful action. Hence for Schutz, turning 
attention to-behaviour-and to action are merely forms of the more 
general process of reflecting upon. experience. 
Schutz's conceptualization of action in terms of a future 
project has important implications for his use of the term motive 
which he considers to be ambiguous in everyday usage as a result of 
the conflation of two distinct types of-motive, namely, the in-order- 
to and the because motive. The in-order-to motive refers to the 
future and is the object or purpose which is to be realised by the 
action. 
"Interpreting the actors 'motive' as his expectations, 
we can say that the motivational context is by 
definition the meaning context within which a 
particular action stands in virtue of tts status as the 
project of an act for a given actors In other words, 
the act thus projected in the future perfect tense 
and in terms of which the action receives its orientation 
is the 'in-order-to motive' for the actor. " 51 
r 
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In contrast the because motive refers to the past and ''... explains 
the project in terms of the actor's past experiences . "52 Thus 
the action is determined by the project which includes the in-order-to 
motive. The project is the intended act imagined as already 
accomplished whereas the in-order-to motive is the future state 
of affairs to be brought about by the projected action, Finally, 
the project as a whole is determined by the because motive, "... a 
lived experience temporally prior to the project...., 
53 
For 
Schutz therefore, whilst the meaning of an action is to be found in 
its relationship to a project with the result that the meaningfulness 
of the in-order-to motive is integral to the action itself, the 
because motive is not necessarily meaningful, indeed'it only 
becomes so if the actor decides to reflect upon the relevant past 
for the-pragmatic purpose of '-self-explication". 
54 
In addition, Schutz argues that for each person the in--order--to 
and because motives are organized in complex subjective systems 
which provide coherence and continuity for their actions and do 
not, therefore, suddenly appear in the actor's consciousness on a 
random basis. For example, the system of in-order-to motives 
consists of vague plans and projects, hopes and values, which are 
refined into more specific plans for the year, month, day as well 
as the time before lunch, the next five minutes and so on. This 
is entirely consistent with a view of human beings based upon the 
assumption of free will and the potential for rational choice 
and action. 
55 
Having established certain basic propositions.. with 
regard to the nature of meaning constitution, the distinction between 
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action and behaviour and the clarification of two'kinds of-motive 
in the context of an analysis of an isolated individual, Schutz 
then considers the more complex situation of interaction in which 
the problem arises: How is it possible to interpret someone 
else's complex of meaning, someone else's in-order-to motives? 
When we say that we understand another person's meaning 
and action, strictly speaking, we imply that we understand what 
is really going on inside the other person's head, yet the only 
evidence for such an understanding is - the person's conversation, 
demeanour and bodily movements, in other words, purely external 
manifestations which indicate but do not necessarily reveal - even 
in a face to face situation "- the other's subjective meaning. 
Schutz indicates the complexity of the problem in this way: 
the assumption 
"... that I can observe the subjective experience 
of another person precisely as he-does is absurd. 
For it presupposes that I myself have lived through 
all the conscious states and intentional Acts wherein 
this experience has been constituted .... my stream 
of consciousness would have to coincide with the 
other person's, which is the same as saying that I 
should have to be the other person. " 56 
This raises, for Schutz, the issue of determining a: 
criterion by which we might distinguish between objective and 
subjective meaning. As a member of the social world I can observe 
and interpret other people's activities which present themselves 
to me as an indication of their consciousness, but the interpretation 
of such phenomena in effect gives them an objective meaning, and 
this is possibleonly by abstracting from the constituting process 
of a personRs consciousness. The result is the formulation-of 
objective meaning contexts for action which are of an anonymous 
241. 
and standardized character in relation to-the particular 
consciousnesses upon which they are based. In contrast, for 
Schutz, -subjective meaning in the social world always refers to 
the constituting process in the consciousness of the person who 
produced the meaningful object. For this reason the world of 
subjective meaning is never anonymous,. it depends upon and exists 
solely within the intentionality of the person's consciousness. 
Hence Schutz tells us that the intended meaning of another person 
"... remains a limiting concept even under optimum. conditions of 
interpretation '... 
57 
Schutz's definition of the two kinds of meaning are as 
follows: 
"We speak ... of the subjective meaning of the product 
if we have in view the meaning-context within which 
--the-product stands or stood in the mind of the producer. 
To know the subjective meaning of the product means that 
we are able to run over in our own minds ... the Acts 
which constituted the experience of the producer". 58 
In order to be able to refer to subjective meaning it is necessary, 
therefore, to be able to 
"... keep in view-the other person's lived experiences, 
as they are occuring; we observe them being constituted 
step by step. For us, the other person's products 
are indications of those lived experiences. The lived, 
experiences stand for him, in turn, within a meaning 
context. We know this by particular evidence, and we 
can in an act of genuine understanding be aware of the 
constituting process in his mind". 59 
However, for the observer , whether in everyday life or 
for purposes of sociological inquiry such a detailed and 
comprehensive accessibility of the person being observed is not 
usually available, with the result that concepts representing 
objective meanings are all that are possible. ' Schutz continues'. 
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"Objective meaning :.: we'can, predicate only of the 
product as such, that is-of the already. constituted 
meaningccontext of the thing produced, whose actual 
production we meanwhile disregard". 60 
Hence, in the formulation of an objective meaning context, 
the observer is unable to incorporate the detailed process of the 
creation of the product for the producer. 
"Objective meaning therefore consists only in a 
meaning context within the mind of the interpreter, 
whereas subjective meaning refers beyond it to a 
meaning-context in the mind of the pröducer: 61 
The objective meaning of such a product is universal, invariant 
and applicable to a very wide range of situations, as well as 
being abstract in relation to "... every subjective flow of 
experience and every subjective meaning-context that could exist 
62 
in such a flow". This objectification of the meaning of a''-, 
product results in its--independence from the situation in which 
it developed and the consciousness of the actor who created it. 
Hence Schutz concludes, 
"Objective meaning is merely the interpreter's 
ordering of his experiences of a product into the 
total context of his experience". 63 
This formulation serves to reinforce the basic assumption 
of Schutz's approach that the attempt to interpret subjective 
meaning necessarily takes the activities of a particular-person 
as its immediate point of reference, whereas, of course, concepts 
representing objective meaning presuppose a generalized and abstracted 
category of typical actors. 
This completes our initial examination of the basic themes 
and categories used by Schutz 
in his analysis of the way in which 
meaning is constituted 
in the natural attitude of everyday life. ' In 
i 
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the'next section, utilizing the insights of this phenomenological 
analysis, we follow Schutz's identification of the problems and 
ambiguities implicit in Weber's approach. 
(b) Critique of Weber's Categories-of'Interpretive Sociology. 
Two aspects of this critique may conveniently be 
distinguished; first, what'is involved in Weber's idea of an 
actor attaching a meaning to behaviour; and, secondly, the problem 
of how the other self is meaningful to ego. 
Action, Meaning and Behaviour 
In the context of Schutz's distinction between meaningful 
experience, behaviour and action in terms of reflection upon the 
stream of consciousness, the activity which produced the experience 
and the future orientation of the project respectively - Weber"s 
distinction between behaviour and action on the basis of the 
meaningless or meaningful nature of the conduct, in question, appears 
imprecise. Moreover, he argues that Weber's concept of action was 
based upon the example of rational conduct oriented to a particular 
end and this explains the marginal nature of affectual and 
traditional action in Weber's inquiries, because such types of 
action specifically lack the level of conscious deliberation 
associated with a clear and precise purposive orientation, 
64 
A further problem is inherent in Webers classification 
of the four types of action because it is based upon an assumed 
identity between the meaning of an action and its motive, but 
from Schutz's point of view, motives can be of two kinds, one with- 
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a prospective reference and the other'. with-i retrospective 
reference, and the meaning of an action is identified only with- 
the in-order-to motive. Consequently Schutz argues that Weber 
had failed to distinguish between the meaning of an action and 
the extent to which the meaning is accessible to an observer; 
after all, the meaningfulness of one's experiences is related to 
the decision to reflect--upon them. 
"When I isolate them from the flux of experience 
and consider them attentively, I ... find them to 
be meaningful in the sense that lam able to find 
in them an underlying meaning. " It is therefore 
wrong to use the criterion of meaningfulness in 
order to distinguish action from merely reactive 
behaviour if meaningfulness is thought of in the 
usual broad sense. Even my traditional or 
affectual behaviour has some kind of meaning .. it is useless to say that what distinguishes action 
from behaviour is that the former is subjectively 
meaningful and the latter is meaningless. On the 
contrary, each-is meaningful in-its own way. " 65 
The real issue for Schutz is that action is distinguished from 
behaviour by the fact that it represents the realization of a 
projected act, the bringin; about of an action which is imagined 
as already completed, in other words, "the meaning of any action 
is its corresponding projected act. , 
66 
In addition Schutz is unhappy with Weber's definition of 
social action as that form of conduct to which the actor "attaches" 
a subjective meaning. According to Schutz, as a result of a lack 
of clarity in Weber's concept of action, this formulation fails 
to take into account the differences in meaningfulness of an action 
in progress and a completed act. Hence it is necessary to 
distinguish between the action of the person and the acts they' 
perform, 
iý 
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"An act is. therefore always something enacted and. 
can be considered independently of the acting subject 
and his experiences. Every act'presupposes*an'action, 
but this by no means implies that reference to the 
action must enter "into. discussion of. -the act. In 
contrast to the act, the action. -is subject bound, 
Whereas the act is, so to speak, performed 
anonymously, the action is a series of experience 
being formed in the concrete and individual 
consciousness of some actor... " 67 
In other words, the meaning of the action to the. actor 
lies purely within the actor's stream of consciousness and 
Weber's failure to clearly distinguish, on the one hand, between 
a projected and completed act, and on the other hand, between 
the meaning of an action and its motive on the basis of an 
examination of ... 
"the formulation and structure of those lived 
experiences which give meaning to an action ..,, 
68 
represents, 
according to Schutz, a serious limitation to his programme for 
sociology. 
The Meaningfulness of Another Self to Ego 
According to Schutz, Weber does not consider in any 
detail how another self is meaningful to ego, in fact, in his 
interpretation of other peoples' conduct the meaningful existence 
of the other self is largely presupposed. Yet, Schutz argues, 
there is no necessary syrmmetry between the meaning of an act to 
an actor and the meaning attributed to the act by an observer 
on the basis of perceptions of the actorts external behaviour; 
Schutz continues, 
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"Were another person's lived=experiences-'as accessible 
to me as my own:., then'his-experience, that is, -the 
intended . meaning of 
his behaviour, would be'directly 
evident to me as I observed it. Even more, his 
behaviour could have for me only the'meaning. he 
subjectively attached to it; that it could have another 
meaning, an objective one,, is obviously absurd, " 69 
For Schutz the problematic nature of Weber's basic 
categories is clearly revealed by his use of the concept of 
intended meaning. 
"First, he is referring to the subjective meaning 
which the action has for the actor. According to 
him, this subjective meaning can be'ünderstood 
'observationally', that is, it can be grasped by 
direct observation. But second, he is referring 
to the broader framework of meaning in which an 
action 'thus interpreted' (i. e., interpreted 
according to its subjective meaning) belongs. It 
is this broader context of meaning which is 
uncovered by motivational or clarifying 
understanding. " 70 
We observe someone's conduct and then place 
it within a wider 
context of meaning by giving the conduct the name associated with 
the particular kind of typical act. But, for Schutz, such 
observation has clear limitations: 
of... context of meaning need not, in fact cannot, 
be identical with the context of meaning in the mind of 
the actor-himself. " 71 
This provides the justification for Schutz's distinction 
between the objective and subjective contexts of meaning: the 
objective context represents an 
interpretation of the other personts 
act which is based purely upon the observers judgement that the 
actor had a particular 
intended meaning and it is a context of 
meaning which is inevitably 
different to the one in the mind of 
the actor. Consequently Schutz argues that motivational understanding 
cannot be achieved purely uponfthe basis of observation as, for 
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instance, in the examples given by'Weber'of understanding the acts 
of wood chopping and mathematical calculation. 
72 
In such cases 
additional information is required of the actor's past activities 
and future hopes before a person's bodily behaviour can be placed 
within the broader context of meaning known as motive. 
73 
Schutz identifies a similar lack of clarity in Weber's 
use of the concept of motive, a usage which is not based upon an 
explicit recognition of the differences between past and future 
grounds of motive - between in-order-to and because motives 'n and 
leads Weber to assume that the intended meaning of an action is the 
same as its motive. 
74 
Looked at from the point of view of the observer Weber's 
concept of motivational understanding presents further difficulties 
because there-can be no. knowledge of motive unless the meaning 
of the action for the actor is clear and yet such knowledge remains 
with the actor. 
"The observer lacks the self-evident starting point 
which is available to the actor. All he can do is 
start out with the objective meaning of the act as 
he sees it, treating this objective meaning as if it 
were without question the intended meaning of the 
actor. Weber sees this clearly enough when he says 
that motivational understanding must search for the 
context of meaning which is from our point of view 
appropriate (or which makes sense to us), into which 
the action, interpreted according to the intended 
meaning of the actor, fits. However; this so-called 
'intended' meaning cannot give us any more information 
in motivational than in observational understanding. 
In neither case do we advance a step beyond the 
interpretation of objective meaning. Indeed, Weber's 
distinction between observational and motivational 
understanding is arbitrary and without any logical 
basis in his own theory. Both types of understanding 
start out from an objective meaning-context. The 
understanding of subjective meaning has no place in 
either. " 75 
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However, Schutz recognises' some point in Weberts 
distinction between observational and motivational understanding. 
In everyday-life we experience other people's actions and regard 
them as an indication of their streams of consciousness, and this 
day-to-day, on-going, experiencing of others corresponds to Weber's 
concept of observational understanding. Whereas motivational 
understanding is not restricted to the direct experience of the 
world of contemporaries treating as its object accomplished 
acts, and it is this form of interpretive understanding which is 
characteristic of sociology. 
76 
Schutz's critique of Weber's interpretive concepts is, 
of course, based upon his distinction between the categories of 
objective and subjective meaning, which he clarifies by means of 
the folliwing.. example: an actor (A) is observed by a friend (F) 
and a sociologist (S), and A's action makes sense to both F and 
S. For A the action has the intended meaning Ni, to F who 
interprets the action on the basis of experience, it has the 
meaning M2, and to S who 
interprets the action through ideal 
type concepts, it has the meaning M3. Schutz continues, 
"Whereas in Weber's terminology MI would be the 
subjective or i_itended meaning which A attributed 
to his own act, M2 and M3 would constitute the objective 
meaning of this act. But'afterall, M2 is only the 
objective meaning relative to F, and M3 is only the 
objective meaning relative to S. Therefore to call 
M2 and M3 objective meaning-contents is merely to say 
that they are different from M1. " 77 
For Schutz this highlights the difficulty which lies in 
Weberos use of the concept motive to refer both to the subjective 
context of meaning for the actor and the observers assumption 
about the meaning. of the action for the actor. 
78 
In contrast, 
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Schutz argues', there is an irreconcilable gulf between the realm 
of subjective meaning, representing the'"constituting processes of 
a meaning-endowing consciousness" and the world of objective meaning 
which is anonymous, abstract and invariant "with respect to 
every consciousness which has given it meaning through its own 
intentionality". Hence the possibility of an observer gaining 
knowledge of an actor's intended (or subjective) meaning remains 
elusive. Afterall, in everyday life the search for such knowledge 
is pursued only to the point necessary for our pragmatic interests 
and this is greatly facilitated if, as in the case of rational 
action, the conduct can be readily subsumed under an objective 
79 
content of meaning. 
The final issue to be'dealt with in this section concerns 
the problem which arises in everyday life, and is also of 
particular relevance for sociological understanding, concerning the 
unity of an action. Frequently, for purposes of understanding, 
an action may be divided by the observer into goals and means 
on the basis of external observation, yet this results inevitably 
in an arbitrary decision as to where the action begins and ends. 
Schutz comments 
"Of what use is it to talk about the intended meaning 
of an action if-one ignores that phase of the action 
which is relevant to the actor and substitute, for it 
as the interpretation an arbitrarily chosen segment 
of the observed performance - 'the facts'? " 80 
In reality, therefore, the uni -of an action remains 
subjective; the unity 
is derived from the project which the act 
will realize and it is on this point, Schutz suggests, that Weber's 
81 
view of actors attaching a meaning to their action is without foundation, 
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II THE SOCIAL. WORLD AND TUE NATURE OF: SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
(a) Schutz . The Structure 'of ' the ' Social 'World 
Having clarified these elementary features of Schutz's 
analysis of intersubjective understanding it is now possible to 
consider in more detail the different kinds of social relationship 
which affect the sort of interpretation which is possible. Some 
relationships are of a face to face nature involving those people 
Schutz calls consociates, whereas in other relationships our 
knowledge of the other person is indirect, we may not, be able to 
observe them, or not at the moments in question - these people are 
our contemporaries. In addition, he refers to predecessors; those 
people who have lived 
at earlier times in'history, and successors, 
those who will live in the future`, but it is unnecessary to consider 
these last two categories in-detail because the sociologically 
relevant issues emerge in relation to the analysis of situations 
- 82 involving consociätes and contemporaries, 
The world of consociates is the realm of directly 
experienced social reality and for Schutz it is a relationship 
which presents certain unique features: 
"In the living-intentionality-of*the direct social 
relationship, the two partners are face to face, 
their streams of consciousness are synchronized 
and geared into each other, each immediately affects 
the other and the in-order-to motive of the one 
becomes the because motive of the other, the two 
motives complementing and validating each other as 
objects of reciprocal attention". 83 
In the direct immediacy of a face to face situation the two 
participants may achieve a simultaneity of their respective streams 
84 
of consciousness. Discussing the example of two people watching 
the same event -"a bird 
in flight at the same moment in time, 
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Schutz makes the point that even*in'such a favourable circumstance 
I cannot say that my lived experiences are the same as yours even 
though there may have been temporal co-ordination of my experiences 
with yours. 
Often the host that can be concluded is 
"... a mere general correspondence between my perceived 
! bird-in-flight äd your experiences. I make no 
pretense to any knowledge of the content of your- 
subjective experiences or of the particular way in which 
they were structured. It is enough for me to know that 
you are a fellow human being who'was watching the same 
thing that I was. And if you have in a similar way 
co-ordinated my experiences with yours, then we can both 
say that we have seen a, bird in flight". 85 
Within the face-to-face we-relationship each participant attempts 
to interpret the other's subjective contexts of meaning by, starting 
with the words spoken and then proceeding to ask how the other person 
came to use these words. In this situation, the objective meaning 
of what is said - the general meaning of the words as they are 
typically spoken - is only a starting point-for the, understanding 
of the subjective meaning in the mind of the speaker. 
"Within this picture I must interpret and construct 
your intentional Acts as you choose your words. 
To the extent that you and I can mutually experience 
this-simultaneity, growing older together for a time, 
to the extent that we can live in it together, to 
that extent we can live in each other's 'subjective 
contexts of meaning". 86 
But it is only as a result of the particular features of the face 
to face relationship that such 
interpretation may be possible, for 
example: 
it... my biography is full of continuous"lived 
experiences of you grasped within the We-relationship; 
meanwhile, you are experiencing me in the same way, and 
I am aware of the fact". 87 
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However the realization of the correct interpretation 
of another's subjective meaning forever remains problematic 
because of the potential for impression management as well as 
sheer ambiguity in interaction, a problem compounded by the fact 
that the further one goes from a we-relationship the less 
reliable our motivational understanding becomes. 
Another type of social relationship which is of 
particular significance for sociology involves the indirect 
observation of another's action -a situation in - which. the. actor 
is unaware of being observed. In this case the relationship is 
one-sided and lacks the reciprocal features so important to 
a face to face We-relationship, and the result is an inevitable 
reduction in the reliability of our motivational understanding. 
Allowing for the additional complications, involved in the attempt 
to interpret the subjective meaning of actors involved in a 
social relationship in comparison with the interpretation of 
activities of one person, for Schutz the rule remains unchanged: 
the less direct the observation the more unreliable the 
interpretation, which has to be based increasingly upon my 
recollection of my own actions 
in similar situations, my knowledge 
of the actor's typical 
in-order-to and because motives, or the 
use of means-end analysis to 
deduce in-order-to motives from the 
overt actions. 
88 
Whilst this constitutes a major limitation for interpretive 
sociology it certainly does not result in, the complete inaccessibility 
or meaninglessness of another's lived experiences to the observer, 
indeed Schutz argues strongly that the discipline remains possible 
-. as long as it 
is recognised that 
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"... the meaning I give to your experiences cannot 
be precisely the same as the meaning you give to them 
when you proceed to interpret them". 89 
Sociology therefore remains committed to the attempt to interpret 
the other person's intended meaning and we do this by imagining how 
we might carry out the particular action. We project the other 
person's goal as if it were our own and imagine ourselves carrying 
it out. Alternatively we may remember how we performed a 
90 
similar action ourselves, in other words, we attempt to put ourselves 
in the place of the actor and identify our lived experience with 
theirs. There is, of course, an obvious limitation in this 
procedure because we are reading our own lived experiences into 
another's mind and in so doing merely discovering our own 
experience. Indeed, given that the intended meaning of an action 
is always subjective and inaccessible to the observer, we know 
that the other person's subjective experiences of'their actions are 
in principle different from our imagined picture of what we would 
do in the same circumstances. 
91 
For Schutz the, transition from the realm of direct to 
indirect observation which is allied to the move from the world 
of consociates to contemporaries is crucial to the structure of the 
social world. The contemporary is someone who is not experienced 
directly and whose subjective meaning context'can only be known- 
to the extent that. it can be known, by the observer at all - in 
terms of "... general types of subjective experience". 
92 
In 
effect, therefore, the attempt to formulate the subjective meaning 
context of the actor or actors is replaced by the recognition that 
they can only be represented by an objective meaning context. 
25tß" 
According to Schutz such a representation 
"... has within it no intrinsic reference to persons 
nor to the subjective-'matrix within which'-the 
experiences in question were constituted. However, 
it is due to this very abstraction from subjective 
context of meaning that they exhibit the property 
which we have called their 'again and again' character. 
They are treated as typical conscious experiences of 
'someone' and, as such, as basically homogeneous '" 
and repeatable. The unity of the contemporary is not 
constituted originally in his own stream of consciousness. 
Rather, the contemporary's unity is constituted in my 
own stream of consciousness". 93 
This unity is based upon a synthesis of my experience . 
of one or more individuals or typical people. The more that the 
contemporary is synthesized from a variety of objective meaning 
contexts, the more that the concept is abstract and anonymous 
in relation to particular people, and this is the basis for the 
categorization of such concepts as ideal types. There is no way 
in which the unique and unrepeatable lived experiences of specific 
actors can be combined into a more inclusive concept. 
"The typical and only the typical is homogeneous, 
and it is always so. In the typifying synthesis 
of recognition I perform an act of anonymization 
in which I abstract the lived experience from its 
setting within the stream of consciousness and thereby 
render it impersonal". 94 
Schutz advocates the creation of two different forms of ideal 
type of human action, the personal and the course of action types. 
The former represents an actor expressing himself in a particular 
way, the latter consists of the expressive process itself. 
Beginning with the construction of a course of action type one 
proceeds to formulate the typical activities associated with a 
particular occupation. This construct is therefore an objective 
context of meaning and the next step is to imagine a subjective 
context of meaning, a personal ideal type representing the consciousness 
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of, for e: maple, a postal clerk which corresponds to the course of 
action type. The essential point to note about this procedure 
is that the personal ideal type is derived from and purely dependent 
upon the course of action type. 
95 
According to Schutz the 
observer interprets an action 
It... within an objective context of meaning in the 
sense that the same motive is assigned to any act 
that repeatedly achieves the same end through the 
same means. This motive is postulated as constant 
for the act regardless 
, 
of. who performs the act or what 
his subjective experiences are at the time. For a 
personal ideal type, therefore, there is one and only 
one typical motive for a typical act ... ideal-typical 
understanding, then, characteristically deduces the 
in-order-to and because-motives of a manifest act by 
identifying the constantly achieved goal of that act. 
Since the act is by definition both repeatable and 
typical, so is the in-order--to- motive. The next 
step is to postulate an agent behind the action, a 
person who ... typically intends this typical act - 
in short, a personal ideal type". 96 
However, the context in which such a construct is formulated 
inevitably results in a very simplified content for the inferred 
subjective processes because the typical act is preordained to 
succeed, there is no . possibility of choice between alternative 
projects, and no doubt that the typical act will be performed. 
The motive of the ideal-typical actor is always clear and precise; 
afterall, as Schutz remarks, 
"... the in-order-to motive of the action is the 
completed act on whose definition the whole 
typification is based". 97 
By this process it is possible to hypothesize an 
individual person whose subjective meaning context is identical 
to the objective meaning context of a typical action. However, 
the limitations of this procedure must never be overlooked: the 
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unity and coherence of the concept of the other person's act is 
derived from the interests, problems and perspectives of the 
observer, 
98 
consequently, 
"... the personal ideal type is itself always 
determined by the interpreter's point of view. 
It is a function of the very question it seeks 
to answer. It is dependent upon the objective 
context of meaning, which it merely translates 
into subjective terms and then personifies". 99 
However, the personal ideal type does not represent a 
real, living, person: one cannot discover from the construct how 
a person may act. The ideal type 
... 
'lives' in a never-never temporal dimension 
that no-one could ever experience. ' It lives 
through just the minimum number of subjective 
experiences to qualify 
it as the author of the 
given act. To be sure, it must be pictured as 
'free'; otherwise it could hardly bestow. 
'its own' meaning to the course of action in 
question. However, its freedom, is only apparent, 
because the original act which the social scientist 
or the common sense observer takes as his datum 
already has ready made and unambiguous in-order-to 
and because motives built into it by definition ... 
anything the social scientist permits his ideal type 
to report about its actions is only a prophecy after 
the event. " 100 
Inevitably, the role of the observer in the construction 
of such ideal types is all-important. These constructions are 
limited by the observer's knowledge at that moment in time, a 
knowledge which is constantly subject to modification and change 
in direct relationship to the person's on-going experience of the 
social world. 
101 Consequently the ideal types themselves are 
constantly subject to revision and modification as a result of 
the changes to the observer's knowledge of the social world. 
According to Schutz, 
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"When such ideal types are being constructed, the 
selection of their fixed and essential elements 
depends upon the point of view of the observer at 
the moment of interpretation. It depends upon his 
stock of knowledge at hand and upon the modifications 
of his attention to his knowledge of the world in 
general and the social world in particular. " 102 
In everyday life we perform a great many actions based 
upon indirect relationships with contemporaries and our actions 
presuppose certain expectations about their conduct. What is of 
particular significance here is the fact that our comprehension 
of these contemporaries is not based upon them as real living 
people but as ideal types. In the case of face-to'-face relätionships 
the direct experience of each other means that faulty inferences 
about the other's subjective meaning can be reduced to a minimum, 
whereas in the case of the indirect relationships with our 
contemporaries there is. the real danger that, in the interpretation 
of the conduct of another, 
"... the observer will naively substitute his own 
ideal types for those in the minds of his subject ... 
the observer (may) be using the wrong ideal type 
to understand his subject's behaviour, but he may 
never discover his error because he never confronts 
his subject as a real person. Social observation 
, 'thus tendsýto'develop into second-order ideal- 
typical construction: the observed actor is himself 
an ideal type of the first order, and the presumed 
ideal type in terms of which the actor understands 
his partner is an ideal type of the second order. 
Both of these are logical constructions of the 
observer. and are determined by his pdint of. view". 103 
For Schutz, this raises major implications for interpretive 
sociology which is inevitably dependent- upon indirect observation, 
of social actors. The construction of personal ideal types must 
be consistent with the types formulated of the actors by their 
partners in the interaction, hence the principle of meaning -- 
I 
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adequacy: 
"... given a social relationship between contemporaries, 
the personal ideal types of the partners and their 
typical conscious experiences must be congruent with 
one another and compatible with the ideal-typical 
relationship itself". 104 
In other words, social reality is pregiven to the 
social scientist, it is not directly experienced. In the attempt 
to clarify as much as possible of the social world in which people 
live sociology cannot escape the limitations of the fact that in the 
everyday world knowledge of one's contemporaries is only possible 
in 
terms of ideal types. Yet the construction of ideal types is 
dependent upon the knowledge and purposes of'the observer and the 
interpretive schemes used by the observer. to understand his 
contemporaries are inevitably different to those of the sociologist. 
1 
.. 
(b) The Implications for Sociology 
Before beginning to consider the problematic features 
which Schutz identified in the sociological attempt to comprehend 
other peoples' actions, it is both possible and desirable to broaden 
our scheme of reference to include Schutz's later formulations. 
These essays which were written whilst he was living in the U. S. A. 
are not only fully consistent with his earlier 
105 
phenomenological 
analyses of the social world, but are also frequently addressed 
to the issue of the procedures to be used in sociology, and 
are therefore, most relevant to the present discussion. A brief 
overview of the main 
features of Schutz's work will provide an 
appropriate framework for the examination of the implications of 
his ideas for the practice of sociology. 
t 
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Following Weber's identification of the broad outlines 
of interpretive sociology, Schutz naturally emphasizes the 
peculiarly meaningful nature of social phenomena and that, in 
contrast to the methods used by the natural sciences to comprehend 
their subject matters, the social, sciences seek to understand 
social phenomena-in terms of their location ... "within the scheme 
of human motives ". 
106 
Stated more formally, the social sciences 
depend upon two unique assumptions: first, the postulate of 
subjective interpretation, which means 
"... that we always can - and for. certain. purpbses 
must - refer to the activities of the subjects within 
the social world and their interpretation by the 
actors in terms of systems of projects, available 
means, motives, relevances, and so on. " 107 
Second, the postulate of adequacy - the belief that 
"Each term used in a scientific, system. referring 
_ 
to. human action must be so constructed that a human 
act-performed within the life world by an individual 
actor in the way indicated by the typical construction 
would be reasonable and understandable for the actor 
himself as well as for his fellow-men. " 108 
Between them these two axioms provide the guidelines for 
Schutz's more methodologically oriented analyses of the ways in 
which people organize their experiences in the, everyday world. 
109 
Whilst the first proposition is consistent with, Weber's approach, 
the second is specifically derived from Schutzfs phenomenological 
study of action and meaning with 
its different levels which 
correspond to various human purposes - and it is this which has 
shaped his influence upon sociology. 
In particular, Schutz's emphasis upon the common-sense 
world has been decisive.. According to Schutz, it has been the 
experience of science that advances in knowledge have: been closely 
i 
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associated with the transformation of common-sense thinking about 
the world into specifically scientific conceptualization. However 
this raises a problem for social science because the social world 
"... has a particular meaning and relevance structure 
for the human beings living, thinking and acting 
therein. They have preselected and preinterpreted 
this world by a series of common-sense constructs 
of the reality of daily life, and it is these thought 
objects which determine their behaviour, define the 
goal of their action, the means available for 
attaining them - in brief, which help them to find 
their bearings within their natural and socio-cultural 
environment and to come to terms with it. " 110 
Unlike the natural sciences, therefore, which can readily 
dispense with common-sense thinking about the-objects of their 
investigations and progress to a more precise and systematic 
terminology, the social sciences must follow a different' procedure. 
"The thought objects constructed by the social scientist 
in order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded 
upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense 
thinking of men living their daily life. ' Thus the 
constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, -" 
constructs of the second degree, that is constructs 
of the constructs made by the actors on the social 
scene, whose behaviour the social scientist has to 
observe and to explain in accordance with the procedural 
rules of his science. " 111 
Moreover, within the everyday world we live confident 
of the realness; both for ourselves and for others, of the 
surrounding social phenomena.. In practice we take for granted 
the intersubjective character of everyday life. However this 
belief is, in fact, dependent upon two implicit assumptions; first, 
the interchangeability of stand points (although I am here and you 
are there, a social object will 
have the same meaning for both of 
us); and, secondly, the congruency of each person's system of 
relevance - in other words, the assumption that our specific 
biographical circumstances which have given rise to differences 
2ö 1. 
in personal perspectives can be safely ignored for the pragmatic 
purpose at hand. Hence the everyday world which people share 
and take for granted is based upon the "... general thesis of 
reciprocal perspectives", 
112 
and'this facilitates a level of 
understanding which is sufficient for communication' and interaction 
in daily life. But what may be unproblematic within the natural 
attitude of everyday life cannot be safely taken for granted by 
the sociologist who recognizes that people have a variety of 
purposes and systems-of relevance, a circumstance which results 
in the same object having different meanings for-different people. 
Another crucial feature of the social world is, for 
Schutz, the dependence of our knowledge of others upon the process 
of typification. In daily life an actor's knowledge of a 
contemporary-Is inevitably fragmentary, which means it is based 
upon anonymous situations lacking face-to-face contact ,. and, 
therefore, the means for checking the reliability of such 
interpretations. Even in the case of knowledge of consociates 
there are considerable variations in the levels ofýintimacy and 
directness of the relationship. with the result that the subjective 
meaning of the other remains essentially private. 
113 
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Uowever, in 
the common-sense world we are not beset by such doubts and-queries 
concerning the meaning of other peoples' actions - it is sufficient. 
to reduce their acts to typical motives for us-to-understand them, 
irrespective of whether they are, to use Schutz's examples, 
foreign statesmen or mail men. Indeed, he argues, to achieve this 
level of understanding 
r 
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ý'... it is not even necessary to reduce human acts 
to a more or less well known individual actor. To 
understand them it is sufficient to find typical 
motives of typical actors which explain the act as a 
typical one arising out of a typical situation, There 
is a certain conformity in the acts and motives of 
priests, soldiers, servants, farmers everywhere and at 
every time. Moreover there are acts of such a 
general type that it is sufficient to reduce them to 
'somebody's' typical motives in order to make them 
understandable. " 114 
The sociologist with a different system'of relevances 
and set of purposes cannot afford to adopt the attitude of 
everyday life towards the phenomena which are the object of 
scientific investigation, especially when it is remembered that 
the sociologist deals almost exclusively with the anonymous 
and indirect world of contemporaries and predecessors, and experiences 
these categories of action in a relationship which has, a large 
potential for-misunderstanding. 
115 
In everyday life we can only 
116 
know contemporaries through the process of typification but 
they merely constitute part of our social world which is structured, 
probably more importantly, in terms of consociates. 
We thus arrive at what is for Schutz the key'problem 
facing the social sciences in general and sociology in particular', 
namely, if subjective meaning 
is essentially private and personal, 
how is it possible to formulate objective scientific knowledge of 
the meaning structures developed in everyday life? 
117 
The solution 
lies in the procedure of typification whereby science replaces the 
thought objects of common-sense with new concepts; to be more 
precise the first order constructs which refer to unique events 
are replaced with a model of a specific part of the social world 
"... within which merely those typified events occur that are 
relevant to the scientist's particular problem". -118 
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Schutz is therefore unable to overcome the subjective- 
objective antithesis, but this is only to be expected in view of 
the conceptual rigidity with which he separated the subjective 
meaning context from the objective meaning context in his 
phenomenological analysis of the constitution of meaning in the 
social world. Instead, he acknowledges that the data of the social 
sciences are different to the subjective meaning contexts we experience 
in everyday life. The social sciences are only concerned with the 
external features of action; consequently they are incapable of 
dealing with intended meanings, even in the most favourable 
circumstances of the action of an individual. person, and it 
is for 
this reason'that they are able to formulate objective meaning 
contexts which comprehend "... the typical subjective processes 
of personal. ideal types". 
119 
The justification for the procedure 
of typification lies in the fact that 
"... the interpretation of 
any human act by the social scientist might be the same as that by 
, 120 the actor or his partner. 
The typification of course of action patterns is based 
upon the sociologist's observation and experience of social reality 
which equally facilitates the construction of models of ideal 
actors who have the appropriate consciousness for the action. 
Developing his views on the role of the sociologist in the 
construction of these types, 
Schutz continues, 
"... it is a consciousness restricted so as to contain 
nothing but the elements relevant to the performing 
of the course-of-action patterns observed. He thus 
ascribes to this ficticious consciousness' a set of 
typical notions, purposes, goals, which are assumed to 
be invariant in the specious consciousness of the 
imaginary actor model. This homunculus or puppet 
is supposed to be interrelated in interaction patterns 
to other homunculi or puppets constructed in a similar 
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way. Amongst these homuncluli. with which 
the social scientist populates his model of 
the social world of everyday life, sets of motives, 
goals, roles - in general, systems. of relevances 
are distributed in such a way as the scientific 
problems under scrutiny require. " 121 
These concepts are based upon the ganeralization, and 
formalization of this fixed and invariant material and it is for 
this reason that they are "universally valid". According to 
Schutz, 
"Such ideal types do not refer to any individual 
or spatip-temporal collection of individuals. 
They are statements about anyone's action, about 
action or behaviour considered as occuring in 
complete anonymity and without any specification- 
of time and place. They are precisely for that 
reason lacking in concreteness. " 122 
Hence the theoretical concepts of economics are 
"... a perfect example of an objective meaning- 
complex about'-subjective meaning-complexes, in 
other words, of an objective meaning-configuration- 
stipulating the typical and invariant subjective 
experiences of anyone who acts within an economic 
framework. " 123 
It is important to clarify at this point that rational ideal 
types are preferred in interpretive sociology because they clearly 
state the end and the means of the action, are based upon a fixed 
in-order-to motive, and the entire construct is formulated so 
that the greatest degree of adequacy on the level of meaning can be 
achieved. 
124 According to Schutz, although the rational types 
represent an objective context of meaning, in those cases where 
they have been formulated to represent very general situations 
they have the advantage of corresponding to subjective meaning 
contexts, 
125 
and by restricting the consciousness of the homunculi' 
to a purely rational content of motives, relevances and so on, it is 
i 
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possible, by imagining changes within which the model is to operate, 
to predict changes in the action to meet new circumstances. 
126 
Given Schutz's emphasis upon the importance of each 
person's system of relevances in the interpretation of the social 
world it is not surprising that he devotes a good deal of attention 
to the problem of eliminating the social scientist's'personal 
idiosyncracies in order to maintain general standards of scientific 
practice. According to Schutz the scientific role can be 
assumed because the social scientist is not part of the observed 
situation and merely has a theoretical interest in it. 
127 
Also, 
the decision to pursue such an interest means that the scientist's 
personal biographical situation and corresponding system of relevances 
have been replaced by a scientific situation in which the solution 
of a problem 
"is. -determined by the actual state of the respective 
science ... in accordance with the procedural rules 
governing this science, which among other things 
warrant the control and verification of the solution 
offered. The scientific problem, once established, 
alone determines what is relevant for the scientist 
as well as the conceptual frame of reference to be 
used by him. " 128 
In other words, the scientific problem under investigation 
indicates the boundaries of relevance within which concepts must 
be consistent: raising the problem 
... creates a scheme of reference for the 
construction of all ideal types which may be 
utilized as relevant. " 129 
Indeed, Schutz argues that 
"This ... is what Max Weber means when he postulates 
the objectivity of the social sciences, their detachment 
from value patterns which govern or might govern the 
behaviour of the actors on the social scene. " 130 
i 
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In this way it is possible to formulate sociological 
concepts with the following characteristics: - first, they are 
objective in relation to the common-sense value systems of everyday 
life; second, they are meaningful and understandable to the actor 
in the everyday world (postulate of adquacy); and third, they 
are scientifically valid because their construction is consistent 
with the principles of formal logic and they formulate the 
conceptual framework "... with the highest degree of clarity and 
131 
xdistinctnazs" (postulate of logical consistency). 
The most effective way to conclude this section upon the- 
implications of Schutz's approach for sociological practice is by 
briefly examinating his critique of the use of the concept of 
rational action in the conventionally oriented discipline 
represented by Parsons. 
132 
He drew an analogy between the 
rationality of an action in everyday life and the cool and calculating 
attitude of a scientific observer precisely defining the objective 
and determining the most effective means'for its realization. 
But for Schutz this approach demonstrates a confusion over 
different levels of the social world, namely the scientific orý 
theoretical as opposed to that of every-day life. 
133 
As we have 
seen, the basis of the sociologists' understanding of the social 
world is different from the naive attitudes and interpretations. of 
people in everyday life. Indeed 
"The everyday actor has, in principle, ' only a partial 
knowledge of the world of his daily life, which he 
only partially understands. His propositions thus have 
but a very small range of applicability, namely within 
the concrete situation. They are not formed with the 
aim of being valid for the broadest possible sector of 
the empirical world, a principle common to all scientific 
thought. " 134 
/ 
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Consequently the concept of rational action which was 
developed at the scientific level of thought cannot be applied 
to the everyday level without fundamentally changing its meaning. 
Ia-effect what Parsons does is, to presuppose that in the action or 
actions under investigation, all the relevant elements involved 
have been clearly conceptualized by the actor and that the means 
chosen to achieve the particular. ends are effective in terms 
135 
of cause-effect relationships but, Schutz argues, this.. 
information cannot be available to. the sociologist. There are two 
reasons for this: first, the intended meaning of an action, remains 
subjective and, second, the social world is unlike the world of 
rational scientific models in which 
"A total harmony has been pre-established between 
the determined consciousness bestowed upon the 
puppet and the preconstituted environment within 
which it is supposed to act freely, to make rational 
choices-and decisions. This harmony is possible 
only because both, the puppet and its reduced 
environment, are the creation of the scientist. " 136 
According to Schutz, in everyday life we are all the 
centre of particular social worlds which we accept naively and- 
unquestioningly, and their boundaries are populated by anonymous. 
and typified actors. Our acts, the means to achieve particular- 
projects, are based upon what Schutz calls "cook book" knowledge 
of typical sequences which are sufficient for coping with the 
routines of daily life. 
137 Everyday thought is characterized by 
what Husserl termed "occasional propositions" and, Schutz argues, 
... 
it is valid and understandable only relative 
to the speaker's situation and to their place in his 
stream of thought. " 138 
Thus Parsons' analogy between. the' rational act and the 
actions of the scientist is quite inappropriate for the study of 
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everyday life. The constructs of the social scientist cannot be 
imposed upon the social world without distorting the very reality 
which is the object of study as can be soen from the way in which 
the sociologist artificially isolates a, specific act from out -- 
of the actors social world with its. system of plans and projects 
of varying degrees of importance, in order to determine its 
rationality. For Schutz, concepts like rationality must be 
confined to the scientific level where the sociologist can construct 
theories made up of ideal types of-typical actors with consciousness 
restricted'in such a way that they"live" within systems of rational 
acts. 
139 
The implications of Schutz's critique of naturalistically 
oriented sociology largely centred upon the problems of hoer the 
sociologist's second order constructs can be made more receptive 
to the nature of everyday life and, thereby, more successfully 
incorporate the first order constructs of actors living their daily 
lives. By themselves these ideas merely represented a corrective 
to certain practices in sociology and it was only with the"develop- 
went of some of Schutz's ideas by Garfinkel and other ethnomethod- 
ologist314° that a more radical critique of conventional sociolor 
was produced. To some extent this critique was implicit in Schutz's 
work, 
141 
on the one hand, in the-contrast betreen the natural 
attitude of everyday life and the quite different system of relevances 
used by the sociologist and, on the other, the general emphasis in 
his word upon the way in which an actor's subjective meaning context 
depends upon a unique system of relevances, biographical experiences 
and future projects. However, Schutz remained committed to a trad- 
itional conception of social science despito the difficulties he 
had illuminated for interpretive socioloMr and his rather impracticable 
269 
solution to them. 
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Garfinkel and his followers combined these ideas of 
Schutz with some themes drawn fror linguistic philosophy to develop 
a view of social life in which meaning, understanding and communic- 
ation were seen to be extremely problematic. Their inquiries were 
directed to showing how people involved in particular settings 
(members) made sense of the world to each other and themselves 
and focussed upon the practices members used to accomplish a 
sense of orderliness in their everyday interactions. For the 
13 
ethnomethodological perspective the meaning of action within 
situations was considered to be unique., *occasional and specific 
to that particular setting, a viva derived from Schutz's ideas on 
the subjective context of meaning together with the assumption 
of the indexical property of language. 
1' In the context of this 
approach, major problems surround the possibility of formulating 
trans-situational meanings, generalizations and theories because 
they are based upon what is to the ethnomethodologist an extremely 
doubtful proposition: namely, that the sociologist's taken for 
granted assumptions about the social world are shared by those 
people in everyday life who are the object of the research. 
145 
Hence, sociological statements far from exhibiting the accuracy 
and reliability of natural science merely represent the occasional 
and reflexive expressions of a particular social setting whose 
members are sociologists. The result of this critique is the denial 
that social science can be anything more than an example of common- 
146 
sense reasoning. 
For our purposes, perhaps the most fundamental assumption. 
of ethnomethodology, and certainly the one from which most of the 
270. 
criticism of conventional sociology is derived, is that language 
and interaction has a meaning unique to specific occasions and 
uses but it is an assumption. which, as marry critics have noted, 
remains to be proven rather than illustrated. 
147 Equally, there 
has been little success in formulating a language for reporting 
social interaction which overcomes the problems, so emphasized 
by ethnomethodologists, of reliance upon the common sense world 
and, in view of the fact that these considerations involve 
issues which go well beyond Schutz's formulations, it is 
unnecessary to pursue them further. 
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CHAPTER-5 
WEREMS '-THEORY- OF 'ACTION 
In view of the fact that this is the pivotal chapter of 
the study it will be useful to preface the outline of its objectives 
with a brief sketch of its place within the wider context of our 
arguments as a whole. The study began with an examination of Parsons' 
interpretation and critique of 'Weber's contribution to sociology - 
an interpretation which largely determined the limits of the 
incorporation of these ideas within the contemporary discipline. 
In chapter two Parsons' extension and modification of some of Weber's 
categories and principles were considered, as well as their merger 
with assumptions and strategies from disparate sources. Chapter 
f 
three dealt with the various stages of development of Parsons' 
General Theoy of Action and the problems which-this synthetic 
theoretical structure encountered, namely: its testability and 
general relevance to empirical phenomena, its objectivity given the 
emphasis upon normative order and shared values in society, and 
the incorporation of the Weberian subjective point of view. These 
doubts fuelled the growing "crisis" in sociology which was also 
sustained by the emerging phenomenlogical approach. In chapter 
four we examined Alfred Schutz's-critique and extension of Weber's 
categories. of ýnterpretjve sociology and sought to show how this 
phenomenologicall}r inspired approach, Which emphasized human meaning 
and individual, action, grac. ually undermined the possibility of 
objective knowledge of social action, These two radically different 
"developments" of. Weberts Theory of Action encountered major 
difficulties' and, with the benefit of hindsight, it is now extremely 
/ 
I 
281. 
difficult to see the'respective formulations of Parsons and Schutz 
as being in any way cumulative and productive extensions of Weber. 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify Weber's theoretical 
and methodological characterization of sociology. This provides 
a basis both . 
for assessing the interpretations of Weber's work by 
Parsons and Schutz and for indicating the. relevance of his Theory of 
Action for contemporary sociology. 
The need for a clarification of these issues has been 
largely shaped by the problematic character of some of the most 
influential commentaries upon Weber's work and, in this respect, 
our attention has been focussed upon the interpretations advanced 
by 
Parsons and to a lesser extent Schutz, It was shown that Parsons' 
interest in Weber was part of his convergence thesis with the result 
that his-interpretation did not have as its primary objective the 
clarification of Weber's work. 
l 
Instead, it was an interpretation 
which attempted to demonstrate a convergence between - what subsequently 
became most important for sociology - the work of Durkheim and Weber. 
In this interpretation Parsons took particular comfort-from Weber's 
use of general concepts and a rational, rather than intuitional, 
form of understanding based upon means-end analysis, and attempted 
to present Weber as gradually moving away from his early intellectual 
context, shaped by 
idealism, historicism and Marxism, towards a 
hesitant and somewhat ambiguous acceptance of a new level of thinking 
about the &c entific study of social action. Parsons identified 
a change fron the analysis of the problems of historical knowledge 
to an ever'increasin; concern, towards the end of his life, with 
generalization. This process culminated in his immenses but 
unfinished;, Ecconömy'and'Society, which Parsons saw as an attempt to 
1 282. 
systematically classify social structures' through the development 
of a comprehensive set'of ideal types. This process was not, 
however, without ambiguity given Weber's distinction between 
natural and cultural science, his emphasis upon value-relevance, 
and his use of ideal type concepts, but for Parsons these features 
of Weberian sociology could be forgiven, as well as forgotten, as 
a legacy of Weber's earlier intellectual milieu. Parsons was 
confident that certain features of Weber's work could be extrapolated 
in order to depict his thinking in his final years as being 
consistent with the belief in the utility of a general system of 
theory. Such an interpretation is far from explicit in Weber's 
own statements, but Parsons argued, the ideal types in Economy and 
Society were not a random collection of social structural and 
institutional: ''types and=-involved a systematictheory based upon the 
conception of legitimate order and normative orientation. 
2 
The detailed and systematic nature of this interpretation 
of Weber was the source of its authority, but it gained additional 
stature from Parsons general influence within sociology with the 
result that his suggestion of distinct theoretical and methodological 
stages in Weber's thinking became widely accepted. Indeed, as an 
example of the way in which this interpretation remained influential, 
we may refer to the work of John Rex - by no means an enthusiastic 
supporter* of rarsons- in matters of sociological theory . -'" who argued 
in 
1971 that Weber'' early discussions of the ideal type ýý.. have 
little relationship to the way in which what are later called ideal 
types. - are actually used in, ..: "Wirtgchaft tmdGesellsch ft". 
3 
r 
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one consequence of the apparent authority of Parsons' 
commentary upon Weber's work, especially its theoretical and 
methodological character, was that further studies of these issues 
were discouraged. 
4 
The shift of interest from Weber's formal 
to substantive studies was marked particularly by Bendix5, who 
sought to present an overall view of the diverse empirical inquiries, 
and furthered by a series of translations of parts of the 
comparative studies of world religions6 and particular sections 
? 
of Economy and Society: 
After the initial enthusiasm for Parsons' theoretical 
sociology began to decline, there was a gradual renewal of interest 
in the founding fathers of sociology and the studies by Aron8 and 
Fletcher are notable examples of this. Indeed', following the 
9 
centenary. discussions by the German Sociological Association10 
Weber's work increasingly became a focus of attention in sociology, 
as can be seen from the volumes edited by Wrong 
ll, 
Eldridge 
12 
. and 
most recently Runciman13, and symbolized perhaps by the complete 
translation of Economy'and'Society14, as well as the publication in 
English of Marianne Weber. 's biography15 of her husband. But what 
is of particular interest to this study is the way in which over 
the last 10 years there has been an unprecedented series of 
publications partly stimulated by Schutz's analysis of Weber's 
categories of weaning and forms of understanding 
16 
- which have 
focussed' upon the theoretical and methodological aspects of Weber's 
approach, Among"the more important of these studies are works by 
, the kollowýng; Freund17Bendix and Roth18 
19 20, 
, Bruun p Runciman , 
Sahay21, Mommsen22, Berger23, Roth and Schluchter24, Marsha1125, 
and Tenbruck26. - 
On a more specialized level interest in Parsons' 
2e4" 
0 
convergence thesis? especially the similarities between Durkheim 
and Weber, also revived as can be seen from the studies by Bendix27, 
28 29 and Cohen 
30 
Sahay , Butts > >Hazelrigg and 
Pope. 
Our aim, therefore, is to utilize these new contributions 
to the understanding of Weber's work in the evaluation of the 
commentaries upon his Theory of Action by Parsons and Schutz. Both, 
it will be recalled, assumed that there were distinct breaks in 
Weber's thinking from an early concern with history to a later 
emphasis upon sociology - indeed Schutz rarely makes reference to 
Weber's work other than -Economy and Society. Consequently, they 
were able to argue that some of Weber's theoretical and methodological 
3 
views published between 1903 and 19071 were - irrevelant to his mature 
sociology. In contrast, however, we argue that there is a 
considerable degree of unity in Webers thinking about the study 
of cultural phenomena and social action. Certainly he changed the 
label'he"gave to his researches from history to sociology, but 
the significance of this has been vastly overrated by both Parsons 
and Schutz. Weber saw a very close connection between history and 
sociology and Roth is undoubtedly. correct when, in a discussion of 
this move from one discipline to the other, he argues, 
! '... intellectually this move meant for him a division 
of labour, not an antagonistic relationship between the 
roles- og historian and sociologist. His methodological 
position is not well suited for the defense of vested 
interests : in disciplinary boundaries. " 32 
Moreover, Roth 
33 
makes the point that Weber's ideas on the 
relationship between history and'sociology did not change after 
1903 ,a view which has been steadily gaining ground in the 
conpmentaries' as can be seeng for example, in, the work of Aron34, 
35 36 37 °' 38 Freund , Bruun , 
Eldridge a Sahay and Burger 
39 
< despite 
285, 
Marianne Webers. contrary view of Ecöriömy'änd.. Society as the 
culmination. of his life's work, 
40 
Unity can be' seen in Webers 
thinking after his illness if attention is concentrated upon the 
epistemological and methodological basis of his historical and 
sociological work which can be clarified by reference to the 
analyses of the philosopher Heinrich Rickert. 
41 
For Weber the 
concepts of individuality, value-relevance, 'and understanding, remained 
of fundamental importance throughout what has been termed his most 
productive years and the recognition of this has been greatly 
facilitated by the recent translation of Weber's critiques of the 
42 
economists Roscher and Knies. In addition, it is important to 
consider Webens theoretical and methodological ideas in the 
context of his substantive inquiries into the effects of religious 
ethics upon ecgnomic life as well as examining the abstract 
definitions and typologies in terms of his stated goals and 
procedures for sociological work rather than seeing them, as 
Parsons does, as an indication of a fundamental change in his 
entire approach to the study of action. 
In the last few yearsthe importance, for Weber's work as 
a whole, of the historical and comparative studies of the world 
religions in terms of the theme of rationalization has been 
highlighted by Tenbruck43 and Schluchter441 By examining the 
chronology of Weber 
' work Tenbruck has identified certain 
rnsunderstandinps about the 
dating of particular components of 
Weberfan sociology which have served to emphasize Eäorio iy 
. anti' 
*Society 
as the final and most sophisticated level. 'of his thinking. 
However, according to, Tenbruck it. Was the:. studies of the economic 
ethics of the world religions which represented' the dominant 
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theme of Webens later'years and that his main contribution to 
sociology lies'in the genezalizations drawm'from these studies 
which can be found in the "Introduction", 
45 
"Intermediate 
Reflections: Theory of the Stages and Directions of the Religious 
46 
Rejection of the World", and "Author's Introduction" 
47 
. Indeed 
Tenbruck argues that the realization of the significance of these 
essays has been hampered by editorial attempts to make Economy 
and Society more systematic by filling in various disjunctures 
(which afterall may have been intentional) and this has served to 
perpetuate the view that it represents the culmination of Weber's 
scholarly activities. 
48 
The combination of a detailed analysis of Webers own 
statements about the nature of the sociological discipline in the 
context of his-views on-the relationship between history and 
sociology together with a more accurate appreciation of the 
chronological development of Weber's work, definitively refutes 
the interpretations by Parsons and Schutz who identify distinct 
breaks between Weber's discussion of the problems of historical 
knowledge in the period 1903 to 1907 and the classificatory 
typologies which seemed to Parsons to foreshadow the kind of 
general theoretical system 
in sociology which he has done so much 
to promote. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that both 
parsons and Schutz seriously m5sunder4tood. Weber's conception of 
sociology and, inevitably therefore= his contribution to the 
contemporary discipline an 
issue which will be examined in the 
fourth part. of the chapter, 
Finally, before looking in detail at Weber's methodology 
of historical and sociological knowledge tt. wxll be useful to clarify 
i 
i 
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the structure of this examination. of Weber's Theory of Action. 
It should by now be'quite clear that our specific interest in Webers 
theoretical and methodological views'has been determined very 
much by the developmental interpretations of his work advanced 
by Parsons and Schutz. 
49 
Consequently this examination of Weber's 
work specifically addresses the issue of distinct periods in his 
thinking about the study of human actions and events; it begins 
by looking at (1) Weber's earlier statements on historico-cultural 
knowledge, (2) moves on to his later views on sociological 
knowledge, then (3) seeks to clarify the fundamental unity of his 
approach at these different points in his career and, finally 
(4) considers the misunderstandings and subsequent erroneous 
assessments of Weber by Parsons and Schutz together with their 
evaluations ofr, the relevance of his Theory of Action for contemporary 
sociology. 
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I WEBER: "THE-NATURE'OF'HISTORICO=CULTURAL' KNOWLEDGE 
The originality of Weber's approach to the character 
of the socio-cultural sciences and, therefore, his contribution 
to the development of sociology can be most clearly seen in terms 
of the debates in Germany about the nature of economics and the 
scientific study of society which lasted throughout the final 
quarter of the 19th Century and continued well into the 20th. 
50 
The debate or Methodenstreit took place in the context of opposing 
evaluations of the merits of abstract theoretical schemes or 
detailed and realistic studies, and was complicated by Dilthey's 
suggestion that the methods of the natural sciences were 
inappropriate for the study of human or spiritual phenomena. 
51 
This perspective was given a more 
formal grounding by Windelband's 
distinction between generalizing sciences concerned with laws 
and individualising sciences based upon the intuition of human 
phenomena. 
52' 
This classification was subsequently revised by 
Rickert who distinguished two methodological procedures 
nomothetic and ideographic - and two--different realms of phenomena 
nature and culture. 
53 
He argued that the most contrasting 
combinations of method and substance could be found in the 
disciplines of physics and history but between-these two extremes 
there existed a whole range of mixed methods for the study of 
54 
particular kinds of phenomenal 
The importance o Rickert's work for Webers 
methodology of. socio-cultural science is quite clear, and is-most 
/ 
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explicitly acknowledged in Weber's discussion of the work of 
Roscher and Knies in which he speaks of applying Rickert! s 
ideas to economics. 
55 
The fact that this was Weber's first 
serious work after his illness demonstrates'the importance of 
Rickert's approach for his entire mature work, 
56 
and this is con- 
firmed in theopening remarks in Economy and Society. 
57 
There 
is some doubt about whether it was Rickert or Weber who first 
developed these epistemological and methodological ideas; 
Rickert claimed Weber as his pupil in these matters, 
58 
though 
Marianne Weber suggests a rather different relationship, 
59 
The 
issues have been studied in great textural detail by Bruun and 
Berger who concluded that despite certain basic similarities there 
were some-divergencies-between Rickert and Weber with regard to 
the objectivity of history and*the nature of the values used 
in historical concept formation. 
60 
From our point of view, 
Rickert's work is particularly important for an appreciation 
of Weber's Theory of Action given the absense of a systematic 
statement by Weber of his views on the methodological character 
of the socio-cultural sciences. 
61 
Indeed his most detailed 
analyses of these issues were frequently polemical critiques 
of other scholars or programmatic statements for very specific 
purposes. 
62 
The implications of these features of his explicit 
methodological analyses are neatly stated by Roth; 
f 
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"They do not spell out the ways in which 
he himself proceeded in his own'empirical 
studies, although they do not conflict 
with his general position ... while I 
perceive no basic inconsistencies, I 
do consider Weber's methodological 
practice in need of explication. " 63 
Consequently, some analysis is required to present a coherent 
picture of Weber's theoretical and methodological views about 
the scientific study of action in view of the implicit nature 
of some of the assumptions in his own formal statements. In 
the work of Rickert we find a more systematic presentation of 
many of the principles and assumptions which lie behind Weberts 
own formulations, in particular, the concepts of value-relevance, 
individuality; -understanding and ideal types. 
64 
Moreover, 
these issues gain added significance in view of the fact that 
Parsons' interpretation of Weber's Theory of Action is weak 
in these areas. 
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(a) Rickert! s Episteidlogical Classigication of'the Empirical 
Sciences 
Rickert*s epistemological objective was to clarify the 
range of variation in the methods of concept formation used by. the 
empirical sciences. He used the idea'of concept formation to refer 
to the end product of scientific activity, the knowledge of the 
empirical world upon which the prestige of the sciences is dependent. 
For Rickert every scientific inquiry, begins with the collection of 
data, but concepts are only developed at the point where this 'raw' 
information is organized'in terms of a classificatory scheme, a causal 
sequence, or some other analytic device, which serves to aid our 
comprehension of empirical phenomena. Within empirical science 
concepts represent""... every idea comprising the scientifically 
essential constitutents of a real entity". 
65 
The presuppositions of Rickert's inquiry are to be found 
in this theory of recognition and they can be most conveniently 
presented in terms of his rejection of a "copy" theory of scientific 
knowledge: namely, the belief that a transcendent world lies behind 
the one we perceive and experience. He argued that such a viewpoint 
was untenable on three grounds; first of all, because it is impossible 
to know anything beyond the "immediate" world; secondly, because 
a perfect copy of reality would only be the aim of science if that 
reality was not directly accessible to us; and thirdly, because a 
perfect "copy" of even a minute aspect of reality is quite unattainable. 
66 
According to Rickert, therefore, scientific cognition is 
not 
"... a reflecting process by which 'phenomenal are 
faithfully transcribed, but ... a process of 
reconstructing the data of immediate experience; 
and ... it is always a process involving' the 
simplification of the actual multiplicity of reality itself. " 67 
i 
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Consequently, selection is inevitable because our capacity to 
experience and observe phenomena, as well as the characteristics 
of the phenomena themselves, impose limitations upon human knowledge. 
For Rickert empirical reality can be characterized by two 
principles: firstly, the "continuity of everything real" refers 
to the continuous nature of phenomena in space and time which 
results in the relatively arbitrary nature of distinctions between 
one phenomenon and the next; and secondly, the "heterogeneity 
of everything real" represents the fundamental uniqueness of all 
real phenomena. 
68 
But if empirical reality can be characterized 
by a "heterogeneous continuum", how is it logically possible for 
science to construct concepts which can deal adequately at one and 
the same time, with heterogeneity and continuity? Rickertts 
solution is as-follows:. - 
"The continuum can be conceptually mastered as soon as 
it is homogeneous; and the heterogeneous becomes 
conceivable when we make incisions in it, thereby 
transforming the continuum into a domain of discrete 
objects. Thus no less'than two mutually opposed methods 
of concept formation are open to science. We transform 
the heterogeneous continuum in everything real into a 
homogeneous continuum or into a heterogeneous discretum. 
In so far as this is possible, reality itself can be 
called rational. It remains irrational only for the 
kind of cognition which aspires to portray it, without 
reconstructing it. " 69 
All the empirical sciences attempt to form their concepts 
upon the basis of the 
heterogeneous discretum whereas, Rickert 
argues, mathematics conceptualizes phenomena in terms of homogeneous 
continua, or a realm of pure quantities. This is quite unreal in 
comparison with 
"... the world accessible to sensory perception 
(which) presents us only with qualitatively determined realities"70, 
and the empirical sciences can only proceed by constructing 
/ 
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relatively arbitrary boundaries around what are conceptualized as 
discrete phenomena. Nevertheless, this imposes certain limitations 
on human knowledge: 
"Everything in the content of reality that lies 
between the conceptual boundaries drawn'in it-is 
lost in the process ... we can do nothing more with 
concepts than construct bridges over the stream of 
reality, however small we may make the individual 
spans. No science of real existence will change 
anything in this regard. " 71 
Concentrating attention, therefore, upon the method of 
concept formation whereby the "heterogeneous continuum" is 
transformed into a "heterogeneous discretum", the question arises; 
How is it possible to reconstruct the data of experience in a careful 
and systematic manner? If arbitariness is to be avoided, the 
sciences 
"..,,., need a principle of selection with respect 
to which they can separate the essential from 
the unessential in the given material". 72 
In answering this question Rickert made a major contribution to 
epistemology and, more generally, to the methodology of the cultural 
sciences. 
Rickert's analysis begins with the formal Kantian definition 
of nature, "... as the existence of things 'as far as it is determined 
73 
according to universal laws'. 
" This formal concept is not necessarily 
identical to the substantive concept of nature, - in other words, to 
the natural world. Rather, for Rickert, formal knowledge of nature 
is gained by generalization. 
74 
Whatever is general and common to 
a class of phenomena 
is essential for its conceptualization, whereas, 
the purely unique properties of a member of the class are of no 
significance to science unless of course, they could become the basis 
for a new class concept. 
The concentration upon the generality of a 
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phenomenon ia, inevitably, a process of selection whereby the 
individuality of the object or event is omitted from its conceptualization 
but, for Rickert, the value of this approach is clear and it is only 
through the use of this method that mankind has been successful in 
comprehending the empirical world. This viewpoint is very important 
to Rickert! s argument and he develops it unambiguously. 
"We can predict only what is general in reality ... If 
the world were not'simplified by way of generalization, 
we should never succeed in laying it open to calculation; 
or in controlling it ... with a concept having only 
individual content we should never be able to get beyond 
this one place and infer anything about other places 
and other times. " 75 
Consequently, it is in the context of the formal concept 
of nature, and in direct opposition to it, that Rickert develops the 
formal concept of history. This refers to the uniqueness and 
individuality. of an object or event and represents, therefore, the 
antithesis of phenomena determined by general rules or laws. The 
need for an individualizing method 
is clear once it is realized 
that the procedure of generalization is incapable of representing a 
76 
phenomenon in terms of 
its individuality. 
In epistemological terms, therefore, Rickert formulates a 
distinction in the methods used for concept formation which is based 
upon the antithetical categories of nature and history. However, 
it is particularly 
important not to automatically identify this .- 
contrast with substantive 
issues and the distinction between natural 
science and historical science; 
for Rickert the formal categories 
of nature and history merely represent 
"... the same reality seen from 
two different points of view,. 
77 
Formulated in a slightly different 
Way, Rickert argues, 
i 
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"Empirical reality becbmes. nature when we view it with 
respect to its universal characteristics; it becomes 
history when we view it as particular and individual. " 78 
For purposes of clarity Rickert develops the structure of 
his argument in terms of these two pure types of scientific procedure 
but he is well aware, as we shall see below, that these two types 
merely represent the extremes of a continuum which includes a wide 
range of mixed types of concept formation utilizing varying degrees 
of generalization and individualization. 
79 
From these purely epistomological issues Rickert then. turns 
his attention to the more complex problem of the classification of 
the empirical sciences which, he argues, can be solved by combining 
the formal consideration of the method of concept formation with 
the substantive division between the natural and cultural objects 
dealt with by-'the empirical sciences. Rickert justifies the 
substantive dichotomy in this way: 
"... nature is the embodiment of whatever comes to pass 
of itself, of what is 'born! and left to its own 'growth'. 
Culture ... comprises whatever is either produced directly 
by man acting according to valued ends or, if it is already 
in existence, whatever is at least fostered intentionally 
for the sake of the values attaching to it". 80 
Relevance of an object to values, or the absense of this 
relevance, is what distinguishes, for Rickert, between objects 
of a natural scientific or a cultural scientific interest. However 
he recognizes that for certain theoretical purposes it is possible 
to suspend the relevance of a phenomenon to value and thereby 
conceptualize it in exactly the same way as natural object. 
81 
According to Rickert empirical phenomena can be distinguished not 
only in terms of their origin and manner of coming into existence, 
_. 
but also, in terms of the way 
in which they are accessible to us. 
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Natural objects are known through sense perception, whereas, the 
meanings, öf"cultural objects, are understoodß2 -" and in the case of 
a cultural object the meaning is derived from the values for which it 
was brought into existence or modified from the natural environment. 
The combination of the formal and substantive categories 
of nature clarifies the character of the extreme type of natural 
science: to be precise, the study of natural objects which lack 
relevance to value by the method of generalization. Similarly 
the identification of. the extreme type of cultural science requires 
the combination of the substantive concept of culture and the formal 
concept of history to produce the study of cultural objects which 
are relevant to value by the method of individualization. Thus, 
for Rickert, the "... concept of culture ... makes history as a 
science possible. "83 
"Out of the enormous abundance of individual, i. e., 
discriminable objects, the historian first considers 
only those which either themselves, in their individual 
peculiarity as expressions . of complexes of meaning, 
actually embody cultural values or stand in some 
relationship to them. And out of the enormous 
abundance of differentiable components constituting 
, 
the singularity of every object, he then selects, in 
turn, those on which its cultural significance depends 
and in which historical individuality, as distinguished 
from mere discriminable differentness, consists. " 84 
In addition, is is only by conceptualizing a, phenomenon in terms of 
the method of historical science that it is possible to represent 
its cultural importance: 
"Viewed merely as part of the world of nature, i. e., 
as subsumed under universal concepts or'laws, it would 
become an indifferent specimen exemplifying the generic 
features common to its class, which could equally well be 
replaced by any other of the same genre. " 85 
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In other words, empirical phenomena which lack relevance 
to value are, in the'majority of cases, only important to science 
as an example illustrating a general concept whereas phenomena which 
are relevant to values and have meaning are of interest to science 
because of their part in a particular sequence of events. 
86 
For Rickert the scope of an epistemological analysis lay 
in the clarification of'the extreme types of concept formation which, 
incidentally, could be found in their purest form of development in 
the disciplines of physics and history. He argued that it was the 
task of the methodologist of the particular science to examine its 
particular mixture of methods of concept formation, and a brief 
reference to some of these examples may avoid a persistent 
misunderstanding of Rickert's position which tends to equate the 
distinction between generalizing and individualizing methods with the 
study of*nature and culture respectively. 
87 
Rickert considers the 
use of an historical method in biology where non-recurring evolutionary 
sequences are studied, but he concludes that because the phenomena 
under investigation lack relevance to value their treatment is 
ultimately rather different from that of phenomena which fall 
strictly within the scope of the historical sciences dealing with cultural 
88 
phenomena. Moreover, he does not have any illusions about the 
absoluteness of the distinction between "individual" and "general", 
with the result that a great many concepts are formed which are, at 
one and the same time, relatively general and relatively historical. 
Indeed, Rickert argues,. it i's frequently the case, especially with 
concepts which refer to the 
interests and aims of large groups of 
people, that a generalizing or an individualizing method of concept 
- formation will lead to very similar results although it must equally 
298, 
be recognized that the content of a relatively historical concept 
need not necessarily coincide with the content of a general concept. 
89 
And within the area of the cultural sciences, Rickert considered 
that the greatest use of general concepts was to be found in those 
disciplines dealing with economic phenomena. especially where the 
subject matter could be treated'in terms of mass phenomena. In such 
cases what is scientifically essential frequently coincides with 
the content of a relatively general concept; for example, the 
concept of a peasant of factory worker at a particular time and 
place will correspond "... more or less exactly to the general concept 
that the natural sciences would form" ... on the basis of what 
is 
90 
common. 
There remains one aspect of Rickert's epistemological 
analysis which_is still in need of clarification and it concerns 
the nature of the values to which cultural phenomena are related 
so that their scientifically essential character can be conceptualized. 
For Rickert, relevance to value is a theoretical principle and not 
a practical orientation to what 
is valuable in the present and the 
past. 
"The validity of values is not, ... a problem for 
Lr)r and the task of the historian. does not histo 
consist in making positive or negative value 
judgements. " 91 
Rather, 
history treats values only in so far as they are 
actuall accepted by subjects... Thus even though 
history deals with values, it is not a science that 
posits values'. 92 
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Allowing for the fact that relevance to value enables the 
meaning and significance of a cultural phenomenon to be portrayed, 
the problem remains; How does the historian decide whether to 
concentrate upon a particular aspect of the inevitably many-sided 
meaning of the events or personalities in question? For Rickert, 
empirical reality is not related arbitrarily to any value, instead, 
the historian 
"... takes it for granted that those to whom his work 
is addressed ... on the whole acknowledge or at least 
understand the. worth ... of the general values embodied 
in religion, the state, law, custom, art, science, etc. ', 
with respect to which what is represented is essential. 
The fact that cultural values are universal in this sense 
is what keeps concept formation in the historical sciences 
from being altogether arbitrary and thus constitutes the 
primary basis of its 'objectivity'. What. is historically 
essential must be important not only for this or that 
particular historian, but for all. " 93 
However, in claiming the universality of cultural values 
Rickert makes a far reaching assumption: in logical terms, it is of 
course quite correct that if historical knowledge is to achieve the 
same kind of objectivity as natural scientific knowledge, then, a 
generally valid set of cultural values would be required to provide 
a common reference point for concept formation but Rickert does not 
investigate the empirical support for such an idea. He argued 
that within particular intellectual communities considerable agreement 
existed over the nature of the values which could serve as the principle 
of concept formation and 
in such a case it was possible to claim an 
r'. .. historically 
limited objectivity. "94 This would mean, of course, 
that the objectivity of historical knowledge could not rival the 
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level attainable in natural science and so he outlined the need to 
identify a system of supra, -historical values, to which the values 
of all cultures approximate, in order that a universally valid 
history would be possible. Hences 
"Fundamental progress in the cultural sciences with 
respect to their objectivity, their' universality, 
and their arrangement in. a coherent'system, is 
dependent on progress in the development of an 
objective and systematically articulated ' concept' of 
culture, i. e., on the approach to a knowledge of 
value based on a system of valid values". 95 
According to Rickert, this could be achieved through a philosophy 
of history which would attempt to determine the "universally valid 
11" - ..,, " I ,I -ý ,,. " ,-r, )-1, 
values" and ultimately they would guarantee the objectivity of a 
universal history. 
Clearly such a system of universally valid values is 
a utopian ideal and if, -As 
Rickert argued, the objectivity of the 
historical sciences dealing with cultural phenomena depends upon 
such a system then, its results will never match those of the 
natural sciences. However Weber held a somewhat different view on 
this issue, as we shall see in the following section, so that it 
is unnecessary to pursue the difficulties of Rickert's formulation 
any further. Our 
interest in Rickert's epistemology is largely 
a heuristic one, it 
is concenred with illuminating the presuppositions 
upon which many of Weber's more detailed'methodological formulations 
were based. Indeed Rickert's clarification of the nature of the 
two extreme forms of concept formation, together with his analysis of 
value-relevance and 
individuality are all basic ideas which reappear 
in Weber's methodological discussion of the cultural sciences. 
Having clarified, as will increasingly become apparent, the 
implicit assumptions of Weber's discussions of the methodological 
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character of historico'cultural knowledge it will now be possible to 
examine his own' formulations upon these topics which, for the most 
part, were the result of work undertaken in the first few years:. 
after-recovering from his illness. The fact that most of Webens 
explicit discussion of the methodological and theoretical character 
of natural and cultural science was published between 1903 and 1907 
96 
was crucial to Parsons' developmental interpretation of Weber. 
In particular it meant that Weberts analyses of historical effectiveness, 
the principle of value relevance, the nature and purpose of ideal 
types, and the rejection of the idea that cultural reality could ever 
be deduced from a system of universal laws, could be represented 
as part of a critique of idealism which served to rehabilitate the 
use of general concepts in historical explanation. Parsons argued 
that increasingly toward the end of his life Weber became concerned 
with the nature of sociology as a generalizing science even though 
he did not explicitly free himself from the ambiguities of the concept 
of value-relevance or the problems of ideal type conceptualization. 
The next stage of the argument, therefore, deals with 
Weber's views upon the kind of knowledge which it is possible to 
gain of cultural reality, the role of individual and general concepts, 
value-relevance and the rejection of a general theory, and the basis 
of the ideal type in the understandability of actions and events. 
The attempt will be made to present these views as an internally 
coherent solution to certain theoretical and methodological problems 
inherent in the study of cultural phenomena'. Thus it will be 
possible to present a comprehensive statement of the formal character 
of Weber's approach which was undoubtedly utilized in his- empirical 
- inquiries concerning the social and economic influence of the 
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Protestant Ethic and this will serve to clarify the baseline 
from which, Parsons argues, Weber gradually moves towards voluntarism. 
(b) Weber: The Nature of Scientific' Knowledge 
Weber does not systematically consider the nature of 
reality and how it is accessible to our senses, but his occasional 
references to the problem reveal a basic similarity to the detailed 
arguments advanced by Rickert. However Weber does examine the 
nature of scientific concepts-and the contrast which can be 
drawn between two different forms of scientific work, 
97 
namely the 
method of the nomological sciences and the method of the sciences 
of concrete reality. It is of particular interest that 
in making 
this distinction, Weber explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness 
to Rickert's epistemological analyses. 
98 
According to Weber, in the nomological sciences the aim 
is 
"... to order an extensively and intensively infinite 
multiplicity of phenomena by employing a system of 
concepts and laws. In the ideal case, these concepts 
and laws are unconditionally and universally valid. 
The concrete 'contingent' propertiesýof the 'things' 
and events perceptually given to us, the properties 
which make them objects of perception, are progressively 
stripped away... Their uncompromising logical committment 
to systematic hierarchies of general concepts under 
other concepts still more general and-their standard of. 
precision and unambiguity commit ... (these sciences) ... 
to the most radical reduction possible: the qualitative 
differences of concrete reality are reduced to precisely 
measurable quantities. " 99 
This methodological 
ideal is most closely approached in pure 
mechanics where 
it has been possible to state. causal relationships 
in terms of mathematical equations, yet the inevitable result is 
that as the concepts become 
increasingly universal in scope their 
1 
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particular content Ls, correspondingly reduced. Thus the formulation 
of these sciences becomes increasingly distant from empirical 
reality which, in so far as it is accessible to our perception 
always presents itself in terms of specific qualitative features. 
100 
Hence the concepts which represent the results of the nomological 
sciences, 
"... are abstract relations of-general validity (laws). 
Their domain is that see of problems in which the 
essential features of phenomena - the properties of 
phenomena which are worth knowing , are-identical 
with their generic' features. A problem, therefore, 
lies within this domain only if our theoretical 
interest in the empirically given individual case is 
satisfied as soon as this case can be classified as 
falling under an abstract concept. " 101 
The other group of sciences, which Weber examines'are 
the sciences of concrete reality; they have as their aim, knowledge 
of empirical. reality in its detailed particularity, and must use 
methods quite different to the nomological sciences to fulfill 
their objective. According to Weber the aim of these sciences is, 
"... knowledge of concrete reality, knowledge of its 
invariably qualitative properties, those properties 
responsible for its peculiarities and its uniqueness. 
Because of the logical impossibility of an exhaustive 
reproduction of even a limited aspect of reality - 
due to the (at least intensively) infinite number of 
qualitative differentiations that can be made - this 
must mean the following: knowledge of those aspects 
of reality which we regard as essential because of 
their individual peculiarities. " 102 
We shall leave on one side, for the moment, the very pertinent 
logical question of why certain aspects of an individual phenomenon 
are regarded as essential and therefore. worth. knowing and why 
other aspects are considered to be un-important and, consequently, 
regarded as 'accidental' or, 
'meaningless'. 103 Hence the concepts 
formed by the sciences of concrete reality are the very, reverse of 
the concepts developed by the methods of the nomological sciences, 
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and their richness of content is balanced by their restricted 
applicability, Such concepts are used, 
"... wherever the essential features of phenomena 
that is, those which we regard as worth knowing - are 
not_exhaus'tively described by-'a', classification 
. of phenomena under some generic-. concept: that. is to say, 
wherever concrete reality*as'such is the object of our 
interest. " 104 ^"ý 
Consequently, it is an error in logic to consider that 
concrete reality could ever be deduced from a system of laws. 
Afterall, the more general the concept the less its content, and 
the more difficult it would be to deduce from it the particularity 
of a concrete phenomenon. 
105 
This belief that reality can be 
deduced from laws is based upon the experience of astronomy which 
unlike almost all other sciences, natural. and social, deals with 
quantitative aspects of phenomena - not qualitative features. But 
Weber argues, 'in the case of astronomy, 
"... Every-individual constellation which it. 'explains' 
or predicts is causally explicable only as the consequence 
of another equally individual constellation which has 
preceded it... the reality to which the laws apply always 
remains equally individual, equally undeducible from laws. " 106 
Having reached a salient point in Webers argument it may 
be useful to comment briefly upon the implications of this contrast 
between different kinds of scientific method. For Weber whilst 
these two extremes of concept formation can be found to be highly 
significant in pure mechanics and certain branches of history 
respectively, for the vast majority of the sciences, the aim of 
concept formation necessitates recourse to a mixture of these 
extremes. Indeed, like Rickert, Weber fully accepts that both 
natural and social phenomena can be- studied by methods which seek to 
subsume them under- increasingly general concepts and by methods which 
i 
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attempt to represent their uniqueness; in short there are no 
intrinsic properties of empirical reality which determine the use of 
particular methods of concept formation. 
In a reference to the study of cultural phenomena by the 
methods of the nomological scienes, which do not depend upon value* 
relevance as the basis of their scientific interest, Weber makes 
the point that, 
"... the real question is whether the generally 
valid laws which may eventually-be discovered make 
any contribution to the understanding of those aspects 
of cultural reality which we regard as'worth knowing. " 107 
And speculating about the utility of the attempt to know natural 
phenomena in their individuality, he continues: 
"That we do not attempt this sort of thing in the 
natural sciences is not a consequence of. the objective 
nature of natural phenomena. It is rather a consequence 
--of-the logical-peculiarities of the theoretical goals of 
the natural sciences. " 108 
For Weber, therefore, the differences in the actual use of particular 
methods by the sciences is a function of what the disciplines have 
set as their ideal form of knowledge and this is related both to 
the nature of the subject matter and to socially valued goals. 
In particular there is nothing in Weber's analysis which 
can be taken to mean that he was opposed to the use of generalization 
in the study of social and cultural phenomena on the grounds, that 
the subject matter - human action - was specifically inaccessible 
to such concepts. - Indeed Weber rejected the view, common to some 
branches of idealism that the "freedom" of action curtailed generalization 
and prediction. Rather, Weber argues that the apparent discrepancies 
between the accuracy of prediction in natural and socio-cultural 
science is based upon the goals of the disciplines and not upon the 
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incalculability of action versus the "determination" of nature. 
109 
According to Weber, 
"The 'calculability' of 'natural processes' in the 
domain of 'weather forecasting! -, for example, * is far 
from being as tcertain'. as the 'calculation' of the 
conduct of a person with whom we. are acquainted. 
Regardless of the completeness of our nomological 
knowledge, it is still not susceptible to the same 
degree of certainty. The same holds whenever the 
concrete uniqueness of a future 'natural-process' 
as opposed to specific, abstracted relations is 
at issue. " 110 
He explicates this argument in terms of an analysis of the fall 
of a boulder from a cliff and its shattering into fragments on the 
ground below. Whilst a great many features of this sequence can 
be causally explained in terms of the laws of mechanics there are 
many other aspects, such as the number of fragments and their shape, 
which would not be explained because a "complete" causal explanation 
would be both pointless in terms of the goals of the relevant 
discipline and impossible because the complex of causal sequences 
has been lost. So long as all of these features were consistent 
with our nomological knowledge, scientific interest would be 
111 
satisfied. 
The causal explanation of specific human acts involves 
exactly. the same logical or formal problems. 
"... its result would reveal a number of possibly relevant 
causal factors which 'could be made larger than any given 
number, no matter how large'. This is because the event, 
like ever individual event, no matter how simple it may 
appear, includes an intensively infinite multiplicity of 
properties R if,. that is, one chooses to conceive it in 
this way. It follows that no matter how complex a course 
of human 'actions' may be, 'objectively' it is in 
principle impossible for it to include more 'elements' 
than could be identified in this simple event in the 
physical world. ' 112 
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However, for Weber the goals of the sociocultural sciences are 
different to the goals of the natural sciences and encourage the 
formulation of an entirely new kind of knowledge. This brings the 
analysis to the consideration of the substantive differences between 
the natural and the socio-cultural sciences. According to Weber, 
the socio'-culturäl can be considered as a coherent group because they 
share one vital and distinguishing feature: the ability to understand 
their subject matter: "... both the course of human conduct and 
also human expressions of every sort are susceptible to a'meaningful 
113 interpretation. 
In the case of the explanation of huthan action it is 
possible to set 
"... at least in principle ... the goal not only of 
representing it as 'possible' - 'comprehensible', 
in the sense of being consistent with our nomological 
knowledge. We can also attempt to 'understand' it: 
that is, to identify a concrete 'motive' or complex 
of motives 'reproducible in inner experience'. " 114 
Weber gives as an example the possibility of explaining the actions 
of Freidrich 11 in 1756, 
i. e., a specific concrete situation. In 
this case it is possible to formulate an explanation which is 
consistent with our nomological knowledge in exactly the same way 
as the breaking of the boulder, but in addition, such an explanation 
".. is also 'teleologically' rational. Not in the 
sense that we can establish, as a result of the ascription 
of causes, a statement of necessity. But rather in the 
sense that his conduct has -an cause', I. e. 
given certain intentions and (true or false) beliefs of 
the monarch, and given also a rational action determined 
thereby, a 'sufficient' motivation-can be identified". 115 
Indeed with this kind of 
interpretation it is possible, Weber argues, 
to see that action 
is more calculable than natural processes. 
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it is particularly important to realize that the 
formulation of laws and generalizations of extreme äpplicability 
do not contribute in any way to the understanding of action, in 
the sense of interpreting its motive. ' On the basis of a hypothetical 
example in which Weber supposed that it had been empirically discovered 
that people always reacted in certain ways in certain situations, 
and that this phenomenon could be expressed in terms of unqualified 
generality (homological knowledge), he argued, 
"... even an ideally comprehensive empirical-statistical 
demonstration of the regular recurrence of a reaction will 
still fail to satisfy the criteria concerning the'kind 
of knowledge which we expect from history and those 
'socio-cultural sciences' which are related to history in 
this respect". 116 
Hence for Weber the coherence of the cultural sciences is 
derived from the meaningfulness of cultural phenomena. The cultural- 
scientist can understand the meaning of people Fs actions by relating 
their acts to their stated, or hypothesized, goals. As a principle 
for distinguishing substantively between natural and cultural objects, 
it is somewhat different to Rickert's criterion of relevance to value. 
Whilst Rickert's formulation inevitably implies that human action 
is involved in the phenomena of culture, for Weber, the distinction 
between natural and cultural objects can be stated in a less . 
ambiguous and qualified manner by bringing the understandability of 
human action to the forefront. 
117 
By combining the method of the sciences of concrete reality 
with the substantive criterion of the understandability of human 
conduct Weber arrives at the distinctive feature of the method of 
the cultural sciences -mon which knowledge-of empirical reality in, 
its uniqueness depends. It is their attempt to 
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"... analyze the phenomena. of life in terms of their 
cultural significance. The significance of a 
configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of 
this significance cannot however'be derived. and rendered 
intelligible by a. system of analytic laws, however 
perfect it may be, since-the significance of cultural 
events presupposes aavalue=örientation towards these 
events. The concept of culture is a value-concept.. 
Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us because and 
insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes 
those segments and only those segments of reality 
which have become significant to us'because of this 
value relevance. " 118 
In other words, the interest of the cultural scientist is focussed 
upon a small portion of reality which, because of its relevance 
to a particular value, becomes significant and worth knowing in its 
individuality. The principle of relevance to value facilitates the 
identification of those specific features of an individual event, 
process, or personality, which constitute its uniqueness and on this 
basis they become essential for its scientific conceptualization. 
In addition, there are no intrinsic properties of 
phenomena, such as effectiveness or its importance for subsequent 
developments, which provide a basis for distinguishing between the 
essential and the unessential features of cultural life. 
"On the. contrary ... the meaning we ascribe to the 
phenomena - that is, the relations which we establish 
between these phenomena and 'values' - is a logically 
incongruous and heterogeneous factor which cannot be 
'deduced' from the 'constitutive elements' of the 
events in question. " 119 
Indeed for Weber there are distinctly creative undertones to the 
way in which aspects of cultural reality are illuminated for us 
through their relevance to certain values; 
from the point of view of our tconception' of 
historical reality, the causal course of events is 
susceptible to intensional and extensional. variatiäns 
-in meaning. In other words, the interplay of . these 
values in which our historical interest is. anchored 
sometimes generates trivial results from the infinitude 
of causal-components which, from a purely logical point 
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of view, are. of no hi, storjcal signigicance or interest. 
In other cases= however, the interplay of these values 
produces. results of great significance: that is results 
which arouse bur. historica1 interest and are coloured by 
itt We ! 'see! ''the latter case as involving the establishment 
of new-axiological relations which did not exist before". 120 
This serves to reinforce Weber''s argument that the character of a 
specific cultural event could never be dedüced'frox a system of 
general categories. 
121 
For all of these reasons, therefore, 
"We cannot discover ... what is meaningful to us by 
means of a ! presuppositionlessF investigation of 
empirical data. Rather perception of its meaningfulness 
to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object 
of investigation. Meaningfulness naturally does not 
coincide with laws as such, and the more general the 
law the less the coincidence. For the specific 
meaning which a phenomenon has for us is naturally'not 
to be found in those relationships which it shares 
with many other phenomena". 122 
Turning now to: the problems of causal. explanation, Weber 
argues that it is only possible to have knowledge of a specific 
historical phenomenon after it has been decided to concentrate 
scientific attention upon a limited aspect of the "... infinite variety 
of phenomena". 
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Even a hypothetically perfect knowledge of 
laws would be insufficient to provide the basis for a causal 
explanation of a particular historical event, in the sense of 
representing its uniqueness in comparison with everything. else, 
because 
"... a description of even the smallest slice of reality 
can never be exhaustive. The number and type of causes 
which have influenced any given event are always infinite 
and there. is nothing in the things, themselves to set 
some of them apart as alone meriting attention, " 124 
For Weber then, the solution to this problem of historical knowledge 
lies in the reduction of our interest to that which is significant 
because of its relevance to values, and this makes i. t possible to 
1 
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know something in ita individuality. In, effect, '.! ''We. select only 
those tcauses. to'_Which-are to be imputed in the individual case, 
the `essentials feature of an event"x. 
125 
And as we have seen, 
the essential characteristic of an event, its individuality, 
cannot be represented by laws but only in terms of its'particular 
developmental sequence. Consequently, 
"Wherever the causal explanation of a tcultural 
phenomenons " an 'historical individual'. -is under 
consideration, the knowledge of causal'laws'is 
not the end of the investigation but only a means. 
It facile ätes and renders possible the causal 
imputation to their concrete causes of those 
components of a phenomenon the individuality of 
which is culturally significant. So far and 
only so far as it achieves this, is it valuable for 
our knowledge of concrete relationships. And the 
more 'general', i. e. the more abstract the laws, 
the less they can contribute to the causal imputation 
of individual phenomena and, more indirectly, to the 
understanding of the significance of cultural 
events". 126 
For Weber, therefore, there are two reasons why laws are 
only of heuristic value in the cultural scineces; first, general 
concepts are abstract vis a vis the content of reality with the 
result that their use cannot reveal concrete features of an 
empirical phenomenon and, second, 
to... knowledge of cultural events is inconceivable 
except on a basis of the' ignificance which the 
concrete constellations of reality have for us. in 
certain' individual concrete situations. In-which 
sense and in which situations this is the case is 
not revealed-to us by any laws- it is decided . 
according to the value-ideas in the light of which 
we vteW 'culture' in each individual case. 4Culturel 
is af nLte segment of the meaningless jnf nity of the 
world process, a-segment on which'human. beings confer 
meaning and s igntf icance,, Fý 127 . 
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At this point let us briefly summarize Weber's methodological 
arguments about knowledge of empirical reality; he believed that 
scientific knowledge could be formulated in two logically distinct 
ways, by generalization and individualization; the two extremes 
being represented by the nomological sciences and the sciences of 
concrete reality respectively. He considered that reality, both 
natural and socio-'cultural, was equally amenable to these contrasting 
methods of study. 
128 
The fact that the method of generalization was 
to be found it its purest form of development in pure mechanics and 
the method of individualization was developed most fully in history, 
could be explained in terms of the goals which are set by society 
for 
these particular disciplines. The aim of the study of natural 
phenomena has become one of control because of the socially valuable 
possibility of-, technical mastery of nature. The study of socio- 
cultural phenomena, in contrast, has as its aim knowledge of their 
unique and particular features 
because they are important for our 
values. Indeed it is only through the relevance of these phenomena 
to values that the individuality of a socio-'cultural phenomenon 
becomes logically feasible through the provision of a criterion for 
selecting the essential aspects of a phenomenon which constitutes 
its individuality. However, for Weber the methods of the nomological 
sciences are not as 
important as the methods of' the sciences of 
concrete reality 
in the study of socio-cultural reality because 
increasing conceptual generality inevitably results in decreased 
content. Hence the 
desire to know reality in its individuality is 
likely to be furthered much more successfully by an examination of the 
causal sequence which 
has produced such a phenomenon. The 
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relative unimportance of generalization in these sciences is not, 
therefore, a result of the "irrationality", of human conduct and 
its aversion to uniformity and predictability, In fact Weber 
argues the very opposite point of view: the ability to interpretively 
understand human action means that the possibility of predicting 
courses of action is enhanced well beyond the level attained by 
natural science in predicting particular developments upon the 
basis of nomological knowledge. Consequently, allowing for their 
different emphases upon the unifying principle of the cultural 
sciences, 
129 it is clear that Weber is in full agreement with 
Rickert on the nature of cultural individuality and the methodological 
problems which are involved in the conceptualization of a unique 
socio-cultural phenomenon. 
in our examination of Weber's position so far, the nature 
of value-relevance and, in particular, the origin, validity, or 
representativeness of these values within a certain culture has not 
been clarified. However, the concept is crucial to his methodological 
analysis of the cultural sciences and in particular to the possibility 
of knowledge of specific cultural phenomena. Hence, the clarification 
of these issues is the task of the following section which is 
concerned, in addition, to identify the differences in the use of the 
concept of value-relevance by Weber and Rickert. 
(c) Value-'Relevance and the Science' filistory 
Value-relevance is Weber's methodological criterion for 
the procedure of reducing attention in, socio-cultural reality to that 
range of facts about an individual event, personality or development 
which can be practically explained, This procedure has the effect 
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of making reality, in the sense of those aspects which are of 
interest to the historian, forever potentially new in character. 
Consequently in the scientific study of culture, reality is not 
a fixed or static entity -" unless, of course, for some extraordinary 
reason, the values which constitute the basis of historical interest 
were themselves to become fixed and static. 
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However, for the 
, 
purposes of clarifying the role and implications of value-relevance 
it is necessary to distinguish the concept from two'other procedures, 
namely value-analysis and value judgement. 
131 
Value analysis makes possible the understanding of the 
intellectual, psychological, and motivational content of a cultural 
phenomenon and suggests "... various possible' relationships of'the 
object to values"132 which may or may not be persued because in 
principle there is no limit to the kinds of evaluative attitudes 
generated by the value interpretation of a cultural phenomenon. 
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This form of interpretation is quite distinct from the practical 
evaluation of an object, i. e. a value judgement, and Weber consistently 
emphasized the irreconcilability of the scientific analysis of 
culture and practical evaluation. 
134 
What, therefore, is the purpose of such an interpretation? 
Weber answers this question as follows: the 
11... type of 'interpretation' which we have alone called 
'value Analysis ' functions as a guide for ... 
'historical' 
i. e., causal :. 'interpretation'. The former type of 
analysis reveals the Evalued' components of the object, 
the causal texplanation' of which is the problem of the 
latter type of analysis. The former creates the points of 
attachment from which there are to be regressively traced 
the web of causal connections and thus provides causal 
analysis with the decisive 'viewpoints' without which it 
would indeed have to operate, as it were, without a compass 
on an uncharted sea, " 135 
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For Weber the role of value analysis in scientific work must be 
strictly separated from the establishment of facts which form part 
of a causal sequence and from the heuristic use of such facts as 
an aid in the explanation of a causal sequence. In contrast, 
its task is to help us to understand the relationship of a phenomenon 
136 
to values. This can be clarified by examining the methodological 
role of value analysis in the construction of an historical 
individual; in other words, the conceptualization of the unique 
phenomenon reconstructed from the data available in history which 
constitutes the object of a causal explanation. According to Weber 
the logical character of this procedure is as follows: 
"... in constructing historical individuals I elaborate 
in. an explicit form the focal points for possible 
'evaluative' attitudes which the segment of reality 
_ 
in. question discloses-and in consequence of which it 
claims a more or less universal 'meaning' which is 
to be sharply distinguished from causal 'significance'. " 137 
Consequently, value analysis serves to identify the characteristic 
features of a socio'-cultural phenomenon, 
".. it aids in-the formation of historical concepts 
and indeed from the point of view of its logical 
role, it functions either as an auxiliary in so 
far as it aids in the recognition of the causally 
relevant components of a concrete historical 
complex as such; it functions, conversely, as a 
source of guidance and direction, insofar as it 
'interpretsl the content of an object ... with 
respect to its possible relations to values. In 
doing the latter it presents EtasksF for the causal 
work of history and thus is its presupposition. " 138 
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Once the possible connections of a phenomenon to different 
values has been discovered by these means (i. e. the clarification 
of its potential range of relevance to values), then, the historian 
decides which of the various values or points of view will constitute 
the presupposition of the inquiry. In this way it becomes logically 
possible to construct a historical individual which constitutes a 
unique problem for causal explanation. However, before the detailed 
methodology of such explanations can'be examined, it is necessary to 
consider the implications of the notion of value relevance for the 
objectivity of history and the sociocultural sciences in general. 
Weber argues that there can be no knowledge of cultural 
reality, in its particularity and detail, unless it is knowledge 
from a 
certain point of view. The points of view used in value analysis 
and value-relevant conceptualization are inevitably subjective, 
in 
other words, they are not shared equally within society, or between 
societies, and they do not remain the same over time. 
"The 'points of view', which are oriented toward 'values1, 
from which we consider cultural objects and from which they 
become 'objects' of historical research, change. Because, 
and as long as they do, new 'facts' will always be becoming 
so in a new way ... This way of being conditioned by 
'subjective 
values' is, however, entirely alien ... to those natural 
sciences which take mechanics as a model, and it constitutes, 
indeed, the distinctive contrast between the historical 
and the natural sciences. ' 139 
The conclusions which Weber draws from this argument raise 
the most serious questions about any cultural-scientific enterprise. 
140 
According to Weber, 
"There is no absolutely 'objectivel''scientific analysis 
of culture - or put perhaps pore narrowly but certainly 
not essentially different for our purposes - of 'social 
phenomena'- independent-of special and '-one sided' viewpoints 
according to which , expressly or tacitly, consciously or 
unconsciously --they are selected, analyzed and organized 
for expositionary Purposes, " 141 
I 
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Indeed for Weber the insitable failure of the economic interpretation 
of history, the attempt to explain "... everything by economic causes 
alone.. " is merely an example of this general rule about knowledge of 
socio-cultural phenonena. 
142 
Whilst the dependence of historical inquiry upon value 
relevance in the construction of an historical individual entails the 
presence of an inevitably subjective element, Weber argues 
"... it obviously does not follow from this that-research 
in the cultural sciences can only have results which are 
'subjectivet in the sense that they are valid for one 
person and not for others. Only the degree to which they 
interest different persons varies. In other words, the 
choice of the object of investigation and the extent or 
depth to which this investigation attempts to penetrate 
into the infinite causal web, are determined by the 
evaluative ideas which dominate the investigator and his 
age. In the method of investigation, the guiding 'point 
of view' if of great important for the construction of the 
conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. 
In the mode of their'use, however, the investigator is 
obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much 
here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what 
is valid for all who seek the truth". 143 
It is particularly significant, therefore, that Weber excludes 
from this element of subjectivity "... the determination of the 
historical 'causes' for a given 'object' to be explained.. " and 
argues that it is possible. to achieve completely valid knowledge 
of the causes of a phenomenon even though the object of the 
historical inquiry has been constructed in accordance with the 
principle of value relevance. 
144 
Accordingly, an individual socio-'cultural phenomenon can 
be conceptualized in several ways, none of which would be objectively 
valid for all cultures, all periods of history and all points of 
view, but each of them could be adequate representations in terms of 
relevance to particular values. In each case the adequacy of the 
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conceptualization depends upon the range and accuracy of the data 
from which the historical individual haa. been'synthesized in 
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accordance with a particular viewpoint, Thus, Weber argues, 
description or the determination of the object of causal explanation 
can never be more than relatively valid in the historico-cultural 
sciences146: in these disciplines unconditionally valid knowledge 
can only consist of causal relationships. 
In comparison with Ricker0s use of the term value 
relevance Weberts approach allows for a subjective or arbitrary 
role in the construction of historical individuals whilst, at the 
same time, the objectivity of causal knowledge is defended. On 
Weber's part this represents a recognition of the diversity of 
points of view which can be used in historical investigations in 
the formation-of the objects of such inquiries. This constitutes 
a decisive break with Rickert who argued for a philosphy of history 
to discover the supra-historical values, valid for all points of 
view, which could serve as the basis of the construction of 
historical individuals possessing an objectivity comparable to the 
concepts used in natural science. 
147 
Having examined Webers use of-the principle of value- 
relevance in the construction of an historical individual it is 
now possible to consider the more methodological problems which are 
involved in an individual causal explanation of a sociocultural 
phenomenon. Once a historical individual has been constructed it 
is possible to analyze the preceeding events in order to-identify 
the causally relevant factors. However this is dependent on an 
estimation of the importance of particular events for a variety of 
potential outcomes: 
i 
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It involves first the production o : -let us say it 
calmly - ! imaginative constructs' by the disregarding 
of one or more of those elements of 'reality'"'-which 
are actually present, and by the mental construction of 
a course of events which is altered through modification 
in one or more 'conditions. ' 148 
Such an alteration of the sequence of events requires abstraction 
and mental isolation. On this basis judgements of possibility 
are constructed-in which certain conditions are changed in order to 
see what "would" happen under these new circumstances. 
149 
In doing 
this, 
11... we so decompose the 'given' into 'components' that 
every one of them is fitted into an 'empirical roles; 
hence, that it can be determined what effect each of 
them, with others present as conditions', 'could be 
expected' to have, in accordance with an empirical 
rule. " 150 
If the general knowledge of what usually happens is reliable, then, 
there is a secure basis for the imputation of causal responsibility 
to a particular component of the complex of events. But Weber does 
not regard this generalized knowledge, which can be expressed in an 
empirical rule, as a scientific law: it is merely based upon our 
experience and knowledge of other people's conduct. Although such 
knowledge has many limitations it is indispensible for causal 
imputation and the interpretive understanding of historical events 
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and contemporary actions. This general kind of knowledge consists 
of 
"... ade uate. causal relationships expressed in rules and 
with the application of the category of "objective possibility'. 
The establishment of such regularities is not the'end but 
rather the means of knowledge. it is entirely. a question 
of expediency, to be settled separately for each individual 
case, whether a regularly recurrent causal relationship of 
everyday experience should be formulated into a 'law'. 
Laws are important and valuable in the exact natural 
sciences in the measure that those sciences are-universally 
,, valid. For the knowledge of historical phenomena in their 
concreteness, the most general laws, because they are most 
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devoid of content are also the. least valuable ., 
In the cultural sciences, the knowledge of the universal 
or general is never valuable in itself. " 152 
In the examination of the importance of value-relevance 
for historical explanation the object of analysis, namely the 
meaningful and therefore understandable phenomena of human action, 
received little attention. This is remedied in the following 
section which focusses upon Weber's analysis of meaning and, in 
particular, its accessibility to the scientific observer. 
(d) Intuition, 'Empathy and Meaning 
Weber's analysisof the concept of meaning took place 
against the influential belief that human actions could be studied 
reliably on the basis of intuition and empathy. The absence of such 
procedures in-natural science was seen to be an important part of 
the rejection of the use of general concepts in the study of socio- 
cultural phenomena. In Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems 
of Historical Economics , 
153 
Weber devotes considerable attention 
to claims which had been made for intuition and the certainty of 
immediate experience in the explanation of human action. 
154 For 
Weber such experience can attain a level of unrivalled certainty 
only under very specific conditions: namely, that a distinction 
is drawn between "bur own experience" and the experience of anyone 
else, that the concept of experience is defined broadly enough to 
include the psychical and physical worlds 'immediately given to us 
at a specific moment"-, and that 
IX., the Fobject of immediate experience' is not a. product 
of reality as constituted byý'science. It. is rather 
constituted by. the totality- ooür perceptions' in 
connection with the undi4ferentiated 'feelings' and 
'desires" that are associated with them. " 155 
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According to Weber, therefore, the'object'of a scientific proposition, 
for example, 'the explanation of a set of empirical facts, is 
fundamentally and irreconcilably different to an object of our 
immediate experience. 
"..: what we really experience can become accessible 
to `interpretation' only after the'texperience' itself 
has elapsed. In which case, what is experienced can 
become the 'object' of a proposition. The content. of 
this proposition is no longer 'experienced' in incohate 
stupor. . ý, >'. On : the 
contrary; it is recognized as 'valid'. 
This 'recognition' ... is concerned with the validity 
of propositions, both first person and third person. " 156 
And for Weber "... the immediate, but incohate, experience" 
... does not possess the 
level of certainty which is associated 
with logical and mathematical propositions, once their assumptions 
have been recognized as true. 
157 
Indeed Weber views the object of 
empathy, _. 
iike. 
_the object of 
immediate experience, as a means to 
knowledge: as the raw material from which knowledge can be 
constructed. Discussing an illustrative examples used by Lipps, 
Weber argues: 
"Whoever 'empathizes' with Lipp's acrobat 'experiences' 
neither what the acrobat 'experiences' on the tightrope 
nor what he would 'experience' if he. were on the tightrope. 
What he 'experiences' does not even have any unambiguous, 
imaginative relationship to the experience of the acrobat. 
And, most importantly, it follows that it not only fails 
to qualify as 'knowledge' in any sense of this word. It 
also fails to constitute the object of 'historical' 
knowledge. For in the present case,. the object of 
'historicalt knowledge would be the experience of the 
acrobats not the experience of the empathizing historian. 
" 158 
Thus, it is fundamental to Webers thinking that scientific knowledge 
is dependent upon concepts which are based upon a selection from-the 
world experienced and the world open to experience, from our own 
immediately, given world and the world external to us. Weber comments,, 
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"When empirical science treats a given manifold as 
a 'thin', and therefore as an ''entity' - e. g. the 
'personality':. of a concrete hLstorical. person '- then 
... this object 
is only trelatively determined. I. e., 
it is a conceptual construct which always includes 
aspects that. are empirically 'intuited'. But ... it is a thoroughly synthetic construct. Its 'unity' is 
constructed by the selection of those aspects which are 
'essential'' from the point of view. of specific 
theoretical goals. It is .., a product of thought, 
which bears only a tfunctionaV relation to the 'given'. " 159 
For Weber, threfore, knowledge of the empirical world is established 
through the use of clear, precise and communicable research 
procedures within a guiding framework of a particular point of view - 
there are no short cuts via intuition or personal experience. 
According to Weber, the meaning examined by cultural 
science can be of two kinds: in the context of the interaction of 
two or more people, it- is possible to understand the meaning of 
what is spoken. and it is, also possible to understand the respective 
speakers ^ the motives for speaking or acting in a certain way. 
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Human beings have the ability to interpretively understand other 
people's "motives" because it is possible to empathize. with the 
other's situation and goals and imaginatively reconstruct them, 
as elements of the content of "... our own inner experience. , 
161 
However, the limitations of interpretive understanding are a result 
of starting from 
i'.. ý the empirical fact that processes of a specific 
kind in practice occur linked mentally with a certain 
'meaning w` whicWls not thought through clearly in detail 
but is just a vague notion.! -' 162 
We attempt to understand empirical actions by, constructing 
one or more conceptually. clear and unambiguous but inevitably 
hypothetical, motivational sequences, Consequently, for Weber the 
fundamental limitations of such interpretation cannot be avoided 
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because the real meanLng of the event to the actor -- and there 
may have been no consciously explicit meaning at all - can be very 
different. 
163 
Interpretive understanding, therefore, can only 
serve to formulate hypotheses which can be used in one of the 
following ways: in the analysis of a particular phenomenon in 
socio-cultural reality, in the construction of general concepts which 
may have a heuristic role in analysis, or as part of an attempt 
to formulate clear and unambiguous concepts. 
164 
In each case, 
Weber argtes, there are considerable benefits in terms of the 
self-evidence of the intepretive understanding if the constructions 
are developed upon the basis of a rational means-end relationship. 
165 
(e) Ideal Type Concepts and the Role of Theory 
- Weber's analysis of ideal type concepts, and theoretical 
abstrations more generally, takes place very much in the context of 
the practices of historical economics. This can be explained in 
terms of two reasons. First, at this point of his intellectual career, 
and prior to his use of the concept of sociology, he defined the 
subject matter of his inquiries in terms of the realm of economically 
relevant and economically conditioned phenomena, so it is only to 
be expected that his methodological discussion of concepts would 
deal with the ones most familiar to him. Second; there was a 
widespread acceptance that the theoretical scheme of economics, 
with its abstract and general concepts, represented the most 
sophisticated forte of scientific analysts available at that time 
for the study of human conduct, 
1 
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These concepts are central to an appreciation of Weberts 
methodological analysis of the study-of h stortco'-cultural reality, 
but in view-of the confusion and lack of clarity over the nature and 
purpose of these concepts which exists in the secondary literature166, 
it is necessary to consider his account of them exhaustively. 
Perhaps Weberts best known characterization of an ideal 
type concept is the example of the 'idea' of the commodity market. 
"It offers us an ideal picture of events on the commodity 
market under conditions of a society organized on the 
principles'of an exchange economy, free competition and 
rigorously rational conduct, This conceptual pattern 
brings together certain relationships and events of 
historical life into a complex, which is conceived. as 
an internally consistent system. Substantively this 
concept in itself is like a"utopia which has been 
arrived at by the analytical accentuation of. certain 
elements of reality. Its relationship to the 
empirical data consists solely in the fact that 
where market conditioned relationships of the type 
referred to by_. the abstract construct are discovered 
or suspected to exist in reality to some extent, we can 
make the characteristic features of this relationship 
pradgmatically clear and understandable by reference to 
an ideal type. "167 
These concepts are utopian not because they are based upon the 
selection of elements taken from concrete reality - although the 
construction of an historical individual based, upon the essential 
facts for a particular point of view, may be the first stage in 
the construction of an ideal type - but precisely because they 
involve the accentuation of the elements selected from reality. 
Continuing the reference to the exchange economy, Weber argues, 
therefore, that the ideal type 
13", ,. ,a not a 
description of, reality but it aims to 
give unambiguous means of expression to such a 
description. z., lt 
is thus the tjdea`" of the historically 
given modern society'"% 168 
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However, according to Weber, ideal type concepts have 
frequently been'seen'to have a descriptive function and the result 
has been a confusion of the strict logical difference between the 
content of an ideal type and the content of empirical reality. In 
particular, it was suggested. that ideal types represent the 'essence' 
of concrete reality or that the ideas which the concepts express 
constitute the driving force behind history. Weber argues that a 
good deal of this problem can be explained by the need to include 
illustrative-empirical material in ideal types in order to make 
the accentuated meaning as clear and relevant to the particular 
research task as possible. Moreover, the potential mixture of 
history and theoretical concepts is most likely to occur when 
ideal type developmental sequences are formulated, 
169 
It-is"a: =fundamental presupposition of Weber's approach that 
all knowledge of individual concrete socio-cultural phenomena is 
knowledge based upon particular points of view or values which 
represent the arbitrary starting points of the inquiries. Hence 
the "reality" from which the ideal type is developed by a process 
of accentuation and synthesis of traits is already a value-relevantly 
conditioned selection-from the potentially almost infinite amount 
of information available. Ideal type concepts therefore do not 
escape the limitations which have already been referred to in the- 
case of the construction of historical individuals in accordance 
with relevance to a particular value. Consequently, "Weber argues, 
when'an ideal type of capitalistic culture is being constructed 
and it is important to note that Weber does not refer to tha'one 
ideal type of this phenomenon -. we 
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it., accentuate certain individual concretely diverse 
traits of modern material and intellectual culture in 
i. ts-unique aspects into an ideal construct which from 
our point of. view would be completely self-consistent. 
This would then be the delineation of an 'idea' of 
capitalistic culture". 170 
However, the diversity of points'of view or values which can form 
the starting point for partiuclar inquiries means that a 
corresponding diversity of different ''utopias" representing 
different "ideas"-of capitalistic culture can be formed and none 
of them could be observed in empirical reality. However, 
"Each of these can claim to be a representation of 
the idea' of capitalistic culture to the extent that 
it really has taken certain traits, meaningful in their 
essential features, from the empirical reality of our 
culture and brought them together into a unified ideal- 
construct. For those phenomena which interest us as 
cultural phenomena are interesting"to us-with . respect. 
to 
very different kinds of evaluative ideas to which we 
relate them. - In as much as the 'points of view' from 
which they can become significant for us are very 
diverse, the most varied criteria can be applied to 
the selection of the traits which are to enter into 
the construction of an ideal type view of a particular 
culture". 171 
In addition to the variety of standpoints within a society at any 
one time Weber also recognizes that the guiding value ideas, change 
with time, consequently, there can be no "definitive historical 
concepts. "172, all ideal types are transitory and will inevitably 
be replaced by new ones. In the cultural sciences there is Weber 
argues,, a 1'.., perpetual reconstruction of those concepts through 
which we'seek to comprehend reality"173 But for Weber it 
is 
precisely because the content of these concepts is transitory that 
the need to achieve clear and precise concepts is increased. Indeed, 
it is only in this way that the specific value relevant significance 
of a sociocultural phenömenon. can be established, 
174 
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Weber is equally insistent that the 'ideale nature of 
the ideal type refers to a perfection of a logical, not an ethical, 
kind and does not involve any evaluative judgements. Moreover 
175 
the concepts are formulated in a particular way, 
"it is a matter ... of constructing relationships which 
our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hence 
as 'objectively possiblet and which appear as adequate 
from the nomological standpoint. " 176 
In other words, the usefulness of the utopian construct is to be 
judged in terms of objective possibility r our knowledge of what 
generally occurs in particular kinds of relationship. The 
significance of this, of course, is that the construction of ideal 
types, even of a particular historical phenomenon, cannot proceed 
in isolation from some generalizing activity. 
177 
Given that Weber regarded ideal types as clear-and precise 
concepts expressing the characteristic 'idea' of a particular 
phenomenon, the question to be asked now is, How are they used in 
empirical research? For Weber the role of these genetic and 
historically oriented concepts follows from the fact that they 
have, 
".. the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept' 
with which the real situation is compared and surveyed 
for the explication of certain of its significant 
components. " 178 
Indeed, Weber argues, their usefulness to science is to be judged 
solely in terms of their, 
"t. succe$s in revealing concrete cultural phenomena 
in their nterdepgndence, their causal conditions and 
thei; r''signtfi'cance, The construction of abstract 
ideal.. types recommends itself not as an end but as a 
means. '''' 179 
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Ideal types then are constructed as an aid in the testing of 
hypotheses and the selection from those causes which are possible, 
in terms of nomological knowledge, the cause of the specific 
historial event. 
180 
Finally, let us briefly examine Webers views on the 
difficulties associated with the attempt to explain actions in terms 
of ideals which are current in a particular society, a problem of 
direct relevance to his study of the effect of the Protestant Ethic 
upon economic life. Weber insists upon a clear logical distinction 
between the ideas which govern peoples' actions and the selection of 
elements drawn from the empirical world from which the corresponding 
ideal type is constructed. According to Weber, the 
... Tideast which govern the behaviour of the population 
of a certain epoch i. e., which are concretely influential 
in determining- their conduct, can... be formulated 
precisely only in the form of an ideal type, since 
empirically it exists in the minds of an indefinite and 
constantly changing mass of individuals and assumes in 
their minds the most multifarious nuances of form and 
content, clarity and meaning. ' 181 
Only through ideal types can the religious beliefs of diverse groups 
of people, at a certain time in the middle ages, be included within 
coherent concepts because the ideas and values which people had about 
spiritual affairs ^ assuming of course that in its complete 
particularity and diversity it were still accessible to us ^ would 
inevitably be ".. t a chaos of infinitely differentiated and highly 
"182 contradictory complexes of ideas and feelings. 
For this reason, Weber argues, we construct an abstract, 
utopian and analytic construct which is, 
a combination of articles of faith, norms from church 
law and custom, maxims of conduct and countless concrete 
interrelationships which we have fused into an 'idea". 
It is a synthesis which we. could not succeed in attaining 
with consistency without the application of ideal type 
concepts. " 183 
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However, he cautions, it is necessary to remember that despite the 
logical coherence og an ideA1 type presentation of ideas ".. empirical- 
historical events occurring in men's minds must be understood as 
primarily psychologically and not logically conditioned. "184 . Of 
course, it is only to be expected, given the various tasks requiredxöf 
concepts and the diversity of empirical phenomena, that the number 
of different kinds of relationship between concrete reality and the 
ideas of it that are presented in a logically consistent way are 
potentially large. The relationship is straightforward in those 
cases where a set of ideas based upon a limited number of principles 
is the object of conceptualization but the character of the synthesis 
of a set of ideas which are diffuse, inconsistently developed, and 
lack an integrated'set of principles, is much more obviously ideal 
typical and a product of our own creativity. 
185 
In view of the length and detailed nature of our 
examination of Weber's methodological ideas on the character of the 
historico-cultural sciences it will be useful, at this point, to 
summarize the main themes of his essays published between 1903 
and 1907. 
Weber argued, in a manner very similar to Rickert, that 
scientific reasoning could be divided into two logically opposed 
methodological strategies, The nomological sciences sought to 
formulate laws, of unqualified generality and the sciences of concrete 
reality atteppted to know phenomena in their uniqueness, Indeed 
it was because of the logical opposition of these two methods that 
Weber rejected the possibility of ever deducing the character of 
particular phenomena from the conjunction of abstract concepts, 
According to Weber, the only, reason why' this form of deduction 
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appeared possible in astronomy was becäuse its subject matter had 
been quantified in a manner unrivalled by any other empirical science. 
In this Weber is in full agreement with Rickert and his principle of 
the "heterogeneous continuum" of reality. Whilst it is possible,. 
in logic, to distinguish. between these two contrasting methods in 
practice almost all the sciences use a mixture of the two. The 
combination of the different methods in particular sciences is not, 
for Weber, to be explained in terms of the intrinsic properties of 
empirical phenomena which determine the use of one kind of method 
rather than the other. For Weber, it is the nature of the socially 
approved goals, set for each discipline, which determines the use 
of specific methods. The close relationship between the discipline's 
goals and its subject matter can be seen, for example, in the case 
of the socio-cultural sciences which deal with the understandable 
actions of individual people. Such understanding, Weber argues, 
is not achieved through the application of nomological methods but 
requires an entirely new procedure, a systematically controlled form 
of empathy. 
As a result of the fact that people act in pursuit-of 
-values and interests, and in so doing create institutions and 
traditions embodying these values, a knowledge of these phenomena 
in their uniqueness becomes a goal for us. According to Weber, 
the basic epistemological problem confronting the realizations of 
such a goal is this 
!'. how-in general is the attribution of a concrete effect 
to an individual '-'cause'-' possible and realizable in 
principle in view of the fact that in truth an infinity 
of causal factors have -conditioned the- occurrence of the 
individual ! -event" and'that. indeed absolutely all of those 
individual causal factors were indispensible for the 
occurrence of the effect in its'concrete form. " '186 
r 
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This problem of a starting point is solved', Weber argues, by our 
value conditioned'interests which provide the criteria for 
distinguishing between those features of a particular phenomenon 
which are essential to its conceptualization, as a unique event, and 
those which are not. In this way a historical individual -. - a 
unique synthesis of data -- is constructed which becomes the entirely 
practicable and realizable object of a causal explanation. It is 
quite fundamental to Webers approach that knowledge of a historico- 
cultural phenomenon in its individuality is only possible as a result 
of selection. The attempt to achieve a complete causal explanation 
of such a phenomenon, conceptualized from'all'points of'view, is 
epistemologically misconceived because it presupposes, as its 
aim, the reproduction of empirical reality. 
187 
However, it is 
equally fundamental to Weber that, although the value conditioned 
starting point of individual causal explanation involves a degree 
of arbitrariness, the discovery of causes can attain the same level 
of objectivity as natural scientific work because causal imputation 
is governed by a set of rules quite independent of values and points 
of * view. 
Weber's analysis of the substance of the historico-cultural 
sciences emphasises that the understanding of the meaning of social 
actions can proceed in two rather different ways; on the one hand, - 
an observer can understand what is spoken by an actor and on the 
other, an observer can understand the speaker -" the motivation for 
a particular action, But the understanding of a persons motivation 
is beset by problems- AccbrdinS to Weber, empathy and sympathetic 
re-experiencing do not lead to the re-creation of another person's 
experience and motivation but merely to what we imagine their meaning 
I 
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to have been, Consequently, anobserver can only gain knowledge of 
another person's- motivation through the selection and synthesis of 
the available information, in other words, through the formation of 
concepts. In the majority of cases, therefore, such understanding 
remains hypothetical., and it is very much in the context of these 
problems that Weber developed the ideal type concepts which had as 
their goal the depiction of courses of action with the highest level 
of clarity and precision possible, Such concepts are ideal because 
of their clarity and precision, properties which may not have been 
present in the mind of the relevant actors whose meaning, anyway, 
may not have been very accessible to the observer. For Weber, 
it is only by accentuating reality, the disparate beliefs, viewpoints 
and interests of various individual actors, that is possible to 
achieve unambiguous concepts which are, of course, a prerequisite 
for communicable scientific research. But for Weber these concepts 
do not represent knowledge because they are based upon a value- 
relevant selection from empirical reality which is then accentuated 
to achieve a degree of logical coherence unlikely to be found 
anywhere in empirical reality. Consequently, for Weber, ideal type 
concepts are an aid to be utilized in the discovery of historico- 
cultural knowledge. 
s 
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II WEGERE THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL'KNOWLEDGE 
In the first part of the chapter the attempt was made to 
present a coherent picture of Webens methodology of the historico- 
cultural sciences based upon his work published between 1903 and 
1907 which is now available in English. In this, the second part 
of the chapter we'turn our attention to WeberEs much briefer 
methodological discussion of sociological categories which constitute 
the opening section of the first chapter of'Economy and Society. 
Given the interpretations of Weberas Theory of Action by Parsons and 
Schutz, who emphasize that this immense study represents a culmination 
of both Weber's analyses of social life and his reflections upon 
the nature of sociology, our interest is focussed upon the alleged 
differences between his early and late positions. In the case of 
Parsons'-interpretation, -it is explicitly stated that Economy and 
Society represents a move by Weber toward the acceptance of a- 
general theoretical system and, therefore, a rejection of some of 
the methodological views expressed in his earlier analyses of 
historico-cultural knowledge. In the case of Schutz's interpretation, 
the concentration upon the categories of interpretive sociology is 
based upon a similar belief that Weber had moved from an early 
concern with the nature of historical inquiry to a final interest 
in sociology -" a developmental perspective which had major 
implications for Schutz's appreciation of the nature of interpretive 
sociology. 
/ 
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(a) Action and-Subjective Meaning 
One of the most distinctive features of Weber! 's conception 
of sociology is that social reality is understandable in a sense 
quite distinct from the way in which natural science makes nature 
intelligible to us; he defines-sociology as 
'F. 
.. a science concerning itself with the 
interpretive 
understanding of social action and thereby with a causal 
explanation of its course and consequences. We shall 
speak. of 'actions in so far as the acting individual 
attaches a subjective meaning to his behaviour - be'it 
overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. Action is 
$social' in so far as its subjective meaning takes 
account 'of the behaviour of others and is thereby 
oriented in its course. " 188 
However, Weber argues that in practice it is not always possible to 
distinguish between meaningful action and-'reactive behaviour', 
a form of conduct which lacks subjective meaning. Consequently, 
the interpretation of action must face the problem that "... under- 
standable and non-understandable components of a process are often 
intermingled and bound up together. " Although understanding 
189 
the subjective meaning of action is the keynote of Weber's definition 
of sociology he is very well aware that the interpretation of a 
course of action must take account of many phenomena which lack 
subjective meaning in themselves but which, nevertheless, constitute 
the conditions of action, 
190 
According to Weber, therefore, sociology as the study of. 
the subjectively understandable orientation og conduct can only 
take as , 
its object of study the actions of one or more individual 
people, 4lthough, it is someti'mes necessary for legal or practical 
purposes to consider organization. -3 and institutions as if they were 
individual actors, in sociology it is-vital to avoid the connotation 
of an acting "collective entity'., Weber continues, 
i 
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"%,. for the subjective interpretätion of action in 
sociological work these collectivities must be treated 
as*solE! ly the resultants and modes of organization of 
the pa ocular acts of individual persons, since these 
alone can be treated as agents in a course of 
subjectively understandable action. " 191 
Whilst such collective concepts may be analyzed in terms of their 
functional relationships with other aspects of society, for Weber, 
this is merely a preliminary step in sociological inquiry. 
192 
Placing the understandability of action at the centre of attention, 
Weber argues that in history and sociology, 
"We can accomplish something which is never attainable 
in the natural sciences, namely the subjective ' 
understanding of the action of. the. component individuals. 
The natural sciences on the other hand cannot do this, 
being limited to the formulation of causal uniformities 
in objects and events, and the explanation of individual 
facts by applying them. We do not 'understand' the 
behaviour of cells, but can only observe the relevant 
functional relationships and generalize on the basis 
---of-these observations. This additional achievement of 
explanation by interpretive understanding, as 
distinguished from external observation, is of course 
attained only at a price -. the more hypothetical and 
fragmentary character of its results.. Nevertheless, 
subjective understanding, is the specific characteristic 
of sociological knowledge. " 193 
(b) Understanding, Interpretation and Explanation 
In a prefatory note to the conceptual exposition, 
194 
Weber refers to the discussion of understanding by Jaspers and a 
brief examination of his main arguments undoubtedly serves to 
clarify Webers assumptions about the character of understanding 
and the implications this raises gor sociological reasoning, 
Jaspers-distinguishes- between two quite separate methods 
for raining knowledge of psychic liXe. 
19 
On the one hand, it is 
possible to formulate. caüsal explanations which are based upon the 
discovery that in reality a certain number'of phenomena are regularly 
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linked together, whereas on the other, through empathy it is 
possible to understand how-one psychic event develops from another, 
"Attacked people become angry and spring to the 
defence, cheated persons grow suspicious. The way 
in which such an emergence takes'place is understood 
by us, our'uriderstanding'is'genetic. " 196 
In elaborating the procedures for understanding meaningful 
connections Jaspers states that the evidence 
"... for genetic understanding is always something 
ultimate. When Nietzsche shows how an awareness 
of onel-s weakness, wretchedness and suffering gives 
rise to moral demands and religions of redemption, 
because 
. 
in this roundabout way the psyche can gratify 
its will to power in spite of its weakness, we 
experience the force of the argument and are. convinced. 
It strikes us as something self-evident which cannot 
be broken down'any further. The psychology of 
meaningful phenomena is built up entirely on this 
sort of convincing experience of impersonal, independent 
and-understandable connections. Such. conviction is 
gained on the occasion of confronting human personality; 
it is not acquired inductively through repetition of 
experience. " 197 
However, the self-evidentness of a meaningful connection does not, 
on its own, prove in a specific case that the connection is 
responsible for the development or event in question. He argues 
that in Nietzsche's example although a general ideally typical 
understandable connection is established between weakness and 
morality its application to the individual case, in other words, 
the origin of Christianity, may be incorrect, For any specific 
phenomenon, the correctness of a meaningful connection must be 
determined through reference to the facts of the situation as well 
as the self": e1ident character of what has been understood. But 
in many cased' the facts of the sttuati, on - people'"'s actions, gestures, 
statements-, as-well as the cultural traditions within, which these 
take place '-- may not be fully known' with the: 'result that our 
understanding of the particular event remains only an interpretation. 
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In addition to this kind of empathic understanding Jaspers 
also refers to rational understanding; Thoughts and propositions 
may be understandable because they have been developed in accordance 
with certain logical rules and in such a case it is a simple matter 
of the rational understanding of deductions from a set of assumptions. 
In this way Jaspers argues we can understand what is said or written, 
but when we attempt to understand how thoughts and ideas arise from 
a person's aims, fears, or moods, it is a question of empathy and 
the genetic understanding of the speaker. 
198 
Jaspers is very much 
aware of the limitations of understanding based purely upon the 
self-evidentness of a meaningful connection: a particular connection 
may be convincing to us but it remains a hypothesis in need of 
testing because a number of interpretations may be equally understandable. 
Weberfs discussion of these issues in Economy and Society 
closely follows the points emphasized by Jaspers. For Weber, the 
meanings with which sociology deals can be of two kinds: firstly, 
the actual meaning of an action to a particular actor, or the 
average and approximate meaning for several actors; ""secondly, the 
theoretically conceived pure type of meaning for a hypothetical 
actor or actors in a certain type of situation. 
199 
According to 
Weber, there are two quite different bases according to which the 
sociologist can become convinced that meaning has-been correctly. 
understood; on the one hand, there is rational understanding which 
can be further subdivided into logical and mathematical kinds, and 
on the other, emotionally empathic or artistically appreciative-I 
Action is. rationally evident, -Weber argues, primarily, 
r 
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«. when. we attain a completely clear intellectual 
grasp of the action elements in their intended context 
of. meaning, ., Empathic or appreciative accuracy is 
attained when', through. sympathetic participation, we 
can adequately grasp the emotional context in which 
the action took place. "' 200 
For Weber, the. highest degreeýof certainty that'the'meaning of an 
action has been correctly understood occurs in those situations where 
an individual attempts to achieve an end by selecting means which, 
in terms of general knowledge derived from experience, are appropriate 
for the attainment of the end. A similar degree of understanding., 
is possible with logical and mathematical propositions because their 
meaning is precise and intelligible. 
"With a lower degree of certainty, which is, however, 
adequate for most purposes of explanation, we are able 
to understand. errors including confusions of problems 
of the sort that we ourselves are liable to, or the 
origin of which we can detect by sympathetic self- 
analysis. " 201 
A further complication arises, Weber argues, in the case 
of action 'oriented towards values which are very different from our 
own and whilst we may be able to comprehend such values and their 
associated actions intellectually such phenomena constitute a serious 
limitation for our capacity to comprehend actions motivated by these 
values. 
202 However, 
"The more we ourselves are susceptible to such emotional 
reactions as anxiety, anger, ambition, envy, jealousy, 
love, enthusiasm t,, and, appetites of all. sorts, and to 
the irrational'' conduct which grows out of them, the' 
more readily can we empathize with them, " 203 
According to Weher, in the analysis of empirical actions and the 
identification of causally important factors in the development of 
`a particular phenomenon,: it is very useful to formulate purely 
rational types, of action, 
K 
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The construction of a. purely rational course of action 
in such cases serves the sociologist as a type (ideal 
type) which has- the merit of clear understandability and 
lack of ambiguity. . 
By comparison with this it is 
possible-to understand the ways in which actual action 
is influenced by irrational factors. of all sorts, such 
as affects and errors, in that they account for the 
derivation from the line. of conduct which would 
be expected on the hypothesis that the action were 
purely rational, " 204 
The problematic and hypothetical character of the 
understanding of someone elsets actions can be seen to lie behind 
Weber's distinction between observational and motivational understanding, 
The distinction serves to emphasise the difficulties involved in 
progressing from a superficial observational understanding of both 
rational acts (shutting a door and chopping wood) and irrational 
emotional reactions (an outburst of anger"... manifested by facial 
expression, exclamations or irrational movements.. "205) to amore 
secure explanatory understanding which is-attained when we understand 
"... what makes (the person) do this at precisely this moment and in 
these circumstances". 
206 
Explanatory understanding is possible 
of both rational and irrational courses of action and is achieved, v 
when - 
. the particular act has been placed in an 
understandable sequence of motivation, the understanding 
of which can be treated as an explanation'of the actual 
course of behaviour. " 207 
Indeed Weber reserves the term 'intended meaning'' for the subjective 
meaning og an action which can be placed within such an interpretive 
framework, irrespective og whether the action is rational or not, 
208 
Weber argues that whilst all attempts at understanding 
attempt to achieve certainty so long as the interpretation depends 
exclusively upon the self--evidentness-of. a"meaningful connection 
it cannot be'regarded*as. a causal explanation, but remains merely a 
i 
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possibility. Weber states in some detail-the reasons for this 
view. 
"In the first place the 'conscious motives' may well, 
even'to the actor himself, conceal the various *motives' 
and repressions' which constitute. the real driving 
force of his action, . Thus 
in such cases even subjectively 
honest self-analysis has only a relative value-,.. Secondly, 
processes of action which seem to an observer to be the 
same or similar may fit into exceedingly various complexes 
of motive in the case of the actual actor. Then even 
though the situations appear superficially to be very 
similar we"must actually understand them or interpret 
them as very different, perhaps, in terms of meaning, 
directly opposed .. Third, the actors in any given 
situation are often subject to opposing and conflicting 
impulses, all of which we'are able to understand. 
In a large number of cases we know from experience it is 
not possible to arrive at even an approximate estimate 
of the relative strength of conflicting motives and . very often we cannot be certain of our interpretation. * 
Only the actual outcome of the conflict gives a solid 
basis of judgement. " 209 
Consequently, it is necessary to examine historical and contemporary 
processes, which are as similar as possible to the one being 
studied with the exception of the motive, in order to test the 
various plausible motives. But Weber argues, there are considerable 
problems involved in finding suitable comparative examples and often 
the sociologist must resort to. imaginary experiments and inevitably 
4 
hypothetical results.. 
It is for this reason that Weber contrasts the meaningful 
and the causal adequacy of an interpretation of a course of action. 
Adequacy on the level of meaning is achieved when an interpretation 
of-a coherent course of action is 
subjectively adequate... in $oar as, according. 
to our hab. tua1 modes of thought and. geeiing, its component 
parts takenjn their mutual relation are recognized to 
constitute a ! typical!, complex of meaning, "- 210 
An interpretation is, causally adequate when there is a probability 
"- in terms of empirical generalizations drawn from experience, that 
i 
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the action will - always. occur in that particular way. Hence 
sociology's specific contribution to' sociäl'scientific knowledge 
as distinct from that of history, is as follows: 
"A correct causal interpretation of a concrete course 
of action is arrived at when the' overt: action and the 
motives have both been correctly apprehended and at 
the same time their relation has become meaningfully 
comprehensible. A corr'ect. causal interpretation of 
typical actions means that the process which is claimed 
to be typical is shown to be both adequately grasped 
on the level of meaning and at the'same time the 
interpretation is to some degree causally adequate. " 211 
But, Weber argues, for both historical and sociological explanation, 
without adequacy on the level of meaning a uniform process! remains 
an incomprehensible statistical probability and without evidence 
that a process usually takes place in a certain way a meaningfully 
adequate interpretation has no causal significance. 
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--The. -particular-character of sociology is a result, Weber 
argues, of the attempt 
"... to formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities 
of empirical process, This distinguishes it from history, 
which is oriented to the causal analysis and explanation 
of individual actions, structures and personalities 
. possessing 
cultural significance. The empirical material 
which underlies the concepts of sociology consists to a 
very large extent, though by no means exclusively, of the 
same concrete processes of action which are dealt with 
by historians. An important consideration in the 
formulation of sociological concepts and generalizations 
is the contribution that sociology can make to the causal 
explanation of some historically and culturally important. 
phenomenon, As in the case of every-generalizing science 
the abstract. character of the concepts of sociology is 
responsible for the fact that, compared with actual 
historical reality, they are relatively lacking in fullness 
of concrete content. To compensate for this advantage, 
sociological analysis can offer a, greater precision of 
concepts, This precision is obtained by striving for the 
highest possible, degree of adequacy on the level of 
meaning 4.. In 'all cases-, rational or irrational, 
sociological anä ysis-both abstracts from reality sand 
at the-same time helps us to understand it, in that it 
shows--with what degree o approximation a concrete 
historical phenomenon can be subsumed under one or more 
of these concepts. " 213 
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Weber was well aware that the attempt to give precise meaning to 
ideal type concepts formulating, courses. of action which were fully 
adequate at the level-of meaning inevitably led in the. direction of 
a form of logical perfection which served to increase the distance 
between the ideal type concept. and real phenomena. In addition 
such concepts are ideal in relation to the subjective processes of 
the individual actor because the formulation of concepts, which are 
completely adequate at the level of meaning proceeds on the basis 
of the assumption that the actor, is explicitly aware of the 
subjective meaning of the action. Yet Weber argues, 
"The ideal type of meaningful, action where the 
meaning is fully conscious and explicit is a marginal 
case. Every sociological or historical investigation, 
in applying its analysis to the empirical facts, must 
take this fact into account. But the difficulty need 
not prevent the sociologist from systematizing his 
concepts by the classification of possible types of 
subjective meaning. " 214 - 
Our review of Weber's outline of the character of interpretive 
sociology reveals a great deal of consistency between this and 
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the theoretical and methodological views stated in the period 
1903-1907. The only evidence of a change of thinking lies in his 
explicit distinction between history and sociology but this change 
in terminology can be interpreted in different ways. For Parsons 
and Schutz it symbolized the gradual movement away from history 
to the recognition of sociology as a generalizing science of social 
action and, in particular, for J? ar$on$ it represented a transcending 
of the idealist legacy of Weber! 'a. earlier work: with its reliance 
upon the concept of value-relevance', the distinction between natural 
and cultural science, and the emphasis upon disparate ideal types 
in opposition to the use 09 a general theoretical system. But it 
can also be argued, and with far more justification, that Weber's 
r 
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views on the relationship between history and sociology remained 
basically unchanged after his illness and exhibit a, fundamental 
continuity of approach to the methodology of the cultural sciences -- 
a concept broad enough to include generalizing sciences and sciences 
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of concrete reality. The evidence for this viewpoint will 
be examined in the third part of the chapter in terms of Weben s 
historical and comparative studies of the world religions and his, 
use of ideal type concepts but, before moving on to these issues, 
it will be useful to precisely establish', the continuity of Weber's 
theoretical and methodological statements, about sociology in 
Economy and Söciety and his discussion of the nature of historico- 
cultural science in his earlier work. 
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There are five main features of Weber's discussion of 
interpretive sociology which are either identical or very similar, 
to his earlier formulations, together with several additional points 
which are more detailed developments of arguments implicit in the 
essays on. the methodology of the historico'-cultural sciences. 
Taking, in each case, the views advanced in'Economy and Society 
first, they are: 
1) The subject matter of sociology is the understandable 
motivations of individual actors, or groups of actors. This 
understandability constitutes the distinctive feature of the subject 
matter and distinguishes it from natural phenomena which are 
studied by disciplines'attemptin8 to formulate causal uniformities 
and, thereby, explain individual eyents. _in these terms, 
In addition, 
natural phenomena cannot be understood in the manner of the 
subjective meaning of peoples '-actions. . This perspective 
is 
fundamental to Weber's early and late-statements about the nature of 
31+4. 
the historxco--cultural sciences and sociology. 
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In Economy and 
Society we find two'new formulations which are entirely consistent 
with the earlier assumptions, namely: the argument which regards 
functionalist analysis as a preliminary method'beföre the 
attempt at causal explanation, and the distinction between four types 
of action. For Weber end-rational and value-rational action are 
fully understandable whereas traditional and affectual action 
represent-the margins oL the. subj ectively understandable. 
2) Weber's distinction between two different ways in which we 
become convinced of our understanding of a meaningful connection, 
namely the rational and the emotionally empathic, is clbsely"related 
to his earlier distinction between understanding what is spoken and 
understanding the speaker, 
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3) In the systematization of concepts which deal with subjectively 
meaningful phenomena Weber distinguishes between, on the one hand, 
the actual meaning of an action to the actor or the average meaning 
to a group of actors, and on the other, the pure type of theoretically 
conceived. meaning. This distinction between an actual and a 
pure type of meaning was equally intrinsic to Weber's discussions in 
the period 1903-1907.220 
4) Weber's recommendation of the, use of rational ideal types 
as an important aid in the understanding of a course of social 
221 
action is identical to his earlier position, 
5) His. distinction between observational and motivational 
understanding and between meaningful and causal adequacy can be 
seen, in terms. of the early recognition og the problems inherent 
in the understandability of self-evidently meaningful connections 
as the development of procedures to minimize. the risks of 
31+5. 
misunderstanding the subjective meaning of particular courses of 
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action. 
Whilst this examination clearly demonstrates a most 
important level of consistency in Weber's thinking at these two 
points in his career, it does not conclusively establish the unity 
of his views on the. relationship between the historico-cultural 
sciences and sociology because. the issues raised in Economy and 
Society are only, a selection of the. points discussed in his very 
extensive early methodological essays. In particular, in the, 
statement of the nature of interpretive sociology Weber does not 
explicitly refer to value-relevance, value judgement, or objectivity, 
and these topics are clearly very important to the question. of_ 
the unity of his work. To discover Weber's views on these issues 
towards the. end of his. life we must consider, his substantive 
researches together with some brief methodological formulations. 
This is the task of the next part of the chapter which begins 
with the attempt to place Economy. and'Society in the context of 
Weber's contribution to sociology. 
k 
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III THE-UNITY'OF WEBER'S THEORETICAL , AND- ETHODOLGICAL VIEWS 
(1903-1920). 
It is important to begin by confronting the issue of the 
chronology of Webers later works: from Schutz and Parsons to'Bendix 
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and more recently Roth it has been generally assumed that-Economy 
and Society represented Weber Fs principal work. This, of course, 
suited Parsons' view of. Weber gradually moving to a "modern" conception 
of the scientific study of action because the general definitional 
ideal types appeared to be much more ! `theoretical" than his historical 
and comparative researches, However the fact that the book was 
published posthumously in 1922, and was unfinished. at Weber's death, 
does not necessarily mean that it contained a new level of thinking 
about a theoretical and generalizing study of social action. Indeed, 
whilst it has-been widely known'that part two of'Economy and Society 
was written between 1911 and 1913224 under the projected title of 
"The Economy and the Normative and De Facto Powers", and uses the 
terminology of Weber's essay "Some Categories of Interpretive 
Sociology" published in 1913,225 and that only part one was written 
or substantially revised between 1918 and 1920,226 the significance 
of this time-scale has only recently been identified by Tenbruck. 
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In the intervening period Weber produced his series of essays ön 
the economic ethics of the world religions. They were as follows: 
the "Introduction" (t"The SocialrPsychology of the World Religions"), 
the studies. of Confucianism and Taoism, the . 'Intermediate Reflections" 
("Religious Rejections of the-World and their Directions") which, were 
all published in 1915; the studies- og Hindüxsm and Buddhism published 
in 1916 and 1917; the'study of ancient-: Judaism -pub 1ished between 
1917 and 1919; " and the "Authorts Introduction" to 'the Collected 
31+7" 
Essays in the-Sociolögy'of'Religion. In addition to the above r . ter 
mentioned' studies, this collection includes' a revised and enlarged 
version of 1906 essay "The Protestant. Sects and the Spirit of 
Capitalism}" and a brief, but highly significant, ''insertion into the 
1904 essay "The-Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" and 
Tenbruck suggests, both of these changes were made in 1920 in 
order to make them more consistent and, therefore, more relevant 
to the later studies. 
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Consequently, to consider the two parts of Econömy'and 
Society as a new stage in Weber's-thinking given that it sandwiches 
the historico-comparative researches in the sociology of religion 
under the guiding theme of rationalization and the disenchantment 
of the world, which are clearly developed from Weber's earlier 
inquiries-into the distinctively Western spirit of capitalism and 
unambiguously utilize a methodological approach stated in the 
essays of 1903 to 1907, requires some extraordinarily persuasive 
arguments. However, the justification for such an interpretation 
is not compelling; it involves two elements, first Marianne Weber's 
assessment of the place of Economy and Society in her husband's 
work which did not take into account his projected studies 
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and, 
second, Parsons' prior committment to abstract systems of theory, 
following the model Of economics, led him to see in Weberts abstract 
definitions a legitimation for his own viewa'on the nature of a 
scientific study of social actions Nevertheless, these interpretations 
have been very, effective' and this has, led* to the view that there is 
a discrepancy'between WeberFs discussions of methodology, his 
substantive researches, and his typologies' based upon an alleged 
theoretical system which'. represent his really important contribution 
to sociology. 
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In direct contrast Tenbruck argues, inýa discussion of the 
unity of Economy'and'Socidty itself, that the study 
",.. can only be understood if one continually bears in 
mind that sociology cannot be and ought not to be 
enclosed within a system of concepts ... This gives rise 
to-the doubt whether one ought to explain'Economy and 
"Soc iety. exclusively as the principal work of an author 
who on his side regarded the sociological instrumentarium 
as a means to the end of knowledge'of historical reality 
and, above all, historical causes. " 230 
For Tenbruck, it is Weber's essays on the economic ethics of the 
world religions, which were hurriedly serialized between-1915 and 
1919 together with the "Authort''s Introduction" ; (1920) and the 
revisions to the two early essays on Protestantism which represent, 
despite some imperfections, 
""... the cohesive report ... on the findings obtained 
from the preceeding major studies on universal history 
... the-work in which Weber laboured most persistently, 
in which he felt. free to define his own problems and 
issues, and in which he finally attained a degree of 
resolution of his studies. " 231 
Unfortunately there has not been sufficient attention 
devoted to the chronological development of Weber's historical and 
comparative studies which began in 1904 with the publication of 
"The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" and ended in 
1919 with the publication of the final part of "Ancient Judaism", 
and the result has been a great deal of unnecessary confusion. 
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In the process of conducting his inquiries, Weber's objective 
gradually widened from the explanation of the origin of the "spirit" 
of economic activity in the Western world to the more inclusive 
context of the disenchantment og the world based upon a particular 
kind og logic the irresLs. table drive towards the rationalization 
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of religious ideas. "' According to Tenbruck. the extent of this 
change is demonstrated by Webeis insertion of the following sentence 
r 
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into his original 19Q4 essay on the Protestant Ethic - an essay 
which dealt exclusively with the historical relationships between 
religious doctrine and the "spirit" of modern western capitalism: 
"That great religous historical-process of disenchantment 
of the world, which disavows all magical ways to salvation 
as a superstition and sacrilege, found its conclusion 
here. " 234 
Clearly Weber was not in a position in 1904 to identify the 
significance ofsthe Protestant Ethic for world historical developments 
and could only make this statement as a`conclüsion to his 
comparative studies of the economic ethics of the world religions. 
The same perspective is to be found in his "Author's introduction" 
but it is a matter of regret that the significant widening of Weber's 
problem was not appreciated until quite recently- 
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Tenbruck's analysis has served to bring the substantive 
studies back to the centre of attention and this has immediate 
consequences for our appreciation of Weber's conception of sociology. 
Weber defined the goal of sociology as the formulation of "type 
concepts and generalized uniformities. of empirical process"236 
and whilst Parsons and Schutz emphasised the construction of ideal 
types of actions, the other objective remained relatively obscure. 
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However, once the view of disunity in Weber's work is rejected the 
notion of "generalized uniformities of empirical process" acquires 
a distinct meaning in terms of the generalizations Weber drew from 
his studies. of the economic ethics of the world religions and it 
is-the statements contained in the "Introduction", ', "Intermediate 
Reflections-"I and '""Author'"s Introduction's", which represent for 
Tenbruck the '"ý ": -su t na of Weber! 's inquiry into the processes of 
rationality-. .. 
', 
238 
0 
350. 
The most important of these sociological generalizations 
is made by Weber in the context of the different forms which can 
be taken by the idea of redemption: 
"Not ideas, but material and ideal interests,. directly 
govern ments conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world 
imagesF that have been created'by'lideas' have, like 
switchmen, determined. the tracks along which action has 
been pushed by the dynamic of interest. " 239 
According to Tenbruck this means that historical events are not 
determined by the 
"... power of ideas through their persistence but 
the. dynamic of their own logic makes them the switchmen 
in history. Certain. ideas under the compulsion of an 
inner logic develop their rational consequences and 
thereby effect universal-historical processes. " 240 
Although we have rejected the idea of disjunction in 
Weber's work on the basis of an analysis of his discussions of the 
understandability of social action and the nature of the procedures 
to be used in its investigation, together with Tenbruck's 
investigation of the significance of particular studies within the 
overall context of Weber's later work, there remain two issues yet 
to be clarified which can help to establish even more securely the 
idea of a fundamental continuity in his approach to the study of 
social action. In, particular, Weber's thinking on value-relevance, 
value-judgement, and objectivity in his later work and the implication 
of his distinction between history and sociology need to be 
explored. Thee issues are examined in the following section 
in the context 09 Weber Fs most distinctive methodological innovation 
the ideal type concept. 
351. 
(a) Webers Ideal Typical' Conceptualization'of'Empirical Reality 
Following Parsons interpretation of Weber it was widely 
accepted that the ideal type was a concept developed specifically 
to deal with the problems of the historico-cultural sciences, in- 
particular, the construction of "historical individuals" on the 
basis of a selection from the data available in empirical reality 
in accordance with relevance to a particular point of view or value. 
This is the methodology outlined in his essay. "Objectivity in' 
Social Science and Social Policy" and applied in'The'Protestant 
Ethic and'the*Spirit'of Capitalism, 
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The implications of this 
methodology are that the descriptive representation of a phenomenon 
can never be the end of scientific research, but only a means to 
knowledge because such-concepts are only useful and appropriate in 
terms of -particular rather than universal values or points-of view. 
Moreover, the provisional nature of such concepts is reinforced 
by the fact that as social values change over time different 
features of reality become of interest to us and result in the 
construction of new concepts to be used in the understanding of 
reality. The role of value-relevance in concept formation - 
represents the involvement of an inevitably arbitrary, element in 
the establishment of the object to be explained by the research 
which, nevertheless, can attain objectivity for'the causal 
explanation of a value-relevant historical individual. According 
to Webers therefore, 
i 
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"In the empirical sciences'.., the' possibility of 
meaningful knowledge of what is essential for us in 
the infinite richness of events is bound up with the 
unremitting application of viewpoints of. a 
specifically particularized character, which, in the 
last analysis, are oriented-on the basis of evaluative 
ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part 
empirically-discoverable and analyzable as elements 
of meaningful human conduct, but their validity can not 
be deduced from empirical data as such. The ? objectivity! 
of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that 
the empirical data are always related to those evaluative 
ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the 
significance of the empirical data is derived from these 
evaluative ideas. But these data can never become the 
foundation for the empirically impossible proof of the 
validity of the evaluative ideas. " 242 
This passage demonstrates how Weber sees knowledge of 
individual phenomena to be dependent upon evaluative ideas which 
give research a starting point from which objective explanations 
can be constructed, but the essential point is that value-relevance 
is entirely different to.. value-judgement. __For 
Weber, value- 
judgement involves the evaluation of a phenomenon as good, bad, or 
indifferent. 
243 They cannot be avoided by making a compromise 
between different value judgements or seeking to derive value 
standards from scientific analysis. 
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There is, Weber argues, a 
clear logical distinction between the establishment of facts and 
245 
their evaluation , and without this separation science cannot 
exist; but he does not consider that an attitude of moral indifference 
is necessarily associated with the scientific attitude and the 
avoidence of value judgements. 
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Webers Whole approach is based 
upon the axiom that values are necessarily, involved in the study of 
socio-cultural phenomena and his thinking on this issue did not 
change even'when he become more concerned with a generalizing form 
of research rather than, 
in the earlier part of his career, when he 
was involved rather more with the historical explanation of specific 
353. 
events. In "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality'in Sociology and 
Economics , 
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published in 1917 we'find Weber' continuing to emphasize 
the principle of value relevance. 
"The problems of the empirical disciplines are .. 
to be solved 'non-evaluativelyt. They are not 
problems of evaluation. ' But the problems of the 
social sciences are selected by the value relevance 
-of the phenomena treated, Concerning the significance 
of the expression 'relevance to value' I refer to my 
earlier writings. and above all to the works of Heinrich 
Rickert.... It should... be recalled that the 
expression 'relevance to*values' refers simply to'the 
philosophical interpretation of that specifically 
scientific tinteresO which' determines the selection 
of a given subject matter and the problems of an 
empirical analysis. 
In empirical investigation, no `practical evaluations' 
are legitimated by this strictly logical fact. But 
together. with historical. experience, it shows that 
cultural (i. e. evaluative) interests give purely 
empirical scientific work its direction ... these 
evaluative interests can be made more explicit and 
differentiated by the analysis of value. judgements.. 
---These considerably reduce ... the task of 'value- 
interpretation'. " 248 
. 
Consequently, there is no justification for the viewpoint 
that whilst value-relevant concept formation is necessary for the 
attempt to gain knowledge of the individuality , of. phenomena once 
the 
generalizing procedure of sociology is adopted, then, these problems 
are automatically transcended because the selection of features for 
conceptualization is made on the basis of the formula - whatever is 
general to the class of phenomena is essential to their 
249 
conceptualizatJon, Soc. ology, for Weber, is not primarily 
concerned with the most abstract and general methods because 
its 
goal knowledge of actions and events is more likely to be 
furthered by the use of relatt. vely general and relatively individual 
methods, Both Rickert and Weber agree that the most generalizing 
methods can only be used successfully upon "mass" sociological 
i r 
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phenomena, and they merely constitute part of the discipline's 
subject matter. 
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Thus whilst Weber sees the goals of history 
and sociology to diverge he considers that their methodological 
practice exhibits major similarities. His views on the relationship 
between the two disciplines are neatly summarized-in a -letter to 
the historian von Below in 1914: history is concerned with the 
establishment of what is unique about, for example, the medieval. city, 
but it'is impossible to know what is unique to this phenomenon 
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unless it'can be'compared with Islamic or Chinese cities. 
According°to Weber' therefore, history attempts to causally explain 
the unique features of actions and events which can only be 
identified with the help of sociology. 
In a comment upon this comparative method which he used 
in The Agrarian Sociology of, Ancient'Civilizätiöns Weber argues that 
its objective is not, the construction of general'schemes of 
development based upon analogies with other phenomena. Rather, 
the goal is, 
"... to identify and define the individuality of each 
development, the characteristics which made the one conclude 
in a manner so different. from that . of. the other. 
This 
done, one can then determine the causes which led to 
these differences. It is also my assumption that an 
indispensible preliminary to such a comparative study 
would be the isolation and abstraction of the individual 
elements in each development, the study of these elements 
-in the light of general rules drawn from experience, and 
finally, the formulation of clear concepts ,... without 
these preliminary steps no causal relationships whatever 
can be established. ' 252 
Weberts recognition that'the uniqueness. of a phenomenon could only 
be established through comparison Ls, the reason for his reluctance, 
at the beginning of his essay on the relationship between the. 
ethics of Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism, to start by 
presenting a definitive historical individual of this "spirit". 
i 
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According to Weber, such a concept could only be formulated- 
gradually, "the final and. definitive concept cannot stand at the 
beginning of the investigation, but must come at the end. , 
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In contrast, *sociological knowledge is based upon the 
individual causal explanations of history, presented in an abstract 
and general form, with the result that for Weber sociological 
and historical explanations are for practical purposes, inseparable: 
the explanation of an individual event presupposes a knowledge of the 
causes of other similar phenomena and a general or typical explanation 
presupposes a knowledge of particular causal sequences. This is 
the precise meaning of WeberFs distinction in'Economy-and Society 
between history and sociology. 
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Consequently, 'Weber"-s use towards the end of his career. 
of the label of sociology for his work'merely represents a more 
explicit acknowledgement of a division of labour of which he was 
fundamentally aware from the start of his examination of the 
particular causes of the spirit of modern western capitalism. 
The fact that it does not represent the discovery of some new 
method or goal for a different kind of generalizing activity'in 
the socio-cultural sciences is highlighted in a letter he wrote 
in 1920 to Liefman, a critic of the emerging discipline of sociology, 
in which he states his reasons for accepting one of the first German 
chairs in Economics, and Sociology; 
"If I now happen to be a Sociologist according to my 
appointment. papers, then I become one, in order to put 
an end to-the mischievous enterprise which still 
operates with collectivist notions, In other words, 
sociology, too, can only be'practi. ced by proceeding 
from the action of one or more, 'few or many, ` individuals, 
that means, by employing a strictly 'individualistic' 
method. " 255 
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In the examination of Weber'"-s use of concepts in the 
historico-cultural sciences and, more particularly, in_sociology we 
have dealt with concepts which are used as part of a causal explanation. 
For such concepts the accuracy of. their "fit" with empirical reality 
is, of courses at a premium but, according to Weber, they remain 
"ideal" as opposed to "real. ". for two reasons,. - First of all, on 
epistemological grounds such concepts are based upon a selection 
from the data. available in empirical reality -- a selection which can 
only aspire to be adequate in. terms, of relevance to. a particular 
point of view or value and not to be objectively valid for all 
points ov view. 
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Secondly, such concepts are "ideal" because 
they represent the values and attitudes of many different people 
but they can, only do this by presenting a coherent and consistent 
meaning which may be different from the motivations of particular' 
actors. 
257 
. 
However, Webers explicit discussions of the ideal 
type concentrates. upon an additional element, which certainly is 
related to the problem of-representing different people's 
meanings but which goes considerably further, namely: the 
intentional accentuation of reality in-accordance-with objective 
possibility in order to produce a pure type of meaning, a utopia. 
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In his 1917 discussion "The Meaning of tEthical Neutrality, ' in 
Sociology and Economics" Weber describes the purpose of the pure 
theoretical form 09 ideal, type in exactly the same way-he had in 
his earlier essay "'"'Objectivity'"- in Social Science and Social, Folicy" 
"Its function is the comparison with empirical 
reality'in order to establish i; ts divergencies or 
s-imi larities", --to describe -them . with tlie'most 
''unambiguousl : intelligible'cöncepts, -and to understand 
and explain them causallys 25 
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The advantage of using rationally accentuated' ideal types of 
motivational sequences'lies in the fact that such concepts are 
precisely understandable, and this is a distinct advantage in 
the attempt to discover the causes, in terms of motivations, of a 
particular event. Moreover Weber's conception of the relationship 
between reality and theaccentuated form"of ideal type and, 
consequently, the status of these concepts as knowledge of empirical 
reality remains equally unchanged, 
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"Theoretical constructions`never-do more than 
assist in the attainment of a knowledge of reality 
which they alone cannot provide, 'and which, as a 
result. of the operation of other factors and complexes 
of motives which are not contained'in their assumptions, 
even in the most extreme cases', only approximate to the 
hypothesized course of events. " '261 
Granted that the theoretically conceived pure type of 
meaning is used, as an aid in the understanding of empirical reality, 
the question which remains is this: Why are such concepts needed 
to help us understand social actions and events? Weber's answer 
is related to his distinction between two quite distinct forms of 
meaning which are used in sociology. According to Weber, 
"'Meaning' may be of two kinds. The term may refer 
first to the actual existing meaning in the given 
concrete case of a particular actor, or to the average 
or approximate meaning attributable to a given plurality 
of actors; or secondly, to the theoretically conceived 
pure type of subjective meaning attributed to the 
iypot ieýical actor or actors in a given type of action.. " 262 
This distinction in-the types of meaning corresponds to the 
contrast Weher draws between explanations which are causally adequate 
and explanations which are adequate at the, level of meaning and shows 
the consistency of his approach to the investigation of potentially 
self-evident meaningful connections. Weber's conception of. scientific 
understanding avoids a reliance upon the intuition of the meaning 
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of particular relationships by emphasizing. the hypothetical 
and heuristic nature of the pure types which can only be used as 
a means to the understanding of the empirical world. 
Weber's explicit discussion of the ideal type is confined 
to the accentuating form of the concept and, undoubtedly, this is 
responsible for some of the confusions which have developed about 
them and, as a result of this, about the sort of conceptualization 
which is the goal of interpretive sociology. Indeed, as Aron 
suggests, the concept of ideal type is a generic name used by 
Weber to include all the different kinds of concept used in the 
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study of social action, Thus it is necessary to refer, like 
Parsons, to the work of von Schelting whose identification of the 
logical basis of four different kinds of ideal type is summarized 
by Sahay: 
"These are, if we take the individualizing forms 
first (1) the ideal type which makes the characteristics 
of a unique action or event explicit and (2) the ideal 
type which makes the ideas of an action clear and 
consistent. 
Then'.; the generalizing forms of the ideal type, which 
are similarly distinct: (1) the ideal type which 
organizes correlated facts to allow imputation of a 
causal relationship between them; (2) the ideal type 
which conceptualizes the basic, general characteristics 
of a social action in its pure form. " 264 
This classification utilizes two separate bases of division, the 
distinction between individual and general and between causal and 
acausal in the latter case the difference is between a 
conceptualization oX an event or development As part of a causal 
sequence'and the representation of a pure type of ideally meaningful 
action which can be abstracted from empirical reality. 
265 Acausal 
ideal types are used, therefore, to conceptualize the motivation for 
a course of action which is completely adequate at the level of 
359" 
meaning, in other words, they represent 
" the subjective interpretation of a coherent course 
of conduct when and. in so far as, according to our 
habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component 
parts taken in their mutual relation are recognized to 
constitute a 'typical' complex of meaning. " 266 
Such a conceptualization represents an explanation which is 
completely plausible in terms of our general understanding of 
social life; it is possible to imagine someone acting in this way 
even though there may not be any evidence to show that the plausible 
but hypothetical motive was effective in the case of a particular 
empirical action or event. To go beyond these limitations it is 
necessary-, Weber: -argues, to formulate an interpretation which is 
causally adequate. ) This requires the demonstration of a 
probability, in terms of general empirical rules, that the action 
regarded as meaningfully adequate always occurs in that particular 
way. 
How Weber proposes to achieve this can best be seen from 
a detailed examination of the role of each of the four ideal type. 
concepts. The actual meaning for a particular individual, or the 
11 
average meaning for a group of people, is represented by the 
individual causal ideal type - also called the historical individual. 
This is a value-relevant description of a course of action including 
both overt behaviour and subjective meaning which establishes the 
problem to be causally explained. 
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However, Weberls use of the 
concept "actual meaning" 'requires some comment, He is very well 
aware that enormous difficulties surround the attempt to. gain 
knowledge of the subjective meaning of another person"s actions. 
The best that can be hoped for is an. approximation to such a meaning 
achieved through the use of meansrends analysis-of material gained 
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from a variety of sources. For a nominalist like Weber the concept 
of ''actual meaning" can have no other implication. 
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The 
other individual ideal type does not face these difficulties because 
it is acausal in character. An example-taken from the "Introduction" 
("Social Psychology of the World. Religions") to his series of essays 
on the economic ethics of the world religions may serve to clarify 
the nature of such a concept, ý Weber, discussing the various types 
of rationalization process, comments: 
"... the author must take the liberty of being 
'unhistorical!, in the sense that the ethics of 
individual religions are presented. systematically' 
and essentially in greater unity than has ever been 
the case in the flux of their actual development... 
the features that to the author are important must 
often be presented in greater logical consistency 
and less historical development than was actually 
the case. " 269 
Bearing in mind that limitations are set by the concept of objective 
possibility270 in the formulation of, a rationally. systematized 
"idea" of a particular set of values, and that only purely logical 
consequences for. the actions. of believers in such'ethics can be 
drawn271 Weber, nevertheless, found these concepts indispensible for 
identifying meaningfully adequate, but hypothetical, explanations. 
The next step in causal explanation involves the comparative 
. analysis of these hypothetical explanations which, as Sahay has 
shown; requires an experimental framework, 
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or more precisely,. 
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a norm of comparison, Weber makes this point when he clarifies 
what is-compared in the-studies of the economic ethics of the world 
religions, 
PThe features- off - religions , that are important for 
economic ethics shall interest us primarily from a 
. 
definitive point of : view; we'. shall be interested' in 
the'way in which they are related to economic 
rationalism,! " 274 
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Nothing precise could have been achieved'in the comparative studies 
if Weber had not had a specific objective: namely, the comparison 
of the level of economic rationalism logically implied by the 
religious ethics with the hypothetical, 'but meaningful, explanation 
of the origin of modern western capitalism which focussed upon the 
effect of Luther's and'Calvin's doetrines'`on the rationalization of the 
actions of the believer. In other words, the desire for salvation 
became inextricably linked to practical actions and in the pure case 
economic activities became the means-to, a-religious end. ' Only 
after comparing this norm with the relationship between everyday 
actions and the hope for salvation in the world religions was Weber 
able to conclude that particular forms of Protestantism represented 
the highest level of the rationalization of this connection between 
religious belief and action. 
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On this basis, together with the 
results of his comparison of the levels of material development in 
the particular civilizations at the relevant periods, Weber 
concluded that certain' Protestant religious doctrines caused the 
spirit of modern western capitalism. 
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The fourth kind of ideal 
type is'both general and acausal and consists of Weber's definitional 
concepts of typical courses of action; from the most simple level of 
social actions to the most complex institutions. However these 
definitions remain of hypothetical status and can serve only as 
a means to knowledge' though, of course, an indispensible one. 
They are hypothetical because they are constructed on the basis of 
an aMalgamation of a variety of'valuevrelevant historical individuals 
and then the' accentuation of the characteristics to produce a more 
rationally. coherent, and, "therefore, a more precise and unambiguous, 
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.' concept, 
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In-the third part of the' chapter'. we. have been concerned 
with the'ünity of Weber's theoretical and methodological views 
which can be'found in his substantive inquiries. Value-relevance 
and individual causal explanation have been shown to be central 
to Weberts Theory of Action and the nature. of the different kinds 
of ideal type concept have been clarified in terms of distinguishing 
between the problems of the self-evident understandability of a 
meaningfully adequate representation of a course of conduct and a 
causal explanation which seeks to determine the relevance of-the 
pure-type of meaningful connection between,,. yalues. and actions to 
the social-psychological motivation for a particular course of 
action in a specific empirical setting. Finally, in view of 
the importance of Weber's distinction between the tasks of history 
and sociology-it is, perhaps, appropriate to conclude our 
analysis of the unity of Weberts thinking about the study of social 
action by summarizing his conception of these issues. In Economy 
and Society Weber defines the goals of sociology as the formulation 
of "... type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical 
process. "278 Our examination of the different kinds of ideal type 
concept which are used by Weber clarifies the meaning of this 
statement. Sociology is concerned with comparing varieties of 
social actions and cannot, 
therefore, 
proceed without the abstract. 
definitional types which have merely a heuristic value in terms of 
knowledge of empirical reality, in contrast, its claim to 
objectvi. ty- depends upon the generalizations which can be made from 
the individual causal explanations. which are produced by historical 
research However, the essential point about Weber's conception 
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of the relationship between history and sociology is that, despite 
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differing goals and consequently some differences of-procedure 
neither historical nor sociological research can proceed in isolation 
from the other. 
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IV 'AN 'ASSESSMENT OF 'THE 'PARSONIAN 'AND ' SCHUTZIAN ' INTERPRETATIONS 
OF WEBER 
Having clarified the nature of W'eber's Theory of Action 
as a result of a detailed examination of his work and, where 
necessary with the aid of the arguments of various commentators it 
is now possible to consider the accuracy of the interpretations of 
his approach which were formulated by Parsons and Schutz. This 
provides a basis for examining, in the conclusion of the study, the 
implications they drew from their analyses about the contemporary 
usefulness of Webers methodological and theoretical ideas for 
sociology. 
(a) Parsons: Value-Relevance; 'Understanding'arid'"tthe Ideal'Type 
It has been emphasized throughout that our, interest in 
Weber's work is focussed upon his theoretical and methodological 
conception of the scientific study of social action and inevitably, 
therefore, the accuracy-of Parsons' interpretation of Weber is to 
be judged here in terms of its treatment of these issues. No 
attempt is made to present a balanced perspective on Parsons' 
introduction to an English speaking audience of Webens substantive 
studiea which, in many respects, is a valuable piece of work. 
However, the same cannot be said of Parsons'- treatment of the 
formal side of Webers sociology which ist in important respects, ' 
misleading., 
We have established that Parsons regarded certain features 
of Weber's methodology favourably because they supported his 
convergence thesis through their similarity with his positivistic 
conception of the social scientific enterprise, *namely: the 
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separation of value judgement from scientific research, the 
necessity of using general categories which pointed in the direction 
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of "theory", the abstractness of such concepts, the emphasis 
upon the subjective aspects, of action, and the use of a comparative 
method. In addition, Parsons correctly saw that Weber did not 
differentiate between the logic of natural and socio-cultural 
science, but he rejected Weber's emphasis upon substantive 
differences between the two groups of sciences and the implications 
Weber drew from this which served to limit the role of generalization 
in the study of action. Parsons, as we have"seen, discerned a 
gradual movement away from this position in Weberfs later formulations 
which culminated in Economy and Society. On the' basis of 'an 
analysis of this work Parsons identified an implicit structural 
outline of action systems in Weber's work which represented an 
"elementary" theory based upon the classification of types of 
social relationship, the four types of action and the normative 
orientation of action. 
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Parsons was also critical of Weberos 
use of separate ideal type concepts for each typical'course of action, 
or complex of such actions, because it raised difficulties for the 
treatment of social process and the transition between types. 
Moreover, it represented an unnecessary duplication of effort when 
each typical action could be reduced to a more'-basic set of 
analytt-c elements. In addition? Parsons objected to the "fictional" 
nature öf Weberts ideal type concepts because they represented a 
misunderstanding of`the proper nature of . scientigic abstraction. 
Certainly ideal type- concepts, such as the' statements of economic 
theory, do not account for the full complexity o empirical 
reality but according to Parsons they can accurately state 
r 
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relationships between analytic elements in a system of theory. 
Finally, we have seen how Parsons rejected the relegation of 
functional analysis to a preliminary role in sociology because 
according to Weber, it could not provide a basis for understanding 
the subjective meaning of action. For Parsons there is no 
conflict between a functional analysis of a, system of action and 
the understanding of the motivation of a particular actor, or 
group of actors. He*suggests that Weber advanced these views 
partly because of the weakness, at that time, -of functional 
accounts of developmental processes and partly because Weber 
focussed exclusively upon individual actions rather than actions 
within systems which was a pre-requisite for a more systematic, 
general, and therefore scientific analysis of social action, 
Parsonst assessment of Weber's methodology for the socio- 
cultural sciences has been very influential with the result that 
only some of-the Weberian principles and assumptions have been 
incorporated into contemporary sociology and, what is particularly 
important, is the fact that in the process of incorporation, the 
original meaning of the concepts has been changed.: The main- 
features of this process are as follows: committment to both the 
value-freedom of sociology 
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and the belief that objective 
sociological research can be attained has been, enthusiastically 
adopted by functionalist sociologists as a basic principle of 
their programmatic statementsp but the practices{of such writers 
as revealed with the passage of time has. made, these ideas appear 
to be hopelessly utopian, and in the sceptical response which has 
been generited'we can see the source oX the currently fashionable 
notion of reflexivity; ' the'related concept-of valuerrelevance has 
367. 
been used to support an emasculated principle of epistemological 
selectivity and what were seen to be residual elements were 
consigned to the "mysteries" of idealism; the distinctiveness 
of Weber's views on subjective meaning and on understanding as 
a special method for sociology have been dissipated in the . 
overwhelmingly Durkheimian ethos which has pervaded sociology 
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until recently and "seemingly" have been made redundant. by 
the substantively different concerns of interactionism and the 
phenomenologically inspired distinctions of Schutz and other 
writers; the concept of ideal types has been assimilated into 
the realm of speculation which so characterizes the "theoretical" 
component of today's sociology, with the result that in 
contemporary usage it is indistinguishable from models, theories, 
and analytic constructs; and last, but not. least, Weber's notion. 
of rationality and the crucial role of this concept in means-ends 
analysis has been obscured by the Parsonian concepts of unit act, 
systems of action and common values. 
Let us consider each of these issues in more detail 
beginning with value-relevance and objectivity. For sociology to be 
value free it must be capable of presenting objective, rather 
than distorted, partial or inaccurate analyses. Within the  
Parsonian approach this is achieved by- adopting the role of the 
scientist with. its. associated prescriptions about the, use of 
evidence and making inferences and generalizations, There is 
of course a degree of selection inevitably-involved-in the, 
conceptualization of phenoTqena and for this reason, Parsons 
emphasises'. the* importance of the action frame of. reference for. 
concentrating a sociological inquiry onto the relevant aspects of 
r' 
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a phenomenon, which may also be investigated*by'a natural science 
utilizing a quite different frame of reference. ' Parsons considered 
this to be the permanently valid element in Weber's concept of 
value-relevance: once the frame of reference had been chosen, 
then, objective description and analysis was possible. But value- 
relevance is a more complex principle for Weber relating to 
epistemological problems only experienced in the socio-cultural 
sciences in which the value-relevant conceptualization of historical 
individuals meant that there could be. no balanced overall description 
or explanation of contemporary or historical phenomena. To clarify 
these issues we must refer to the conflicting arguments in some 
detail. 
According to Parsons, Weber"views-relevance to value in 
this way: _, the, conanon 
human basis for interest in natural phenomena 
is control, and this is made possible through the natural sciences 
formulating general concepts. The situation is different in the 
social case, here a value attitude is taken towards the phenomena 
because the objects of study are actions and cultural achievements 
which embody human ideals and values. In this. case, our interest 
in the phenomena focusses upon their'individuality because of 
their relevance to values which the scientist actually shares, or 
are in some way significant to him, 
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parsons concedes that there is some merit in this 
formulation for it makes, explicit the unavoidable degree of 
relativism in science which follows fror the fact that knowledge 
is" always-. s. electiye, and the basis for this selection is not to be' 
found in. the facts.; but in the subjective interest of the scientist; 
in Parsons-" terns, observation is always in terms of a conceptual 
r 
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scheme, 
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Parsons is impressed by. the way in which Weber admits 
values to a role in science whilst carefully circumscribing this 
role in a manner acceptable to modern science. In particular, 
Weber does not capitulate to relativism because of the distinction 
he draws between motives of scientific interest and the entirely 
separate issue of the validity of scientific statements. However, 
Parsons argues that Weber is mistaken in two ways for identifying 
a difference in principle between the subjective directions of the, 
scientistts interest in natural. and social science. First of-all, 
whilst Parsons accepts that the motive of control is important 
for natural science he, 'nevertheless, argues that it is more 
significant in social science than Weber believed.. Secondly, 
according to Parsons there is no. reason why a value interest 
rather than a control interest should give rise to a concern with 
individual rather than general concepts. Consequently, 
"... there seems to be no basis for a radical 
distinction in principle between the natural and 
social sciences with regard to the roles of 
individuality and generality. Quantitative 
differences of degree there may be, but these are 
not sufficient to justify such a distinction. 
The principle of value relevance helps to explain 
the element of relativism, in scientific 
methodology, but it is applicable to. both groups 
of sciences, not to one alone. " 286 
on this basis Parsons formulates his rather different 
conception of the relationship between indiyidüal and general 
concepts. bn a classification of the sciences based upon the 
distinction between the Analytic and the hi, $torical which is quite 
independent of the natural and &oci. il science division; 
According to Parsons in physics, economics, and sociology, systems 
of analytic theory are developed which can be'üsed in the 
explanation of a wide range of objects whereas in history, geology, 
r 
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and neterology, attention is concentrated'upon a specific group of 
phenomena and the attempt is made to explain their particular 
historical development. Hence the distinction between two kinds 
of scientific procedure - the development of general systems of 
analytic theory or the explanation of unique historical individuals - 
does not coincide with the classification of real phenomena into 
natural and social. For the same reason, Parsons rejects the 
idea that the division between a scientific interest in control and 
in the value-relevant individuality of an empirical phenomenon is 
confined, respectively, to natural and social science. 
In the detailed analysis of Weber's methodological 
assumptions about the nature of the historico-cultural sciences 
two points emerged which cast doubt upon the accuracy of Parsons' 
understanding of these issues. First of all, Weber emphasized 
that there were no logical differences between the procedures of 
natural and social science; natural and social phenomena are 
neither more nor less intrinsically amenable to a generalizing or 
an individualizing method of study. For Weber, the fact that 
one method was used predominantly to study certain phenomena was 
to be explained by the goals set by society for the scientific 
investigation of a particular aspect of reality, The goal set 
for the study, of Social phenomena is a detailed knowledge of 
actions and events because, their unique features are of interest 
to us. - and this-certainly does not mean that generalizations 
cannot be formed about these phenomena. In contrast the goal of 
natural science'is mastery of natural phenomena and this objective 
can only be'achieved through genera Iiza'tion., For Weber these 
differences in the' practices of the' sciences' are to be' explained' in 
i 
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terms of the nature of the subject'matter'together with the 
socially approved goals which are set for these inquiries. 
Parsons not only has little sympathy with Weber s 
restriction of the role of ' generalization in the study of action 
but also fails to clearly see the reasoning behind Weben s 
distinction between naturäl and socio-cultural science. ' According 
to Parsons it was the value-relevance of social phenomena which 
constituted the basis, in Weber's argument, for distinguishing 
them from natural objects. Of course, Weber considered social 
phenomena to be value-relevant, but this was not the most fundamental 
basis for the separation of all phenomena into two groups, rather, 
for him the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of phenomena was 
the most fundamental criterion. We can understand the meaning of 
social actions=and events in terms of the motivations which lead 
people to act in certain ways in pursuit of specific values and 
interests, whereas, natural objects have no meaning in this sense 
even though we may gain knowledge about such phenomena by 
subsuming them within general concepts. 
For Parsons value-relevance referred to the role of the 
scientist's values in the determination of the problem to be 
studied and, he goes on to argue, that this subjective direction of 
interest is a common feature of both natural and social science. - 
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Committed as he was to a posjtiy stic unity of science he could do 
little more than consign Weberts argument that knowledge could only 
be gained"of social phenomena on the basis, o value presuppositions 
to the mysteries. of an idealist legacy which Weber had been unable 
to fully exorcise. However, for Weber, the concept of valuer 
relevance refera not only to the inherent selectivity of different 
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scientistls. interests in reality but goes beyond this to a problem 
quite unique to the socio-cultural sciences, namely; the 
formation of historical individuals representing particular social 
phenomena, The facts of social life are, at the same time, values 
the hopes and fears of the participants in the various actions. 
The problem for both history and sociology which Weber recognized 
and attempted to solve concerns the irreconcilability of the 
diverse values inherent in the facts of social life. Let us 
consider, for example, a set of actions and events. On the basis 
of value-analysis the constituents of two contrasting historical 
individuals can be identified which represent when synthesized into 
concepts, on the one hand, the actions of a terrorist and, on the 
other, the actions of a freedom fighter. In each case value- 
analysis clarifies the range of information relevant to the 
particular point of view or value-presupposition. The difference 
between the two analytic descriptions lies in their relevance to 
quite different values which can be used as the basis of an 
examination of these features of empirical reality. 
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There is 
nothing in the actions-and events themselves which can suggest 
that the facts be related to one set of values rather than another. 
For Weber, there is an inescapably arbitrary element at the start 
of any socioccultural research: a point of view has to be adopted 
which enables us to approach reality and select the relevant from 
the irrelevantt Hence a descriptive representation of a 
particular phenomenon cannot be objective for all points of view, 
it cannot present a 
"'balanced" or overall description because this 
would depend upon an arbitrary evaluation of the significance' bi 
, particular value-presuppositions. 
At best, it can be valid for a 
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particular point of view. Objective sociological knowledge 
remains possible for Weber within the confines'of this choice Of 
point of view because analysis and explanation are subject to the 
rules of scientific reasoning. It is partly because of 
value-relevance and partly because general concepts cannot reveal 
the details of concrete reality that Weber rejected the attempt 
to formulate a general system of theory in sociology. Instead, 
Weber developed precise but accentuated general definitional 
concepts which were to be used as an aid in the understanding of 
concrete reality and, thereby, its causal explanation. The 
fact that Parsons criticised that strategy of formulating pure types 
of action as a mosaic theory of history demonstrates that he 
completely failed to appreciate the significance in Weber's Theory 
of Action_of.. the distinction between meaningfully and causally 
adequate statements. 
Parsons' failure to appreciate the basis of this distinction 
can be explained in terms of his ambivalence toward Weber's concept 
of understanding. A brief review of the contexts in which both 
Parsons and Weber developed their respective positions on this 
issue may help to clarify the extent of the divergence between 
them. 
Parsons has consistently maintained that the subjective. 
point og view is a defining characteristic of the General Theory 
of Action because 
Lt establishes the boundaries of the relevance 
of the Action Frame of Reference. Parsons developed his perspective 
at a time in the history of American social science when 
behaviourism was sufficiently strong for him to regard his emphasis 
upon the subjective point of view as a radical step which needed 
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to be justified and, certainly, could. not'be taken for granted, 
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In this, he was strongly influenced by the practice of economics 
which combined reference to a particular kind of rational motivation 
with a legitimately scientific study of action and behaviour. In 
contrast, Weber formulated his approach within a very different 
perspective in which the subjective meaning of action was taken 
to be the defining characteristic of, the socio-cultural sciences. 
Hence his concern was not so much to legitimate its place within 
social science, but to limit the potential dangers of a dependence 
upon intuitive understanding. 
Their. contrasting attitudes towards the theoretical 
concepts of economics clearly reveals the extent of the differences 
between them. - For Weber these concepts were fictional theoretical 
constructions based upon simplified assumptions which meant. that 
apart from in very specific circumstances the concepts did not 
state generalizations about empirical reality. The subjective 
reference contained within these concepts was limited to the 
motivation of simplified models of actors and 'there-was no attempt 
to refer directly to the motivation of real people in empirical 
situations. 
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stated the relationships between the analytic elements of 
particular systems of theory. As we have seen, Parsons' strategy. 
was to identify the basic constituents of phenomena and the way 
in which, different-kinds of object were formed by particular, 
combinations of elements. 
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He originally argued that the 
intrinsic and symbolic means-end. relationships contained structural 
propertiesC.. of action systems (ultimate ends and means, and inter-, 
mediate sector, normative orientation, and effort) and within this 
t 
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framework he envisaged'the formation of a system of anlytic theory 
applicable to all the substantive areas of the sciences of action 
whereby all conduct - from the simple acts of, a few people to the 
complex existence of modern large-scale organisations - could be 
explained in terms of particular combinations of these analytic 
elements. At this point in his thinking, subjective reference 
consisted of fixed, i. e. rational, relationships between means: 
and ends for hypothetical actors who were envisaged as linked 
together in interactive systems by common values. 
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But for 
Parsons these constructions stated analytically real relationships 
between theoretical elements and he emphatically rejected Weber's 
characterization of them as fictional ideal types. 
As Parsonst work moved away from analytic theory, with 
its emphasis upon rational means-ends relationships, :: towards 
the functional analysis of systems of action, he maintained the 
combination of conditional reasoning and normative orientation, 
though in a somewhat different context. The "motivations" for 
social actions were no longer given priority instead, consistent 
with a functional orientation, the effects of complexes of 
interactions upon the social system became the centre of attention. 
However, from a Weberian point of view a functionalist method of 
analysis is inconsistent 
with understanding the subjective meaning 
of particular actors and 
it is in terms, of ParsonsT adoption of 
this approach that his most fundamental'assumptions about subjective 
reference are most clearly revealedt Indeed, it is at this point 
that any superficial similarities between the subjective point of 
view and interpretive understanding disappear. The debate about 
the extent to which Durkheim and Weber converged into a common 
t 
376 " 
acceptance of a voluntaristic position has, of course, always 
centred upon this issue, Indeed, Parsons recently claimed that 
voluntarism was essentially the same kind of phenomenon as the 
self-regulating properties of living systems which are studied in 
biology. 
This perspective would have been totally, unacceptable to 
Weber who considered that the understandability of social action 
was something unique. 
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In comparison with natural science this 
gave the social sciences a distinct advantage because they could 
explain actions and events in terms of the motivations of the 
participants, although the advantage was balanced, to some extent, 
by the fragmentary nature of the results. This accounts for 
Weber's relegation of the functionalist method of analysis, 
developed in the study of meaningless natural phenomena, to a 
preliminary role in sociological inquiry because for him, only 
individual actions could be understood. In comparison with Weber, 
Parsons dehumanizes subjectivity by reducing it to "analytic" 
components. According to Weber, understanding is an indissoluble 
entity even though it can take a rational or, empathic . 
form. 
Moreover, Weber's distinction between action and behaviour, when 
compared with the Parsonian approach, is particularly revealing. 
For Weber, action represented behaviour together with the 
intended meaning for the actor whereas behaviour consisted of 
conduct which lacked conscious motivation. Weber's Theory of 
fiction deals particularly with action which approximates, to the 
ideal type of value-rational action because such kinds of action 
are the most susceptible to causal explanation in terms of an 
understandable motivation linking values, interests, and conduct. 
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Parsons' General Theory of Action deals only with behaviour, i. e. 
it lacks any real attempt to explain empirical actions in terms 
of its subjective meaning, and is content to present models of 
systems of interaction in which the relationships between values, 
interests, and conduct is not empirically investigated, but is 
fixed arbitrarily in accordance with conditional reasoning and 
normative orientation. 
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For Parsons, understanding does not represent a unique 
characteristic of social science and for this reason he fails to 
appreciate Weber's use of different kinds of ideal type concept as 
part of a strategy of dealing with the problematic nature of 
understanding. As we have seen, Weber argues that in sociology 
two different kinds of meaning can be utilized. On the one 
hand, there are the real296 empirical values and beliefs which 
people attempt to realize through their actions and, on the other, 
there are ideal meanings which are constructed from empirical 
meanings into a more logically coherent and unambiguous "idea" 
of a particular phenomenon or group of phenomena. Such concepts 
present meanings clearly and precisely and this greatly facilitates 
the task of understanding. However, Parsons identifies the 
abstractness and artificiality of these concepts, which in their 
general form constitute Webers definitions of the major types of 
social action as part of a theoretical project ': which impliiitly 
concerns. -the structure of social action. But for Weber these 
concepts-are only a means to understand a reality which necessarily 
can only approximate to one or more unreal ideal types because of 
the complexities and ambiguities of actual subjective meaning. The 
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acausal ideal types are accentuated, in terms of objective 
possibility, to form rationally coherent possible meanings of 
action and, for this reason, can only serve a heuristic purpose, 
They do not state generalized uniformities of empirical process 
they do not reveal the most basic properties of action, and they'do 
not establish the most fundamental types of social relationship, 
rather, they constitute a means to the understanding of action, 
Indeed for Weber, it is the other kind of ideal type which is 
designed to represent. the subjective meaning of particular actions, 
the variety of meanings for complexes of action, or compare the 
motivations for similar kinds of actions, which occupy the central 
place within his Theory of Action because they make possible 
the causal explanation of action and, thereby, the formation of 
objective sociological knowledge. 
In the attempt to formulate such explanations--the concepts 
of the means-ends relationship are indispensible for Weber. In -' 
analysis, the rational connection between means and ends reveals 
whether or not the actions (means) are directly and exclusively 
caused by the person's values (ends). If this is the case, then, 
a complete sociological explanation has been provided of an 
action, or set of actions, in terms of the subjective meaning for 
the actor. However, Parsons does not use these concepts to analyze 
empirical reality; 
instead, he sees them to represent'-. an actual 
property of the structure of action itself. 
This brings to a close the examination of. Parsons' 
misunderstanding of certain crucial features of Weber's Theory of 
Action, and we'turn. next to consider the accuracy of Schutz's 
commentary upon Weber''s 
interpretive 
sociology. 
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(b) 'ý 'Schutz: '' *Meaning, ' Iritersubj ectivit}i ' and ' Ideal 'Types 
Schutz's analysis and critique of Weberts interpretive 
sociology is conceived within the context of a developmental 
perspective. According to this viewpoint, Economy and Society is 
seen to represent the most valuable elements of Weber's thinking 
about the study of social action because it explicitly focusses upon 
the nature and task of sociology in contrast to the rather different 
problems of historical research. As a result, Schutz's detailed 
examination of Weberian sociology is based overwhelmingly upon the 
opening section of that study where Weber provides a brief definition 
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of the concepts and procedures to be used in interpretive sociology. 
However, in view of the unity we have demonstrated between 
Weber's early and late work, it has become clear that Economy and 
Society does not represent a new stage in his thinking about social 
action bist; rather, a project which became much larger than 
originally intended because of the responsibility of being editor 
of the series Outline of Social Economics. 
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Moreover, by seeing 
this massive study both in the context of his substantive researches 
and his explicit discussions of theoretical and methodological 
issues, it is possible to reach a much more accurate assessment of 
its place in Weber's conception of sociology. Afterall, whilst 
Weber explicitly recognizes two objectives for sociology "... to 
formulate type concepts'and generalized uniformities of empirical 
- 11 11 
process'4,2gg in'Econömy 'and Society only one of these goals is'. 
attempted, 
300 Consequently, ideal type definitional concepts 
representing precise, though accentuated meanings o typical 
forms of action are for Weber an indispensible means to knowledge 
of socio-cultural phenomena. The second and more important 
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feature of sociological work is-the formulation of generalizations 
which, in his work, are based upon the causal explanation of the 
role of religious ethics in economic life. They represented 
explanatory knowledge of social life and for Weber such knowledge of 
concrete reality is the primary justification of both history 
and sociology. 
-. 
The difficulty with Schutz's almost exclusive reliance 
upon the definition of categories and'*methodological procedures 
follows from the fact that the briefness of Weber's treatment of these 
issues inevitably means that some of them remain ambiguous. However 
it should be emphasized, that the ambiguity is not so, much a; resült 
of fundamental confusion in Weber's arguments ani assumptions as a 
lack of space which prevents a more complete exposition, In 
particular this has led to difficulties for the appreciation of the 
nature of understanding, the role of ideal type concepts in 
sociological analysis and the problems involved in the interpretation -" 
of other people's actions. 
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In fact, Weber's presentation of 
the categories of interpretive sociology at the start of'Economy''änd 
Society is merely a summary of the relevant features of a much 
wider body of work302 which provides an introductory orientation to 
the sets of acausal ideal types contained in that study. Although 
Webens methodological essays do'not present a systematic view of 
his Theory of Action, they do provide a good deal of background 
material which can be used to clarify the categories of his 
interpretive sociology. Hence, Schutz Es decision to base his 
analysis of Weber's approch to the scientific understanding of 
action upon about 30 pages taken £rom the total work, which very 
inadequately reflects his substantive researches, almost guarantees 
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the identification of ambiguities and problems in the foundations 
of Weber's interpretive sociology. 
Another consequence of this very narrow focus upon Weber's 
later work and, within that his formal definitions, concerns the 
strategy. for achieving objective, i. e., value-free, results in 
sociology. For Schutz, this seems to involve little more than 
the professionalization of the sociologist and the intentional 
avoidence of value-judgements. Indeed, by largely ignoring-the 
earlier methodological discussions, Schutz fails to appreciate 
the nature of Weber's conception of the objectivity of sociological 
statements which depend not only upon causal relationships but upon 
the value-relevant description and establishment of data. 
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Having clarified the manner-in which Schutz'"s interpretation 
of Webers work is hampered by his decision to concentrate upon a 
very specific part of Weberian sociology, we'may. now consider 
Schutzts more critical and evaluative comments. It is important 
however, to remember that the critical issues raise1"about: Weber's 
work are very much intended as detailed comments within a framework 
of agreement with Weber's overall strategy for-interpretive sociology 
which Schutz regarded as a decisive contribution to social science. 
It will be helpful to begin by briefly reviewing the 
main criticisms Schutz jnakes of Weberts approach upon the basis. of 
what he sees to be omissions and ambiguities in Weber's work. 
According to Schutz, Weber does not sufficiently clarify his 
interpretive terminology with respect to the need to distinguish 
between the following issues: an action -in progress and a completed 
act, the meaning for the producer of a, social, object. and the object 
itself, the meaning of my'action and someone else's action, and the 
p 
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understanding of myself and of another person. In addition, 
Schutz argues that Weber fails to consider the following features 
of the social world, namely: the ways in which an actor's meaning 
is modified for those with whom he interacts and for an observer, 
the unique character of the relation between one person and another, 
and the different levels of anonymity and directness in which we 
are able to know other people. 
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. 
Such criticism; appeartat first sight to constitute a 
major problem for an approach to the study of human action which 
claims as its distinguishing feature the understanding of social action. 
But, "Schutz immediately qualifies his indictment by arguing that 
Weber undoubtedly ". . saw all these problems" 
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This 
qualification leaves the exact status of Schutz's criticisms somewhat 
ambiguous but, 'in fact, --Weber 
is not only aware of these, problems, 
but formulates his methodological strategy in such a way as to solve 
them. As a result of our examination of Weber's earlier 
methodological essays it is clear that Weber recognizes the 
possible differences between an action in*progress and a completed 
act306, that he distinguishes between the meaning for the producer 
307, 
of a social object and the meaning of the object produced, . and 
that he takes into account the problems involved in understanding 
one's own actions and those of another. 
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Moreover, Weber is 
fully aware of the ways in which the meaning of an action is 
modified differently 
by the actor's fellow participants and by 
an observer. Certainly Weber does not consider the detailed 
processes and structures which Schutz identifies in the modification 
of meaning, but 
it is, afterall, the basis for-his development of 
383. 
acausal ideal types of possible meanings which are formulated as 
hypotheses to help overcome the particular difficulties of understanding 
another person's actions. Indeed the same arguments can be applied 
to Schutz's analysis of the relationship between different people 
and their level of directness and anonymity of their knowledge of 
each other. 
Consequently, Schutz is wrong when he argues that Weber 
"... naively took for granted the meaningful. phenomena of the 
social world as a matter of intersubjective agreement". 
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Such 
a comment ignores all the difficulties which Weber emphasizes 
about understanding the meaning of other people's actions, as well. 
as one's own, and this applies as much in the routines of 
everyday life as to the sociologist's observations of the social 
world. The fact that Weber does not constantly doubt and 
scrutinize the intersubjectivity of the social reality he is 
investigating does not mean that he assumes a precise, complete, 
and shared intersubjectivity between social actors going about 
their everyday lives, or between the sociologist and the actors 
who are the object of inquiry. Weber undoubtdly assumes the 
existence of some level of common understanding amongst people 
for particular purposes, and in specific contexts. Afterall, this 
is not only 'a prerequisite for the existence of society and social 
action but also for any form of sociology which aspires to be more 
than a literal behaviourism. What is important about Weber's 
approach to these 
issues is that he makes no assumptions about the 
extent or completeness of this intersubjectivity. For Weber it 
remains an empirical question to be settled by inquiry and not 
384. 
a priori speculation. 
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Schutz develops his critique from the assumption that 
because Weber does not distinguish the world of everyday life and 
the world of scientific inquiry then, inevitably, his interpretive 
sociology cannot adequately incorporate the common-sense constructs 
used in daily life which partly constitute social phenomena. Thus 
according to Schutz, Weber is not aware of the problems involved in 
building sociological concepts upon the concpets used in everyday 
life and, in particular, of the limitations of attempting to 
understand the social world in terms of concepts, such as rational 
action, which have been developed at the scientific level. 
However Schutz does not present a detailed argument showing how 
Weber's omission of this distinction necessarily results in his 
failure, to consider the meaning of action for people going about their 
everyday lives. Again, Weberts development of the ideal type set 
of concepts is relevant to this issue. For Weber the subjective 
meaning of an action for the acting person constitutes the empirical 
reality which sociology attempts to understand and explain. 
However, given the difficulties which Weber frequently associates 
with the attempt to understand the meaning of someone else's 
action, it remains a goal more often approached than fully realized. 
The construction of unambiguous, accentuated and, therefore, merely 
hypothetical meanings of action are clearly a means' to help the 
sociologist to approximate. as closely as possible to empirical 
reality. However, as we have seen, Schutz does not appreciate 
this part of Weber's methodological strategy and he associates all 
the ideal types used by Weber with the acausal kind - and these 
1 
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are clearly open to the criticism that in using them sociologists 
are imposing their own meanings upon someone else's course of action. 
No doubt Schutz was encouraged in this interpretation by 
the apparent social structural level of Weber's substantive researches 
which dealt with very large groups of people, if not entire societies, 
in terms of the effects of religions beliefs upon action. 
Undoubtedly, Weber concentrates upon large scale analysis but it 
is a basic principle of his approach that only the action of 
particular people can be understood and this means that in 
attempting to interpret the actions of large numbers-of people the 
conceptualizations used remain subjectively and objectively ideal. 
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For Weber the differences between small and large scale analysis 
are matters of degree rather than principle. The decision to' 
focus upon the actions of large groups-of people is inevitably 
made with full awareness that the sociologists ability to accurately 
represent the meaning of these actions is potentially very limited 
but, of course, the limitations are not removed, even though they 
may be on a smaller scale, when the actions of small groups of 
people are being studied. Hence there is no necessary opposition 
between'studying the everyday life of a few people and studying 
large groups of actors. 
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However, as a result of Schutz's analysis of Weber it. 
has become widely accepted that his criticisms are valid and, that 
Weber's Theory of Action was grounded on ambiguous foundations. 
In contrast, by examining Webers definition of the categories of 
interpretive sociology in the context of his earlier methodological 
essays it has been possible to show that Schutz greatly overestimated 
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the differences between his approach and that of Weber. Certainly 
different concepts are used which are based upon different 
assumptions but up to this point no fundamental and irreconcilable 
positions have been identified. 
Turning aside from the detailed criticims of Weber let 
us now focus more upon how Schutz developed his phenomenological 
analysis of the-social world and the implications this has for 
Weber's interpretive sociology. We begin by considering his 
position on the nature of meaning and intersubjectivity and then 
move on to what is, perhaps, the most fundamental difference of 
all between Schutz and Weber - the ideal type. 
At the heart of Schutz's analysis of meaningful 
experience in the social world lies his examination of the stream 
of consciousness which is intended to provide a secure foundation 
for sociological work. Paradoxically, however, the accounts of 
how empirical reality is accessible to us by Rickert and Weber, 
bear- a remarkable similarity to this perspective, Hence Weber's 
distinction between the reality we experience and the way we can 
incorporate these experiences into an objective scientific 
conceptualization exhibits some similarities with the assumptions 
which lie behind Schutz's account of how the decision to reflect 
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upon past experiences makes them meaningful. The differences can 
be explained in terms of their respective orientations; for Weber 
the aim is to explicate the epistemological issues involved in 
scientific knowledge whereas for Schutz the goal is to present a 
descriptive phenomenology of the meaningfulness of. the social 
world. The extent of this different orientation emerges over 
x. .. 
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Weber's distinction between action and behaviour in terms of 
the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of conduct. In contrast, 
Schutz argues that all experience can have meaning if it is 
reflected upon,, that behaviour refers to the spontaneous activity 
producing the experience, and action consists of behaviour 
together with its pro ject. 
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In effect, Weber's discussion of the problem of 
understanding is based purely upon the sociological problem of how 
a. -scientific observer can interpret and understand another person's 
course of action. From this viewpoint it may or may not be true, 
as Schutz argues, that all behaviour has meaning for the actor 
but, either way, it is not really important for Weber's approach 
because the most accessible kind of subjective meaning for an 
observer is action which in ieberian terms is defined in terms of 
a choice ("overt or covert, omission or acquiescence"315) of 
means to achieve a particular end. Indeed the way in which Weber 
defines action and behaviour is symptomatic of his concern to 
identify the most accessible kinds of meaningful criteria whereas, 
behaviour is a residual concept. Rather similar considerations 
apply to Schutz's suggestion that Weber fails to distinguish 
between future and past (in-order-to and because) orientations 
in his conception of motive. In his substantive researches the 
two elements are not clearly distinguished though Weber frequently 
identifies circumstances from the past with the actor's situation 
which is used to explain why a particular person, or group of 
people, holds certain values. 
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As we have seen the whole 
emphasis of Weber's approach is upon a rational form of 
ý` 
388. 
understanding whereby clear and precise hypotheses are formulated 
as means to the understanding and explanation of action which link 
particular values (ends) and acts (means). These understandable, 
though hypothetical, motivational sequences are used to compare 
with empirical actions for the purpose of attempting to gain as 
accurate an interpretation of a course of action as is possible 
within the limitation that, for the reasons emphasized by Weber, 
the subjective meaning of an action is likely to remain private. 
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The distinctiveness of their respective projects is 
similarly apparent in Schutz's argument that Weber equates the 
meaning of an action with its motive-. - the persons reason ; for 
acting. According to Schutz this is clearly revealed in Weber's 
distinction between four categories of action and, in particular, 
the affectuäl and traditional kinds which are on the borderline 
between action and behaviour. The types of conduct which fall 
into these two categories are marginal to action because they 
lack a sufficiently conscious and deliberate motivation to 
achieve particular goals. Accordingly, Schutz argues, 
"When Weber talks about meaningful behaviour, he is 
thinking about rational behaviour ... This kind of' behaviour he thinks of as the archetype of action. " 318 
However, this interpretation is incorrect: Weber does not regard 
rationality as the defining characteristic of action. 
319 Afterall, 
he distinguishes between rational and empathic understanding, he 
emphasizes the problems 
involved in understanding other people's 
actions, and develops the acausal ideal types as a means to 
overcome these problems. For Weber's sociological work the use 
of rational constructions has distinct methodological-advantages. 
320 
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"The construction of a purely rational course of 
action ... serves ... as a type (ideal type) which has the merit of clear understandability, and lack 
of ambiguity. By comparison with this it is 
possible'to understand the ways in which actual action 
is influenced by irrational factors of all sorts, ... in that they account for the deviation-from the line 
of conduct which would be expected on the hypothesis 
that the actions were purely rational. " 321 
For Schutz, another crucial problem in Weber's approach 
concerns the lack of distinction between the meaning of 'an action 
and the extent to which it is accessible to an observer. This is 
entirely reasonable from Schutz's phenomenological perspective on 
the way in which experience is meaningful to the actor but its 
philosophical, rather than empirical, origin should not be 
forgotten. 
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To argue, as Schutz does, that all experience can 
become meaningful if it is reflected upon merely presupposes a 
model of--an actor with a clarity of purpose, single-mindedness and 
availability of time which bears more resemblance to the traditionally 
denigrated armchair theorist than to the typical member of the 
social world going about their everyday life. 
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In contrast, 
Weber presupposes a rather different model of an actor possessing 
a considerable degree of ambiguity and confusion over purposes and 
motives. Weber starts from the assumption of the difficulties of 
understanding and develops 
°a methodology to try and overcome these 
problems. His strategy involves breaking into the skibjective 
unity of an actor's life-world in order to isolate particular 
acts so that they can be analyzed in'terms of the connection 
between means and ends. In this way it is possible to discover 
whether or not particular values have been the motive for specific 
courses of action. Undoubtedly, Weber recognizes that taking 
elements from-a person's subjective world introduces some 
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distortion and arbitrariness but, from his point of view, if 
knowledge is to be discovered about empirical reality at all, 
then, a beginning has to be made somewhere. 
324 
Similar considerations are relevant to Schutzts 
critique of the concept of rationality. This concept is derived 
from the theoretical level of analysis and is, according to Schutz, 
inappropriate for the depiction of everyday life. At this level, 
he argues, people rely on routines and on "cookbook" knowledge 
to cope with social life rather than follow the model of the 
scientist and precisely clarify the nature of the situation, 
consider all the available alternatives and calculate the appropriate 
means to achieve a particular end. 
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Schutz's opposition to the 
use of purely theoretical (second order) concepts to describe 
everyday life (first order) concepts results from his belief that 
scientific terms cannot properly represent the phenomenal reality 
of an individual's world - and on the basis of our examination 
of Weber's approach, there can be little doubt that he would 
have been in full agreement. 
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But Schutz fails to see that, 
for Weber, theoretical concepts (primarily, acausal ideal types) 
are used as an aid to facilitate as accurate an understanding of 
empirical reality as possible. Such concepts are particularly 
suited for this task because they have the unique advantage of 
being precise, clear, and fully communicable. 
However, perhaps the single most decisive innovation 
Schutz introduces into interpretive sociology and to which most 
of the criticism raised against Weber, to say nothing of 
conventional sociology in general, can be attributed is his 
distinction between the subjective meaning 'of an action in progress 
I 
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for the acting person and the ideal typical meaning of an act 
performed anorymously. 
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The fact that Weber refers to the 
sociologist's understanding of the actor's intended meaning, 
whether achieved by rational or emotionally empathic means, 
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is 
for Schutz additional confirmation that Weber does not take sufficient 
account of the problems of intersubjectivity. Rather.. Schutz 
argues, it is necessary to distinguish between the objective meaning 
placed by the sociologist upon someone else's action and the 
subjective meaning of that action for the acting person. In these 
terms, Weber's distinction between observational and motivational 
understanding appears misconceived because both categories refer 
to an objective context of meaning, i. e. they are both derived 
from an interpretation by an observer , of 
the meaning of another 
person's course of action. 
329 According to Schutz, in everyday 
life we gain knowledge of our contemporaries indirectly and we 
know their subjective meaning only through general types of 
subjective experience. This relationship within the social world 
is particularly important for sociology because the limitations 
imposed upon our awareness of our contemporaries apply equally to 
the relationship between sociologists and the actors they observe. 
In addition, the sociologist with a different system of relevances 
and interests to the actor in everyday life attempts to build 
ideal types, of an abstract nature, upon the constructs used in 
everyday life which are themselves general types representing 
the subjective experiences of anonymous actors or courses of 
action. For Schutz, sociology must incorporate the commonsense 
thinking contained in the typifications of everyday life, but in 
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so doing it cannot represent the Subjective meaning of the actor 
which remains private. Instead, the first order constructs which 
refer to unique events, are replaced by models of typified events 
relevant to particular scientific problems. Once an objective 
course of action type is constructed then it is possible for the 
sociologist to hypothesize an actor with the relevant subjective 
meaning context. In this way, Schutz argues, objective knowledge 
of the meaning structures of everyday life can be formulated. 
It depends upon the use of models of actors (puppets) with 
specifically restricted consciousnesses for the particular theoretical 
purposes of the sociologist. Such concepts are, for Schutz, 
objective because they do not refer to the subjective meanings 
of real people in empirical settings and, on this basis, interpretive 
sociology can only deal with the purely external features of action. 
Nevertheless, according to Schutz, these formulations are 
generally valid rather than merely being '6f : interest to their 
formulator because sociologists are trained to. observe, to make 
inferences, and to generalize, all of which serves to guarantee 
the scientific value of the results. 
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There can be little doubt that Schutz draws his 
inspiration for the construction of his personal and course of 
action ideal types from Weber's general definitional concepts 
presented in Economy and Society. Weber's definition of 
bureaucracy can be -interpreted as being based upon a simplified 
model of an actor whose consciousness is limited in a particular 
way to the rational pursuit of a set of precise and. unambiguous 
objectives... By accentuating reality in terms of objective 
possibility in order to construct a rationally coherent and, 
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therefore, a completely understandable concept of a 
. 
possible 
social action Weber would, no doubt, have accepted that he had 
created a puppet. But any similarities between the ideal types 
used by Schutz and Weber cease at this point. For Schutz. such 
abstract and anonymous types represent sociological knowledge, 
whereas for Weber, the acausal ideal types merely constitute 
a means for gaining knowledge of empirical reality. Consequently, 
for Weber objective sociological knowledge consists of causal 
explanations because only on this basis can the problems associated 
with both objectivity and the intuitive understanding of 
meaningfully self-evident connections be overcome. 
There are, perhaps, two reasons-why Schutz does not 
follow Weber's interest incausal explanation: first of all, 
as we have seen, Schutz associates causal explanation with 
historical inquiry and sociology with the formulation of abstract 
types331 and second, Schutz's distinction between subjective and 
objective contexts of meaning leaves no possibility of a difference 
between Weber's categories of meaningfully and causally adequate 
explanation. Schutz's use of the category "objective context 
of meaning" is somewhat idiosyncratic and requires some comment 
before it is possible to-appreciate his reasons for equating 
meaningful and causal adequacy. - 
Schutz makes a genetic distinction between subjective 
and objective meaning, 
i. e. he differentiates these contexts of 
meaning in terms of their origin. Hence subjective meaning refers 
to the private world of the actor and, significantly, objective 
meaning is defined residually to include all accounts of someone 
else's meaning - and these are inevitably constructed on the basis 
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of inference rather than direct experience. Given that the 
idea of objective meaning has the connotation of validity as well 
as generality (in opposition to subjective peculiarity) it would 
have been less confusing if Schutz had distinguished between the 
subjective meaning for the actor and an observers inferences 
about the actor's meaning. Had Schutz followed this strategy 
he would have left open the possibility of distinguishing between 
different levels of accuracy or inaccuracy in the observer's' 
accounts of the meaning of action which may well vary in terms of 
the observer's thoroughness and the representativeness or 
accuracy of assumptions about the typicality-of social life. 
However, by using the term objective to denote merely an observer's 
account of the meaning of another personts action he precludes 
the possibility of some accounts being more'accurate than others 
and, in effect, equates the value of all the representations 
of subjective meaning which can be formulated whether as part of 
everyday life, or more anonymously by sociologists. 
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For Schutz, therefore, all sociological statements 
present objective contexts of meaning-with the result that for 
his point of view, Weber's attempt to discover the actor's intended 
meaning is doomed to failure. Hence, the sociologist's-'judgement 
that an interpretation-of a course of action is meaningfully 
adequate can only be based upon objective criteria, and is made 
when the action conforms to the observer's typical expectations. 
According to Schutz, however, a judgement of causal adequacy must 
meet very similar criteria: an interpretation of a course of 
action is causally adequate when there is a probability that the - 
action will happen again in the same way. In each case the 
judgement is based upon the observer's past experiences and not 
395. 
the actor''s intentions. 
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According to Schutz, therefore, 
"Any interpretation which is meaning-adequate must 
also be causally adequate and vice versa. The 
two postulates really require that there be , 
no contradiction. to previous experience. As soon 
as one assumes that there is a definite stock of 
such experiences at hand... then either both of 
these 'postulates will be fulfilled or neither 'of' 
them will. " 334, 
Referring to the ideal type constructions used in sociology, Schutz 
argues, that they formulate motivational sequences which because 
of their typicality, are meaningfully adequate. He continues: 
"To say that the motives must be causally adequate 
merely means that the motives could have brought 
about this action and, more strictly, that they 
probably did so. " 335 
In this way, Schutz merges the notions of meaningful and causal 
adequacy but it is an argument which has particularly unfortunate 
consequences--for his attempt to anchor interpretive sociology 
upon secure foundations. - 
Whilst both Schutz and Weber are agreed on the 
inaccessibility of subjective meaning their responses'to this 
problem are quite different. For Schutz sociology deals 
exclusively in ideal types of actors and courses of action which 
represent objective meaning contexts. The aim is to formulate 
abstract generalizations about the social world on the basis of 
the typifications of everyday life. Moreover., the emphasis upon 
generality rather than`specific cases makes the construction of 
these concepts unproblematic and any difficulties which may be 
involved in the process of selection can be resolved in terms of 
the professional training of the sociologist. 
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Within this 
abstract and de-contextualised world there is no need for analysis 
to discover which of a potential range of constructions is 
i 
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accurate because there is no possibility of comparing them with 
empirical reality. The subjective meaning of acting people has 
become an ideal-standard which is, by definition, quite 
unattainable to an observer. But in creating such a gulf between 
the subjective reality which sociology is designed to study and 
the kind of formulations which are possible Schutz has completely 
undermined the possibility, within his approach, of a reliable, accurate 
and therefore, scientific investigation of social action. In 
contrast, for Weber, although the subjective reality of the actor 
remains private, as a result of the complications involved in its " 
study, this reality remains the goal for sociological work even though 
it may only be imperfectly attained. Within this methodological 
strategy Weber recognizes that a variety of meaningfully adequate 
(i. e. intuitively self-evident) interpretations may be equally 
plausible for a particular course of action.. Thus the objective 
of sociological analysis is to discover, on the basis of a detailed 
examination of evidence about a particular case and in comparison 
with similar instances, whether or not one interpretation is 
causally adequate. 
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For Weber this is the justification of 
sociology's claim to scientific status. 
Let us briefly conclude with a summary of some of the 
most important differences between the approaches of Schutz and 
Weber to the study of action. Weber defines actions in terms of 
meaning, and for sociological purposes the subjective meaning he 
identifies is referred to as the motive. He is not concerned 
with how life as a whole is meaningful to the individual, rather 
only with the problem of the interpretation of an act or set of 
acts. He assumes that people have motives for some of their 
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conduct and that in favourable circumstances these can be 
discovered by an observer, although for most purposes an 
approximation to this is all that is possible. On other occasions 
a persons' conduct, whilst having meaning for the actor in Schutz's 
sense, is not comprehensible to'the observer through means-ends 
analysis - the only method of understanding which is intersubjectively 
testable. 
Weberfs acausal ideal types are a means to discover 
knowledge of the social world, -they do not represent such 
knowledge in themselves. By comparing them with reality the 
formulation of plausible hypotheses is made possible. These can 
then be examined from the causal point of view to see which, if 
any, were effective in a particular situation. ' As a result of 
Schutz's-misurderstanding of the nature and purpose of ideal type 
concepts, he formulates abstract types which are intended to 
represent social reality and, therefore, constitute sociological 
knowledge. 
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The same preoccupations can be detected in their 
respective definitions of reality., For Schutz all action is 
rational to the extent that it has an in-order-to motive. 
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Yet 
for Weber the rational is not synonymous with the intentional 
because although the actor may have a motive, the action can only 
be described as rational if the appropriate choice of means to 
achieve an end is 
involved. Moreover, it is only through analysis 
that we understand action as the complex of intention, perseverence, 
knowledge of the situation, together with the potential degree of 
self deception, to mention only some of the relevant factors. 
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The basis for Webers distinction between explanations 
which are meaningfully and causally adequate is his recognition 
of the inherent limitations of'intuition as a method of scientific 
interpretation. The criterion of what is meaningful or plausible 
is the observer's own experience and this equally provides the 
basis for deciding what is typical. However, experience is 
personal, not common to members of a society and, for this reason, 
plausibility must remain a relatively subjective consideration. 
For Weber, it is only through empirical causal analysis that it is 
possible to guard against the dangers of idiosyncratic interpretation. 
But for Schutz with an entirely different view of the role of 
ideal type concepts, there is little explicit consideration of how 
the problems of the reliance upon intuitive understanding can be 
overcome. And, in fact, his discussion of the relationship between 
course of action and personal ideal types shows how real the 
danger is of presenting, in the guise of sociological knowledge, 
ones own awareness of the social world. 
1 
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and methodological bases of sociological knowledge is only 
pursued by Sahay as a means of clarifying both Webens 
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knowledge. 
265. See Sahay, Hindu Reformist Ethics and the'Weber. 'Thesis, op. cit., 
166-171. 
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320. Schutz was aware of this, but he did not see its significance 
for Weber's overall approach, 'Phenomenology of"the'Social, 
World, op cit., 19. 
321. Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit., 6. 
322. C. f., Rex, Sociology and the' Demystification of the Modern 
World, op cit., 13-15. 
323. C. f., Weber, Economy and Society, op. d%t.; 21"2. 
324. 'aradoxically, whilst Schutz recognizes that scientific 
knowledge--involves selection, he is ambivalent about its. 
status'Ys a vis phenomenological analys s. 
325, Later in his career Schutz generalized. this point to make 
thought valid only for a speaker Ys. situation,. see' 4'Don Quixote 
and the Problem of Reality! *, op. cit. 
326. C: f. 1 Weber; 'Roscher 'and Knies, -op cit., 162, 
. ..... .... 
327. Schutz; The Phenomenology-of the Social'World, *bp; cit. 
418. 
328. Weber, Economy'and'Society, op. cit., 9. - 
329, This is a good example bf'ýhow little Schutz's and Weber's 
projects.. *have in common, 'Schütz*'s criticism is. quite 
correct in terms of his distinction between. subjective 
and objective meaning, but from Weber'-s rather' different 
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CONCLUSION 
In this study the attempt has been made to clarify the 
nature of Weber's Theory of Action which has been obscured by the 
attempts, particularly by Parsons though to a lesser extent by 
Schutz, to extend and in their view improve his approach to the 
scientific study of social action. 
' 
Their interpretations of 
his work are based upon the belief that Economy and Society 
represents a new stage in Weber's thinking in which sociology is 
conceived of for the first time as a thoroughly generalizing study 
of action and society. and, therefore, constitutes a radical break 
with his earlier methodological analyses of the problems of historical 
inquiry - in particular, that his statements about the dependence 
of empirical knowledge upon value-relevance and individual causal 
explanation are inappropriate for sociological methodology. In 
Parsons' case, the identification of a major change in Weber's 
position is developed to the point where the abstract and general 
types of action and social relationship, presented in Economy and 
Society, are seen to involve an implicit general theoretical system 
of the kind favoured in naturalistic conceptions of social science 
but explicitly repudiated by Weber in the essays written between 
1903 and 1907. For Schutz the almost exclusive emphasis upon 
Economy and Society led him to identify the goal of sociology with 
the formulation of general acausal ideal types which are quite 
different in purpose, though indispensible, to the goal of Weber's 
sociological researches - namely, the conclusions he drew from the 
comparative studies of the effects of religious ethics upon economic 
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life, which as Tenbruck has shown, occupy an equally prominent 
place in the last few years of Weber's life. 
On the basis of a detailed examination of, Weber's 
epistemological assumptions, theoretical conceptualizations and 
methodological strategies, clarified where necessary by reference 
to his empirical studies,, we argue that there is a fundamental' 
continuity in his approach to the study of action throughout the 
work produced after his illness. Consequently; the interpretation 
by Schutz and Parsons of stages in Weber's thinking has led to the 
misunderstanding of his theoretical and methodological position in 
three main areas: value-relevance and the objectivity of socio- 
logical knowledge;. the role of theoretical concepts and the 
relationship between history and sociology; and the character of 
understanding together with both the possibilities and the limitations 
this form of knowledge provides for the study of action. 
For Weber, in the study of social action objective knowledge 
can only be formulated. in terms of individual causal explanations of 
value-relevant historical individuals or in terms of generalizations 
derived from such causal. sequences. It is a"fundamental principle 
of his epistemological stance that a presuppositionless knowledge 
of social reality is not possible. All description involves selection 
in accordance with a particular point of view and as a result of the 
diversity of values, which could serve as the principle of selection, 
the process of establishing the object to be explained by an inquiry 
'involves an inescapably arbitrary element. This has major consequences 
for the definitional concepts used in history and sociology where there 
is an interdependence between relatively individual and general 
r 
421. 
concepts. 
2 
However, both Parsons3 and Schutz denied the applic- 
ability of value-relevance in sociology and argued that objective 
conceptualization avoiding value judgement was possible on the basis 
of a generalizing strategy and the professionalization of sociologists 
who would follow the discipline's rules of procedure. However, it 
is not without significance that Parsons' work received a great deal 
of criticism precisely in terms of its claims to conceptualize social 
systems power inequality; and social order, ob'ectivel 
4 
ssJ Y- 
The theoretical.. concepts used in sociology were, for Weber, 
general acausal "definitions" of typical actions and complexes of 
action, and served purely as a means. to the discovery of knowledge 
about the empirical world; afterall, their explicitly accentuated 
nature meant that they could not represent the conclusion of the 
attempt to gain knowledge of social reality. According to Weber, 
sociological knowledge is derived from the individual causal explan- 
ations of historical work which is equally dependent upon sociological 
typologies for an initial . orientation, to its subject matter. But 
for Weber these "definitions" were. not fixed for all times because 
they were constructed on the basis of an amalgamation of several 
value-relevant historical individuals and were, of course, only 
useful to particular inquiries. Weber states this explicitly in 
terms of his typology of church and sect and undoubtedly the same 
reasoning applies, to his other types including, perhaps the most 
famous of all, bureaucracy. In effect, the types were constructed 
for specific purposes and their validity is to be judged only in 
these terms, a point sadly missed in the voluminous literature which 
has developed with the intention of improving the ideal typical 
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actions to fit all points of view. Whilst Parsons and Schutz 
differed in their interpretations of these theoretical concepts they 
both accepted a major division between the problems and methods of 
historical and sociological work and, thereby, reject the inter- 
dependence of historical and sociological explanation which is so 
crucial to Weber. 
5 
For Parsons, as we have seen, Weber's theoretical 
concepts represented a growing acceptance of general theory and 
became a justification of his own development-of theoretical sociology, 
largely independent of empirical research. For Schutz, within the 
framework of his distinction between subjective and objective meaning, 
the formulation of abstract types, of action became one of the goals 
of sociological work. Indeed Schutz saw great merit in the abstractness 
of these concepts because it afforded the opportunity of unifying the 
objective and subjective meaning contexts in the consciousness of the 
homunculus constructed by the social scientist and, thereby, solved 
the fundamental problem of interpretive sociology - the representation 
of the actor's (subjective) meaning by the scientist's (objective) 
concepts. However, both Parsons and Schutz failed to see that the 
precision of these theoretical concepts was attained only at the 
cost of becoming a means to gaining knowledge. 
Weber's use of ideally accentuated types is also closely 
related to his views on the nature of the understandability of human 
action which, as we have seen, can involve two kinds of meaning - 
the real empirical meaning of an individual's action and the ideally 
typical meanings constructed by the sociologist about an actor or 
group of actors. In sociology, which has traditionally aimed to 
be an empirical science the object is to gain knowledge of empirical 
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actions, but as Weber made abundantly clear, major problems confront 
the sociologist's attempt to understand the meaning of another 
person's action. It is for this reason that the sociologist, on 
the basis of an appreciation of what generally motivates action, 
formulates several hypothetical explanations of the action which, 
for the purposes of clarity, are developed to a level of logical 
coherence unlikely to be found in reality. By comparing the 
empirical actions with the ideally typical hypotheses, Weber argues 
that it is possible to achieve a clearer and more accurate under- 
standing of the action. In this manner, it is possible to progress 
from an explanation which is adequate at the level of meaning to 
one which is causally adequate - recognizing, of course, that even 
in the most favourable circumstances of the availability of evidence 
the best that can be achieved is'a close approximation to the actor's 
subjective meaning which, for a variety of reasons, remains private 
and elusive to the sociologist. Nevertheless, despite these 
qualifications, this approximation may be sufficient for the 
sociologist's purposes. In contrast to the complexities of under- 
standing with which Weber's methodology is designed to deal, Parsons 
took a simplistic view of understanding the other and, as a result 
of the sustained theoretical nature of his work he did not seriously 
confront the problems of interpreting the subjective meaning of action 
at the empirical level. Schutz proceeded in a different direction 
and decided that the problems involved in gaining knowledge of the 
subjective meaning of another's action were so fundamental as to be 
insolvable and as a result of this focussed his methodological 
strategy upon the attempt to represent the typical meanings of 
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general and repeatable action. If this strategy is compared to 
Weber's the weaknesses of Schutz's reasoning become more'clear 
because the construction of the ideal types is based essentially 
upon the sociologist's own experience of the world and given his 
rejection of the possibility of knowledge of the subjective meaning 
of actions for specific actors it is difficult to see how the 
sociologist can progress beyond meaningfully adequate but plausible 
hypotheses about courses of action and events. 
Having clarified the areas of misunderstanding, fostered 
by these two important interpretations and extensions of Weber's 
approach, it is appropriate to consider how successfully Weber's 
Theory of Action'can withstand the criticisms which have been directed 
at the work of Parsons and'Schutz.. In comparison with Parsons' 
work, Weber's approach is based upon a more complex theoretical and 
methodological structure involving a three-fold distinction between 
description, generalized conclusions and methodological procedures 
which-link description and generalization together. For Parsons, 
theory is separated from research - it is an a priori speculative 
activity which because of the programmatic nature of his approach 
is largely immune to the testing of descriptive studies and knowledge 
of specific cases. Much of what is for Weber merely a methodological 
device to aid our interpretation and analysis of concrete events 
becomes within the Parsonian system an allegedly real characteristic 
of empirical reality. Moreover in Parsons', unlike in Weber's, 
approach theory is no longer a means to the discovery of knowledge, 
but becomes the object of knowledge itself. In comparison with 
Schutz's conception of interpretive sociology, Weber's Theory of 
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Action provides a methodological strategy for understanding the 
subjective meaning of action. It is a strategy which recognizes 
the real limitations of the understandability of another person's 
actions and guards against the presentation as sociological knowledge 
of an intuitive appreciation of actions and events, based upon the 
sociologist's inevitably partial experiences of social life, by 
emphasizing the importance of analyzing meaningfully adequate 
explanations in the attempt to discover the closest possible cor- 
respondence with the empirical material. In Schutz's work the use 
of utopian standards of understanding led him to abandon Weber's 
practical research strategy and in the emphasis upon general types 
of action and actor led him to separate sociological reasoning from 
research into specific events and situations 
6 
and, of course, 
the subsequent development of some of his ideas in ethnomethodology 
led to the rejection of the possibility of objective knowledge of 
the subjective meaning of someone else's action. 
This comparison of the work of Weber with that of Parsons 
and Schutz has revealed some of the strengths of the Weberian Theory 
of Action in. relation to the limitations of conventional sociology 
which were revealed during the crisis of the late 1960's and early 
1970's. Parsons and other functionalists, whether of a conflict 
or consensus perspective, did not recognize that the selection of 
material for conceptualization involves-value relevance and the 
relating of material to different points of view and, therefore, 
an inevitably arbitrary element in. the description and establishment 
of the data of sociological inquiry. Indeed, it was the refusal 
to recognize this, allied to the simplistic view that objectivity 
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was dependent upon the training of the sociologist, which led to 
the inherently unresolvable debates about ideological distortion 
and political partiality because the real, though unperceived, issue 
concerned the attempt to reconcile the fundamental diversity of 
values which could be used as a basis for investigating empirical 
reality. These problems were made much more difficult by the 
legitimation of a theoretical level of reasoning largely independent 
of specific individual instances, whether contemporary or historical, 
in which theoretical schemes were developed, modified and rejected 
on grounds quite different to those of empirical testing. Indeed 
the situation was exacerbated by the view taken in conventional 
0 
sociology that'the understanding of the meaning of action was 
relatively self-evident with the result that the phenomenological and 
ethnomethodological critiques of sociological knowledge found some 
rather t. `. ' easy targets in the dependency upon taken for granted and 
unjustified assumptions about social life. Ultimately sociology 
cannot be immune from such criticism, but in the enthusiastic 
realization of this weakness of principle in conventional sociology 
little attempt was made to see how-such assumptions necessarily 
undermined sociological findings or if the problems of this dependency 
could be minimized. 
7 
The result was a "crisis" in sociology and 
the increasing popularity of new forms of social inquiry. In the 
context of these problems raised against sociology, this study has 
attempted to show that Weber's Theory of Action offers a methodological 
strategy which takes account of the value-relevant nature of conceptual- 
ization and the problems which this raises for objectivity, which 
emphasizes the closest links between theory and empirical research, 
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between sociology and history, between heuristic devices and 
knowledge of reality and, which offers a practical methodology for 
studying the connections between values and human action that in 
favourable circumstances may lead to an understanding of social 
action sufficiently accurate for sociological explanation. 
Finally, a comment in terms of the objectives of this study 
about the relationship between Weber's Theory of Action and sociology 
more generally. Weber's approach is specifically concerned with 
understanding social action which for him meant discovering the 
link between beliefs and conduct. He recognized that other 
conceptions of sociology are quite possible and, indeed, since his 
death definitions of sociology in which the understandability of 
action has been accorded a far less prominent place have been 
particularly influential within the discipline. However, with the 
exception of the work of Parsons and Schutz, who explicitly attempted 
to extend and improve Weber's ideas, these other approaches have 
not been examined. The aim of this study has been to clarify one 
very significant contribution to sociology, not to evaluate the merits 
of widely differing perspectives, nor to define what sociology is, or 
should be. 
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NOTES 
1. Cf., RJ Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and 
Political Theory, op. cit., 137, fn. 26 
2. E. g., the conceptualization of the British car worker 
would not be identical to all car workers in the 
industrialized world, although some features would be 
held in common. Hence it is not immune from the 
implications of value-relevance. 
3. Parsons notionally accepted the importance of value- 
relevance, but interpreted it too narrowly as the 
scientist's interests which determined the problem 
studied and thereby rejected the more radical 
implication of Weber's use of the concept. 
4. Schutz's analyses do not deal with the macro level of 
social structure which is probably the reason his work 
has escaped criticism of its objectivity. 
5. See D. Zaret, "From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: 
The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory", 
American Journal of Sociology 85 (1980), 1180-1201 
which is in broad agreement with our conclusions. 
6.. Cf., Gorman, op. cit., 84 
7. 
_, 
E. g. Filmer, et. al. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APOSTLE, R. N. "Parsonian Sociology", Sociology and Social Research, 
51 (1967). 
ARON, R. German Sociolog , -(London: Heineman, 1957). ARON, R. Main Currents in Sociological Thought, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1968,1970). 
BAUIMAN, Z. Hermeneutics and Social Science, (London: Hutchinson, 1978). 
BENDIX, R. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, (London: University of 
California Press, 1977). 
BENDIX, R. "Two Sociological Traditions", in R. Bendix and G. Roth, 
Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber, (London: University- 
of California Press, 1971). 
BENDIX, R. and ROTH, G. Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max 
Weber, (London: University of California Press, 1971). 
BERGER, P. and LUCILWT, T. The Social Construction of Reality, (London: Allen Lane, 1961). 
BERGGER, J. and ZELDITCH, M. "Review of Sociological Theory and Modern 
Society", American Sociological Review, 33 (1968). 
BERGSON, H. Time and Free Will, (New York: MacMillan, 1910). 
BERNSTEIN, R. J. The Reconstruction of Social and Political Theo , (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976). 
BERSHADY, H. J. Ideology and Social Knowledge, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973). 
BIEGESTADT, R. "The Means End Schema in Sociological Theory", American 
Sociological Review, 3 (1938). - BI tSTADT, R. "The Common-Sense World of Alfred Schutz", Social 
Research, 26 (1959). 
B0TT0MO3 , T. B..... "Out of this World: The Sociology of Talcott Parsons", 
reprinted in his Sociolo. -; r as Social Criticism, (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 197.5)). 
BRUUN, H. Science. Values and. Politics in Max Weber's Methodology,, 
(Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1972). 
BURGER, T. Max K'leber's Theory of Concept Formation, (Durham: Duke, 
University Press, 1976). 
BURGER, T. "Talcott Parsons, the Problem of Order, and the Programme 
of an Analytic Sociology", A. J. S., 83 (1978). 
BUTS, S. "Parsons, Weber and the Subjective Point of View", Sociology 
ical Analysis and Theory, 5 (1975). 
BUTTS, S. "Parsons Interpretation of Weber: A. Methodological Analysis", 
Sociological Analysis and Theory, 7 (1977). 
CAM WT, W. J. "Max Weber and the Methodological Controversy in Social 
Science", in Cahnman and Boskoff (Eds. ) Sociology and History, (New 
York: Free Press, 1964). 
CANNON, W. B. The Wisdom of the Body, (London: Routledge, 1932). 
CICOUREL, A. V. Method and Measurement in Sociology, (New York: Free 
Press, 1964). 
CICOUREL, A. V. The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice., (New York: 
Wiley, 1968). 
CICOUREL, A. Y. Cognitive Sociology, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973)" 
COHEN, et. al. "Reply to Parsons", American Sociological Review, 40 (1975). 
COHSN, et. al. "De Parsonizing Weber: A Critique of Parsons' Interpret- 
ation of Weber's Sociology", American Sociological Review, 40 (1975). 
COSER, L. A. The Functions of Social Conflict. (London: Routledge, 1956). 
DAHRENDORF, R. "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of 
Sociological Analysis", A. J. S., 64 (1958). 
DAME, A. "The Two Sociologies", B. J. S., 21 (19i0). 
DOUGLAS, J. D. (Ed. ) The Relevance of Sociolo, (New York: 
Appleton-Century Crofts, 1970). 
DOUGLAS, J. D. (Ed. ) Understanding Everyday Life: Toward the 
Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge, (London: Routledge, 1971). 
EIST. NSTADT, S. N. "Introduction", in Max Weber, On Charisma and 
Institution Building, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
EIS rSTADT, S. N. and CUBELARU, M. . '. The-Form-of -Sociology: Paradigms 
and Crises, (New York: Wiley, 1976). 
ELDRIDGB, J. E. T. (Ed. ) Max 'Weber: The Interpretation of Social 
Reality, (London: Michael Joseph, 1971). 
ELIAESON, S. "Some Recent Interpretations of Max Weber's Method- 
ology", Sociological Analysis and Theory, 7 (1977). 
FILMER, P. et. al. New Directions in Sociological Theory., 
(London: Collier-MacMillan, 1972). 
FLETCHER, R. The_g of SocioloIZ, (London: Nelson, 1971). 
FREUND, J. The Sociology of Max Weber, (London: Allen Lane, 1968). 
FREUND, J. "German Sociology in the Time of Max Weber", in 
T Bottomore and R Nisbet (Eds. ) A History of Sociological Analysis, 
(London: Heinemann, 1978). 
GARFIIKEL, H. Studies in Ethnomethodolo , 
(Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1967). 
GARFII7RL, H. and SACKS, H. "On Formal Structures of Practical 
Actions", in McKir -ey and Tizyakian 
(Eds. ) Theoretical Sociolor p 
GELL' , E. " "Ethnomethodology: The ReEnchantment Industry or t1ie Californian Way of Subjectivity". Philosophy of Social Science, 
5 (1975) " 
GERS'TEIN, D. R. "A Note on the Continuity, of Parsonian Action 
Theory", Sociological Inquiry, 45 (1975). 
GIDDENS, A. New Rules of Sociological Method, (London: Hutchinson, 1976). 
GOLt1THORPE, J. H. "A Revolution in Sociology' , Sociolo ,7 
(1973) 
GORMAN, R. The Dual Vision, (London: Routledge, 1977). 
GOULD EE. , A. W. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, 
(London: 
Heinemann, 1971). 
GOULDNER, A. W. "Anti Minotaur: The Myth of a Value Free Society", 
in J. D. Douglas (Ed. ) The Relevance of Sociology 
GOULDNE, A. W. "The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the 
Welfare State", in J. D. Douglas (Ed. ) The Relevance of Sociology 
GOULD,.. , A. W. 
"Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory", 
in L. Gross (Ed. ) S nosium on Sociological Theory, (New York: 
Harper and Row,; 1959 . 
GOULDNER, A. W. "Some Observations on Systematic Theory 191,. 5-l955", 
in For Sociolo : Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today, (London: 
Allen Lane, 1973)- 
GREGOR., A. J. "Review of Sociological Theory and Modern Society", 
American Sociological Review, 33 (1968). 
GJMMER, G. "A Critical Examination of Phenomenological Sociology", 
Sociological Analysis: A Discussion Journal, 3 (1973)" 
GUR, VITSCH, A. "The Common-Sense World as Social Reality - A: Dis- 
cussion on Alfred Schutz", Social Research, 29 (1962). 
HAMMAS, J. Knowledge and Human Interests, (London: Heinemann, 1971). 
HABEEUSAS, J. Theory and Practice, London: Heinemann, 1974). 
HABEPSMAS, J. Legitimation Crisis, London: Heinemann, 1976). 
HMRFEL, C. G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, (New York: Free Press, 
1965). 
HOM NS, G. C. "Bringing Men Back In", in H. Turk and R. L. Simpson, 
Institutions and Social Exchange: The Sociology of Talcott Parsons 
and George C. Homan, (New York: BobbsMerril, 1971). 
HUSSE_R. L, E. The Phenomenolo of Internal Time Consciousness, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). 
JASPERS, K. General -Ps ehooatholog , 
(Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1963). 
KUHN, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1970). 
LASSMAN, P. "Phenomenological Perspectives in Sociology", in 
J. Rex (Ed. ) Approaches to Sociolor, ý, (London: Routledge, 197+). 
LESSNOEF, M. H. "Parsons' Systems Problems", Sociological Review, 
16 (1968). 
LEWIS, J. Max Weber and Value-Free Sociolo. :A Marxist Critique, 
(London! Lawrence & Wishart, 19T9). 
LOCK; IOOD, D. "Some Remarks on 'The Social System"', B. J. S., 7 (1956). 
LOPREATO, J. and ALSTON, L. "Ideal Types and the Idealization 
Strategy", American Sociological Revier, 35 (1970). 
MARSHALL, G. Presb eries and Profits: Calvinism and the Development 
of Capitalism in Scotland, 1560-1707. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 
M. flTINDALE, D. The us and TvDes of Sociological Theory, 
(London: Roittledge, 1964). 
t; IND. U , D. "Talcott Parsons' Theoretical Metamorphosis 
from 
Social Behaviourism to Macro Functionalism", in H. Turk and 
R. L. Simpson (Eds. ) Institutions and Social Exchange 
MicKUNNEY, J. C. Constructive T olo and Social Theory, (New York: 
Appleton-Century Crofts, 1966). 
McSIEMY, B. "Meanin , Context and Situation", European Journal 
of Sociolopv, 1Z. (1973). 
Mr: TON, R. K. "Discussion of 'The Position of Sociological Theory'", 
American Sociological Review, 13 (19tß$). 
MILLS, C. V4. The Sociological Imagination, (New York: O. U. P.,, 1959). 
MOMMSE , "U. J. The Age of Bureaucrac : Perspectives on 
the Political 
Sociology of Max Weber, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). 
td ELMANN, E. I. I. "Sociology in Germany", in H. Becker and A. Boskoff 
(Eds. ) Modern Sociological Theo , 
(New York: Holt, Rinehardt and 
Winston, 1957). 
MULKAY, M. J. Functionalism, Exchange and Theoretical Strategy; ' 
(London: Routledge, 1971). 
NAGEL, E. The Structure of Science, (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Wold, 1961). 
NATANSON, M. (Ed. ) Phenomenology and Social Realit : Essays in 
Memory of Alfred Schutz, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970). 
NATANSON, M. "Alfred Schutz on Social Reality and Social Science", 
Social Research, 35 (1968). 
NELSON, B. "Max Weber's Author's Introduction", Sociological 
Imo, 44 (1971+) " 
O'PJEILL, J. "The Hobbesian Problem in Marx and Parsons", in 
J. H. Loubser, egal. (Eds. ) Explorations in General Theory in 
Social Soience, 1 (New York: Free Press, 197ö . 
I 
PARSONS, T., The Social System, (New York: Free Press, 1951). 
PARSONS, T. Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966). 
PARSONS, T. The Structure of Social Action, (New York: Free Press, 
1968). 
PARSONS, T. The System of IJtodern Societies, (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1971). 
PARSONS, T. et. al. Towards a General Theory of Action, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1951). 
PARSONS, T. et. al. Working Papers in the Theory of Action, 
(New York: Free Press, 1953). 
PARSONS, T. et. al. Family, Socialization and Interaction Process, 
(New York: Free Press, 1955). 
PARSONS, T. and SMELSER, N. J. Economy and Society, (London: 
Routledge, 1956). 
PARSONS, T. et. al. (Eds. ) Theories of'Society, (New York: Free 
Press, 1961). 
PARSONS, T. et. al. The American University, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1973). 
PARSONS, T. "Capitalism' in Recent German Literature: Sombart and 
Weber", 11 Journal of Political Economy, 37 (1929). 
PARSONS, T. "Some Reflections on 'The Nature and Significance of 
Economics ", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 48 (1933-34). 
PARSONS, T. "Sociological Elements in Economic Thought", 1 and 11, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 49 (1934) 414-453 and 49 (1935) 
645-667. 
PARSONS, T. -"The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory", 
International Journal of Ethics, 45 (1935). 
PARSONS, T. "Review of A, von Scheltin, g 'Max Weber's Wissenschaftslehre"' 
American Sociological Review, 1 (1936). 
PARSONS, T. "The Present Position and the Prospect of Systematic 
Theory in Sociology", in G. Gurvich and WE. Moore, (Eds. ) Twentieth 
Century Sociology, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945). 
PARSONS, T. "Introduction" to Max Weber, The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization, translated and edited by T. Parsons and 
A. H. Henderson, (New York: Free Press, 1947). 
PARSONS, T. "The Position of Sociological Theory", American 
Sociological Review, 13 (1948). 
'ARSONS, T. "Some Comments on the State of the General Theory of 
Action", iimerican Sociological Review, 18 (1953). 
PARSONS, T. "Introduction to the Revised Edition", Essays in Sociol- 
icalTheory, (New York: Free Press, 1954). 
PARSONS, T. "Some Highlights of the General Theory of Action", in 
R. Young (Ed. ), Approaches to the Study of Politics, (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1958). 
PARSONS, T. "Comment on Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework for 
Sociology"', A. J. S., 67 (1961). 
PARSONS, T. "The Point of View of the Author", in ICI0 Black (Ed. ), 
The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons, (Englewood. Cliffs: Prentice- 
Hall, 1961). 
PARSONS, T. "Evolutionary Universals in Sociology", American 
Sociological Review, 29 (1964). 
PARSONS, T. "Max Weber: 1864-1964", American Sociological 
Review, 30 (1964). 
PARSONS, T. "Cause and Effect in Sociology", in D. Lerner (Ed. ), 
Cause and Effect, (New York: Free Press, 1965). 
PARSONS, T. "Introduction' to Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, 
translated by E. Fischoff, (Boston: Beacon, 1962), reprinted in 
Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, (New York: Free 
Press, 1967). 
PARSONS, T. "Order as a Sociological Problem", in P. G. Kuntz (Ed. ), 
The Concept of Order, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968). 
PARSONS, T. "Systems Analysis: Social Systems", in D. L. Sills (Ed. ), 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: 
MacMillan and Free Press, 1968). 
PARSONS, T. "Sociological Theory", in Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 
20 (1969). 
PARSONS, T. "On Building Social Systems Theory", Daedalus, 99 (1970). 
PARSONS, T. "Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology", in 
J. C. McKinney and E. A. Tiryakian (Eds. ), Theoretical Sociology: 
Perspectives and Developments, (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1970). 
PARSONS, T. "Comparative Studies in Evolutionary Change", in 
I. Vallier (Ed. ), Comparative 1Iethods in Sociology, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971). 
PARSONS, T. "Comment on 'Current Folklore in the Criticisms of 
Parsonian Action Theoryt", Sociological Inquiry, 44 (1974). 
PARSONS, T. "Comment on tParsons' Interpretation of Durkheim' and 
on Moral Freedom Though Understanding in Durkheimt", American 
Sociological- Review, -40 (1975). 
PtARSONS, T. "On 'De-Parsonizi. ng Weber"', American Sociological 
Review, 40 (1975). 
PARSONS, T. "Reply to Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope", American 
Sociological Reviere, 41 (1976). 
PARSONS.;, T. "Social Interaction", in Social Systems and the Evolution 
of Action Theory, (New York: Free Press, 1977). 
PARSONS, T. "The University Bundle: A Study of Balance Between 
Differentiation and Integration", in Action Theory and the Human 
Condition, (New York: Free Press, 1978). 
PARSONS, T. "Parsons Letter to Schutz, January 16th 1941", in 
R. Grathoff (Ed. ), The Theory of Social Action: Correspondence of 
Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1978). 
PARSONS, T. "The Present Status of (Structural-Functionalt Theory", 
in Social Systems and the Evolution of'Action Theory 
PARSONS, T. "Introduction to the Paperback Edition", in The Structure 
of Social Action 
PARSONS, T. "Introduction", to Essays in Sociological Theory 
PARSONS, T. "The Pattern Variables Revisited: A Response to Robert 
Dubin", in Sociological Theory and Modern Society 
PARSONS, T. "General Introduction", to Social Systems and the 
Evolution of Action Theory 
PARSONS, T. "The Role of Theory in Social Research", American 
Sociological Review, 3 (1938). 
PARSONS, T. "Theory in the Humanities and Sociology", Daedalus, 
99 (1970). 
PARSONS, T. "An Approach to Psychological Theory in Terms of 
The Theory of Action", in S. Koch (Ed. ), Psychology: A Study 
of Science, (New York: McGraw Hill) Vol. 3. 
PARSONS, T. "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Science: 
An Evaluation of Max Vleber's Constitution", in his Sociological 
Theory and Modern Society 
PARSONS, T. "Unity and Diversity in the Modern Intellectual 
Disciplines: The Role of the Social Sciences", reprinted in 
Sociological Theory and Modern Society 
PARSONS, T. "An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge", reprinted 
in Sociological Theory and Modern Society 
PARSONS, T. et. al. "Toward a Common Language for the Area of Social 
Science", in Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied, 
(New York: Free Press, 1949). 
PARSONS, T. and ACKERIMAN, C. (Eds. ) Concepts Theory and Explanation 
in the Behavioural Sciences, (New York: Random House, 1966). 
PARSONS, T. et. al. "Values, Motives and Systems of Action", in 
Toward a General Theory of Action 
PARSONS, T. and BALES, R. F. "The Dimensions of Action-Space", in 
T. Parsons et". al. Working Papers in the Theory of Action 
PARSONS, T. et. al. "A General Statement", in Toward a General Theory 
of Action 
PHILLIPSON, 1: 7. "Theory, Nethodblogy and Conceptualization", in 
Filmer et. al. Nerv Directions in Sociological Theory 
POPE, 17. "Classic on Classic: Parsons' Interpretation of Durkheim", 
American Sociological Roviecr, 38 (1973). 
POPE, V7. et. al. "On the Divergence of Durkheim and Weber: A Critique 
of Parsons' Convergence Thesis", American Sociological Review, 40 (1975). 
REX, J. Key Problems in Sociological Theory, (London: Routledge, 1961). 
REX, J. Sociology and the Demystification of the Modern World, 
(London: Routledge, 1974). 
REX, J. "Typology and Objectivity: A Comment on Weberts Four 
Sociological Methods", in A. Sahay (Ed. ), Max Weber and Modern Society 
RICKERT, H. Science and History, (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962). 
RICKMAN, H. P. Meaning in History: Wilhelm Dilthey's Thoughts on 
History and Society, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961). 
ROCHER, G. Talcott Parsons and American Sociology?, (London: Nelson, 
1974). 
ROTH, G. "Socio-Cultural Model and Development Theory", American 
Sociological Review, 40 (1975). 
R00f, G. - "Introduction to the New Edition", in R. Bendix, Max Weber: 
An Intellectual Portrait, (London: University of California Press, 
1977). 
ROIi, G. "Charisma and Counterculture", in Roth and Schluchter, 
Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and methods 
ROTH, G. and SCHLUCHTER, 1,1. Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics 
and Methods, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). 
RU: TCILIAIr, W. G. Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Science, 
(Cambridge: C. U. P., 1972). 
RILXIISAN, W. G. (ed. ) Max Weber: Selections in Translation, 
(Cambridge: C. U. P., 1978). 
SAHAY, A. Hindu Reformist Ethics and the Weber Thesis: An 
l: pnlication of Max Weber's Methodology, (Unpublished Ph. D. 
Thesis: Univeristy of London, 1969). 
SAHiY, A. Sociological Analysis, (London: Routledge, 1972). 
SAHAY, A. "Introduction" to A. Sahay (Ed. ), Max Weber and 
Modem Sociology, (London: Routledge, 1971). 
SAHAY, A. "The Importance of Max Weber's Methodology", in - 
A. Sahay (Ed. ), Max Weber and Modern Sociology 
SCHLUCHTER, 17. "The Paradox of Rationalization: On the Relations 
of Ethics and 7orld", in Roth and Schluchter, Max Weber's Vision 
of History: Ethics and Methods 
SCHUTZ, A. The PhenomenoloQ of the Social World, (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1967). 
SCHUTZ, A. "The P.. foblem of Rationality in the Social World", 
reprinted in Collected Papers 11, edited by A. Brodersen, 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964). 
SCHUTZ, A. "The Social World and the Theory of Social Action", 
in A. Schutz, Collected Papers 11 
SCHUTZ, A. "The Stranger", in his Collected Papers 11 
SCHUTZ, A. "The Homecomer", in his Collected Pagers 11 
SCHUTZ, A. "The Well Informed Citizen", in his Collected Papers 11 
SCHUTZ, A. "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World", 
Collected Pavers 11 
SCHUTZ, A. "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality", reprinted in 
Collected Papers 11 
SCHUTZ, A. "Corson Sense and Scientific Interpretaion of Human 
Action", reprinted in his Collected Pavers 1, edited by PSI. Natanson, 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967). 
SCUTG, A. "Phcnomenololty and Social Science", Collected Papers 1 
SCHUTZ, A. "Concept and Theory Formation in-Social Science", 
Collected Pavers 1 
SCHUTZ, A. "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology", Collected Papers 1 
SCHUTZ, A. "On Multiple Realities", Collected Papers 1 
SCHUTZ, A. "Parsons Theory of Social Action: F Critical Review", in 
Grathoff (Ed. ), The Theory of Social Action 
SCHUTZ, A. and LUCKLIANN, T. The Structure of the Life World 
(London: Heinemann, 1974). 
SCOTT, J. F. "The Changing Foundations of the Parsonian Action 
Scheme", American Sociological Review, 28 (1963) 
SCOTT, J. F. "Review of 'Sociological Theory and Modern Society"', 
American Sociological Review, 33 (1968). 
SCOTT, J. F.. "Interpreting Parsons' Work: A Problem in Method", 
Sociological Inquiry, 44 (1974). 
SHELDON, R. C. "Some Observations on Theory in Social Science", 
in Parsons, et. al., Toward a General Theory of Action 
SIiILS, E. "The Calling of Sociology", ins Theories of Society 
SHILS, E. "Foreward" in LI. Weber, The Methodology of the Social 
Sciences 
SILVERR, ZAN, D. Reading Castaneda, (London: Routledge, 1975). 
SKINNER, B. P. Science and Human Behaviour, (New York: MacMillan, 1953). 
SOROKIN, P. A. Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related 
Sciences, (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1965). 
SOROKIN, P. A. Sociological Theories of To-Day, (New York: 
Harper, 1966). 
SPROTT, W. J. H. "Principia Sociologica", B. J. S., 3 (1952). 
STALILER, 0. (ed. ) Max Weber and Sociology Today, (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971). 
TENBRUCK, F. H. "The Problem of Thematic Unity in the Works of 
Max -Veber", B. J. S., 3 (1980). 
TEI''fBRUCK, F. H. "Prefatory Note", B. J. S., 31 (1980). 
TORRANCE, J. "Max Weber: Methods and the Man", European Journal 
of Sociology, 15 (1974). 
TURK, A. T. "On the Parsonian Approach to Theory Construction", 
Sociological Quarterly, 8 (1967). 
TURNER, J. H. and BEEGHLEY, L. "Current Folklore in the Criticisms 
of Parsonian Action Theory", Sociological Inquiry, 44 (1974). 
WAGNER, H. (Ed. ) Alfred Schutz on Phenomenology and Social Relations, (Chicago: Univerisyt of Chicago Press, 1970). 
WARNER, R. S. "Toward a Redefinition of Action Theory: Paying, the 
Cognitive Element its Due", A. J. S., 83 (1978). 
17ATKINS, J. W. N. "Ideal Types and Historical Explanations", in 
H. Peigle and M. Brodbeck (Eds. ), Readings in the Philosophy of 
Science, (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1953). 
VIERER, N. Ancient Judaism, (New York: Free Press, 1952). 
17EBER, M. On Law in Economy and Society, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1954). 
WEBER, N. The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, (New York: 
Free Press, 1957). 
WEBER, M. The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hindur and 
Buddhism, (New York: Free Press, 1958). 
WEBER, N. Economy and Society, (Berkley and Los Angeles; University 
of California Press, 1978). 
WEBER, Id. Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical 
Economics, (New York: Free Press, 1975). 
WEBER, H. The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, (London: 
New Left Books, 1976). 
WEBER, M. "Religious Rejection of the World and Their Directions", 
in H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (Eds. ), Prom Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
(London: Routledge, 1964). 
WEBER, M. "The Social-Psychology of the_ World Religions", in, 
H. Garth and C. W. Mills (Eds. ), Prom Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 
WEBER, I. I. "tObjectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy", in 
Methodology of the Social Sciences, (New York: Free Press, 1968). 
WEBER, N. "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences"', 
in Methodology of the Social Sciences 
17EBER, I: I. "Author's Introduction", in his The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism, (London: -. Allen and Unwin, 1971). WEBER, LI. "R. StanmlerTs 'Surmounting' of the Materialist Conception 
of History", 1, British Journal of Law and Society, 3 (1976). 
WEBER, Marianne Max Weber: A Biography, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1975). 
WHITEHEAD, A. N. Science and the Modern World, (Cambridge: C. U. P., 
1953). 
WHYTE, W. F. "Parsons' Theory Applied to Organizations", in 
M. Black (Ed. ), The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons 
WILLIAMS, R. 1.1. "The Social Theory of Talcott Parsons", in 
U. Black (Ed. ), The Social Theory of Talcott Parsons 
17ILSON, T. P. "Normative and Interpretive Paradigms in Sociology", 
in J. D. Douglas (Ed. ), Understanding Everyday life 
WINDELBAND, W. History of Philosophy, (New York: 1. Macr1illan, 1901). 
WRONG, D. (Ed. ) Max Weber, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). 
WRONG, D. "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Society", 
American Sociological Review, 26 (1961). 
ZARET, D. "From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The. Eclipse of History 
in Modern Social Theory", A. J. S., 85 (1980). 
ZILTr. 1 P N, D. H. and POLLrIER, M "The Everyday World as a Phenomenon", 
in J. D. Douglas (Ed. ), Understanding Everyday Life 
